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Header image for an article on PGM usage by Russia

Precision Reconsidered: Russia’s Shift from Guided Missiles to Mass Bombardment

Previously Russia positioned itself as a modern power able to cripple an adversary’s decision-cycle with carefully targeted precision-guided munitions. Three years of war in Ukraine have punctured that story. The Kremlin now relies on volume rather than accuracy, trading the prestige of “surgical” strikes for the blunt attrition of drone swarms and repurposed air-defence missiles. What follows traces that transition and asks what it does to Western analytical assumptions about technology, ethics and power.

From Surgical Imagery to Saturation Practice

Pentagon tallies show that Russian forces loosed more than one thousand one hundred guided missiles in the first month of the invasion, yet many exploded in apartment blocks rather than command nodes (Department of Defense, 2022). Domestic production never kept pace. By mid-2023 Russian factories were turning out roughly sixty new cruise missiles a month, a fraction of operational demand (Williams, 2023).

Facing depletion, Moscow shifted firepower architecture. S-300 surface-to-air missiles were redirected at ground targets, increasing miss distances, while Iranian-designed Shahed drones began to pad nightly salvos (Army Recognition, 2024). Guided-missile launches fell steadily while drone use soared, reaching an estimated total of four thousand deployed by the first quarter of 2025 (Atalan and Jensen, 2025). The identity of the high-tech precision striker gave way to the practicalities of magazine depth and industrial capacity.

Implications for Western Analysis

Western security discourse long treated accuracy as a twin proof of technical mastery and ethical restraint (Schmitt and Widmar, 2014; Wilson, 2020). Russia’s practice weakens both pillars. Norms endure through consistent observance and recognition; when a major power claims the vocabulary of precision while accepting wide error margins, the social meaning of accuracy erodes (Tannenwald, 2017).

The episode therefore offers a methodological caution. Counting missiles without attending to their symbolic weight risks analytical short-sightedness. The shift towards low-cost saturation munitions signals a recalibration of Russian strategic identity and alters the deterrence calculus of adversaries who must now defend against continuous drone attrition rather than episodic cruise-missile raids. Civilian resilience, alliance solidarity and arms-control expectations all pivot on how quickly that new reality is understood.

In Summary

Russia’s move from precision-guided missiles to mass bombardment is more than a supply-chain story. It marks the point where an identity built on technological finesse buckled under material constraint, transforming both the battlefield and the normative landscape around it. Analysts tracking future conflicts would do well to remember that weapons categories are not only hardware inventories but carriers of meaning, and that meaning can shift faster than production lines.


Bibliography

Army Recognition 2024. ‘Russia Repurposes S-300 Surface-to-Air Missiles for Ground Attacks Against Kharkiv’, 5 January.

Atalan, Y. and Jensen, B. 2025. Drone Saturation: Russia’s Shahed Campaign. CSIS Brief, 13 May.

Department of Defense 2022. ‘Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds a Press Briefing’, 21 March.

Schmitt, M. and Widmar, E. 2014. ‘On Target: Precision and Balance in the Contemporary Law of Targeting’. Journal of National Security Law and Policy, 7(3).

Tannenwald, N. 2017. ‘How Strong Are the Nuclear Taboo and the Chemical Weapons Ban?’ The Washington Quarterly, 40(1), 79–98.

Williams, I. 2023. ‘Russia Isn’t Going to Run Out of Missiles’. CSIS Analysis, 28 June.

Wilson, N. 2020. ‘The Ambiguities of Precision Warfare’, Intimacies of Remote Warfare commentary, 12 June. 

UN Helmet on the ground

Reflection – The UN’s Legitimacy Gap: A Haiti Case Study

Thomas Weiss identifies five “gaps” that chronically hamper global governance: knowledge, normative, policy, institutional and compliance (Weiss 2013).  In Haiti, those gaps seem to have coalesced into what many Haitians read as an enduring legitimacy deficit.  A more charitable interpretation does note instances of UN adaptation – better crime mapping after 2011, a dramatic scaling-up of the Haitian National Police (HNP), and a science-led cholera response – but, examined closely, such achievements tend to appear partial and fragile, leaving the larger breach largely intact.

Knowledge and compliance.  MINUSTAH’s 2004 start-up underestimated the dense, shifting alliances between gangs and political patrons.  When a contingent from Nepal inadvertently introduced cholera in 2010, infecting more than 800,000 people and claiming over 10,000 lives (Frerichs et al. 2012; Katz 2013), the Organisation spent six years contesting its own liability before an apology was issued (United Nations 2016).  Subsequent epidemiological work certainly curbed transmission, yet the delay itself suggested an accountability reflex still subordinate to reputational caution – an impression hard to reverse.

Normative conduct.  Sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, including minors among the victims, seriously undercut the UN’s human-rights narrative.  The Associated Press counted more than 2,000 allegations between 2004 and 2016, with very few domestic prosecutions (Associated Press 2017).  Reforms adopted in 2017 – victim-centred assistance, mandatory pre-deployment training, a voluntary trust fund – mark welcome movement, and Haiti arguably catalysed those global norms.  Even so, the survivors’ experience of limited redress reinforces a perception that institutional learning operates at UN headquarters, not in the quartiers populaires where the harm occurred.

Policy and institutional adaptation.  Supporters of the UN strategy point to iterative mandates: from peace enforcement (MINUSTAH) to rule-of-law mentoring (MINUJUSTH) and, since 2019, a slim political office (BINUH), with a Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support force now in train (UN Security Council 2023).  Elections held in 2006, 2010 and 2016 proceeded on schedule with heavy UN logistical underwriting, and the HNP expanded from roughly 4,000 officers in 2004 to more than 15,000 by 2020 (Malone and Day 2020).  Yet the police have struggled to retain personnel and equipment since the draw-down, and gang territory has again expanded.  The pattern suggests that short, mandate-driven cycles may be ill-suited to a state so hollow that capacity must be nurtured for decades, not rotations.

Legitimacy in the balance.  Survey data gathered in Port-au-Prince in 2015 found only a minority favouring immediate UN withdrawal, indicating a degree of conditional acceptance; most respondents nonetheless judged the mission “only somewhat” effective (International Crisis Group 2016).  Such grudging tolerance implies utility rather than genuine confidence.  In other words, the Organisation remains necessary but is seldom trusted.

Taken together, Haiti illustrates how partial advances in knowledge production, normative reform, and institutional design, whilst real, have not yet outweighed the reputational cost of early missteps and uneven compliance.  Unless the UN sustains a far longer horizon of engagement – accepting that legitimacy is rebuilt in increments and measured locally – its blue helmet risks settling into an increasingly tarnished emblem: credible enough to be tolerated, rarely persuasive enough to inspire.

Bibliography

Associated Press. 2017. “UN Child Sex Ring Left Victims but No Arrests.” Associated Press investigative report, 12 April.

