Matthew Toy

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Russia/EU chess

Examining Europe’s proposed ‘re-armament surge’

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On June 17, 2025

In Strategy

Andrew Michta’s Helsinki-Commission briefing, available on YouTube and social media, urges Europe to accelerate the deployment of armour and air-defence to its eastern flank. His logistics are solid, yet the argument remains trapped in a materialist mindset. The Kremlin’s strategic theatre is part gun-count, part morality play; it must perform the role of a besieged civilisation to sustain elite cohesion and domestic consent (Giles, 2021). Moscow therefore magnifies even token NATO deployments, weaving them into a narrative of encirclement. Numbers certainly matter, but myths and interpretations drive policy.

Historically, Western analysis rarely pauses on this critical identity driver. Civilisational framings, or what Marlene Laruelle calls Russia’s “anti-liberal European” self-image (Laruelle, 2016), explain why deterrence sometimes falters when, on balance, an alliance should be the rational option. Michta’s focus on equipment and troop-tallies risks underestimating this discursive asymmetry.

NATO’s dilemma: choreographing presence

The security dilemma cannot just be wished away, but its social meaning can be reframed. NATO now plans to defend forward with rotating brigades rather than permanent garrisons. Visibility is deliberate: forces spend most of their time at home and surge only for exercises, reassuring Baltic publics while limiting imagery that feeds Moscow’s siege myth. Twenty-two Allies already meet the 2 per cent GDP benchmark, up from three a decade ago (NATO, 2024), yet credible posture still requires narrative discipline. Radical transparency, such as publishing force-flow schedules and live-streaming major drills, signals defensive intent and denies the Kremlin the fog in which worst-case fantasies multiply. A minimalist inspection regime, of the kind sketched in recent European Leadership Network workshops, could complement this by addressing Russian ontological insecurity without conceding capability (ELN, 2024).

Lessons from outside Europe

Wargames on a Taiwan contingency reinforce the logic. RAND analysts find that smart sea-mines, road-mobile fires and cheap drones raise the PLA’s operational risk more sharply than prestige carriers (RAND, 2023). Denial assets lower the escalatory temperature while still signalling resolve. Yet capability is not enough: Beijing will test whether the coalition’s political will is socially durable. Expanding informal constructs like AUKUS into routine crisis-response exercises needs to narrate a shared story of status-quo preservation rather than anti-China containment.

South Asia offers a counter-example. The 2025 India-Pakistan crisis, analysed at the Belfer Center, showed deterrence only holding once both sides satisfied domestic identity needs with symbolic strikes before back-channeling de-escalation (Belfer, 2025). Conversely, the Israel–Hezbollah dyad illustrates erosion: CSIS charts a steep rise in rocket exchanges as mutually reinforcing victim narratives demand ever larger demonstrations of “honour” (CSIS, 2024). Deterrence frays when stories that cultures tell themselves are left unmanaged.

Policy implication

Europe’s re-armament is necessary, but insufficient by itself. Credible high-readiness forces must be paired with an information architecture that denies Moscow the dramaturgy it craves. That means choreographed deployments, radical transparency, selective arms-control gestures and a public narrative that casts NATO as guardian of a plural security order, not the shadow of tomorrow’s invasion. Any deterrence strategy that ignores identity politics may well become an expensive repeat of history.

Bibliography

Belfer Center (2025) Escalation Gone Meta: Strategic Lessons from the 2025 India–Pakistan Crisis. Harvard Kennedy School.

CSIS (2024) The Coming Conflict with Hezbollah. Center for Strategic and International Studies.

European Leadership Network (2024) OSCE Workshop Report: Strengthening European Security Architecture.

Giles, K. (2021) What Deters Russia. Chatham House.

Laruelle, M. (2016) ‘Russia as an Anti-liberal European Civilisation’, in The New Russian Nationalism, Edinburgh University Press.

Michta, A. (2024) ‘Why NATO Must Step Up’, testimony to the U.S. Helsinki Commission.

NATO (2024) ‘Defence Expenditures and the 2 Per Cent Guideline’.

RAND Corporation (2023) These Technologies Could Defeat China’s Missile Barrage and Defend Taiwan.

Digital Union Jack / Tank and Drone

Is the Strategic Defence Review an Engineered Response? Rethinking UK Defence in an Age of Bricolage

By

On June 9, 2025

In Strategy

Abstract

Looking at the situation, the United Kingdom’s 2025 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) projects a confident rationality: an “Integrated Force” designed to deter, fight, and win through “constant innovation at wartime pace” (Ministry of Defence, 2025, p. 14). Yet Moscow’s conduct in Ukraine has revealed a profoundly different strategic grammar. Russia behaves, in Ondřej Ditrych’s terms, as a bricoleur – an opportunistic tinkerer that stitches together ad hoc “assemblages” while actively cultivating contradictions to wrong-foot a rule-bound opponent (Ditrych, 2024, p. 2). This article argues that a defence posture optimised for elegant integration may prove brittle when confronted by such an adversary. It posits that Russia’s dialectical approach is designed to exploit the very linear logic that underpins Western military planning. By contrasting the systemic fragility of Russian bricolage, vividly exposed by the Wagner Group’s implosion, with the SDR’s search for institutional longevity, this analysis suggests that effective deterrence now requires the UK to supplement integration with a capacity for institutionalised improvisation. This ‘controlled bricolage’ is presented as a form of adaptive power, essential for reassuring allies and succeeding in an era of disorderly, attritional conflict.

1. A Strategy of Contradiction

To understand the contemporary threat is to look beyond conventional military net assessment and into an opponent’s strategic culture. Ondřej Ditrych (2024, p. 3) characterises the Russian state not as a grand strategist but as a bricoleur, a tinkerer that improvises solutions from a limited repertoire of available parts. This is more than mere opportunism; it is a dialectical method. It is comfortable with, and indeed actively cultivates, the very contradictions that would paralyse a Western staff college. Russia’s strategy often appears to be a pastiche of mutually exclusive signals: complaining of encirclement while expanding its territory, invoking international law while flouting it, and deploying high-tech weaponry alongside crudely adapted civilian technologies. This is not strategic incoherence but a feature designed to create a chaotic information environment, wrong-footing an adversary who seeks clarity and predictability.

