Matthew Toy

Thoughts, reflections and experiences

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Tag: ModernConflict

Header image for an article on PGM usage by Russia

Precision Reconsidered: Russia’s Shift from Guided Missiles to Mass Bombardment

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On May 29, 2025

In Strategy

Previously Russia positioned itself as a modern power able to cripple an adversary’s decision-cycle with carefully targeted precision-guided munitions. Three years of war in Ukraine have punctured that story. The Kremlin now relies on volume rather than accuracy, trading the prestige of “surgical” strikes for the blunt attrition of drone swarms and repurposed air-defence missiles. What follows traces that transition and asks what it does to Western analytical assumptions about technology, ethics and power.

From Surgical Imagery to Saturation Practice

Pentagon tallies show that Russian forces loosed more than one thousand one hundred guided missiles in the first month of the invasion, yet many exploded in apartment blocks rather than command nodes (Department of Defense, 2022). Domestic production never kept pace. By mid-2023 Russian factories were turning out roughly sixty new cruise missiles a month, a fraction of operational demand (Williams, 2023).

Facing depletion, Moscow shifted firepower architecture. S-300 surface-to-air missiles were redirected at ground targets, increasing miss distances, while Iranian-designed Shahed drones began to pad nightly salvos (Army Recognition, 2024). Guided-missile launches fell steadily while drone use soared, reaching an estimated total of four thousand deployed by the first quarter of 2025 (Atalan and Jensen, 2025). The identity of the high-tech precision striker gave way to the practicalities of magazine depth and industrial capacity.

Implications for Western Analysis

Western security discourse long treated accuracy as a twin proof of technical mastery and ethical restraint (Schmitt and Widmar, 2014; Wilson, 2020). Russia’s practice weakens both pillars. Norms endure through consistent observance and recognition; when a major power claims the vocabulary of precision while accepting wide error margins, the social meaning of accuracy erodes (Tannenwald, 2017).

The episode therefore offers a methodological caution. Counting missiles without attending to their symbolic weight risks analytical short-sightedness. The shift towards low-cost saturation munitions signals a recalibration of Russian strategic identity and alters the deterrence calculus of adversaries who must now defend against continuous drone attrition rather than episodic cruise-missile raids. Civilian resilience, alliance solidarity and arms-control expectations all pivot on how quickly that new reality is understood.

In Summary

Russia’s move from precision-guided missiles to mass bombardment is more than a supply-chain story. It marks the point where an identity built on technological finesse buckled under material constraint, transforming both the battlefield and the normative landscape around it. Analysts tracking future conflicts would do well to remember that weapons categories are not only hardware inventories but carriers of meaning, and that meaning can shift faster than production lines.

Bibliography

Army Recognition 2024. ‘Russia Repurposes S-300 Surface-to-Air Missiles for Ground Attacks Against Kharkiv’, 5 January.

Atalan, Y. and Jensen, B. 2025. Drone Saturation: Russia’s Shahed Campaign. CSIS Brief, 13 May.

Department of Defense 2022. ‘Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds a Press Briefing’, 21 March.

Schmitt, M. and Widmar, E. 2014. ‘On Target: Precision and Balance in the Contemporary Law of Targeting’. Journal of National Security Law and Policy, 7(3).

Tannenwald, N. 2017. ‘How Strong Are the Nuclear Taboo and the Chemical Weapons Ban?’ The Washington Quarterly, 40(1), 79–98.

Williams, I. 2023. ‘Russia Isn’t Going to Run Out of Missiles’. CSIS Analysis, 28 June.

Wilson, N. 2020. ‘The Ambiguities of Precision Warfare’, Intimacies of Remote Warfare commentary, 12 June. 

GCAP Fighter

Is GCAP a Necessary Investment in UK Air Power Sovereignty, or a High-Risk Gamble?

By

On May 4, 2025

In Strategy

The United Kingdom’s commitment to the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), in partnership with Italy and Japan, represents the most significant defence investment decision of this generation. Faced with an increasingly contested and volatile world and the limitations of current air power assets against proliferating advanced threats, the UK seeks a sixth-generation capability intended to secure air dominance and strategic advantage well into the mid-21st century. This analysis contends that while the strategic desire for GCAP is understandable, particularly the drive for sovereign capability, its necessity hinges critically on unproven technological assumptions, optimistic cost and schedule projections, and a specific view of future warfare that may not materialise. Therefore, continued UK participation should be contingent on meeting stringent, pre-defined cost, schedule, and capability gateways, with failure triggering consolidation or cancellation.

Defining the Sixth-Generation Ambition

GCAP aims to deliver more than just a replacement for the RAF’s Eurofighter Typhoon; it embodies a conceptual leap towards a ‘system of systems.’ The envisioned capability includes a core manned stealth platform (‘Tempest’) acting as a command node, integrated with uncrewed Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs or ‘loyal wingmen’), all connected via a resilient ‘combat cloud’. Key technological differentiators include advanced AI for data fusion and decision support, next-generation sensors providing unprecedented situational awareness (such as the developmental ISANKE/ICS suite), adaptive engines offering performance flexibility, and an open systems architecture for rapid upgrades. This technological ambition, pursued trilaterally under dedicated governmental (GIGO) and industrial joint venture structures headquartered in the UK, aims to deliver not just an aircraft, but a step-change in air combat capability by its ambitious 2035 target date. However, this vision immediately flags a core vulnerability: the entire concept is critically dependent on secure, high-bandwidth connectivity that is a prime target for adversary electronic warfare and cyber-attacks.

Strategic Rationale

GCAP is positioned as essential for UK grand strategy, aligning with the Integrated Review’s goals of technological advantage, global power projection (including the Indo-Pacific tilt), and contributing high-end capability to NATO. A primary driver is the pursuit of national sovereignty – defined as “Freedom of Action” and “Freedom of Modification” – avoiding dependence on allies, particularly the US. Past experiences, such as reported US control over integrating certain UK weapons onto the F-35 platform, fuel this desire for independent control over critical capabilities.

Yet, this pursuit of sovereignty within a deeply collaborative international programme creates inherent tensions. True freedom of action requires open technology sharing between partners, potentially conflicting with national industrial interests or security concerns, as highlighted by recent Italian ministerial comments about UK reluctance on tech access. Furthermore, the incorporation of some US subsystems – for example, advanced Gallium Nitride (GaN) transmitter modules crucial for next-generation radar and electronic warfare systems, which often fall under strict US export controls – could still subject GCAP to US ITAR restrictions. This would potentially negate the desired export freedom and sovereignty regardless of trilateral agreements. The strategic question is whether the immense premium paid for national control via GCAP outweighs the proven capability and interoperability benefits of alternatives, like an expanded F-35 fleet.