Frerichs, R. R., et al. 2012. “Nepalese Origin of Cholera Outbreak in Haiti.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109 (47): 19944–19949.

International Crisis Group. 2016. Haiti: Security and the Reinforcement of the Rule of Law. Latin America/Caribbean Report No. 62. Brussels: ICG.

Katz, Jonathan M. 2013. The Big Truck That Went By: How the World Came to Save Haiti and Left Behind a Disaster. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Malone, David M., and Adam Day. 2020. “Taking Measure of the UN’s Legacy at Seventy-Five.” Ethics & International Affairs 34 (3): 285–295.

United Nations. 2016. “Secretary-General’s Remarks to the General Assembly on a New Approach to Cholera in Haiti.” UN Doc. A/71/620, 1 December. New York: United Nations.

United Nations Security Council. 2023. Resolution 2699 (2023) on Haiti. UN Doc. S/RES/2699, 2 October.

Weiss, Thomas G. 2013. Global Governance: Why? What? Whither? Cambridge: Polity Press.

Symbolic representation of US memories

The Strategic Cost of Selective Memory: America’s Curated History and Its Global Fallout

In international affairs, collective memory isn’t just about remembrance, it is strategy. Building on Maurice Halbwachs’ foundational insight that memory operates within ‘social frameworks’ rather than being purely individual, states don’t merely remember; they perform memory. They weaponise it, sanitise it – engaging in what scholars analysing the commemoration of conflict call the ‘politics of memory’ – or altogether reinvent it in service of national mythologies. Nowhere is this more visible than in the United States, where curated memory masquerades as identity and policy follows suit like a loyal retriever chasing a dream of exceptionalism.

American memory is less a reflection of truth and more a product of selective mythmaking, a process operating, as recent work suggests, between individual cognition and broader social systems. Slavery becomes a tragic prelude to civil rights triumphalism; Vietnam is rebranded as a “lesson” rather than a quagmire; Iraq fades into a haze of “intelligence failures” rather than strategic hubris – precisely the kind of state-managed remembrance of war that historians like Jay Winter have examined. The result is not forgetfulness, but an active process of narrative laundering – a continual reframing that turns moral ambiguity into digestible fables of resilience and heroism.

This curated memory has profound consequences on the global stage. For one, it erodes credibility. When the U.S. invokes democracy, freedom, or human rights in its foreign policy, other nations, particularly those in the Global South, hear the echoes of hypocrisy. How can a country that selectively remembers its own imperial past credibly critique the actions of others? The inability to reconcile with its own historical misdeeds, from colonial genocide to CIA-sponsored coups, prevents the kind of sustained engagement with inherited trauma that theorists like Marianne Hirsch describe through the concept of ‘postmemory’ – rendering its moral posture performative at best, disingenuous at worst.

Secondly, America’s self-mythologising fuels dangerous policy cycles. By continually framing itself as a liberator rather than an empire in denial, the U.S. is caught in a loop of interventionist déjà vu. Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya – each was framed through a narrative lens of moral imperative, conveniently edited for domestic consumption. The strategic amnesia of past failures enables new ones, while domestic audiences, pacified by a curated history, fail to ask the right questions until it’s too late.

Finally, selective remembrance alienates allies and emboldens adversaries. Nations with long historical memories (Russia, China, Iran) perceive American forgetfulness as both weakness and opportunity. They understand that the U.S. forgets what it cannot afford to confront. In contrast, these states actively curate their own histories to justify assertive policies, turning memory into statecraft. The battlefield, then, is not just diplomatic or military – it’s mnemonic. A clash of memory regimes.

Collective memory, when manipulated, becomes a liability. It blinds policymakers to patterns. It masks structural failings. It builds castles of credibility on foundations of denial. And eventually, it collapses under the weight of its own revisionism.

If America seeks to reclaim its influence on the global stage, it must confront its past not as mythology, but as memory: flawed, complex, and deserving of honest reckoning. Until then, its strategic future will remain tethered to the convenient lies it tells itself and the inconvenient truths the rest of the world refuses to forget.


Bibliography

Ashplant, T. G., Graham Dawson, and Michael Roper, eds. Commemorating War: The Politics of Memory. London: Routledge, 2000.

Halbwachs, Maurice. Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1925.

Hirsch, Marianne. The Generation of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture After the Holocaust. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.  

Orianne, Jean-François, and Francis Eustache. “Collective Memory: Between Individual Systems of Consciousness and Social Systems.” Frontiers in Psychology 14 (2023).  

Winter, Jay. Remembering War: The Great War Between Memory and History in the 20th Century. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.  

Insurgency vs. Terrorism: What’s the Difference?

I’ve created a video on the difference between the definitions of insurgency and terrorism. While both involve violence and political motivations, I explore why understanding their key differences is essential. The video includes historical examples and the blurred lines between these two concepts, which should help in shedding light on the political implications behind the labels we use.

Please do feel free to reach out and discuss anything in the video, or leave a comment if you would prefer.

Strategic Chessboard

The Unfolding Strategic Environment: Reconciling Enduring Principles with Revolutionary Change

The contemporary strategic environment presents a paradox. On one hand, the fundamental nature of war as a political instrument, driven by human factors and subject to friction and uncertainty, appears timeless. Carl von Clausewitz’s assertion that war serves political objectives remains a crucial anchor, forcing strategists to connect means with ends, even amidst technological fascination. Similarly, Sun Tzu’s principles regarding deception, intelligence, and achieving advantage with minimal direct confrontation resonate strongly in an era increasingly defined by non-traditional operations and persistent competition below the threshold of open warfare.

Yet, the character of conflict is undergoing a profound transformation. Technological disruption, particularly in the digital domain, is eroding traditional military advantages, intensifying “grey zone” activities, empowering non-state actors, and blurring the very definitions of war and peace. This necessitates a critical re-examination of established strategic paradigms and a forward-looking approach to national security. The challenge for policymakers and strategists lies in reconciling the enduring nature of war with its rapidly evolving character.

From Deterrence by Punishment to Deterrence by Resilience?

The Cold War’s strategic stability, largely built upon the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), faces fundamental challenges in the digital age. While nuclear deterrence created a precarious balance, its logic struggles to adapt to threats operating outside its established framework. Cyberspace and information warfare lack the clear attribution mechanisms and proportional response options that underpin traditional deterrence by punishment. As Thomas Rid notes, establishing credibility and effective retaliation in these domains is problematic. Jeffrey Knopf’s work on “Fourth Wave” deterrence highlights how emerging threats disrupt existing models.

