Given the shifting sands of contemporary conflict, do we need to reassess the meaning of warfare? Clausewitz famously called war ‘a continuation of politics by other means’ (1832). But does that idea still hold up today? These days, conflicts play out on social media, in cyberspace, and even in elections—often without a single shot fired. Today’s battlespace incorporates cyber operations, climate change, mass-urbanisation, space weaponisation, and continuous strategic competition. This blurs the lines between war and peace. While classical theorists maintain that war’s fundamental nature has not changed, modern conflicts increasingly challenge traditional frameworks.
Historically, warfare was characterised by physical destruction, decisive battles, and territorial conquest. Modern conflicts, however, do not always adhere to this pattern. For instance, cyber warfare has shown that states and non-state actors can achieve strategic effects without kinetic violence. Thomas Rid (2017) contends that cyber operations can coerce, disrupt, and deceive, thereby challenging Clausewitz’s notion that war is inherently violent. The 2007 cyberattacks on Estonia and the Stuxnet virus, which incapacitated Iranian nuclear facilities, are stark reminders of strategic aggression that did not involve traditional warfare.
Clausewitz and Sun Tzu never saw Twitter battles or deepfake propaganda coming. But here we are. Rather than fighting discrete wars, we’re in a period of ongoing strategic competition. The 2018 U.S. National Defence Strategy even describes it as ‘long-term strategic competition’ (Department of Defence, 2018). This shift undermines the traditional Westphalian model, where war and peace were regarded as distinct states. Hybrid warfare thrives in ambiguity. Hoffman (2017) describes it as a mix of misinformation, economic coercion, cyberattacks, and proxy forces. The goal? Stay below the conventional threshold of war. The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, involving cyber operations, disinformation, and unmarked troops, serves as an exemplary case.
Despite these transformations, Clausewitz’s core concepts continue to be highly relevant. His idea of the trinity of “violence, chance, and political purpose” continues to offer a valuable framework for understanding modern conflicts. Colin Gray (1999) underscores that strategy is fundamentally about applying means to achieve political ends, irrespective of technological advancements. The risk, however, lies in excessively broadening the definition of war. If every act of geopolitical rivalry, such as economic sanctions, election interference, or cyber espionage, is termed “war,” it risks conceptual dilution. Gartzke (2013) cautions that this approach could end with unnecessary escalation, with states treating cyber incidents as casus belli when they might be closer to espionage or subversion.
So where do we go from here? Rather than discarding classical strategic theory, we should reinterpret its principles to align with current realities. Clausewitz’s trinity can evolve: “violence” can encompass non-kinetic coercion; “chance” is amplified by the unpredictability of interconnected digital systems; and “political purpose” now includes influence operations and behavioural shaping alongside territorial ambitions. Warfare may not appear as it did in Clausewitz’s era, but its essence, driven by politics and strategy, remains unchanged.
