Matthew Toy — Articles

The Missing Adversary: What the UK's Cyber Security Strategy Leaves Out

2026-04-12T15:41:30Z

The UK Government Cyber Security Strategy 2022–2030 is 84 pages long. It mentions offensive cyber capability once, in a subordinate clause, in a focus box, on page 49. The remaining 83 pages describe risk management, asset discovery, vulnerability reporting, supply chain assurance, incident response, workforce development, and the adoption of the Cyber Assessment Framework across the public sector. It is thorough, competent, and well-structured. It is also not a strategy.

Rather than an issue of drafting, the document cannot contain the thing that would make it genuinely strategic, because that thing — the reciprocal logic of state cyber competition, including the UK's own offensive posture and the adversary intent it provokes — is precisely what politics dictate that a public document must leave out. As such, if you are a practitioner building your cyber defences from this document, that structural gap has consequences you need to understand.

Strategy requires an adversary

A strategy, in any serious usage, is a theory of how applying your means produces a desired effect on an adversary pursuing their own ends. It demands that you understand not just what you are defending, but who is attacking, what they want, and why your organisation matters to them. The UK's cyber security strategy does none of this. Its five objectives (manage risk, protect, detect, respond, develop skills) are the components of a security operations programme. While they do describe how to administer resilience, they do not link it to the strategic intentions of the actors generating the threat.

The document's aim is that all government organisations should be resilient to known vulnerabilities and attack methods by 2030. That is a maturity target, and a reasonable one. But a maturity target is to strategy what vehicle maintenance is to a campaign plan. It ensures your equipment works. It does not tell you where to concentrate your forces or why.

In practice, if you are a CISO implementing the Cyber Assessment Framework, you are sizing your defences against a threat profile. But the threat profile describes adversary capabilities and methods, not adversary objectives. It tells you what is being done to you. It cannot tell you why, because answering that question honestly would require the UK government to describe a two-sided strategic contest in which it is an active participant, not a passive recipient. And that is not politically possible.

The adversaries have strategies. You don't.

The actors referenced obliquely throughout the document — never named, often gestured at — do operate with genuine strategic intent, even if their cyber operations vary enormously in sophistication and purpose. North Korea's cyber theft programme serves regime survival by generating hard currency that sanctions deny through conventional channels. China's operations span industrial espionage, domestic surveillance, and the suppression of external dissent, each serving distinct but related political objectives. Russia employs cyber operations as one component of a broader approach to degrading institutional coherence in adversary states. These are necessarily simplified descriptions of complex state behaviours, but they share a common feature: in each case, cyber operations are means directed toward stable, rational and identifiable political ends.

The UK's published strategy, by contrast, presents the threat environment as something to be endured and managed rather than understood as a competitive interaction. The result is a document that describes the defensive half of a strategic relationship as though it were the whole picture.

Your threat model is incomplete, and the framework cannot fix it

The Cyber Assessment Framework provides tiered profiles matched to threat levels, and organisations assess against the profile that corresponds to their function's criticality. Sound in principle, but in practice it produces a uniform defensive posture calibrated to adversary capability rather than adversary intent. But the difference between being scanned by an automated botnet and being targeted by a state actor pursuing a specific intelligence requirement is not a difference of degree. It is a difference of kind. The botnet will move on when it encounters adequate defences. The state actor will adapt, persist, and find another way in, because the objective driving the operation has not changed. Achieving your Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF) profile outcomes addresses the first situation. It does not reliably address the second, because the second is shaped by strategic logic your threat profile does not and cannot capture.

The question you need to answer, which the strategy will not answer for you, is: what does my adversary want from me specifically? Not what tools they use. Not what vulnerabilities they exploit. What political or economic objective my organisation's compromise would serve.

Identify your centre of gravity

This is ultimately a question about your own centre of gravity — the asset, function, or data set whose compromise would cause disproportionate harm and which a strategically motivated adversary would therefore prioritise.

If you are a government department managing classified defence procurement, your centre of gravity is not your email server. It is the data that reveals UK capability trajectories to a competitor. If you manage health infrastructure, your centre of gravity shifts depending on context: during a crisis, it is service continuity; in normal operations, it is patient data at population scale. If you regulate energy, it is the dependency mapping that would allow an adversary to identify cascading failure points across the national grid.