Furthermore, the strategic landscape is no longer solely dominated by states. Powerful technology firms, transnational terrorist organisations, and ideologically driven groups operate with increasing autonomy and influence, complicating deterrence calculations built on state-centric assumptions. The conflict in Ukraine provides stark examples, where companies like SpaceX have deployed capabilities, such as Starlink, that significantly impact battlefield communications and information warfare dynamics, challenging the state’s traditional monopoly on such strategic assets. This diffusion of power necessitates a broader conception of deterrence, moving beyond punishment towards denial, resilience, deception, and proactive information operations. Security may increasingly depend on the ability to withstand, adapt, and operate effectively within a contested information environment, rather than solely on the threat of overwhelming retaliation.

The Digital Revolution and the Transformation of Conflict Logic

The digital revolution represents more than just the introduction of new tools; it signifies a potential “change of consciousness” in warfare, as Christopher Coker suggests. Conflict becomes less geographically bounded and more psychological, abstract, and continuous, eroding distinctions between wartime and peacetime. Cyber operations, AI-enabled decision-making, and sophisticated disinformation campaigns are not merely adjuncts to traditional military power; they are becoming central components of strategic competition. China’s “Three Warfares” doctrine integrating psychological operations, public opinion manipulation, and legal maneuvering, which exemplifies how state actors are weaponising the information domain to achieve strategic aims.

This shift challenges classical strategic concepts. How is escalation controlled when cyberattacks lack clear attribution? How is victory defined when conflict plays out continuously in the non-physical domain? The Ukraine conflict serves as a real-world laboratory, demonstrating the strategic significance of cyber defenses, AI-driven targeting, and narrative warfare alongside conventional operations. It highlights how eroding conventional advantages forces a rethink of the very currency of power. Non-state actors, like ISIS, have also adeptly exploited the digital realm for recruitment, propaganda, and operational coordination, demonstrating the asymmetric advantages offered by this environment.

Systemic Fragility, Strategic Agility, and Redefined Victory

The deep integration of technology across society creates unprecedented efficiencies but also introduces systemic fragility. Interconnectedness means that disruptions, whether from cyberattacks, pandemics, financial crises, or supply chain breakdowns, can cascade rapidly with significant security implications. Consequently, building national resilience – encompassing robust cybersecurity, hardened infrastructure, diversified supply chains, and societal preparedness – becomes a core strategic imperative.

Alongside resilience, strategic agility is paramount. The accelerating pace of technological and geopolitical change means that strategies and institutions must be capable of rapid adaptation. The failure of European powers to adapt their doctrines to the realities of industrialised warfare before World War I, as chronicled by Barbara Tuchman, serves as a potent warning against strategic rigidity. Fostering agility requires institutional cultures that embrace learning and experimentation, empower decentralised action, and anticipate change.

This evolving landscape also forces a re-evaluation of “victory”. As warfare expands beyond purely military considerations to encompass cyber, economic, and informational domains, success becomes more ambiguous. Robert Mandel’s distinction between “war-winning” (tactical success) and “peace-winning” (achieving sustainable political outcomes) is increasingly pertinent. Future conflicts, likely to be protracted and involve multiple actors with divergent goals, may necessitate strategies focused on achieving iterative, adaptable political objectives rather than decisive military triumphs.

Adapting Strategy for an Unfolding Future

While some argue that classical, state-centric models of war are obsolete, discarding the foundational insights of strategists like Clausewitz and Sun Tzu would be premature. As Lawrence Freedman emphasises, war remains shaped by human agency and political motives, regardless of technology. The core task is not replacement but adaptation: applying enduring principles to navigate the complexities of the contemporary environment.

Successfully navigating the future strategic environment requires a conceptual shift. Technological foresight, AI-driven analysis, and robust cyber capabilities are necessary but insufficient. The decisive factor may be institutional and cultural: the capacity for continuous learning, adaptation, and innovation. Strategy must become truly multidimensional, integrating all instruments of national power – diplomatic, informational, military, and economic – within a coherent framework that acknowledges both the timeless nature and the transforming character of conflict. The future belongs to those who can master this complex, dynamic interplay.


Bibliography

  • Awan, Imran. “Cyber-Extremism: Isis and the Power of Social Media.” Society 54, no. 2 (April 2017): 138–49. https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/cyber-extremism-isis-power-social-media/docview/1881683052/se-2.
  • Coker, Christopher. Future War. Polity Press, 2015.
  • Freedman, Lawrence. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
  • Freedman, Lawrence. The Future of War: A History. New York: PublicAffairs, 2017.
  • Gray, Colin S. The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Online edn, Oxford Academic, September 1, 2010.
  • Greggs, David. “Violent Limitation: Cyber Effects Reveal Gaps in Clausewitzian Theory.” The Cyber Defense Review 9, no. 1 (2024): 73–86. [invalid URL removed].
  • Jervis, Robert. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989.
  • Kaldor, Mary. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012.
  • Kania, Elsa B. “The PLA’s Latest Strategic Thinking on the Three Warfares.” The Jamestown Foundation, August 22, 2016. https://jamestown.org/program/the-plas-latest-strategic-thinking-on-the-three-warfares/.
  • Knopf, Jeffrey W. The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2002.
  • Layton, Peter. “Fighting artificial intelligence battles: Operational concepts for future ai-enabled wars.” Network 4, no. 20 (2021): 1-100.
  • Mandel, Robert. The Meaning of Military Victory. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006.
  • Morozov, Evgeny. To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism. New York: PublicAffairs, 2013.
  • Rid, Thomas. Cyber War Will Not Take Place. London: Hurst, 2013.
  • Skove, Sam. “How Elon Musk’s Starlink Is Still Helping Ukraine’s Defenders.” Defense One, March 1, 2023. https://www.defenseone.com.
  • Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Newburyport: Dover Publications, Incorporated, 2002.
  • Tiwari, Sachin. “Cyber Operations in the Grey Zone.” The Digital Humanities Journal, November 14, 2023. https://tdhj.org/blog/post/cyber-operations-grey-zone/.
  • Tuchman, Barbara W. The Guns of August. New York: Macmillan, 1962.
  • Van Creveld, Martin. Transformation of War. New York: Free Press, 1991.
  • Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press,1 1984.
Chessboard with smoke floating over the pieces

How Grey Zone Warfare Exploits the West’s Risk Aversion

Western democracies are caught in a strategic bind. Adversaries, skilled at operating in the murky “grey zone” between peace and open warfare, are exploiting a fundamental Western characteristic: risk aversion. Grey zone warfare blends cyberattacks, disinformation, economic coercion, and proxy warfare to achieve strategic goals without triggering a full-scale military response. The risk is not merely theoretical. One might argue that the resulting ambiguity produces a kind of strategic paralysis, one that leaves Western states unable or unwilling to respond decisively to threats that refuse the comfort of clear categorisation.