Military Utility

The core military case for GCAP rests on its ability to operate in the most highly contested environments anticipated post-2035, specifically penetrating and dismantling advanced Integrated Air Defence Systems (IADS). This high-end SEAD/DEAD mission is presented as a capability gap that existing platforms cannot fill. Enhanced range, beneficial for UK global deployments, is another selling point. However, the likelihood of the UK needing to conduct such demanding missions unilaterally is debatable.

Many analysts wonder if cost justifies niche capability. Could upgraded Typhoons (contingent on successful ECRS Mk2 radar integration) and the existing F-35 fleet, armed with next-generation stand-off missiles and supported by more numerous, cheaper drones, achieve strategically sufficient effects against likely threats? While GCAP promises the ultimate air dominance tool – a bespoke rapier for peer conflict – the UK might derive better overall utility from a more flexible, affordable mix of capabilities resembling a Swiss Army knife.

Costs

Transparency on GCAP’s ultimate cost remains elusive. The UK has committed £2 billion initially and budgeted £12 billion over the next decade, while partner estimates suggest a total programme investment potentially exceeding €40 billion by 2035 merely to reach initial production. Unit fly-away cost estimates are highly speculative but frequently placed in the £150-£250 million range per core aircraft – significantly higher than the F-35B. This excludes the substantial costs of developing and procuring the necessary CCA fleets – with public estimates for ‘loyal wingman’ concepts varying widely, typically between £5 million and £25 million per drone – plus ground infrastructure, and network hardening.

Illustrative Unit Cost Impact (UK Share – Hypothetical 100 core aircraft buy):

  • @ £150m/unit: £15 billion procurement
  • @ £200m/unit: £20 billion procurement
  • @ £250m/unit: £25 billion procurement (Note: Illustrative procurement costs for core platform only, excluding R&D share, CCA costs, and lifetime support)

This level of expenditure inevitably forces stark choices. Within defence, it competes directly with funding for the Royal Navy, the Army’s modernisation, and crucial investments in space and cyber domains. Outside defence, this sum dwarfs spending on critical public services. The opportunity cost is immense, demanding certainty that GCAP delivers uniquely essential capability unavailable through less expensive means.

Industrial Strategy vs. Economic Reality

The argument for GCAP often leans heavily on industrial benefits: sustaining the UK’s sovereign combat air sector, supporting tens of thousands of high-skilled jobs, driving R&D, and enabling exports. Partnering with Italy and Japan is key to achieving the scale necessary for viability. However, large defence programmes create path dependency, making it politically difficult to cancel or curtail the programme even if strategic or financial justifications weaken. The programme must deliver genuine value for money, not just serve as industrial life support.

Technological Risk

GCAP is predicated on successfully mastering multiple cutting-edge technologies concurrently, presenting significant risk. Key areas include:

  • Adaptive Engines: Achieving a mature, reliable variable-cycle engine certified for flight by the required date remains a major hurdle, with full demonstrator engines yet to complete testing. Risk: High
  • AI/Autonomy: Developing certifiable AI for mission-critical functions and effective human-machine teaming is technologically complex and ethically challenging. Integrating this seamlessly with CCA control adds layers of difficulty. Risk: High
  • Stealth & Materials: Achieving next-generation broadband stealth requires advanced materials and manufacturing techniques still scaling up. Risk: Medium
  • Networking & Software: Creating a secure, resilient, interoperable ‘combat cloud’ integrating systems from three nations is the highest risk area, prone to delays and vulnerabilities. Risk: Very High

Failure or significant delay in any one of these critical paths will derail the entire programme or force capability compromises that undermine its rationale. The F-35’s protracted software development provides a stark warning.

Systemic Vulnerabilities and Integration Challenges

The network-centric ‘system of systems’ concept, while powerful in theory, is inherently vulnerable. The reliance on continuous data flow makes the combat cloud a prime target for jamming, cyber-attack, and kinetic strikes against space assets. Ensuring resilience requires costly hardening measures often excluded from baseline programme costs. Integrating GCAP effectively with legacy UK platforms (Typhoon, F-35B) and wider NATO systems presents significant technical hurdles, particularly regarding secure data-link compatibility. Furthermore, the parallel, nationally-led development of CCAs creates a major integration risk – ensuring these vital adjuncts are ready, affordable, and fully interoperable by 2035 is far from guaranteed.

Failure Scenarios

While outright cancellation carries severe consequences – a major capability gap as Typhoons retire (whose operational life depends on successful upgrades), industrial collapse, and irreparable diplomatic damage – significant delays also pose serious threats. A slip of 2-5 years past the 2035 IOC would necessitate costly life-extension programmes for the Typhoon fleet, potentially overlap awkwardly with F-35B support cycles, and could force a reconsideration of procuring land-based F-35As for the RAF to bridge the gap. Such delays would inevitably inflate overall programme costs and erode partner confidence, risking a slow collapse.

A Framework for Managing the Risks

Given the immense stakes and inherent uncertainties, the UK requires clear decision points and off-ramps for GCAP. Continued investment should be conditional:

  1. Sovereignty Definition: Explicitly define the specific sovereign modification and action freedoms GCAP must deliver (beyond F-35 limitations) and verify these are achievable without ITAR constraints on core systems.
  2. Budgetary Ceiling & Trade-offs: Establish a firm ceiling for the UK’s total R&D and procurement contribution, linked to clear decisions in the upcoming Strategic Defence Review on which other capabilities will be curtailed or cancelled to fund it.
  3. Performance Gates & Kill-Switch: Define non-negotiable technical milestones (e.g., successful demonstrator flight by 2027/28, integrated core systems test by 2030) and cost/schedule thresholds. A breach beyond a pre-agreed margin (e.g., 20% cost overrun or 2-year schedule slip by 2028-2030) should trigger an automatic review with consolidation or cancellation as default options unless compelling justification for continuation is presented.

Conclusion

Does the UK need GCAP? Ultimately, yes. Given that maintaining a fully independent capability to defeat the most advanced air defences globally post-2035 is a non-negotiable strategic requirement, and the industrial and geopolitical benefits of leading a trilateral programme outweigh the risks, then GCAP becomes a strategic necessity. However, this necessity is predicated on assumptions about future threats, technological feasibility, cost control, and partner reliability that are far from certain.