The Wagner Group was, perhaps, the ultimate expression of this method. It was a composite entity that simultaneously functioned as a proxy military force, a resource-extraction enterprise, a political influence operation, and a vehicle for plausible deniability (Ditrych, 2024, p. 3). It allowed Moscow to project power into Africa and the Middle East in ways that circumvented the rules of state-on-state competition. Yet this bricolage has a breaking-point. Such ad hoc structures lack institutional resilience. Wagner’s spectacular implosion following Yevgeny Prigozhin’s 2023 mutiny was not the result of external pressure but of the unbearable internal frictions of the system that created it (Ditrych, 2024, p. 4). This reveals the core vulnerability of the bricoleur: a reliance on improvised, personality-driven structures that can shatter under systemic stress, a stark contrast to the West’s enduring, if cumbersome, search for institutional longevity.

2. The Limits of an Engineered Deterrence

The SDR’s answer to this disorderly world is a renewed drive for rational integration. It proposes a force “integrated by design” (Ministry of Defence, 2025, p. 15-16), directed by a new Military Strategic Headquarters and equipped via a streamlined Defence Investment Plan. The document is, in itself, a signal of intent, a blueprint for a logical, legible, and thereby deterring military machine. However, in applying this lens, it arguably misreads the nature of the challenge. As the RAND Corporation’s work on national power suggests, military effectiveness is not simply a function of material capabilities– the ships, tanks, and aircraft a nation possesses. It depends equally on the efficiency of the conversion process that turns those national resources into usable military power (Treverton and Jones, 2005, p. 18). Russian bricolage is, in essence, a high-speed, high-risk conversion strategy. The UK’s SDR, with its focus on creating new bureaucratic structures and processes, risks optimising its inventory of capabilities while neglecting the need for a truly agile conversion mechanism.

This creates a deterrence paradox, which plays out for multiple audiences. The first, and most obvious, is the adversary. As Keir Giles argues, Russia often discounts material symbols of Western strength, focusing instead on a perceived lack of political will and a hesitation to accept risk (Torun, 2024, p. 667, summarising Giles). A bricoleur state, seeking seams to exploit, is unlikely to be deterred by a show of conventional force that it believes will never be used in the ambiguous ‘sub-threshold’ where it prefers to operate. The second, and equally critical, audience is domestic and allied. Effective deterrence requires not only a credible threat but also the reassurance of one’s own public and partners that the nation can withstand and respond to shocks. This requires a resilient defence industrial base capable of surging production. The SDR acknowledges this, noting that a nation’s Armed Forces are only as strong as the industry behind them (Ministry of Defence, 2025, p. 7), but the deep-seated challenge of moving from peacetime efficiency to wartime industrial mass remains a critical constraint on the UK’s own risk appetite and, therefore, its credibility.

3. Towards an Elastic Architecture: Institutionalising Bricolage

If Russia’s strategic advantage lies in its tolerance for disorder, then an effective counter-strategy cannot lie solely in the imposition of a more perfect order. The UK must learn to fight fire with fire, supplementing its integrated blueprint with a capacity for institutionalised improvisation. This means cultivating a form of ‘controlled bricolage’ as a source of adaptive power. Treverton and Jones (2005, p. 11) noted two decades ago how the information technology revolution would inevitably move action away from slow-moving governments and “toward nimbler organisations.” The SDR’s proposal for an “expert Digital Warfighters group” (Ministry of Defence, 2025, p. 47-49) is a promising, if nascent, step in this direction. For this to become a genuine source of advantage, however, it must be treated not as a specialist enclave but as a guiding ethos for the entire force, empowering small teams at the tactical edge to experiment, adapt, and exploit opportunities at a speed the adversary cannot match.

This, in turn, requires a fundamental shift in the Ministry of Defence’s culture of procurement and risk. It necessitates an embrace of “good-enough” solutions that can be fielded rapidly, with iterative upgrades baked into the process, rather than pursuing perfect capabilities that risk arriving too late. Such an approach accepts that in a state of constant technological flux, some failure is inevitable and should be treated as an opportunity for accelerated learning. This is the logic behind the Royal Navy’s planned regulatory “sandbox” for autonomous systems (Ministry of Defence, 2025, p. 105-106), a concept that must be expanded across all domains. An elastic and adaptive force, capable of improvising under pressure, offers a more credible deterrent to a bricoleur than a rigid one, however powerful. It signals a capacity to endure, to adapt, and to respond effectively amid the very chaos the adversary seeks to create.

4. Conclusion

Arguably, a rationally designed and integrated force remains indispensable for the enduring demands of high-intensity warfare. Integration alone, however, is no longer sufficient. The central insight for UK defence is that an over-optimisation for elegant, systemic coherence can itself become a vulnerability when facing an opponent whose strategy is to weaponise disorder. Power in the 21st century is increasingly a function of adaptability. The challenge, therefore, is to create an architecture that is not only strong but also elastic; one that can, when necessary, fracture gracefully into many semi-autonomous nodes, each authorised to improvise within the commander’s intent. Deterrence means more than pure strength, it is the ability to adapt one’s defence to the changing strategic landscape.

Bibliography

Ditrych, O. (2024). DECONSTRUCTING RUSSIA’S BRICOLAGE TACTICS: Strategic insights for defeating the Kremlin. EUISS Brief 18. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies.

Ministry of Defence. (2025). Strategic Defence Review 2025: Making Britain Safer, Secure at Home, Strong Abroad. London: HM Government.

Torun, Z. (2024). Review of ‘Russia’s War on Everybody. And What it Means for You’, by Keir Giles. Europe-Asia Studies, 76(4), pp. 667-668.

Treverton, G. F. and Jones, S. G. (2005). Measuring National Power. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

Header image for an article on PGM usage by Russia

Precision Reconsidered: Russia’s Shift from Guided Missiles to Mass Bombardment

By

On May 29, 2025

In Strategy

Previously Russia positioned itself as a modern power able to cripple an adversary’s decision-cycle with carefully targeted precision-guided munitions. Three years of war in Ukraine have punctured that story. The Kremlin now relies on volume rather than accuracy, trading the prestige of “surgical” strikes for the blunt attrition of drone swarms and repurposed air-defence missiles. What follows traces that transition and asks what it does to Western analytical assumptions about technology, ethics and power.

From Surgical Imagery to Saturation Practice

Pentagon tallies show that Russian forces loosed more than one thousand one hundred guided missiles in the first month of the invasion, yet many exploded in apartment blocks rather than command nodes (Department of Defense, 2022). Domestic production never kept pace. By mid-2023 Russian factories were turning out roughly sixty new cruise missiles a month, a fraction of operational demand (Williams, 2023).

Facing depletion, Moscow shifted firepower architecture. S-300 surface-to-air missiles were redirected at ground targets, increasing miss distances, while Iranian-designed Shahed drones began to pad nightly salvos (Army Recognition, 2024). Guided-missile launches fell steadily while drone use soared, reaching an estimated total of four thousand deployed by the first quarter of 2025 (Atalan and Jensen, 2025). The identity of the high-tech precision striker gave way to the practicalities of magazine depth and industrial capacity.