A 21st-Century Threat

Grey zone warfare encompasses more than just cyberattacks and disinformation. Think of cyberattacks that cripple infrastructure but stop short of causing mass casualties, disinformation campaigns that sow discord and erode trust in institutions, and the use of proxy forces to destabilise a region. Crucially, it also includes economic coercion. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, with its potential for creating debt traps and strategic dependencies, is a prime example. Russia’s use of energy supplies as a political weapon, particularly against European nations, is another. The key is plausible deniability and making it difficult for the target to definitively attribute actions. This in turn makes it more challenging for states to justify a strong response. The underlying ambition is to achieve strategic objectives, be it weakening an adversary, gaining leverage, or shaping policy outcomes, all while avoiding the threshold of open military conflict. We see this in China’s response to Lithuania’s engagement with Taiwan, where trade sanctions were used as a punitive measure. Similarly, the West’s reliance on Chinese rare earth minerals creates a vulnerability that can be exploited for political leverage.

Grey Zones as a Strategic Vulnerability

The West, particularly Europe and North America, has a deeply ingrained preference for diplomacy and de-escalation. This isn’t necessarily a bad thing as it stems from a genuine desire to avoid the horrors of large-scale war and maintain a stable global order. But this risk aversion, while understandable, has become a strategic vulnerability. Adversaries see this hesitation and tailor their actions accordingly. They operate just below the threshold of what would trigger a decisive military response, creating a constant dilemma for Western leaders: how to respond effectively without escalating the situation into a wider conflict?

Ukraine is a tragic textbook example of grey zone warfare in action. Russia’s strategy goes far beyond conventional military force. It includes crippling cyberattacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, a relentless barrage of disinformation aimed at undermining the Ukrainian government and sowing discord, and the backing of separatist movements to create internal instability. These actions are calculated to achieve Russia’s goals while staying below the threshold that would provoke a direct military intervention from NATO. The Western response, consisting primarily of sanctions and diplomatic pressure, reveals the core problem. While intended to punish Russia and deter further aggression, this relatively restrained approach has, perhaps, enabled Russia to continue its grey zone operations, demonstrating the difficulty of countering these tactics without risking a wider war. The continued, grinding conflict, and the incremental nature of Western support, highlight the limitations of a purely reactive, risk-averse strategy.

The Erosion of American Global Leadership and Europe’s Quest for Strategic Autonomy

One might observe that the erosion of American global leadership (accelerated, though not solely caused, by the Trump administration) has unsettled the transatlantic alliance in ways that are still playing out. Actions such as imposing tariffs on allies, questioning NATO’s relevance, and the perceived (and sometimes explicit) wavering of commitment to Article 5’s collective defence clause have created a climate of uncertainty. European nations are now grappling with a fundamental question: can they rely on the US security umbrella? This doubt isn’t just theoretical; it’s driving concrete policy changes.

This uncertainty has fuelled a push for European “strategic autonomy” and the ability to act independently in defence and foreign policy. Figures like French President Macron have long championed this idea, and it’s gaining traction across the continent. Even in the UK, traditionally a staunch US ally, Labour leader Keir Starmer has emphasised the need for increased defence spending and closer European security cooperation. Germany’s Zeitenwende, its historic shift towards rearmament, is a direct response to this new reality. These are not just rhetorical flourishes; they represent a fundamental rethinking of European security, driven by a perceived need to fill the void left by a less predictable and less engaged United States. The debate over a European army, or a more coordinated European defence force, is no longer fringe; it’s becoming mainstream.

Strategic Paralysis Under the Clausewitzian Lens

This brings us to the heart of the matter: strategic paralysis. The West, caught between a desire to avoid escalation and the need to respond effectively, often finds itself frozen. This is the sort of effect to which grey zone tactics aspire, though whether paralysis is a design or an emergent consequence remains open to debate. By fostering ambiguity, where traditional responses appear either disproportionate or politically fraught, adversaries create the very conditions in which Western decision-making risks becoming paralysed. The fear of “provoking” a larger conflict becomes a weapon in itself. As Clausewitz argued, war is an extension of politics. Grey zone conflict is simply an extension of war by subtler means, one designed to neutralise the West’s ability to make political decisions with clarity.

Looking at the situation, it could be suggested that Western states would do well to move beyond rhetorical condemnation or reactive sanctions. Addressing the breadth of grey zone threats requires not only the technical apparatus to respond, but also a reconsideration of what risks must be borne, and what forms of resilience truly matter. Societal awareness, for instance, is not a panacea, but a necessary condition for resisting disinformation and political interference.

If Western governments are to avoid strategic paralysis, their response cannot rely solely on traditional deterrence or diplomatic ritual. Perhaps the focus should shift toward nurturing resilience – not just through technological investment or alliance-building, but by cultivating an informed citizenry, capable of recognising manipulation in its many guises. The challenge is not merely technical, nor simply a matter of resolve either.

Concluding Reflections

Grey zone tactics have flourished amid Western risk aversion and a prevailing uncertainty over deterrence. It could be suggested that the greater risk, at times, lies in mistaking inertia for prudence. Whether Western policymakers can recalibrate their tolerance for ambiguity, and adapt to the subtler forms of coercion now in play, remains an open question – one on which the resilience of the international order may quietly depend. I would argue that it is not merely the West’s material strength, but the demonstration of resolve (and a measure of unpredictability) that will matter most. Whether Western states can move beyond a posture of predictable restraint, or whether caution will continue to invite opportunism, remains to be seen. In the end, the future of the international liberal order may depend less on declarations of intent than on the willingness to accept calculated risk. Whether the West can adapt to this new era of conflict remains the most pressing question.

Bibliography

American Military University. “Gray Zone Attacks by Russia Being Used to Undermine Ukraine.” AMU Edge, May 12, 2023. https://amuedge.com/gray-zone-attacks-by-russia-being-used-to-undermine-ukraine/.

Chivvis, Christopher S. Understanding Russian “Hybrid Warfare” and What Can Be Done About It. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017. https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT468.html.

Gray, Colin S. Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare. London: Phoenix, 2005.

Military Strategy Magazine. “Deterring War Without Threatening War: Rehabilitating the West’s Risk-Averse Approach to Deterrence.” Military Strategy Magazine,1 April 2023. https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/deterring-war-without-threatening-war-rehabilitating-the-wests-risk-averse-approach-to-deterrence/.

Onsolve. “Gray Zone Warfare: What Business Leaders Need to Know.” Onsolve Blog, March 2024. https://www.onsolve.com/blog/sra-gray-zone-warfare-business-leaders/.

Rid, Thomas. Cyber War Will Not Take Place. London: C. Hurst & Co., 2013.

The Wall Street Journal. “Trump Is Overturning the World Order That America Built.” WSJ, January 25, 2024. https://www.wsj.com/world/trump-is-overturning-the-world-order-that-america-built-10981637.

The New Yorker. “What’s Next for Ukraine?” The New Yorker, February 2024. https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-lede/whats-next-for-ukraine.