It is not a programme to be pursued out of blind faith or industrial inertia. Proceeding demands rigorous scrutiny, transparent accounting, realistic assessment of alternatives, and clearly defined performance metrics with consequences. Without such discipline, the UK risks pouring vast resources into a programme that, while technologically dazzling, may arrive too late, cost too much, or address yesterday’s perceived threats, ultimately failing to deliver the security it promises. The strategic wager has been placed. Ensuring it doesn’t break the bank requires vigilance, realism, and the political courage to fold if the odds turn decisively against it.

Bibliography

BAE Systems. “Assessment of the expected economic impact of the Future Combat Air System programme (2025-2070)” Accessed via BAE Systems website, October 28, 2024. 

BAE Systems. “GLOBAL COMBAT AIR PROGRAMME. ” BAE Systems Media. Accessed April 22, 2025. 

Bronk, Justin. “The Global Combat Air Programme is Writing Cheques that Defence Can’t Cash | Royal United Services Institute.” RUSI Commentary, April 27, 2023.

Bronk, Justin. “Integrating Typhoon and F-35: The Key to Future British Air Power.” RUSI Defence Systems, February 2016.

Bronk, Justin. “Large, Crewed Sixth-Generation Aircraft Have Unique Value in the Indo-Pacific.” RUSI Commentary, March 5, 2025.

Bronk, Justin. “Unlocking Sixth-Gen Air Power: Inside the Military Capability for GCAP.” RUSI Commentary. Accessed April 22, 2025.

Cranny-Evans, Sam, and Justin Bronk. “How Export Controls Endanger the West’s Military Technology Advantage.” RUSI Commentary, August 2, 2024.

House of Commons Library. “The forthcoming strategic defence review 2025: FAQ.” Research Briefing CBP-10153, March 26, 2025.

House of Commons Library. “What is the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP)?” Research Briefing CBP-10143. Accessed April 22, 2025.

IAI (Istituto Affari Internazionali). “New Partnership among Italy, Japan and the UK on the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP).” IAI Papers 25 | 03 – March 2025.The 

Japan, Ministry of Defense. “Global Combat Air Programme.” MoD Website. Accessed April 22, 2025.

The Aviationist. “The GCAP Program: A Step Toward Europe’s Military Autonomy and Interoperability.” March 17, 2025.

The Aviationist. “Delivering GCAP by 2035 Is Not Easy as it Needs to Break the Mold and Avoid Mistakes, Says UK Report.” January 15, 2025.

UK Defence Journal. “Report highlights challenges for new British stealth jet.” January 14, 2025.

UK Government. “Defence’s response to a more contested and volatile world.” Defence Command Paper 2023. Accessed April 22, 2025.

UK Government. “Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a more contested and volatile world.” Accessed April 22, 2025.

UK Parliament. Committees. Defence Committee. “Global Combat Air Programme. ” HC 598, January 14, 2025.

Watkins, Peter. “The Damage from Doubt: Labour’s Clumsy Handling of the GCAP Programme | Royal United Services Institute. ” RUSI Commentary, September 12, 2024.

Zona Militar. “Italy accuses the United Kingdom of not sharing key technologies for the development of the new sixth-generation GCAP fighter.” April 21, 2025.

Insurgency vs. Terrorism: What’s the Difference?

By

On April 4, 2025

In Strategy

I’ve created a video on the difference between the definitions of insurgency and terrorism. While both involve violence and political motivations, I explore why understanding their key differences is essential. The video includes historical examples and the blurred lines between these two concepts, which should help in shedding light on the political implications behind the labels we use.

Please do feel free to reach out and discuss anything in the video, or leave a comment if you would prefer.

Chessboard with smoke floating over the pieces

How Grey Zone Warfare Exploits the West’s Risk Aversion

By

On March 16, 2025

In Strategy

Western democracies are caught in a strategic bind. Adversaries, skilled at operating in the murky “grey zone” between peace and open warfare, are exploiting a fundamental Western characteristic: risk aversion. Grey zone warfare blends cyberattacks, disinformation, economic coercion, and proxy warfare to achieve strategic goals without triggering a full-scale military response. The risk is not merely theoretical. One might argue that the resulting ambiguity produces a kind of strategic paralysis, one that leaves Western states unable or unwilling to respond decisively to threats that refuse the comfort of clear categorisation.

A 21st-Century Threat

Grey zone warfare encompasses more than just cyberattacks and disinformation. Think of cyberattacks that cripple infrastructure but stop short of causing mass casualties, disinformation campaigns that sow discord and erode trust in institutions, and the use of proxy forces to destabilise a region. Crucially, it also includes economic coercion. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, with its potential for creating debt traps and strategic dependencies, is a prime example. Russia’s use of energy supplies as a political weapon, particularly against European nations, is another. The key is plausible deniability and making it difficult for the target to definitively attribute actions. This in turn makes it more challenging for states to justify a strong response. The underlying ambition is to achieve strategic objectives, be it weakening an adversary, gaining leverage, or shaping policy outcomes, all while avoiding the threshold of open military conflict. We see this in China’s response to Lithuania’s engagement with Taiwan, where trade sanctions were used as a punitive measure. Similarly, the West’s reliance on Chinese rare earth minerals creates a vulnerability that can be exploited for political leverage.

Grey Zones as a Strategic Vulnerability

The West, particularly Europe and North America, has a deeply ingrained preference for diplomacy and de-escalation. This isn’t necessarily a bad thing as it stems from a genuine desire to avoid the horrors of large-scale war and maintain a stable global order. But this risk aversion, while understandable, has become a strategic vulnerability. Adversaries see this hesitation and tailor their actions accordingly. They operate just below the threshold of what would trigger a decisive military response, creating a constant dilemma for Western leaders: how to respond effectively without escalating the situation into a wider conflict?

Ukraine is a tragic textbook example of grey zone warfare in action. Russia’s strategy goes far beyond conventional military force. It includes crippling cyberattacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, a relentless barrage of disinformation aimed at undermining the Ukrainian government and sowing discord, and the backing of separatist movements to create internal instability. These actions are calculated to achieve Russia’s goals while staying below the threshold that would provoke a direct military intervention from NATO. The Western response, consisting primarily of sanctions and diplomatic pressure, reveals the core problem. While intended to punish Russia and deter further aggression, this relatively restrained approach has, perhaps, enabled Russia to continue its grey zone operations, demonstrating the difficulty of countering these tactics without risking a wider war. The continued, grinding conflict, and the incremental nature of Western support, highlight the limitations of a purely reactive, risk-averse strategy.