Implications for Western Analysis

Western security discourse long treated accuracy as a twin proof of technical mastery and ethical restraint (Schmitt and Widmar, 2014; Wilson, 2020). Russia’s practice weakens both pillars. Norms endure through consistent observance and recognition; when a major power claims the vocabulary of precision while accepting wide error margins, the social meaning of accuracy erodes (Tannenwald, 2017).

The episode therefore offers a methodological caution. Counting missiles without attending to their symbolic weight risks analytical short-sightedness. The shift towards low-cost saturation munitions signals a recalibration of Russian strategic identity and alters the deterrence calculus of adversaries who must now defend against continuous drone attrition rather than episodic cruise-missile raids. Civilian resilience, alliance solidarity and arms-control expectations all pivot on how quickly that new reality is understood.

In Summary

Russia’s move from precision-guided missiles to mass bombardment is more than a supply-chain story. It marks the point where an identity built on technological finesse buckled under material constraint, transforming both the battlefield and the normative landscape around it. Analysts tracking future conflicts would do well to remember that weapons categories are not only hardware inventories but carriers of meaning, and that meaning can shift faster than production lines.

Bibliography

Army Recognition 2024. ‘Russia Repurposes S-300 Surface-to-Air Missiles for Ground Attacks Against Kharkiv’, 5 January.

Atalan, Y. and Jensen, B. 2025. Drone Saturation: Russia’s Shahed Campaign. CSIS Brief, 13 May.

Department of Defense 2022. ‘Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds a Press Briefing’, 21 March.

Schmitt, M. and Widmar, E. 2014. ‘On Target: Precision and Balance in the Contemporary Law of Targeting’. Journal of National Security Law and Policy, 7(3).

Tannenwald, N. 2017. ‘How Strong Are the Nuclear Taboo and the Chemical Weapons Ban?’ The Washington Quarterly, 40(1), 79–98.

Williams, I. 2023. ‘Russia Isn’t Going to Run Out of Missiles’. CSIS Analysis, 28 June.

Wilson, N. 2020. ‘The Ambiguities of Precision Warfare’, Intimacies of Remote Warfare commentary, 12 June. 

Cyber operators working at screens

From Theory to the Trenches: Introducing “Cyber Centres of Gravity”

By

On May 16, 2025

In Strategy

The nature of warfare is in constant flux. Clausewitz’s timeless insight that war is a “contest of wills” remains central, yet the means by which this contest is waged are transforming. Traditionally, Centres of Gravity (CoGs) were often seen as physical entities: armies, capitals, industrial capacity. The thinking was that neutralising these would cripple an adversary’s warfighting ability. However, it’s crucial to recognise, as scholars like Echevarria highlight, that Clausewitz himself acknowledged non-material CoGs, such as national will. The concept isn’t entirely new, but modern interpretations significantly expand upon it, especially in the context of cyberspace.

Today, the pervasive nature of information networks prompts us to consider what this means for strategic targeting. What happens when the critical vulnerabilities lie not just in the physical domain, but in an enemy’s belief systems, the legitimacy of their leadership, or their very grasp of shared reality? This is where exploring an emerging concept – what this article terms “Cyber Centres of Gravity” (Cyber CoGs) – becomes vital for contemporary military strategists. While “Cyber CoG” as a distinct term is still evolving and not yet firmly established in formal doctrine (which tends to use adjacent terms like cognitive targets or information influence objectives, as noted by analysts like Pawlak), its exploration helps us grapple with these new strategic challenges. Ignoring these intangible, yet increasingly critical, aspects in our information-saturated world could represent a significant strategic blind spot.

Understanding “Cyber CoGs”

So, what might a “Cyber CoG” entail? It can be conceptualised as a critical source of an adversary’s moral or political cohesion, their collective resolve, or a foundational element of their operative reality-construct that underpins their ability or will to resist your strategic objectives. The key idea is that significant degradation of such a “Cyber CoG,” predominantly through cyber-enabled means, could fundamentally unravel an enemy’s capacity or desire to continue a conflict, perhaps by altering their perception of the strategic landscape.

This isn’t merely about disrupting networks or servers, though such actions might play a role. A true “Cyber CoG,” in this conceptualisation, is intrinsically linked to these deeper wellsprings of an enemy’s will, cohesion, or their understanding of reality. If an operation doesn’t aim to decisively alter the strategic balance by impacting these moral, political, or epistemic foundations, it’s more likely an operational objective rather than an attack on a strategic “Cyber CoG”.

Clausewitz identified the CoG as “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends”. In an age increasingly defined by information, this hub can often be found in the cognitive and informational realms. When societal “passion” can be manipulated through digital narratives, when a military’s operating environment is shaped by perception as much as by physical friction, and when governmental “reason” is threatened by the decay of a shared factual basis, cyberspace becomes an increasingly central domain in shaping strategic outcomes. While kinetic, economic, and geopolitical power still hold immense, often primary, sway in high-stakes confrontations (a point Gartzke’s work on the “Myth of Cyberwar” reminds us to consider), the cyber domain offers potent avenues to contest the very “reality” upon which an adversary’s will is constructed. Here, strategic success may rely less on physical destruction and more on the ability to influence or disrupt an adversary’s cognitive and narrative environments.

Identifying Potential “Cyber CoGs”: A Framework for Analysis

Pinpointing these potential “Cyber CoGs” requires a nuanced analytical approach, considering factors such as:

  1. Strategic Relevance: Does the potential target truly sustain the enemy’s will to fight or their core strategic calculus? This involves looking at national cohesion, public legitimacy, dominant narratives, key alliances, or shared assumptions underpinning their strategy. Its degradation should aim to undermine their strategic purpose or resolve.
  2. Cyber Primacy in Effect: Can cyber-enabled operations offer a uniquely effective, or significantly complementary, method for impacting this CoG, especially when compared or combined with kinetic, economic, or diplomatic levers? Some intangible CoGs may be less susceptible to physical attack but highly vulnerable to informational strategies.
  3. Potential for Decisive Influence: Is the intended effect of targeting the “Cyber CoG” likely to be decisive, whether through an irreversible loss of trust (e.g., in institutions or information), a critical breakdown in a foundational narrative, or a fundamental, lasting shift in the adversary’s perception of their strategic environment? It could also be a cumulative effect, eroding coherence and resolve over time.
  4. Linkage to Moral and Political Dimensions (Clausewitzian Character): Is the “Cyber CoG” intrinsically tied to the enemy’s unity, cohesion, will to resist, or the shared narratives defining their interests and threats? It’s not just a system or infrastructure but is linked to the collective spirit or governing principles.
  5. Strategic Viability and Responsibility: Can the proposed operation be conducted with a rigorous assessment of attribution risks, potential for unintended escalation, and broader second-order societal effects? This includes careful consideration of evolving international norms and legal frameworks.