Once you identify what a strategically motivated adversary would actually want from you, your defensive posture should concentrate around that. Not distribute itself uniformly to meet a standardised profile. Compliance with the CAF is necessary. But the gap between compliance and genuine strategic defence is precisely the space the document's unwritten section would have occupied — the section that explains who is coming for you, what they want, and what that means for where you put your resources.

Reading the silence

The Government Cyber Security Strategy is not a bad document produced by people who don't understand strategy. It is a public document produced under conditions that make honest strategic disclosure impossible. You cannot publish a candid account of reciprocal cyber competition without exposing capabilities, revealing intelligence sources, and acknowledging that the UK's own operations shape the threat environment its departments face. The genre of 'published national cyber strategy' is therefore structurally evasive, given it must present administrable resilience in place of the adversarial logic that would make it genuinely strategic, because that logic is classified, diplomatically sensitive, or both.

For practitioners, the implication is not that you should disregard the strategy. Implement the CAF. Build shared capabilities. Invest in your workforce and your detection capacity. But do not mistake the document for a complete account of the strategic environment you operate in. It is the publicly sayable portion of a larger contest whose most important dynamics, the ones that determine why you are being targeted and what your adversary considers worth taking, cannot appear in a document with an ISBN number.

The unwritten section is the one that matters most. Plan as though it exists.

Why the West Doesn't Board Shadow Fleet Tankers

2026-01-16T21:13:46Z

Legal Architecture, Political Economy, and Strategic Restraint in Maritime Sanctions Enforcement

Introduction

In early January 2026, the United States seized at least five oil tankers as part of a declared blockade on Venezuelan oil exports following the capture of Nicolás Maduro.^[1] The seizures included vessels that had previously transported sanctioned Russian crude, with Russia's Transport Ministry protesting that the interdictions violated the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and amounted to 'outright piracy'.^[2] These dramatic events raise an obvious question: if the United States is willing to pursue tankers across the Atlantic and board them in international waters, why does the West tolerate over a thousand shadow fleet vessels continuing to transport Russian oil with apparent impunity?

The answer is not that Western navies lack the capability to interdict more vessels, nor that international law straightforwardly prohibits such action. Rather, the restraint reflects a convergence of three distinct logics: a legal architecture that channels enforcement toward indirect mechanisms; a political economy in which the sanctions regime was deliberately designed to tolerate evasion; and a strategic calculus about precedent and escalation that makes routine interdiction unattractive even when technically feasible.

This article synthesises the emerging academic and policy literature on these questions to provide an explanatory framework for understanding Western enforcement choices.

I. The Legal Architecture: UNCLOS and the Limits of Coastal State Jurisdiction

The international legal framework governing maritime enforcement does not prohibit action against shadow fleet vessels, but it does channel such action toward particular mechanisms while raising the costs of others. Understanding this architecture is essential for grasping why Western states have relied primarily on what might be called 'paper levers', insurance requirements, port state controls, and flag state pressure, rather than physical interdiction.

The Flag State System and Its Weaknesses

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea establishes a framework in which primary enforcement responsibility rests with flag states—the states where vessels are registered. As Beckman, Nguyen, and Ong explain in their analysis of coastal state options, 'it is extremely rare for IMO conventions to give any enforcement powers to coastal States over foreign ships navigating in the waters off their coast. The primary responsibility for enforcing rules and standards in IMO conventions rests with the flag State.'^[3]

This creates an immediate problem for sanctions enforcement. Shadow fleet tankers systematically exploit the flag state system by registering with states that are 'either unable or unwilling to require inspections to ensure that they comply with IMO rules and regulations.'^[4] The RUSI analysis documents how vessels removed from one registry for sanctions violations can 're-register under another state, often within days,' a practice known as 'flag-hopping' that has 'reached a peak in 2025.'^[5]

The weakness of flag state enforcement is structural rather than accidental. Many states operate 'open' registries that do not verify beneficial ownership, assess vessel histories, or screen for sanctions risks. Some registry functions are outsourced to private companies operating outside the territory of the nominal flag state, further attenuating oversight.^[6]

Coastal State Enforcement: Limited but Not Absent

Coastal states do possess some enforcement authorities under UNCLOS, but these are hedged with significant constraints. Article 220 permits coastal states to enforce pollution regulations in their Exclusive Economic Zones, but only under specific circumstances. As Beckman, Nguyen, and Ong note, 'the coastal State is not authorised to undertake a "physical inspection" of a foreign ship unless there are clear grounds' to suspect violations, and this provision 'reflects the fact that the LOSC protects the freedom of navigation in the EEZ by placing constraints on the power of coastal States.'^[7]

The practical implication is that coastal states must frame enforcement actions in terms of safety, pollution prevention, and regulatory compliance rather than sanctions enforcement per se. This is why recent European measures have focused on insurance documentation, ship-to-ship transfer regulations, and automatic identification system requirements—these fit within existing jurisdictional doctrines without requiring novel legal theories.