The Erosion of American Global Leadership and Europe’s Quest for Strategic Autonomy

One might observe that the erosion of American global leadership (accelerated, though not solely caused, by the Trump administration) has unsettled the transatlantic alliance in ways that are still playing out. Actions such as imposing tariffs on allies, questioning NATO’s relevance, and the perceived (and sometimes explicit) wavering of commitment to Article 5’s collective defence clause have created a climate of uncertainty. European nations are now grappling with a fundamental question: can they rely on the US security umbrella? This doubt isn’t just theoretical; it’s driving concrete policy changes.

This uncertainty has fuelled a push for European “strategic autonomy” and the ability to act independently in defence and foreign policy. Figures like French President Macron have long championed this idea, and it’s gaining traction across the continent. Even in the UK, traditionally a staunch US ally, Labour leader Keir Starmer has emphasised the need for increased defence spending and closer European security cooperation. Germany’s Zeitenwende, its historic shift towards rearmament, is a direct response to this new reality. These are not just rhetorical flourishes; they represent a fundamental rethinking of European security, driven by a perceived need to fill the void left by a less predictable and less engaged United States. The debate over a European army, or a more coordinated European defence force, is no longer fringe; it’s becoming mainstream.

Strategic Paralysis Under the Clausewitzian Lens

This brings us to the heart of the matter: strategic paralysis. The West, caught between a desire to avoid escalation and the need to respond effectively, often finds itself frozen. This is the sort of effect to which grey zone tactics aspire, though whether paralysis is a design or an emergent consequence remains open to debate. By fostering ambiguity, where traditional responses appear either disproportionate or politically fraught, adversaries create the very conditions in which Western decision-making risks becoming paralysed. The fear of “provoking” a larger conflict becomes a weapon in itself. As Clausewitz argued, war is an extension of politics. Grey zone conflict is simply an extension of war by subtler means, one designed to neutralise the West’s ability to make political decisions with clarity.

Looking at the situation, it could be suggested that Western states would do well to move beyond rhetorical condemnation or reactive sanctions. Addressing the breadth of grey zone threats requires not only the technical apparatus to respond, but also a reconsideration of what risks must be borne, and what forms of resilience truly matter. Societal awareness, for instance, is not a panacea, but a necessary condition for resisting disinformation and political interference.

If Western governments are to avoid strategic paralysis, their response cannot rely solely on traditional deterrence or diplomatic ritual. Perhaps the focus should shift toward nurturing resilience – not just through technological investment or alliance-building, but by cultivating an informed citizenry, capable of recognising manipulation in its many guises. The challenge is not merely technical, nor simply a matter of resolve either.

Concluding Reflections

Grey zone tactics have flourished amid Western risk aversion and a prevailing uncertainty over deterrence. It could be suggested that the greater risk, at times, lies in mistaking inertia for prudence. Whether Western policymakers can recalibrate their tolerance for ambiguity, and adapt to the subtler forms of coercion now in play, remains an open question – one on which the resilience of the international order may quietly depend. I would argue that it is not merely the West’s material strength, but the demonstration of resolve (and a measure of unpredictability) that will matter most. Whether Western states can move beyond a posture of predictable restraint, or whether caution will continue to invite opportunism, remains to be seen. In the end, the future of the international liberal order may depend less on declarations of intent than on the willingness to accept calculated risk. Whether the West can adapt to this new era of conflict remains the most pressing question.

Bibliography

American Military University. “Gray Zone Attacks by Russia Being Used to Undermine Ukraine.” AMU Edge, May 12, 2023. https://amuedge.com/gray-zone-attacks-by-russia-being-used-to-undermine-ukraine/.

Chivvis, Christopher S. Understanding Russian “Hybrid Warfare” and What Can Be Done About It. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017. https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT468.html.

Gray, Colin S. Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare. London: Phoenix, 2005.

Military Strategy Magazine. “Deterring War Without Threatening War: Rehabilitating the West’s Risk-Averse Approach to Deterrence.” Military Strategy Magazine,1 April 2023. https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/deterring-war-without-threatening-war-rehabilitating-the-wests-risk-averse-approach-to-deterrence/.

Onsolve. “Gray Zone Warfare: What Business Leaders Need to Know.” Onsolve Blog, March 2024. https://www.onsolve.com/blog/sra-gray-zone-warfare-business-leaders/.

Rid, Thomas. Cyber War Will Not Take Place. London: C. Hurst & Co., 2013.

The Wall Street Journal. “Trump Is Overturning the World Order That America Built.” WSJ, January 25, 2024. https://www.wsj.com/world/trump-is-overturning-the-world-order-that-america-built-10981637.

The New Yorker. “What’s Next for Ukraine?” The New Yorker, February 2024. https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-lede/whats-next-for-ukraine.

Why Technology Alone Doesn’t Win Wars

By

On March 8, 2025

In Strategy

We often assume that the latest military technology will define the future of warfare. AI, cyber weapons, and autonomous drones are hailed as game-changers, just as tanks, aircraft, and nuclear weapons were in past eras. But history tells a different story, one where new technology is only as effective as the strategy, doctrine, and human adaptation behind it.

In this video, we explore David Edgerton’s critique of technological determinism, the idea that wars are shaped by cutting-edge innovation alone. From ancient weapons to modern cyber warfare, we show why old technologies persist, how armies adapt, and why war remains a contest of resilience, not just hardware.

The Real Lesson of Military Technology

The biggest mistake in war isn’t failing to develop new technology, it’s assuming that technology alone will guarantee victory. History proves that the best weapons don’t always win battles; those who adapt, integrate, and sustain their forces over time do.

What do you think? Are we overhyping AI and cyber warfare today, just as people once overhyped battleships or air power?

Europe's Leadership Vacuum in the Shadow of Russia and America

Europe’s Leadership Vacuum in the Shadow of Russia and America

By

On March 6, 2025

In Strategy

The concept of ‘strategic culture’ as critiqued in Hew Strachan’s “The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective” emphasises continuity and a nation’s resistance to change, shaped historically and geographically. Strategic culture includes historical memory, institutional norms, core national values, and collective threat perceptions, all contributing to a nation’s strategic posture. This comprehensive framework is valuable when examining Europe’s contemporary security challenges, specifically the strategic vacuum highlighted by the ongoing war in Ukraine and America’s ongoing withdrawal from global leadership.

Europe’s Strategic Culture

European strategic culture, forged during the Cold War, assumed stability through American military and diplomatic leadership. Strachan argues convincingly that such cultural assumptions hinder strategic flexibility, creating vulnerabilities when geopolitical realities shift dramatically, as they have since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

NATO-centric thinking, predicated on the guarantee of American power projection, has revealed problematic inertia… European states, notably the UK and the EU members, have found themselves scrambling to define a coherent, autonomous response.