Implications for Military Planners

Strategically engaging potential “Cyber CoGs” would necessitate evolving current approaches:

  • Integrated Intelligence: Identifying and understanding these “Cyber CoGs” demands a deep, multidisciplinary intelligence effort, fusing technical insights with profound cultural, political, cognitive, and narrative analysis. This requires collaboration between experts in fields like anthropology, sociology, political science, and data science to map the ‘human terrain’ and ‘narrative architecture’.
  • Dynamic and Adaptive Campaigning: Operations targeting “Cyber CoGs” are unlikely to be single events. Influencing moral cohesion or perceived reality is a complex, interactive process involving continuous adaptation to feedback loops, narrative shifts, and adversary countermeasures. The aim is often cognitive degradation or displacement, subtly altering the adversary’s decision-making calculus over time.
  • Strategic, Not Just Tactical, Focus: While drawing on tools from traditional information warfare or psychological operations, the concept of “Cyber CoGs” pushes for a more strategically ambitious focus on these Clausewitzian centers of power, wherever they may reside. When a CoG itself is located in the moral, political, or epistemic domains, cyber-enabled operations can become a key component of strategic engagement.

Navigating the Ethical and Legal Landscape

The capacity to strategically influence an adversary’s societal beliefs and perceived reality carries a profound ethical burden and operates within a complex legal landscape. Responsible statecraft demands a deliberate moral calculus, especially in the ambiguous “grey zone”. The Tallinn Manual 2.0, for instance, provides detailed interpretations of how international law applies to cyber operations, including complex issues around sovereignty, non-intervention, and due diligence. Operations that aim to alter perception or manipulate societal beliefs can brush up against these established and evolving legal interpretations. Pursuing strategic goals through such means requires careful navigation to avoid widespread societal disruption or unintended consequences that could undermine international order. There is also the risk of “blow-back,” where the methods used externally could erode internal democratic norms if not carefully managed.

Integrating New Concepts into Strategic Thinking

The future of conflict is undeniably intertwined with the contested terrains of perception, belief, and societal cohesion. Exploring concepts like “Cyber Centres of Gravity” can help us theorise and analyse these critical nodes of will, unity, and perceived reality. This endeavor is less about new technologies and more about refining our understanding of strategy itself: to influence an adversary’s will or alter their perceived reality to achieve strategic aims, through means that are proportionate, precise, and adapted to the evolving character of modern conflict.

Failing to adapt our thinking, to build the necessary multidisciplinary approaches, and to foster the institutional agility to operate in this transformed strategic landscape is a risk to our future strategic effectiveness.

Selected Bibliography

  • Brittain-Hale, Angela. “Clausewitzian Theory of War in the Age of Cognitive Warfare.” The Defense Horizon Journal (2023): 1–19.
  • Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
  • Echevarria, A. J. (2002). “Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine—Again!” Strategic Studies Institute.
  • Gartzke, E. (2013). “The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth.” International Security, 38(2), 41–73.
  • Krieg, Andreas. Subversion: The Strategic Weaponization of Narratives. London: Routledge, 2023.
  • Lin, Herbert, and Jackie Kerr. “On Cyber-Enabled Information/Influence Warfare and Manipulation.” Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, 2017.
  • Pawlak, P. (2022). “Cognitive Warfare: Between Psychological Operations and Narrative Control.” EUISS Brief.
  • Schmitt, M. N. (Ed.). (2017). Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations. Cambridge University Press.

GCAP Fighter

Is GCAP a Necessary Investment in UK Air Power Sovereignty, or a High-Risk Gamble?

By

On May 4, 2025

In Strategy

The United Kingdom’s commitment to the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), in partnership with Italy and Japan, represents the most significant defence investment decision of this generation. Faced with an increasingly contested and volatile world and the limitations of current air power assets against proliferating advanced threats, the UK seeks a sixth-generation capability intended to secure air dominance and strategic advantage well into the mid-21st century. This analysis contends that while the strategic desire for GCAP is understandable, particularly the drive for sovereign capability, its necessity hinges critically on unproven technological assumptions, optimistic cost and schedule projections, and a specific view of future warfare that may not materialise. Therefore, continued UK participation should be contingent on meeting stringent, pre-defined cost, schedule, and capability gateways, with failure triggering consolidation or cancellation.

Defining the Sixth-Generation Ambition

GCAP aims to deliver more than just a replacement for the RAF’s Eurofighter Typhoon; it embodies a conceptual leap towards a ‘system of systems.’ The envisioned capability includes a core manned stealth platform (‘Tempest’) acting as a command node, integrated with uncrewed Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs or ‘loyal wingmen’), all connected via a resilient ‘combat cloud’. Key technological differentiators include advanced AI for data fusion and decision support, next-generation sensors providing unprecedented situational awareness (such as the developmental ISANKE/ICS suite), adaptive engines offering performance flexibility, and an open systems architecture for rapid upgrades. This technological ambition, pursued trilaterally under dedicated governmental (GIGO) and industrial joint venture structures headquartered in the UK, aims to deliver not just an aircraft, but a step-change in air combat capability by its ambitious 2035 target date. However, this vision immediately flags a core vulnerability: the entire concept is critically dependent on secure, high-bandwidth connectivity that is a prime target for adversary electronic warfare and cyber-attacks.

Strategic Rationale

GCAP is positioned as essential for UK grand strategy, aligning with the Integrated Review’s goals of technological advantage, global power projection (including the Indo-Pacific tilt), and contributing high-end capability to NATO. A primary driver is the pursuit of national sovereignty – defined as “Freedom of Action” and “Freedom of Modification” – avoiding dependence on allies, particularly the US. Past experiences, such as reported US control over integrating certain UK weapons onto the F-35 platform, fuel this desire for independent control over critical capabilities.

Yet, this pursuit of sovereignty within a deeply collaborative international programme creates inherent tensions. True freedom of action requires open technology sharing between partners, potentially conflicting with national industrial interests or security concerns, as highlighted by recent Italian ministerial comments about UK reluctance on tech access. Furthermore, the incorporation of some US subsystems – for example, advanced Gallium Nitride (GaN) transmitter modules crucial for next-generation radar and electronic warfare systems, which often fall under strict US export controls – could still subject GCAP to US ITAR restrictions. This would potentially negate the desired export freedom and sovereignty regardless of trilateral agreements. The strategic question is whether the immense premium paid for national control via GCAP outweighs the proven capability and interoperability benefits of alternatives, like an expanded F-35 fleet.