The Innocent Passage Question

UNCLOS grants vessels a right of 'innocent passage' through territorial waters and straits. The question of whether shadow fleet activities render passage non-innocent has attracted considerable attention from those advocating more assertive enforcement. Nick Childs of the International Institute for Strategic Studies summarises the debate: 'Advocates of the more permissive approach suggest that there is room for manoeuvre over what constitutes the threshold for action.'^[8]

However, Childs notes the concern that 'the argument that the Western-led coalition should adopt a more assertive, permissive and liberal approach to taking action at sea against the shadow fleet under the aegis of UNCLOS and its stated exceptions to the right to innocent passage raises the concern that it would encourage revisionist states—such as China via its maritime claims in the South China Sea, Iran over ship seizures in the Strait of Hormuz and Russia in the way it applies UNCLOS in the Arctic—to abuse the system.'^[9]

This is the crux of the legal constraint as it actually operates. The issue is not that UNCLOS categorically prohibits interdiction, but that any legal theory permissive enough to justify routine boarding of shadow fleet vessels would also be available to adversaries pursuing quite different objectives.

II. The Political Economy: A Sanctions Regime Designed to Tolerate Evasion

The legal architecture explains why Western enforcement has favoured indirect mechanisms, but it does not explain why Western states have not pushed harder at the boundaries of what is legally permissible. The deeper answer lies in the design of the sanctions regime itself, which was constructed to reduce Russian revenue while maintaining global oil supply.

The Price Cap's Design Logic

The G7 price cap, implemented in December 2022, was explicitly designed to balance two objectives that stand in tension with each other. As the European Parliament briefing explains, the regime seeks to 'curb the Kremlin's revenues which finance its war effort' while 'restricts profits while still allowing sales below a certain price.'^[10] The mechanism works by denying Western shipping services—crucially, insurance from the International Group of P&I Clubs—to vessels carrying Russian oil priced above the cap.

Spiro, Wachtmeister, and Gars, in the most rigorous empirical assessment to date, conclude that 'the price cap has not primarily functioned as a binding price cap, but as a partial transport embargo, reinforcing the import embargo's effects.'^[11] The cap works by limiting the supply of tankers available to Russia, thereby increasing transport costs, rather than by directly constraining the price at which oil is sold.

The emergence of the shadow fleet was therefore not a failure of the sanctions regime but a predictable—indeed, predicted—response to its structure. The regime was 'specifically designed to reduce Russia's revenues without decreasing global supply.'^[12] If Western policymakers had wanted to physically prevent Russian oil from reaching markets, they would have designed a different architecture. They chose one that could accommodate substantial evasion because the alternative was a supply shock that would destabilise energy markets and domestic politics.

The Scale of Shadow Shipping

The quantitative literature confirms that shadow shipping operates at enormous scale. Fernández-Villaverde, Li, Xu, and Zanetti estimate that 'from 2017 to 2023, an average of 7.8 million metric tons of crude oil per month were exported via dark ships from Iran, Syria, Venezuela, and Russia, accounting for approximately 43% of total world seaborne crude oil exports recorded in UN Comtrade data.'^[13]

More strikingly, the authors find that 'after the G7 countries implemented a $60 per barrel price cap on Russian crude oil exports in December 2022, recorded global seaborne oil exports dropped sharply. However, sanctioned oil exports via dark shipping more than doubled, offsetting much of the reduction in supply and exerting downward pressure on global oil prices.'^[14]

This is the revealed preference of the sanctions regime. The doubling of dark shipping was not an unintended consequence but the mechanism through which the regime achieved its actual objective: reducing Russian revenue per barrel while preventing the price spike that would have resulted from genuine supply interdiction.

III. The Strategic Calculus: Precedent, Escalation, and Coalition Management

Even if the legal and economic constraints were weaker, routine interdiction of shadow fleet vessels would raise strategic concerns that counsel restraint.