America’s Strategic Shift from Protector to Competitor

America’s strategic withdrawal from Europe, evidenced by Obama’s pivot to Asia, that accelerated by Trump V1.0’s transactional approach, Biden’s reticence and culminating with Trump 2.0’s recent dramatic geopolitical hand grenades. This reflects not merely a change in policy but a radical break from previous expectations. This withdrawal is a revolutionary, not evolutionary, shift in global strategy, shattering Europe’s assumption of guaranteed U.S. engagement.

Strategically, this creates immediate tensions:

  • The U.S. increasingly frames its engagement with Europe as transactional and conditional upon shared responsibilities, as demonstrated by U.S. ambivalence toward NATO under Trump and Biden’s conditional engagement in Ukraine.
  • Simultaneously, Russia’s aggression has starkly shown that the belief in a diminished threat from inter-state warfare, fashionable among policymakers since the Cold War’s end, is dangerously misplaced. Strachan’s scepticism about overly optimistic predictions of war’s obsolescence resonates strongly here, given recent events.

This combination reveals Europe’s strategic culture as critically unprepared for the harsh geopolitical realities of the 21st century.

Europe’s Strategic Awakening

Europe has not been entirely inactive. The EU’s Strategic Compass, adopted in 2022, and the UK’s Integrated Review Refresh in 2023 demonstrate genuine acknowledgment of new realities. These documents move beyond purely reactive policies and represent Europe’s incremental shift towards strategic autonomy:

  • Increased defence expenditure: Germany’s Zeitenwende is a prime example.
  • Increased EU defence coordination, exemplified by the European Peace Facility funding Ukraine’s defence.
  • Renewed commitment to territorial defence and enhanced military deployments in Eastern Europe.

Yet, despite these efforts, the doctrinal and strategic mindset change has been incomplete. European policies continue to implicitly rely on the assumption of sustained U.S. involvement, despite public and political statements affirming Europe’s need for self-sufficiency.

Russia and America as Mirrors

The actions of Russia and the retreat of America each independently expose the inadequacies of Europe’s current strategic posture:

Russia’s Actions: Highlighted Europe’s continuing strategic vulnerability, emphasising weaknesses in rapid military deployment, critical capability gaps (such as long-range precision munitions and air defence), and dependence on U.S. logistical, intelligence, and strategic capabilities.

America’s Pivot Away: Underscores that strategic autonomy isn’t merely desirable but imperative. Starting with Biden administration’s reluctance to escalate beyond certain lines in Ukraine and Washington’s growing Indo-Pacific focus expose a stark misalignment between European expectations and American strategy. The most recent signals from Trump are an unequivocal message to Europe: unless there is something in it for America, you are on your own.

The Limits of Integration and NATO

While deeper European integration and renewed commitment to NATO might appear sufficient, these solutions alone are inadequate. Integration without clear autonomous capabilities risks perpetual dependency, and NATO’s structure, inherently reliant on American leadership, cannot compensate for America’s strategic reorientation. As Strachan underscores, relying purely on continuity without adaptability is strategically naive.

From Reactive Culture to Proactive Realism

Europe’s security doctrine requires nuanced recalibration rather than wholesale abandonment. The gap is not merely military, it is doctrinal, conceptual, and philosophical. A robust European strategic doctrine should:

  1. Recognise NATO’s Limitations: Explicitly acknowledge NATO’s limitations without undermining its centrality to European defence.
  2. Embed Strategic Autonomy: Clearly outline Europe’s independent capabilities and strategic objectives, moving beyond rhetoric to practical operational frameworks. Europe must realistically assess scenarios in which it may need to act without guaranteed American backing.
  3. Rethink Strategic Culture: Move beyond traditional assumptions of continuity—what previously seemed unthinkable, such as large-scale inter-state conflict, must become integral to planning and preparedness again.

Engaging Broader Perspectives

Drawing briefly from constructivist insights, strategic culture is not immutable but socially constructed, implying that European nations have the agency to reshape it consciously. Additionally, realist thinkers like John Mearsheimer caution against complacency in alliance politics, reinforcing the need for independent European capabilities.

Rethinking Doctrine for Strategic Resilience

The UK’s Integrated Review and the EU’s Strategic Compass represent valuable first steps toward a more strategic and independent Europe. However, they still fall short of addressing the fundamental gap that Russia’s aggression and America’s strategic recalibration have exposed.

Addressing Europe’s leadership vacuum demands overcoming historical and cultural inertia. It requires strategic humility: recognising that the stability provided by Cold War-era assumptions no longer applies, that threats are tangible, and that peace through strength must be anchored not in external assurances, but in Europe’s credible, independently sustainable power.

Europe must confront this reality head-on, accepting change not merely rhetorically but operationally, doctrinally, and culturally. Only then will Europe secure genuine strategic autonomy, prepared not just for today’s threats but also for tomorrow’s inevitable uncertainties.

Bibliography

  • Strachan, Hew. The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective. Cambridge University Press, 2013.
  • European Union. “Strategic Compass for Security and Defence.” 2022.
  • United Kingdom Government. “Integrated Review Refresh.” 2023.
  • Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W. W. Norton & Company, 2001.
  • Smith, Rupert. The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. Penguin, 2005.

The Grey Mirage: Navigating Strategic Uncertainty and the Elusive Victory in Grey Zone Conflicts

By

On February 15, 2025

In Strategy

Imagine a world where war is waged not with bombs and bullets, but with lines of code and viral misinformation. This is the reality of grey zone conflicts, a persistent feature of modern geopolitics characterised by cyber operations, economic coercion, and disinformation. While many initially hailed these tactics as a revolutionary new form of strategic competition, a critical examination reveals that they not only fundamentally fail to achieve strategic victory in a traditional Clausewitzian sense but also introduce profound strategic uncertainty and volatility into the international system. Extending Thomas Rid’s compelling argument that “cyber war will not take place” due to the inherent lack of decisive physical destruction, this critique applies even more broadly to the entire spectrum of grey zone conflicts.

To understand the inherent limitations of these operations, we must return to the foundational strategic thought of Carl von Clausewitz. His framework remains a lodestar: tactical successes must always serve political objectives, and the very essence of war is to impose one’s will upon the enemy. As Michael Handel succinctly summarises, Clausewitzian war aims at the destruction of enemy forces, control of vital resources, and the sway of public opinion. Grey zone tactics, however, are structurally incapable of achieving these aims in the decisive manner Clausewitz envisioned. They may sow disruption and discord, but they rarely deliver battlefield outcomes, nor can they compel political compliance in the way traditional military campaigns do. Consider, for instance, the persistent cyberattacks between nations; while disruptive and costly, they have yet to force a nation to fundamentally alter its core strategic direction.