Military Utility

The core military case for GCAP rests on its ability to operate in the most highly contested environments anticipated post-2035, specifically penetrating and dismantling advanced Integrated Air Defence Systems (IADS). This high-end SEAD/DEAD mission is presented as a capability gap that existing platforms cannot fill. Enhanced range, beneficial for UK global deployments, is another selling point. However, the likelihood of the UK needing to conduct such demanding missions unilaterally is debatable.

Many analysts wonder if cost justifies niche capability. Could upgraded Typhoons (contingent on successful ECRS Mk2 radar integration) and the existing F-35 fleet, armed with next-generation stand-off missiles and supported by more numerous, cheaper drones, achieve strategically sufficient effects against likely threats? While GCAP promises the ultimate air dominance tool – a bespoke rapier for peer conflict – the UK might derive better overall utility from a more flexible, affordable mix of capabilities resembling a Swiss Army knife.

Costs

Transparency on GCAP’s ultimate cost remains elusive. The UK has committed £2 billion initially and budgeted £12 billion over the next decade, while partner estimates suggest a total programme investment potentially exceeding €40 billion by 2035 merely to reach initial production. Unit fly-away cost estimates are highly speculative but frequently placed in the £150-£250 million range per core aircraft – significantly higher than the F-35B. This excludes the substantial costs of developing and procuring the necessary CCA fleets – with public estimates for ‘loyal wingman’ concepts varying widely, typically between £5 million and £25 million per drone – plus ground infrastructure, and network hardening.

Illustrative Unit Cost Impact (UK Share – Hypothetical 100 core aircraft buy):

  • @ £150m/unit: £15 billion procurement
  • @ £200m/unit: £20 billion procurement
  • @ £250m/unit: £25 billion procurement (Note: Illustrative procurement costs for core platform only, excluding R&D share, CCA costs, and lifetime support)

This level of expenditure inevitably forces stark choices. Within defence, it competes directly with funding for the Royal Navy, the Army’s modernisation, and crucial investments in space and cyber domains. Outside defence, this sum dwarfs spending on critical public services. The opportunity cost is immense, demanding certainty that GCAP delivers uniquely essential capability unavailable through less expensive means.

Industrial Strategy vs. Economic Reality

The argument for GCAP often leans heavily on industrial benefits: sustaining the UK’s sovereign combat air sector, supporting tens of thousands of high-skilled jobs, driving R&D, and enabling exports. Partnering with Italy and Japan is key to achieving the scale necessary for viability. However, large defence programmes create path dependency, making it politically difficult to cancel or curtail the programme even if strategic or financial justifications weaken. The programme must deliver genuine value for money, not just serve as industrial life support.

Technological Risk

GCAP is predicated on successfully mastering multiple cutting-edge technologies concurrently, presenting significant risk. Key areas include:

  • Adaptive Engines: Achieving a mature, reliable variable-cycle engine certified for flight by the required date remains a major hurdle, with full demonstrator engines yet to complete testing. Risk: High
  • AI/Autonomy: Developing certifiable AI for mission-critical functions and effective human-machine teaming is technologically complex and ethically challenging. Integrating this seamlessly with CCA control adds layers of difficulty. Risk: High
  • Stealth & Materials: Achieving next-generation broadband stealth requires advanced materials and manufacturing techniques still scaling up. Risk: Medium
  • Networking & Software: Creating a secure, resilient, interoperable ‘combat cloud’ integrating systems from three nations is the highest risk area, prone to delays and vulnerabilities. Risk: Very High

Failure or significant delay in any one of these critical paths will derail the entire programme or force capability compromises that undermine its rationale. The F-35’s protracted software development provides a stark warning.

Systemic Vulnerabilities and Integration Challenges

The network-centric ‘system of systems’ concept, while powerful in theory, is inherently vulnerable. The reliance on continuous data flow makes the combat cloud a prime target for jamming, cyber-attack, and kinetic strikes against space assets. Ensuring resilience requires costly hardening measures often excluded from baseline programme costs. Integrating GCAP effectively with legacy UK platforms (Typhoon, F-35B) and wider NATO systems presents significant technical hurdles, particularly regarding secure data-link compatibility. Furthermore, the parallel, nationally-led development of CCAs creates a major integration risk – ensuring these vital adjuncts are ready, affordable, and fully interoperable by 2035 is far from guaranteed.

Failure Scenarios

While outright cancellation carries severe consequences – a major capability gap as Typhoons retire (whose operational life depends on successful upgrades), industrial collapse, and irreparable diplomatic damage – significant delays also pose serious threats. A slip of 2-5 years past the 2035 IOC would necessitate costly life-extension programmes for the Typhoon fleet, potentially overlap awkwardly with F-35B support cycles, and could force a reconsideration of procuring land-based F-35As for the RAF to bridge the gap. Such delays would inevitably inflate overall programme costs and erode partner confidence, risking a slow collapse.

A Framework for Managing the Risks

Given the immense stakes and inherent uncertainties, the UK requires clear decision points and off-ramps for GCAP. Continued investment should be conditional:

  1. Sovereignty Definition: Explicitly define the specific sovereign modification and action freedoms GCAP must deliver (beyond F-35 limitations) and verify these are achievable without ITAR constraints on core systems.
  2. Budgetary Ceiling & Trade-offs: Establish a firm ceiling for the UK’s total R&D and procurement contribution, linked to clear decisions in the upcoming Strategic Defence Review on which other capabilities will be curtailed or cancelled to fund it.
  3. Performance Gates & Kill-Switch: Define non-negotiable technical milestones (e.g., successful demonstrator flight by 2027/28, integrated core systems test by 2030) and cost/schedule thresholds. A breach beyond a pre-agreed margin (e.g., 20% cost overrun or 2-year schedule slip by 2028-2030) should trigger an automatic review with consolidation or cancellation as default options unless compelling justification for continuation is presented.

Conclusion

Does the UK need GCAP? Ultimately, yes. Given that maintaining a fully independent capability to defeat the most advanced air defences globally post-2035 is a non-negotiable strategic requirement, and the industrial and geopolitical benefits of leading a trilateral programme outweigh the risks, then GCAP becomes a strategic necessity. However, this necessity is predicated on assumptions about future threats, technological feasibility, cost control, and partner reliability that are far from certain.