Why Technology Alone Doesn’t Win Wars

We often assume that the latest military technology will define the future of warfare. AI, cyber weapons, and autonomous drones are hailed as game-changers, just as tanks, aircraft, and nuclear weapons were in past eras. But history tells a different story, one where new technology is only as effective as the strategy, doctrine, and human adaptation behind it.

In this video, we explore David Edgerton’s critique of technological determinism, the idea that wars are shaped by cutting-edge innovation alone. From ancient weapons to modern cyber warfare, we show why old technologies persist, how armies adapt, and why war remains a contest of resilience, not just hardware.

The Real Lesson of Military Technology

The biggest mistake in war isn’t failing to develop new technology, it’s assuming that technology alone will guarantee victory. History proves that the best weapons don’t always win battles; those who adapt, integrate, and sustain their forces over time do.

What do you think? Are we overhyping AI and cyber warfare today, just as people once overhyped battleships or air power?

Europe's Leadership Vacuum in the Shadow of Russia and America

Europe’s Leadership Vacuum in the Shadow of Russia and America

The concept of ‘strategic culture’ as critiqued in Hew Strachan’s “The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective” emphasises continuity and a nation’s resistance to change, shaped historically and geographically. Strategic culture includes historical memory, institutional norms, core national values, and collective threat perceptions, all contributing to a nation’s strategic posture. This comprehensive framework is valuable when examining Europe’s contemporary security challenges, specifically the strategic vacuum highlighted by the ongoing war in Ukraine and America’s ongoing withdrawal from global leadership.

Europe’s Strategic Culture

European strategic culture, forged during the Cold War, assumed stability through American military and diplomatic leadership. Strachan argues convincingly that such cultural assumptions hinder strategic flexibility, creating vulnerabilities when geopolitical realities shift dramatically, as they have since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

NATO-centric thinking, predicated on the guarantee of American power projection, has revealed problematic inertia… European states, notably the UK and the EU members, have found themselves scrambling to define a coherent, autonomous response.

America’s Strategic Shift from Protector to Competitor

America’s strategic withdrawal from Europe, evidenced by Obama’s pivot to Asia, that accelerated by Trump V1.0’s transactional approach, Biden’s reticence and culminating with Trump 2.0’s recent dramatic geopolitical hand grenades. This reflects not merely a change in policy but a radical break from previous expectations. This withdrawal is a revolutionary, not evolutionary, shift in global strategy, shattering Europe’s assumption of guaranteed U.S. engagement.

Strategically, this creates immediate tensions:

  • The U.S. increasingly frames its engagement with Europe as transactional and conditional upon shared responsibilities, as demonstrated by U.S. ambivalence toward NATO under Trump and Biden’s conditional engagement in Ukraine.
  • Simultaneously, Russia’s aggression has starkly shown that the belief in a diminished threat from inter-state warfare, fashionable among policymakers since the Cold War’s end, is dangerously misplaced. Strachan’s scepticism about overly optimistic predictions of war’s obsolescence resonates strongly here, given recent events.

This combination reveals Europe’s strategic culture as critically unprepared for the harsh geopolitical realities of the 21st century.

Europe’s Strategic Awakening

Europe has not been entirely inactive. The EU’s Strategic Compass, adopted in 2022, and the UK’s Integrated Review Refresh in 2023 demonstrate genuine acknowledgment of new realities. These documents move beyond purely reactive policies and represent Europe’s incremental shift towards strategic autonomy:

  • Increased defence expenditure: Germany’s Zeitenwende is a prime example.
  • Increased EU defence coordination, exemplified by the European Peace Facility funding Ukraine’s defence.
  • Renewed commitment to territorial defence and enhanced military deployments in Eastern Europe.

Yet, despite these efforts, the doctrinal and strategic mindset change has been incomplete. European policies continue to implicitly rely on the assumption of sustained U.S. involvement, despite public and political statements affirming Europe’s need for self-sufficiency.

Russia and America as Mirrors

The actions of Russia and the retreat of America each independently expose the inadequacies of Europe’s current strategic posture:

Russia’s Actions: Highlighted Europe’s continuing strategic vulnerability, emphasising weaknesses in rapid military deployment, critical capability gaps (such as long-range precision munitions and air defence), and dependence on U.S. logistical, intelligence, and strategic capabilities.

America’s Pivot Away: Underscores that strategic autonomy isn’t merely desirable but imperative. Starting with Biden administration’s reluctance to escalate beyond certain lines in Ukraine and Washington’s growing Indo-Pacific focus expose a stark misalignment between European expectations and American strategy. The most recent signals from Trump are an unequivocal message to Europe: unless there is something in it for America, you are on your own.

The Limits of Integration and NATO

While deeper European integration and renewed commitment to NATO might appear sufficient, these solutions alone are inadequate. Integration without clear autonomous capabilities risks perpetual dependency, and NATO’s structure, inherently reliant on American leadership, cannot compensate for America’s strategic reorientation. As Strachan underscores, relying purely on continuity without adaptability is strategically naive.

From Reactive Culture to Proactive Realism

Europe’s security doctrine requires nuanced recalibration rather than wholesale abandonment. The gap is not merely military, it is doctrinal, conceptual, and philosophical. A robust European strategic doctrine should:

  1. Recognise NATO’s Limitations: Explicitly acknowledge NATO’s limitations without undermining its centrality to European defence.
  2. Embed Strategic Autonomy: Clearly outline Europe’s independent capabilities and strategic objectives, moving beyond rhetoric to practical operational frameworks. Europe must realistically assess scenarios in which it may need to act without guaranteed American backing.
  3. Rethink Strategic Culture: Move beyond traditional assumptions of continuity—what previously seemed unthinkable, such as large-scale inter-state conflict, must become integral to planning and preparedness again.

Engaging Broader Perspectives

Drawing briefly from constructivist insights, strategic culture is not immutable but socially constructed, implying that European nations have the agency to reshape it consciously. Additionally, realist thinkers like John Mearsheimer caution against complacency in alliance politics, reinforcing the need for independent European capabilities.

Rethinking Doctrine for Strategic Resilience

The UK’s Integrated Review and the EU’s Strategic Compass represent valuable first steps toward a more strategic and independent Europe. However, they still fall short of addressing the fundamental gap that Russia’s aggression and America’s strategic recalibration have exposed.

Addressing Europe’s leadership vacuum demands overcoming historical and cultural inertia. It requires strategic humility: recognising that the stability provided by Cold War-era assumptions no longer applies, that threats are tangible, and that peace through strength must be anchored not in external assurances, but in Europe’s credible, independently sustainable power.

Europe must confront this reality head-on, accepting change not merely rhetorically but operationally, doctrinally, and culturally. Only then will Europe secure genuine strategic autonomy, prepared not just for today’s threats but also for tomorrow’s inevitable uncertainties.