Precedent and Norm Fragmentation

The United States has long been the principal guarantor of freedom of navigation as a global norm. American naval power projection depends on predictable access to international waters and straits. Any doctrine that permits interdiction of commercial shipping on economic grounds creates precedents that adversaries could invoke in quite different contexts.

Childs articulates the concern directly: such a shift 'would make it more difficult to challenge revisionist states on this issue and leave the West more vulnerable to charges it already faces of inconsistency in the application of global principles. This could complicate the challenge of winning support from the critical constituency of sceptical, hedging or opportunistic states, whose support and engagement will be key to deterring and choking off shadow-fleet operations.'^[15]

The practical risk is that China could invoke a permissive interdiction doctrine in the Taiwan Strait, framing action against vessels trading with Taiwan as enforcement of domestic law. Iran could do the same in the Strait of Hormuz. Russia already interprets UNCLOS aggressively in the Arctic. Expanding the envelope of acceptable state behaviour would complicate the American position in each of these theatres.

Coalition Management

The sanctions regime operates through a coalition, not unilateral American action. European allies have different exposure to the trade-offs involved. The United Kingdom, as a major maritime services provider, has commercial interests in the existing framework's predictability. Nordic and Baltic states have both significant shipping industries and direct exposure to shadow fleet environmental risks in their waters.

These states have pursued enhanced enforcement through mechanisms compatible with coalition maintenance: the UK's Voluntary Insurance Reporting Mechanism, the EU's mandatory ship reporting system introduced in April 2025, and diplomatic pressure on flag states.^[16] Aggressive unilateral interdiction would strain these arrangements and potentially fragment the coalition.

Escalation Risk

The Venezuelan seizures illustrate both the possibility and the risks of assertive enforcement. Russia reportedly deployed a submarine to shadow one of the pursued tankers, and Moscow formally protested the interdictions as 'piracy.' The episode unfolded in the context of a declared blockade following regime change: circumstances quite different from routine sanctions enforcement.

Childs notes that more assertive approaches 'could carry the risk of potential retaliatory and escalatory side effects.'^[17] The question is not whether Western navies could board more vessels, but whether doing so routinely would invite responses (whether naval, economic, or diplomatic) that exceed the benefits of marginal enforcement gains.

IV. The Venezuelan Exception

The January 2026 Venezuelan seizures appear to contradict the pattern of restraint described above. However, they are better understood as confirming the rule by illustrating the exceptional circumstances required to overcome it.

The seizures occurred in the context of a declared 'total and complete blockade' of Venezuelan oil exports, following the capture of President Maduro and the installation of an interim government. The administration framed the interdictions explicitly as law enforcement actions under existing sanctions authorities, conducted with the cooperation of allied surveillance assets. The vessels seized had clear jurisdictional hooks: prior designation under US sanctions, involvement in documented violations, and in some cases US person involvement or financial system exposure.

This is interdiction in the context of regime change and explicit confrontation, not routine sanctions enforcement against an adversary with whom the West maintains complex relationships across multiple domains. The willingness to accept Russian protests, submarine shadowing, and accusations of piracy reflects a calculation that these costs are acceptable in the Venezuelan context. That calculation would look quite different for routine interdiction of Russian-linked tankers in the Baltic or the English Channel.

Conclusion

The question of why the West does not interdict more shadow fleet vessels resolves once we understand that the constraints are layered and mutually reinforcing. The legal architecture channels enforcement toward indirect mechanisms and raises the costs of novel theories. The sanctions regime was designed to reduce Russian revenue while maintaining supply, which means tolerating substantial evasion. The strategic calculus weighs precedent effects, coalition management, and escalation risks against marginal enforcement gains.

None of these constraints is absolute. The Venezuelan case demonstrates that circumstances can shift the calculus. Enhanced flag state pressure, insurance enforcement, and environmental regulations can tighten the screws incrementally. But the expectation that Western navies will begin routinely boarding shadow fleet tankers misunderstands the nature of the restraint. It is not weakness or legal naivety, but a considered judgment about objectives, costs, and risks.

For those frustrated by this state of affairs, the implication is clear: changing enforcement requires changing the underlying calculus. That might mean accepting higher energy prices in exchange for genuinely restrictive measures, building stronger coalitions for assertive action, or developing legal frameworks that expand coastal state authorities without creating exploitable precedents. Until then, the shadow fleet will continue to operate in the space that Western policy has deliberately left open.