The very nature of grey zone strategies – their calculated avoidance of outright force and immediately recognisable acts of aggression – means they cannot truly compel an adversary to accept a fundamentally new strategic order. Cyber operations, as Rid convincingly argues, rarely inflict the kind of lasting, tangible damage comparable to conventional military strikes. Disinformation campaigns, while capable of eroding trust in institutions and even mobilising populations, as seen in the Arab Spring uprisings, cannot on their own force political capitulation. Economic sanctions, though often painful and strategically useful in shaping behaviour, are notoriously slow and far from guaranteed to change a determined state’s core strategic calculations.

This inherent strategic limitation is further underscored by Colin Gray’s assertion that strategy is fundamentally about the application of force to achieve political objectives. For Gray, war is fundamentally about contesting and achieving control, and without the capacity to impose a decisive order, grey zone tactics fall drastically short of true strategic efficacy. He cautions that the absence of decisive engagement in contemporary conflicts leads not to resolution, but to a debilitating strategic paralysis. This resonates deeply with Clausewitz’s core tenet that successful war must culminate in the decisive defeat of the enemy. Grey zone conflicts, by their very nature, do not and cannot fulfil this criterion. At best, they generate protracted stalemates; at worst, they risk unintended escalation into open, conventional warfare.

Countering the Cumulative Argument and Embracing Ambiguity: Incrementalism vs. Decisiveness

It is important to acknowledge a key counterargument: that grey zone tactics, while rarely decisive alone, gain strategic effect cumulatively over time. Proponents argue that persistent cyber intrusions, disinformation, and economic pressure can erode an adversary’s strength and will. This view sees grey zone warfare as long-term shaping, not a knockout blow, exemplified by China’s “Three Warfares” doctrine.

Furthermore, the ambiguity of grey zone conflicts can be strategically useful, like nuclear deterrence. Bernard Brodie argued nuclear war’s cost shifted strategy to prevention, redefining “victory” as avoiding war. Similarly, grey zone tactics might deter and manage competition below open conflict. Incremental disruption, like cyberattacks on Iran’s nuclear program, can also shift power balances.

Hurting Without Winning and the Zero-Sum Nature of Grey Zone Competition

Thomas Schelling noted, “Victory is no longer a prerequisite for hurting the enemy.” This is key to grey zone tactics, which can aim to inflict pain and signal resolve without overt war. Even non-military gains – diplomatic wins, sanctions, legal advantages achieved through disinformation and cyber influence – become strategic victories in this zero-sum competition. This is particularly relevant as tech-savvy strategists recognise the advantages of ambiguity in these operations.

However, pursuing overwhelming military victory can backfire, escalating conflict. Grey zone tactics offer a way to avoid this, operating below the threshold of conventional war. Yet, this ambiguity breeds volatility, with miscalculation and escalation always looming.

Strategic Victory as Peace-Winning and the Challenge of Subjectivity

Rethinking “strategic victory” beyond military terms is crucial. Robert Mandel distinguishes “war-winning” from “peace-winning,” arguing true strategic victory is “peace-winning” – a multi-dimensional achievement across information, politics, economics, and diplomacy. Grey zone tactics align with this broader view, especially as public mobilisation and decentralised networks shape geopolitics.

Yet, “victory” in the grey zone remains subjective and hard to measure. Ethan Kapstein highlights the difficulty of defining metrics, gaining consensus, and obtaining reliable data in grey zone operations. Progress in one area may undermine another, increasing strategic uncertainty. Whether grey zone tactics are a “strategic win” depends on perspective and chosen metrics.

Taiwan: Strategic Uncertainty in Action

Taiwan exemplifies the inherent volatility of grey zone warfare: while hybrid strategies can pressure an opponent, they provide no clear pathway to a controlled, predictable outcome. The lack of definitive thresholds makes grey zone tactics as much a risk as an opportunity for the aggressor. Imagine China using grey zone tactics against Taiwan: cyberattacks, disinformation, and economic pressure. While this might weaken Taiwan, it’s unlikely to force capitulation without risking wider conflict. Taiwan’s reaction, U.S. responses, and the ever-present risk of miscalculation create a strategic dilemma.

While Russia has shown resilience to external grey zone pressures by controlling information, societal resilience only mitigates, not eliminates, strategic uncertainty. Even the most robust resilience strategies cannot eliminate the risk of miscalculation or escalation, underscoring the inherent volatility of grey zone conflicts. Because grey zone conflicts operate ambiguously, even careful campaigns can unexpectedly escalate, making control and predictability elusive.

Policy Implications: Actively Shaping the Grey Zone for Advantage

The inherent strategic uncertainty of grey zone conflicts demands proactive policies:

  1. Sharpen Intelligence and Active Disruption: Enhance intelligence to understand adversary intentions and develop capabilities to actively disrupt their grey zone operations.
  2. Develop Flexible and Escalatory Response Options: Create a wider range of responses, including calibrated counter-grey zone tactics and clear signalling for de-escalation and conflict management. As artificial intelligence and automation continue to reshape information warfare, states must anticipate how AI-driven disinformation, deepfake technology, and autonomous cyber operations will further complicate grey zone conflicts. Developing countermeasures that integrate AI-based detection and rapid-response systems will be critical for maintaining strategic advantage.
  3. Promote Transparency to Force Predictability: Actively expose adversary actions to force them into a more predictable strategic posture, enhancing transparency and accountability in the grey zone.
  4. Focus on Proactive Crisis Management: Develop proactive crisis management to prevent crises, including clear communication, de-escalation protocols, and persistent low-intensity engagement for stability.
  5. Re-evaluate “Victory” and Embrace Persistent Engagement: Shift from traditional victory metrics to measures of resilience, deterrence, and long-term shaping, embracing persistent engagement as the norm in grey zone competition.

Conclusion: Embracing Uncertainty, Seeking Control Through Persistent Engagement

Russia’s pre-2022 hybrid warfare campaign in Ukraine – combining cyber operations, disinformation, and economic pressure – demonstrated the limitations of grey zone tactics. Rather than coercing Ukraine into submission, these operations reinforced Ukrainian national resistance and galvanised Western military support, ultimately leading to Russia’s full-scale invasion. This case underscores the strategic volatility of grey zone competition: while these tactics can create disruption, they provide no guarantee of controlled, predictable outcomes.