Bibliography

  • Strachan, Hew. The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective. Cambridge University Press, 2013.
  • European Union. “Strategic Compass for Security and Defence.” 2022.
  • United Kingdom Government. “Integrated Review Refresh.” 2023.
  • Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W. W. Norton & Company, 2001.
  • Smith, Rupert. The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. Penguin, 2005.

[Video] UK and EU AI Influence

Artificial intelligence isn’t just reshaping industries—it’s reshaping reality. While the UK and EU focus on regulating AI and combating misinformation, adversarial states like Russia and China are weaponizing it for influence warfare. The AI-driven disinformation battle isn’t coming; it’s already here.

In my latest article, “Why the UK and EU Are Losing the AI Influence War”, I explore how Europe’s slow response, defensive posture, and reliance on outdated regulatory approaches are leaving it vulnerable to AI-enhanced propaganda campaigns.

To bring these ideas to life, I’ve created a video that visualises the scale of the challenge and why urgent action is needed. Watch it below:

The AI influence war is no longer a hypothetical—it’s unfolding in real-time. Europe’s current strategies are reactive and insufficient, while adversaries leverage AI to manipulate narratives at unprecedented speed. Without a cognitive security unit, AI-powered countermeasures, and a national security-driven approach, the UK and EU risk losing control of their own information space.

The question isn’t whether AI will reshape public perception, it’s who will be in control of that perception. Will Europe rise to the challenge, or will it remain a passive battleground for AI-driven narratives?

What do you think? Should the UK and EU take a more aggressive stance in countering AI-enhanced disinformation? Feel free to discuss in the comments.

WHY THE UK AND EU ARE LOSING THE AI INFLUENCE WAR

Why the UK and EU Are Losing the AI Influence War

Abstract

Western democracies face a new front in conflict: the cognitive battlespace, where artificial intelligence (AI) is leveraged to shape public opinion and influence behaviour. This article argues that the UK and EU are currently losing this AI-driven influence war. Authoritarian adversaries like Russia and China are deploying AI tools in sophisticated disinformation and propaganda campaigns, eroding trust in democratic institutions and fracturing social cohesion. In contrast, the UK and EU response, focused on regulation, ethical constraints, and defensive measures, has been comparatively slow and fragmented. Without a more proactive and unified strategy to employ AI in information operations and bolster societal resilience against cognitive warfare, Western nations risk strategic disadvantage. This article outlines the nature of the cognitive battle-space, examines adversarial use of AI in influence operations, evaluates UK/EU efforts and shortcomings, and suggests why urgent action is needed to regain the initiative.

Introduction

Modern conflict is no longer confined to conventional battlefields; it has expanded into the cognitive domain. The term “cognitive battlespace” refers to the arena of information and ideas, where state and non-state actors vie to influence what people think and how they behave. Today, advances in AI have supercharged this domain, enabling more sophisticated influence operations that target the hearts and minds of populations at scale. Adversaries can weaponise social media algorithms, deepfakes, and data analytics to wage psychological warfare remotely and relentlessly.

Western governments, particularly the United Kingdom and European Union member states, find themselves on the defensive. They face a deluge of AI-enhanced disinformation from authoritarian rivals but are constrained by ethical, legal, and practical challenges in responding. Early evidence suggests a troubling imbalance: Russia and China are aggressively exploiting AI for propaganda and disinformation, while the UK/EU struggle to adapt their policies and capabilities. As a result, analysts warn that Western democracies are “losing the battle of the narrative” in the context of AI (sciencebusiness.net). The stakes are high: if the UK and EU cannot secure the cognitive high ground, they risk erosion of public trust, social discord, and strategic loss of influence on the world stage.

This article explores why the UK and EU are lagging in the AI influence war. It begins by defining the cognitive battlespace and the impact of AI on information warfare. It then examines how adversaries are leveraging AI in influence operations. Next, it assesses the current UK and EU approach to cognitive warfare and highlights key shortcomings. Finally, it discusses why Western efforts are falling behind and what the implications are for future security.

The Cognitive Battlespace in the Age of AI

In cognitive warfare, the human mind becomes the battlefield. As one expert succinctly put it, the goal is to “change not only what people think, but how they think and act” (esdc.europa.eu). This form of conflict aims to shape perceptions, beliefs, and behaviours in a way that favours the aggressor’s objectives. If waged effectively over time, cognitive warfare can even fragment an entire society, gradually sapping its will to resist an adversary.

Artificial intelligence has become a force multiplier in this cognitive domain. AI algorithms can curate individualised propaganda feeds, amplify false narratives through bot networks, and create realistic fake images or videos (deepfakes) that blur the line between truth and deception. According to NATO’s Allied Command Transformation, cognitive warfare encompasses activities to affect attitudes and behaviours by influencing human cognition, effectively “modifying perceptions of reality” as a new norm of conflict (act.nato.int). In essence, AI provides powerful tools to conduct whole-of-society manipulation, turning social media platforms and information systems into weapons.

A vivid example of the cognitive battlespace in action occurred in May 2023, when an AI-generated image of a false Pentagon explosion went viral. The fake image, disseminated by bots, briefly fooled enough people that it caused a sharp but temporary dip in the U.S. stock market. Though quickly debunked, this incident demonstrated the “catastrophic potential” of AI-driven disinformation to trigger real-world consequences at machine speed (mwi.westpoint.edu) . Generative AI can manufacture convincing yet false content on a massive scale, making it increasingly difficult for populations to discern fact from fabrication.

In the cognitive battlespace, such AI-enabled tactics give malign actors a potent advantage. They can rapidly deploy influence campaigns with minimal cost or risk, while defenders struggle to identify and counter each new false narrative. As the information environment becomes saturated with AI-amplified propaganda, the traditional defenders of truth, journalists, fact-checkers, and institutions, find themselves overwhelmed. This asymmetry is at the heart of why liberal democracies are in danger of losing the cognitive war if they do not adapt quickly.

Adversaries’ AI-Driven Influence Operations

Russia and China have emerged as leading adversaries in the AI-enabled influence war, honing techniques to exploit Western vulnerabilities in the cognitive domain. Russia has a long history of information warfare against the West and has eagerly integrated AI into these efforts. Through troll farms and automated bot networks, Russia pushes AI-generated propaganda designed to destabilise societies. Moscow views cognitive warfare as a strategic tool to “destroy [the West] from within” without firing a shot. Rather than direct military confrontation with NATO (which Russia knows it would likely lose), the Kremlin invests in “cheap and highly effective” cognitive warfare to undermine Western democracies from inside (kew.org.pl) .