It is not a programme to be pursued out of blind faith or industrial inertia. Proceeding demands rigorous scrutiny, transparent accounting, realistic assessment of alternatives, and clearly defined performance metrics with consequences. Without such discipline, the UK risks pouring vast resources into a programme that, while technologically dazzling, may arrive too late, cost too much, or address yesterday’s perceived threats, ultimately failing to deliver the security it promises. The strategic wager has been placed. Ensuring it doesn’t break the bank requires vigilance, realism, and the political courage to fold if the odds turn decisively against it.

Bibliography

BAE Systems. “Assessment of the expected economic impact of the Future Combat Air System programme (2025-2070)” Accessed via BAE Systems website, October 28, 2024. 

BAE Systems. “GLOBAL COMBAT AIR PROGRAMME. ” BAE Systems Media. Accessed April 22, 2025. 

Bronk, Justin. “The Global Combat Air Programme is Writing Cheques that Defence Can’t Cash | Royal United Services Institute.” RUSI Commentary, April 27, 2023.

Bronk, Justin. “Integrating Typhoon and F-35: The Key to Future British Air Power.” RUSI Defence Systems, February 2016.

Bronk, Justin. “Large, Crewed Sixth-Generation Aircraft Have Unique Value in the Indo-Pacific.” RUSI Commentary, March 5, 2025.

Bronk, Justin. “Unlocking Sixth-Gen Air Power: Inside the Military Capability for GCAP.” RUSI Commentary. Accessed April 22, 2025.

Cranny-Evans, Sam, and Justin Bronk. “How Export Controls Endanger the West’s Military Technology Advantage.” RUSI Commentary, August 2, 2024.

House of Commons Library. “The forthcoming strategic defence review 2025: FAQ.” Research Briefing CBP-10153, March 26, 2025.

House of Commons Library. “What is the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP)?” Research Briefing CBP-10143. Accessed April 22, 2025.

IAI (Istituto Affari Internazionali). “New Partnership among Italy, Japan and the UK on the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP).” IAI Papers 25 | 03 – March 2025.The 

Japan, Ministry of Defense. “Global Combat Air Programme.” MoD Website. Accessed April 22, 2025.

The Aviationist. “The GCAP Program: A Step Toward Europe’s Military Autonomy and Interoperability.” March 17, 2025.

The Aviationist. “Delivering GCAP by 2035 Is Not Easy as it Needs to Break the Mold and Avoid Mistakes, Says UK Report.” January 15, 2025.

UK Defence Journal. “Report highlights challenges for new British stealth jet.” January 14, 2025.

UK Government. “Defence’s response to a more contested and volatile world.” Defence Command Paper 2023. Accessed April 22, 2025.

UK Government. “Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a more contested and volatile world.” Accessed April 22, 2025.

UK Parliament. Committees. Defence Committee. “Global Combat Air Programme. ” HC 598, January 14, 2025.

Watkins, Peter. “The Damage from Doubt: Labour’s Clumsy Handling of the GCAP Programme | Royal United Services Institute. ” RUSI Commentary, September 12, 2024.

Zona Militar. “Italy accuses the United Kingdom of not sharing key technologies for the development of the new sixth-generation GCAP fighter.” April 21, 2025.

Insurgency vs. Terrorism: What’s the Difference?

By

On April 4, 2025

In Strategy

I’ve created a video on the difference between the definitions of insurgency and terrorism. While both involve violence and political motivations, I explore why understanding their key differences is essential. The video includes historical examples and the blurred lines between these two concepts, which should help in shedding light on the political implications behind the labels we use.

Please do feel free to reach out and discuss anything in the video, or leave a comment if you would prefer.

Chessboard with smoke floating over the pieces

How Grey Zone Warfare Exploits the West’s Risk Aversion

By

On March 16, 2025

In Strategy

Western democracies are caught in a strategic bind. Adversaries, skilled at operating in the murky “grey zone” between peace and open warfare, are exploiting a fundamental Western characteristic: risk aversion. Grey zone warfare blends cyberattacks, disinformation, economic coercion, and proxy warfare to achieve strategic goals without triggering a full-scale military response. The risk is not merely theoretical. One might argue that the resulting ambiguity produces a kind of strategic paralysis, one that leaves Western states unable or unwilling to respond decisively to threats that refuse the comfort of clear categorisation.

A 21st-Century Threat

Grey zone warfare encompasses more than just cyberattacks and disinformation. Think of cyberattacks that cripple infrastructure but stop short of causing mass casualties, disinformation campaigns that sow discord and erode trust in institutions, and the use of proxy forces to destabilise a region. Crucially, it also includes economic coercion. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, with its potential for creating debt traps and strategic dependencies, is a prime example. Russia’s use of energy supplies as a political weapon, particularly against European nations, is another. The key is plausible deniability and making it difficult for the target to definitively attribute actions. This in turn makes it more challenging for states to justify a strong response. The underlying ambition is to achieve strategic objectives, be it weakening an adversary, gaining leverage, or shaping policy outcomes, all while avoiding the threshold of open military conflict. We see this in China’s response to Lithuania’s engagement with Taiwan, where trade sanctions were used as a punitive measure. Similarly, the West’s reliance on Chinese rare earth minerals creates a vulnerability that can be exploited for political leverage.

Grey Zones as a Strategic Vulnerability

The West, particularly Europe and North America, has a deeply ingrained preference for diplomacy and de-escalation. This isn’t necessarily a bad thing as it stems from a genuine desire to avoid the horrors of large-scale war and maintain a stable global order. But this risk aversion, while understandable, has become a strategic vulnerability. Adversaries see this hesitation and tailor their actions accordingly. They operate just below the threshold of what would trigger a decisive military response, creating a constant dilemma for Western leaders: how to respond effectively without escalating the situation into a wider conflict?

Ukraine is a tragic textbook example of grey zone warfare in action. Russia’s strategy goes far beyond conventional military force. It includes crippling cyberattacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, a relentless barrage of disinformation aimed at undermining the Ukrainian government and sowing discord, and the backing of separatist movements to create internal instability. These actions are calculated to achieve Russia’s goals while staying below the threshold that would provoke a direct military intervention from NATO. The Western response, consisting primarily of sanctions and diplomatic pressure, reveals the core problem. While intended to punish Russia and deter further aggression, this relatively restrained approach has, perhaps, enabled Russia to continue its grey zone operations, demonstrating the difficulty of countering these tactics without risking a wider war. The continued, grinding conflict, and the incremental nature of Western support, highlight the limitations of a purely reactive, risk-averse strategy.