This highlights how grey zone tactics, while seemingly flexible, are unlikely to deliver traditional strategic victory and introduce significant strategic uncertainty. While ambiguity and “peace-winning” are modern adaptations, they don’t guarantee predictable outcomes or escalation control. The grey zone is a volatile battlespace defined by miscalculation and instability. Navigating the grey zone requires embracing uncertainty, prioritising crisis management, and actively shaping the battlespace. In this new era of perpetual contestation, mastering the grey zone is not about winning – it is about ensuring that one’s adversaries never can.

References

  1. Brodie, Bernard. “The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order.” The Yale Review 35, no. 3 (Spring 1946): 456-472.
  2. Gray, Colin S. The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
  3. Handel, Michael I. Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought. London: Frank Cass, 2001.
  4. Kania, Elsa B. “The PLA’s Latest Strategic Thinking on the Three Warfares.” The Jamestown Foundation, August 22, 2016. https://jamestown.org/program/the-plas-latest-strategic-thinking-on-the-three-warfares/.
  5. Kapstein, Ethan B. “Measuring Success in Complex Operations.” The Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 2 (April 2011): 267-285.
  6. Mandel, Robert. “Thinking about Victory in Strategy.” The Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 2 (April 2011): 199-200.
  7. Monaghan, Sean. “Twitter Revolutions? Social Media and the Arab Spring.” Whitehall Papers 69, no. 1 (2011): 21-22.
  8. Rid, Thomas. Cyber War Will Not Take Place. London: Hurst, 2013.
  9. Sanger, David E., and William J. Broad. “Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran.” The New York Times, June 1, 2012. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html.
  10. Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.
  11. Simons, Greg. “Russia and information confrontation: perceptions, strategies and responses.” Journal of strategic studies 42, no. 1 (2019): 139-140.
Past meets Future

Rethinking Warfare: Clausewitz in the Age of Cyber and Hybrid Conflict

By

On February 14, 2025

In Strategy

Carl von Clausewitz’s claim that war is “a continuation of politics by other means” has survived railways, radio and nuclear weapons.  Today the “other means” range from data-wiping malware that bricks ventilators to viral deep-fakes that never fired a shot.  The central puzzle is whether these novelties merely change the character of war (the tools, tempo and terrain) or whether they erode its immutable nature of violence, chance and political purpose (Echevarria 2002; Strachan 2013). 

International lawyers behind the Tallinn Manual 2.0 accept that a non-international armed conflict may now consist solely of cyber operations if the effects rival kinetic force (Schmitt 2017).  Thomas Rid counters that almost all cyber activity is better classed as espionage, sabotage or subversion. Such attacks may be potent, but not war in the Clausewitzian sense (Rid 2017).  The Russian “AcidRain” attack of February 2022 sits precisely on that fault-line: a single wiper disabled thousands of Ukrainian satellite modems and 5,800 German wind-turbines, yet no bombs fell (SentinelLabs 2022; Greenberg 2023).  If violence is judged by effect on human life rather than by the immediate mechanics of injury, Clausewitz still works; if it is judged by physical harm alone, he wobbles. 

The 2022 US National Defense Strategy elevates “integrated deterrence”, urging day-to-day campaigning below the armed-attack threshold (US DoD 2022).  US Cyber Command’s doctrine of persistent engagement pushes the same logic into practice, contesting adversaries continually rather than waiting for crises (USCYBERCOM 2022).  Fischerkeller and Harknett argue that such calibrated friction stabilises the domain; Lynch casts it as a new “power-sinew contest” in which outright war is the exception, not the rule (Fischerkeller & Harknett 2019; Lynch 2024).  The danger is conceptual inflation: call every malicious packet “war” and escalation thresholds blur, yet forcing every new tactic into Clausewitz’s vocabulary risks missing genuine novelty. 

Frank Hoffman’s once-handy term “hybrid warfare” now covers almost any sub-threshold activity.  NATO’s recent work on cognitive warfare goes further, treating perception itself as decisive terrain and calling for a fresh taxonomy of “acts of cognitive war” (NATO Innovation Hub 2023).  Clausewitz, writing in an age of limited literacy, rarely considered the deliberate collapse of an adversary’s shared reality as a line of operation.  The gap is undeniable – but it need not be fatal if his categories can stretch. 

Clausewitzian elementDigital-age inflectionIllustrative case
ViolencePhysical harm or systemic disruption that produces downstream human sufferingAcidRain modem wipe, 2022
ChanceAmplified by tightly coupled networks where small code changes trigger cascading failuresLog4j exploit cascade, 2021
Political purposeTerritorial control plus cognitive or behavioural manipulation2016 US election interference

The table shows how old categories bend.  Violence migrates into infrastructure; chance spikes in opaque systems; political purpose colonises the infosphere.  None of these shifts removes politics from the centre – precisely why the trinity still maps the ground.

There are 3 key areas where Clausewitz’s wisdom holds strongly:

  1. Politics first.  Colin Gray insists that strategy is the orchestration of means to political ends; replacing artillery with algorithms does not move that lodestar (Gray 1999).
  2. Escalation logic.  Even in cyberspace, deterrence depends on adversaries reading tacit red lines.  Clausewitz’s emphasis on uncertainty and friction remains apt.
  3. Human cost.  Cyber operations hurt indirectly – frozen hospital wards, confused electorates – but the harm is felt by bodies in time and space, not by circuits.

There are however, a number of places where the strain shows, namely where:

  • Systemic cyber harm approaches “force” while sidestepping bodily violence.
  • Persistent, below-threshold campaigning blurs the war–peace boundary Clausewitz assumed.
  • The trinity was never meant to classify acts aimed at belief rather than battalions.

For now, Rid’s scepticism still holds true – most cyber operations do not meet Clausewitz’s threshold of war.  Yet as societies entangle their critical functions ever more tightly with code, the line between systemic disruption and physical violence narrows.  Clausewitz’s trinity of violence, chance, political purpose – still offers the clearest compass, because politics, not technology, remains the centre of gravity of strategy.  The compass, however, is being asked to steer across novel terrain.  Should a future campaign achieve political aims through cyber-enabled systemic coercion alone, the Prussian might finally need more than a tune-up.  Until then, his core logic endures, and while needing adaptation, it has not been eclipsed.

Bibliography

Clausewitz, C. v. (1832) On War.  Berlin: Ferdinand Dümmler.

Echevarria, A. J. (2002) ‘Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine – Again!’.  Carlisle, PA: US Army Strategic Studies Institute. 