Russian military thinkers refer to this concept as “reflexive control,” essentially their doctrine of cognitive warfare. The idea is to manipulate an adversary’s perception and decision-making so thoroughly that the adversary “defeats themselves”. In practice, this means saturating the information space with tailored disinformation, conspiracy theories, and emotionally charged content to break the enemy’s will to resist. As one analysis describes, the battleground is the mind of the Western citizen, and the weapon is the manipulation of their understanding and cognition. By exploiting human cognitive biases, our tendencies toward emotional reaction, confirmation bias, and confusion, Russia seeks to leave citizens “unable to properly assess reality”, thus incapable of making rational decisions (for example, in elections). The goal is a weakened democratic society, rife with internal divisions and distrust, that can no longer present a united front against Russian aggression.

Concrete examples of Russia’s AI-fuelled influence operations abound. Beyond the fake Pentagon incident, Russian operatives have used generative AI to create deepfake videos of European politicians, forge fake news stories, and impersonate media outlets. Ahead of Western elections, Russian disinformation campaigns augmented with AI have aimed to sow discord and polarise public opinion. U.K. intelligence reports and independent researchers have noted that Russia’s automated bot accounts are evolving to produce more “human-like and persuasive” messages with the help of AI language models. These tactics amplify the reach and realism of propaganda, making it harder to detect and counter. Even if such interference does not always change election outcomes, it erodes public trust in information and institutions, a long-term win for the Kremlin.

China, while a newer player in European information spaces, is also investing heavily in AI for influence operations. Chinese military strategy incorporates the concept of “cognitive domain operations”, which merge AI with psychological and cyber warfare. Beijing’s aim is to shape global narratives and public opinion in its favour, deterring opposition to China’s interests. For instance, China has deployed swarms of AI-driven social media bots to spread disinformation about topics like the origins of COVID-19 and the status of Taiwan. Chinese propaganda operations use AI to generate deepfake news anchors and social media personas that promote pro-China narratives abroad. According to NATO analysts, China describes cognitive warfare as using public opinion and psychological manipulation to achieve victory, and invests in technologies (like emotion-monitoring systems for soldiers) that reveal the importance it places on the information domain. While China’s influence efforts in Europe are less overt than Russia’s, they represent a growing challenge as China seeks to project soft power and shape perceptions among European audiences, often to dissuade criticism of Beijing or divide Western unity.

The aggressive use of AI by authoritarian adversaries has put Western nations on the back foot in the information environment. Adversaries operate without the legal and ethical constraints that bind democracies. They capitalise on speed, volume, and ambiguity, launching influence campaigns faster than defenders can react. Authoritarian regimes also coordinate these efforts as part of broader hybrid warfare strategies, aligning cyber-attacks, diplomatic pressure, and economic coercion with information operations to maximise impact. In summary, Russia and China have seized the initiative in the cognitive battlespace, leaving the UK, EU, and their allies scrambling to catch up.

UK and EU Responses: Strategies and Shortcomings

Confronted with these threats, the United Kingdom and European Union have begun to recognise the urgency of the cognitive warfare challenge. In recent years, officials and strategists have taken steps to improve defences against disinformation and malign influence. However, the Western approach has so far been largely reactive and constrained, marked by cautious policy frameworks and fragmented efforts that lag the adversary’s pace of innovation.

United Kingdom: The UK government acknowledges that AI can significantly amplify information warfare. The Ministry of Defence’s Defence Artificial Intelligence Strategy (2022) warns that “AI could also be used to intensify information operations, disinformation campaigns and fake news,” for example by deploying deepfakes and bogus social media accounts. British military doctrine, including the Integrated Operating Concept (2020), emphasises that information operations are increasingly important to counter false narratives in modern conflicts (gov.uk). London’s approach has included establishing units dedicated to “strategic communications” and cyber influence and working with partners like NATO to improve information security.

The UK has also invested in research on AI and influence. For instance, the Alan Turing Institute’s research centre (CETaS) published analyses on AI-enabled influence operations in the 2024 UK elections, identifying emerging threats such as deepfake propaganda and AI-generated political smear campaigns. These studies, while finding that AI’s impact on recent elections was limited, highlighted serious concerns like AI-driven hate incitement and voter confusion (cetas.turing.ac.uk) . The implication is clear: the UK cannot be complacent. Even if traditional disinformation methods still dominate, the rapid evolution of AI means influence threats could scale up dramatically in the near future. British policymakers have started to discuss new regulations (for example, requiring transparency in AI political ads) and bolstering media literacy programs to inoculate the public against fake content.

Despite this awareness, critics argue that the UK’s response remains disjointed and under-resourced. There is no publicly articulated doctrine for cognitive warfare equivalent to adversaries’ strategies. Efforts are split among various agencies (from GCHQ handling cyber, to the Army’s 77th Brigade for information ops, to the Foreign Office for counter-disinformation), making coordination challenging. Moreover, while defensive measures (like fact-checking services and takedown of fake accounts) have improved, the UK appears reluctant to consider more assertive offensive information operations that could pre-empt adversary narratives. Legal and ethical norms, as well as fear of escalation, likely restrain such tactics. The result is that Britain often plays catch-up, reacting to disinformation waves after they have already influenced segments of the population.

European Union: The EU, as a bloc of democracies, faces additional hurdles in confronting cognitive warfare. Brussels has treated disinformation chiefly as a policy and regulatory issue tied to election security and digital platform accountability. Over the past few years, the EU implemented a Code of Practice on Disinformation (a voluntary agreement with tech companies) and stood up teams like the East StratCom Task Force (known for its EUvsDisinfo project debunking pro-Kremlin myths). Following high-profile meddling in elections and referendums, EU institutions have grown more vocal: they label Russia explicitly as the chief source of disinformation targeting Europe. The European Commission also incorporated anti-disinformation clauses into the Digital Services Act (DSA), requiring large online platforms to assess and mitigate risks from fake content.

When it comes to AI, the EU’s landmark AI Act – primarily a regulatory framework to govern AI uses – indirectly addresses some information manipulation concerns (for example, by requiring transparency for deepfakes). However, EU efforts are fundamentally defensive and norm-driven. They seek to police platforms and inform citizens, rather than actively engage in influence operations. EU leaders are wary of blurring the line between counter-propaganda and propaganda of their own, given Europe’s commitment to free expression. This creates a dilemma: open societies find it difficult to wage information war with the ruthlessness of authoritarian regimes.

European security experts are starting to grapple with this challenge. A recent EU security and defence college course underscored that cognitive warfare is an “emerging challenge” for the European Union (esdc.europa.eu) . Participants discussed the need for technological tools to detect, deter, and mitigate cognitive threats. Yet, outside of specialised circles, there is no EU-wide military command focused on cognitive warfare (unlike traditional domains such as land, sea, cyber, etc.). NATO, which includes most EU countries, has taken the lead in conceptualising cognitive warfare, but NATO’s role in offensive information activities is limited by its mandate.