The Erosion of American Global Leadership and Europe’s Quest for Strategic Autonomy

One might observe that the erosion of American global leadership (accelerated, though not solely caused, by the Trump administration) has unsettled the transatlantic alliance in ways that are still playing out. Actions such as imposing tariffs on allies, questioning NATO’s relevance, and the perceived (and sometimes explicit) wavering of commitment to Article 5’s collective defence clause have created a climate of uncertainty. European nations are now grappling with a fundamental question: can they rely on the US security umbrella? This doubt isn’t just theoretical; it’s driving concrete policy changes.

This uncertainty has fuelled a push for European “strategic autonomy” and the ability to act independently in defence and foreign policy. Figures like French President Macron have long championed this idea, and it’s gaining traction across the continent. Even in the UK, traditionally a staunch US ally, Labour leader Keir Starmer has emphasised the need for increased defence spending and closer European security cooperation. Germany’s Zeitenwende, its historic shift towards rearmament, is a direct response to this new reality. These are not just rhetorical flourishes; they represent a fundamental rethinking of European security, driven by a perceived need to fill the void left by a less predictable and less engaged United States. The debate over a European army, or a more coordinated European defence force, is no longer fringe; it’s becoming mainstream.

Strategic Paralysis Under the Clausewitzian Lens

This brings us to the heart of the matter: strategic paralysis. The West, caught between a desire to avoid escalation and the need to respond effectively, often finds itself frozen. This is the sort of effect to which grey zone tactics aspire, though whether paralysis is a design or an emergent consequence remains open to debate. By fostering ambiguity, where traditional responses appear either disproportionate or politically fraught, adversaries create the very conditions in which Western decision-making risks becoming paralysed. The fear of “provoking” a larger conflict becomes a weapon in itself. As Clausewitz argued, war is an extension of politics. Grey zone conflict is simply an extension of war by subtler means, one designed to neutralise the West’s ability to make political decisions with clarity.

Looking at the situation, it could be suggested that Western states would do well to move beyond rhetorical condemnation or reactive sanctions. Addressing the breadth of grey zone threats requires not only the technical apparatus to respond, but also a reconsideration of what risks must be borne, and what forms of resilience truly matter. Societal awareness, for instance, is not a panacea, but a necessary condition for resisting disinformation and political interference.

If Western governments are to avoid strategic paralysis, their response cannot rely solely on traditional deterrence or diplomatic ritual. Perhaps the focus should shift toward nurturing resilience – not just through technological investment or alliance-building, but by cultivating an informed citizenry, capable of recognising manipulation in its many guises. The challenge is not merely technical, nor simply a matter of resolve either.

Concluding Reflections

Grey zone tactics have flourished amid Western risk aversion and a prevailing uncertainty over deterrence. It could be suggested that the greater risk, at times, lies in mistaking inertia for prudence. Whether Western policymakers can recalibrate their tolerance for ambiguity, and adapt to the subtler forms of coercion now in play, remains an open question – one on which the resilience of the international order may quietly depend. I would argue that it is not merely the West’s material strength, but the demonstration of resolve (and a measure of unpredictability) that will matter most. Whether Western states can move beyond a posture of predictable restraint, or whether caution will continue to invite opportunism, remains to be seen. In the end, the future of the international liberal order may depend less on declarations of intent than on the willingness to accept calculated risk. Whether the West can adapt to this new era of conflict remains the most pressing question.

Bibliography

American Military University. “Gray Zone Attacks by Russia Being Used to Undermine Ukraine.” AMU Edge, May 12, 2023. https://amuedge.com/gray-zone-attacks-by-russia-being-used-to-undermine-ukraine/.

Chivvis, Christopher S. Understanding Russian “Hybrid Warfare” and What Can Be Done About It. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017. https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT468.html.

Gray, Colin S. Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare. London: Phoenix, 2005.

Military Strategy Magazine. “Deterring War Without Threatening War: Rehabilitating the West’s Risk-Averse Approach to Deterrence.” Military Strategy Magazine,1 April 2023. https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/deterring-war-without-threatening-war-rehabilitating-the-wests-risk-averse-approach-to-deterrence/.

Onsolve. “Gray Zone Warfare: What Business Leaders Need to Know.” Onsolve Blog, March 2024. https://www.onsolve.com/blog/sra-gray-zone-warfare-business-leaders/.

Rid, Thomas. Cyber War Will Not Take Place. London: C. Hurst & Co., 2013.

The Wall Street Journal. “Trump Is Overturning the World Order That America Built.” WSJ, January 25, 2024. https://www.wsj.com/world/trump-is-overturning-the-world-order-that-america-built-10981637.

The New Yorker. “What’s Next for Ukraine?” The New Yorker, February 2024. https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-lede/whats-next-for-ukraine.

Why Technology Alone Doesn’t Win Wars

By

On March 8, 2025

In Strategy

We often assume that the latest military technology will define the future of warfare. AI, cyber weapons, and autonomous drones are hailed as game-changers, just as tanks, aircraft, and nuclear weapons were in past eras. But history tells a different story, one where new technology is only as effective as the strategy, doctrine, and human adaptation behind it.

In this video, we explore David Edgerton’s critique of technological determinism, the idea that wars are shaped by cutting-edge innovation alone. From ancient weapons to modern cyber warfare, we show why old technologies persist, how armies adapt, and why war remains a contest of resilience, not just hardware.

The Real Lesson of Military Technology

The biggest mistake in war isn’t failing to develop new technology, it’s assuming that technology alone will guarantee victory. History proves that the best weapons don’t always win battles; those who adapt, integrate, and sustain their forces over time do.

What do you think? Are we overhyping AI and cyber warfare today, just as people once overhyped battleships or air power?

Europe's Leadership Vacuum in the Shadow of Russia and America

Europe’s Leadership Vacuum in the Shadow of Russia and America

By

On March 6, 2025

In Strategy

The concept of ‘strategic culture’ as critiqued in Hew Strachan’s “The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective” emphasises continuity and a nation’s resistance to change, shaped historically and geographically. Strategic culture includes historical memory, institutional norms, core national values, and collective threat perceptions, all contributing to a nation’s strategic posture. This comprehensive framework is valuable when examining Europe’s contemporary security challenges, specifically the strategic vacuum highlighted by the ongoing war in Ukraine and America’s ongoing withdrawal from global leadership.

Europe’s Strategic Culture

European strategic culture, forged during the Cold War, assumed stability through American military and diplomatic leadership. Strachan argues convincingly that such cultural assumptions hinder strategic flexibility, creating vulnerabilities when geopolitical realities shift dramatically, as they have since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

NATO-centric thinking, predicated on the guarantee of American power projection, has revealed problematic inertia… European states, notably the UK and the EU members, have found themselves scrambling to define a coherent, autonomous response.