Fischerkeller, M. P. and Harknett, R. J. (2019) ‘Persistent Engagement, Agreed Competition, and Cyberspace Interaction Dynamics’. The Cyber Defense Review. 

Gray, C. S. (1999) Modern Strategy.  Oxford: Oxford University Press. 

Greenberg, A. (2023) ‘Ukraine Suffered More Wiper Malware in 2022 Than Anywhere, Ever’. WIRED, 22 February. 

Lynch, T. F. III (2024) ‘Forward Persistence in Great Power Cyber Competition’.  Washington, DC: National Defense University. 

NATO Innovation Hub (2023) The Cognitive Warfare Concept.  Norfolk, VA: NATO ACT. 

Rid, T. (2017) Cyber War Will Not Take Place.  Oxford: Oxford University Press. 

Schmitt, M. N. (ed.) (2017) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 

SentinelLabs (2022) ‘AcidRain: A Modem Wiper Rains Down on Europe’.  SentinelOne Labs Blog, 31 March. 

US Cyber Command (2022) ‘CYBER 101 – Defend Forward and Persistent Engagement’.  Press release, 25 October. 

US Department of Defense (2022) National Defense Strategy of the United States of America.  Washington, DC. 

The Future of War: AI and Strategy

By

On February 6, 2025

In Strategy

When Carl von Clausewitz wrote that war is “a continuation of politics by other means,” he centred conflict on purpose rather than technology. Colin Gray later warned that strategic constants outlive every gadget. Artificial intelligence now accelerates observation-decision loops from minutes to milliseconds, but whether that shift dethrones human strategy is still contested.

Speed Meets Friction

Ukrainian drone teams run machine-vision updates at the front line every fortnight, turning quadcopters into near-autonomous kamikaze platforms (Bondar 2025). Yet the same coders struggle with false positives – such as bears flagged as enemy sentries – and with mesh-network bottlenecks once EW jammers blanket the spectrum. AI compresses time, but it also multiplies friction, the very element Clausewitz thought ineradicable. We have to be conscious that false positives do not just waste munitions; when the same image-detection stack mis-tags an ambulance as a supply truck, the result is shrapnel in a paediatric ward, not an algorithmic hiccup. In 2025, the World Health Organization stated that hospitals reported 205 deaths from strike-related service loss in Ukraine.

Open-source models still give insurgents propaganda reach, but the sharper edge of algorithmic warfare sits with states.  Israel’s Lavender system, revealed in 2024, generated a list of roughly 37,000 potential Hamas targets and was used even when commanders expected up to twenty civilian deaths per strike—a machine-driven tempo that unsettled some of the intelligence officers involved (McKernan & Davies 2024).  Cutting-edge autonomy, however, still demands high-end GPUs, abundant power and proprietary data.  That keeps strategic dominance gated by infrastructure, mirroring geopolitical power.  Yet, as Kuner (2024) notes, Brussels carved a national-security escape hatch into the AI Act precisely to preserve state leverage over the biggest models.

Washington’s Replicator initiative aims to field “thousands of attriable autonomous systems” within two years (DoD 2024). Beijing answers through civil-military fusion; Moscow improvises with AI-augmented loitering munitions. These programmes underpin an operating concept of continuous, sub-threshold contest, paralleling U.S. Cyber Command’s “persistent engagement”. Strategic deterrence thus rests on the hope that algorithmic agents still read tacit red lines the way humans do. In Stanford’s 2024 crisis simulations, LLM agents recommended first-strike escalation in seventy-nine per cent of runs, providing evidence that algorithmic ‘rationality’ may be anything but.

If LLM advisers escalate crises in simulation nine times out of ten, the locus of judgement drifts from commander to code.  The next question is whether that drift merely speeds execution or begins to automate strategy itself.

Promoters once claimed AI would dissolve uncertainty; real battlefields say different. Sensor glut, spoofed tracks and synthetic “ghost columns” now drown analysts in contradictory feeds (Collazzo 2025). AI redistributes fog rather than lifting it – accelerating some judgements while blinding others through overload or deception (Askew and Salinas 2025). 

The Pentagon updated Directive 3000.09 on autonomous weapons in late 2024, tightening human-in-the-loop requirements. At the multilateral level, UN talks in May 2025 once again failed to agree binding rules, though Secretary-General Guterres set a 2026 deadline (Le Poidevin 2025). Norms lag well behind code, keeping accountability – and escalation liability – firmly in human hands. 

Strategic implications

The transformative impact of AI on strategic paradigms can be distilled into a few key considerations:

  • Advantage remains political. AI is a means; objectives still emanate from human intent. Strategy therefore keeps its Clausewitzian anchor in politics.
  • Automation magnifies misperception. Faster loops leave less time for reflection; and black-box models hide their own failure modes.  Bias and data poisoning risk strategic self-harm.
  • Deterrence becomes brittle. Autonomous systems may over-react to spoofed inputs; adversaries may test thresholds in micro-seconds rather than hours, shortening the ladder of de-escalation.

Conclusions

AI does not automate strategy; it amplifies both its promise and its pathologies. Machines accelerate tactics, generate options and even draft operational plans, but they do not choose political ends – and they continue to manifest friction, chance and uncertainty. Thomas Rid remains broadly right that most cyber and AI activity falls short of war (Rid, 2017), yet as energy grids, logistics chains and battlefield kill cycles digitise, the gap between systemic disruption and physical violence narrows. For the moment, Clausewitz’s compass still points true – but the ground beneath it is starting to slide.

Select bibliography

Askew, M. and Salinas, A. (2025) ‘AI Will Make the Mind Games of War More Risky’, Business Insider, 18 Apr.

Bondar, K. (2025) Ukraine’s Future Vision and Current Capabilities for Waging AI-Enabled Autonomous Warfare.  CSIS.

Collazzo, A. (2025) ‘Warfare at the Speed of Thought’, Modern War Institute, 21 Feb.

Department of Defense (2024) ‘Replicator Initiative Progress Update’.

Kuner, C. (2024) ‘The AI Act National Security Exception’, Verfassungsblog, 15 Dec.

Le Poidevin, O. (2025) ‘Nations Meet at UN for “Killer Robot” Talks’, Reuters, 12 May.

McKernan, B., & Davies, H. (2024). The Machine Did It Coldly. The Guardian, 3 April. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/03/israel-gaza-ai-database-hamas-airstrikes  

Rid, T. (2017) Cyber War Will Not Take Place.  Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stanford HAI (2024) Escalation Risks from LLMs in Military and Diplomatic Contexts.

World Health Organization (2025) WHO’s Health Emergency Appeal 2025. Geneva: World Health Organization.

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