A telling critique comes from a Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) commentary on disinformation and AI threats. It notes that NATO’s 2024 strategy update acknowledged the dangers of AI-enabled disinformation, using unusually strong language about the urgency of the challenge. However, the same strategy “makes no reference to how AI could be used” positively for strategic communications or to help counter disinformation (rusi.org) . In other words, Western nations are emphasising protection and defence, strengthening **governance standards, public resilience, and truth-checking mechanisms, **but they are not yet leveraging AI offensively to seize the initiative in the info sphere. This cautious approach may be ceding ground to adversaries who have no such reservations.

Why the West Is Losing the AI Influence War

Several interrelated factors explain why the UK, EU, and their allies appear to be losing ground in the cognitive domain against AI-equipped adversaries:

Reactive Posture vs. Proactive Strategy: Western responses have been largely reactive. Democracies often respond to disinformation campaigns after damage is done, issuing fact-checks or diplomatic condemnations. There is a lack of a proactive, comprehensive strategy to dominate the information environment. Adversaries, by contrast, set the narrative by deploying influence operations first and fast.

Ethical and Legal Constraints: The UK and EU operate under strict norms – adherence to truth, rule of law, and respect for civil liberties – which limit tactics in information warfare. Propaganda or deception by government is domestically unpopular and legally fraught. This makes it hard to match the scale and aggressiveness of Russian or Chinese influence operations without undermining democratic values. Authoritarians face no such constraints.

Fragmented Coordination: In Europe, tackling cognitive threats cuts across multiple jurisdictions and agencies (domestic, EU, NATO), leading to fragmentation. A unified command-and-control for information operations is lacking. Meanwhile, adversaries often orchestrate their messaging from a centralised playbook, giving them agility and consistency.

Regulatory Focus Over Capabilities: The EU’s inclination has been to regulate (AI, social media, data) to create guardrails – a necessary but slow process. However, regulation alone does not equal capability. Rules might curb some harmful content but do not stop a determined adversary. The West has invested less in developing its own AI tools for strategic communication, psyops, or rapid counter-messaging. This capability gap means ceding the technological edge to opponents.

Underestimation of Cognitive Warfare: Historically, Western security doctrine prioritised physical and cyber threats, sometimes underestimating the impact of information warfare. The concept of a sustained “cognitive war” waged in peacetime is relatively new to Western planners. Initial responses were tepid – for example, before 2016, few anticipated that online influence could significantly affect major votes. This lag in appreciation allowed adversaries to build momentum.

These factors contribute to a situation where, despite growing awareness, the UK and EU have struggled to turn rhetoric into effective countermeasures on the cognitive front. As a result, authoritarian influence campaigns continue to find fertile ground in Western societies. Each viral conspiracy theory that goes unchecked, each wedge driven between communities via disinformation, and each doubt cast on democratic institutions chips away at the West’s strategic advantage. NATO officials warn that information warfare threats “must neither be overlooked nor underestimated” in the face of the AI revolution. Yet current efforts remain a step behind the onslaught of AI-generated falsehoods.

Conclusion and Implications

If the UK, EU, and like-minded democracies do not rapidly adapt to the realities of AI-driven cognitive warfare, they risk strategic defeat in an important realm of 21st-century conflict. Losing the AI influence war doesn’t happen with a formal surrender; instead, it manifests as a gradual erosion of democratic resilience. Societies may grow deeply divided, citisens lose trust in media and governments, and adversarial narratives become entrenched. In the long run, this could weaken the political will and cohesion needed to respond to more conventional security threats. As one analysis grimly observed, the cost of inaction is high – allowing adversaries to exploit AI for malign influence can lead to a “strategic imbalance favouring adversaries”, with a flood of false narratives eroding public trust and even devastating democratic institutions if left unchecked.

Reversing this trajectory will require Western nations to elevate the priority of the cognitive battlespace in national security planning. Some broad imperatives emerge:

Develop Offensive and Defensive AI Capabilities: The UK and EU should invest in AI tools not just to detect and debunk disinformation, but also to disseminate counter-narratives that truthfully push back against authoritarian propaganda. Ethical guidelines for such operations must be established, but fear of using AI at all in information ops leaves the field open to adversaries.

Whole-of-Society Resilience: Building public resilience is crucial. Education in media literacy and critical thinking, transparency about threats, and empowering independent journalism are all part of inoculating society. A populace that can recognise manipulation is the best defence against cognitive warfare. The goal is to ensure citizens can engage with digital information sceptically, blunting the impact of fake or AI-manipulated content.

International Coordination: The transatlantic alliance and democratic partners need better coordination in the information domain. NATO’s work on cognitive warfare should be complemented by EU and UK joint initiatives to share intelligence on disinformation campaigns and align responses. A unified front can deny adversaries the ability to play divide-and-conquer with different countries.

Adaptive Governance: Western policymakers must make their regulatory frameworks more agile in the face of technological change. This might include faster mechanisms to hold platforms accountable, updated election laws regarding AI-generated content, and perhaps narrowly tailored laws against the most dangerous forms of disinformation (such as deceptive media that incites violence). The challenge is doing so without undermining free speech – a balance that requires constant calibration as AI technology evolves.

In summary, the UK and EU are at a crossroads. They can continue on the current path – risking that AI-enabled influence attacks will outpace their responses – or they can strategise anew and invest in winning the cognitive fight. The latter will demand political will and creativity: treating information space as a domain to be secured, much like land, sea, air, cyber and space. It also means confronting uncomfortable questions about using emerging technologies in ways that align with democratic values yet neutralise malign propaganda.

The cognitive battle-space is now a permanent feature of international security. Western democracies must not cede this battlefield. Maintaining an open society does not mean being defenceless. With prudent adoption of AI for good, and a staunch defence of truth, the UK, EU, and their allies can start to turn the tide in the AI influence war. Failing to do so will only embolden those who seek to “attack the democratic pillars of the West” through information manipulation. In this contest for minds and hearts, as much as in any other domain of conflict, strength and resolve will determine who prevails.

Bibliography

1. NATO Allied Command Transformation. “Cognitive Warfare.” NATO ACT, Norfolk VA.

2. Bryc, Agnieszka. “Destroy from within: Russia’s cognitive warfare on EU democracy.” Kolegium Europy Wschodniej, 27 Nov 2024.

3. European Security & Defence College (ESDC). “Cognitive warfare in the new international competition: an emerging challenge for the EU,” 28 May 2024.

4. Williams, Cameron (Modern War Institute). “Persuade, Change, and Influence with AI: Leveraging Artificial Intelligence in the Information Environment.” Modern War Institute at West Point, 14 Nov 2023.

5. UK Ministry of Defence. Defence Artificial Intelligence Strategy, June 2022. UK

6. Fitz-Gerald, Ann M., and Halyna Padalko (RUSI). “The Need for a Strategic Approach to Disinformation and AI-Driven Threats.” RUSI Commentary, 25 July 2024.

7. Science Business News. “EU is ‘losing the narrative battle’ over AI Act, says UN adviser,” 05 Dec 2024.

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