America’s Strategic Shift from Protector to Competitor

America’s strategic withdrawal from Europe, evidenced by Obama’s pivot to Asia, that accelerated by Trump V1.0’s transactional approach, Biden’s reticence and culminating with Trump 2.0’s recent dramatic geopolitical hand grenades. This reflects not merely a change in policy but a radical break from previous expectations. This withdrawal is a revolutionary, not evolutionary, shift in global strategy, shattering Europe’s assumption of guaranteed U.S. engagement.

Strategically, this creates immediate tensions:

  • The U.S. increasingly frames its engagement with Europe as transactional and conditional upon shared responsibilities, as demonstrated by U.S. ambivalence toward NATO under Trump and Biden’s conditional engagement in Ukraine.
  • Simultaneously, Russia’s aggression has starkly shown that the belief in a diminished threat from inter-state warfare, fashionable among policymakers since the Cold War’s end, is dangerously misplaced. Strachan’s scepticism about overly optimistic predictions of war’s obsolescence resonates strongly here, given recent events.

This combination reveals Europe’s strategic culture as critically unprepared for the harsh geopolitical realities of the 21st century.

Europe’s Strategic Awakening

Europe has not been entirely inactive. The EU’s Strategic Compass, adopted in 2022, and the UK’s Integrated Review Refresh in 2023 demonstrate genuine acknowledgment of new realities. These documents move beyond purely reactive policies and represent Europe’s incremental shift towards strategic autonomy:

  • Increased defence expenditure: Germany’s Zeitenwende is a prime example.
  • Increased EU defence coordination, exemplified by the European Peace Facility funding Ukraine’s defence.
  • Renewed commitment to territorial defence and enhanced military deployments in Eastern Europe.

Yet, despite these efforts, the doctrinal and strategic mindset change has been incomplete. European policies continue to implicitly rely on the assumption of sustained U.S. involvement, despite public and political statements affirming Europe’s need for self-sufficiency.

Russia and America as Mirrors

The actions of Russia and the retreat of America each independently expose the inadequacies of Europe’s current strategic posture:

Russia’s Actions: Highlighted Europe’s continuing strategic vulnerability, emphasising weaknesses in rapid military deployment, critical capability gaps (such as long-range precision munitions and air defence), and dependence on U.S. logistical, intelligence, and strategic capabilities.

America’s Pivot Away: Underscores that strategic autonomy isn’t merely desirable but imperative. Starting with Biden administration’s reluctance to escalate beyond certain lines in Ukraine and Washington’s growing Indo-Pacific focus expose a stark misalignment between European expectations and American strategy. The most recent signals from Trump are an unequivocal message to Europe: unless there is something in it for America, you are on your own.

The Limits of Integration and NATO

While deeper European integration and renewed commitment to NATO might appear sufficient, these solutions alone are inadequate. Integration without clear autonomous capabilities risks perpetual dependency, and NATO’s structure, inherently reliant on American leadership, cannot compensate for America’s strategic reorientation. As Strachan underscores, relying purely on continuity without adaptability is strategically naive.

From Reactive Culture to Proactive Realism

Europe’s security doctrine requires nuanced recalibration rather than wholesale abandonment. The gap is not merely military, it is doctrinal, conceptual, and philosophical. A robust European strategic doctrine should:

  1. Recognise NATO’s Limitations: Explicitly acknowledge NATO’s limitations without undermining its centrality to European defence.
  2. Embed Strategic Autonomy: Clearly outline Europe’s independent capabilities and strategic objectives, moving beyond rhetoric to practical operational frameworks. Europe must realistically assess scenarios in which it may need to act without guaranteed American backing.
  3. Rethink Strategic Culture: Move beyond traditional assumptions of continuity—what previously seemed unthinkable, such as large-scale inter-state conflict, must become integral to planning and preparedness again.

Engaging Broader Perspectives

Drawing briefly from constructivist insights, strategic culture is not immutable but socially constructed, implying that European nations have the agency to reshape it consciously. Additionally, realist thinkers like John Mearsheimer caution against complacency in alliance politics, reinforcing the need for independent European capabilities.

Rethinking Doctrine for Strategic Resilience

The UK’s Integrated Review and the EU’s Strategic Compass represent valuable first steps toward a more strategic and independent Europe. However, they still fall short of addressing the fundamental gap that Russia’s aggression and America’s strategic recalibration have exposed.

Addressing Europe’s leadership vacuum demands overcoming historical and cultural inertia. It requires strategic humility: recognising that the stability provided by Cold War-era assumptions no longer applies, that threats are tangible, and that peace through strength must be anchored not in external assurances, but in Europe’s credible, independently sustainable power.

Europe must confront this reality head-on, accepting change not merely rhetorically but operationally, doctrinally, and culturally. Only then will Europe secure genuine strategic autonomy, prepared not just for today’s threats but also for tomorrow’s inevitable uncertainties.

Bibliography

  • Strachan, Hew. The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective. Cambridge University Press, 2013.
  • European Union. “Strategic Compass for Security and Defence.” 2022.
  • United Kingdom Government. “Integrated Review Refresh.” 2023.
  • Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W. W. Norton & Company, 2001.
  • Smith, Rupert. The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. Penguin, 2005.

[Video] UK and EU AI Influence

By

On March 3, 2025

In Strategy

Artificial intelligence isn’t just reshaping industries—it’s reshaping reality. While the UK and EU focus on regulating AI and combating misinformation, adversarial states like Russia and China are weaponizing it for influence warfare. The AI-driven disinformation battle isn’t coming; it’s already here.

In my latest article, “Why the UK and EU Are Losing the AI Influence War”, I explore how Europe’s slow response, defensive posture, and reliance on outdated regulatory approaches are leaving it vulnerable to AI-enhanced propaganda campaigns.

To bring these ideas to life, I’ve created a video that visualises the scale of the challenge and why urgent action is needed. Watch it below:

The AI influence war is no longer a hypothetical—it’s unfolding in real-time. Europe’s current strategies are reactive and insufficient, while adversaries leverage AI to manipulate narratives at unprecedented speed. Without a cognitive security unit, AI-powered countermeasures, and a national security-driven approach, the UK and EU risk losing control of their own information space.

The question isn’t whether AI will reshape public perception, it’s who will be in control of that perception. Will Europe rise to the challenge, or will it remain a passive battleground for AI-driven narratives?

What do you think? Should the UK and EU take a more aggressive stance in countering AI-enhanced disinformation? Feel free to discuss in the comments.

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