Bibliography

Beckman, Robert, Trung Nguyen, and Joel Ong. "Possible Actions by Coastal States to Protect Their Marine Environment from Oil Tankers in the Dark Fleet." The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 40, no. 1 (2025): 1–28.

Ben-Ur, Samuel, and Krystal Bermudez. "US Seizes More Tankers, Courts Oil Companies as Post-Maduro Venezuela Takes Shape." Long War Journal, 13 January 2026. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2026/01/us-seizes-more-tankers-courts-oil-companies-as-post-maduro-venezuela-takes-shape.php.

Caprile, Anna, and Gabija Leclerc. "Russia's 'Shadow Fleet': Bringing the Threat to Light." Briefing PE 766.242. Brussels: European Parliamentary Research Service, November 2024.

Childs, Nick. Russia's 'Shadow Fleet' and Sanctions Evasion: What Is To Be Done? London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, January 2025.

Fernández-Villaverde, Jesús, Yiliang Li, Le Xu, and Francesco Zanetti. "Charting the Uncharted: The (Un)Intended Consequences of Oil Sanctions and Dark Shipping." CESifo Working Paper No. 11684. February 10, 2025.

Saiz Erausquin, Gonzalo, and Tom Keatinge. "Countering Shadow Fleet Activity through Flag State Reform." RUSI Insights Paper. London: Royal United Services Institute, 2 September 2025.

Spiro, Daniel, Henrik Wachtmeister, and Johan Gars. "Assessing the Impacts of Oil Sanctions on Russia." Energy Policy 206 (2025): 114739.

^[1]Samuel Ben-Ur and Krystal Bermudez, "US Seizes More Tankers, Courts Oil Companies as Post-Maduro Venezuela Takes Shape," Long War Journal, 13 January 2026, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2026/01/us-seizes-more-tankers-courts-oil-companies-as-post-maduro-venezuela-takes-shape.php.

^[2]Ben-Ur and Bermudez, "US Seizes More Tankers."

^[3]Robert Beckman, Trung Nguyen, and Joel Ong, "Possible Actions by Coastal States to Protect Their Marine Environment from Oil Tankers in the Dark Fleet," The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 40, no. 1 (2025): 3.

^[4]Beckman, Nguyen, and Ong, "Possible Actions," 11.

^[5]Gonzalo Saiz Erausquin and Tom Keatinge, "Countering Shadow Fleet Activity through Flag State Reform," RUSI Insights Paper (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2 September 2025).

^[6]Saiz Erausquin and Keatinge, "Countering Shadow Fleet Activity."

^[8]Nick Childs, Russia's 'Shadow Fleet' and Sanctions Evasion: What Is To Be Done? (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, January 2025), 10.

^[9]Childs, Russia's 'Shadow Fleet', 10.

^[10]Anna Caprile and Gabija Leclerc, "Russia's 'Shadow Fleet': Bringing the Threat to Light," Briefing PE 766.242 (Brussels: European Parliamentary Research Service, November 2024), 1.

^[11]Daniel Spiro, Henrik Wachtmeister, and Johan Gars, "Assessing the Impacts of Oil Sanctions on Russia," Energy Policy 206 (2025): 5.

^[12]Spiro, Wachtmeister, and Gars, "Assessing the Impacts," 5.

^[13]Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, Yiliang Li, Le Xu, and Francesco Zanetti, "Charting the Uncharted: The (Un)Intended Consequences of Oil Sanctions and Dark Shipping," CESifo Working Paper No. 11684 (February 10, 2025), 3.

^[14]Fernández-Villaverde et al., "Charting the Uncharted," 25.

^[15]Childs, Russia's 'Shadow Fleet', 8.

^[17]Childs, Russia's 'Shadow Fleet', 4.

Beyond the War/Crime Binary and Why International Security Studies Must Reckon with Cyber Operations

2025-11-09T15:12:46Z

When North Korea's estimated gains from cybercrime exceeded its total legitimate international trade in 2022, something fundamental shifted in the nature of strategic competition.[1] Pyongyang generated $1.7 billion through cyber operations while earning only $1.59 billion from legal exports. This should not be considered as supplementary revenue or criminal opportunism, but instead it represents a primary mechanism of state finance that funds weapons programmes and regime stability.

Yet this development barely registered in mainstream security studies literature. The reason reveals a deeper problem in how adversaries now compete strategically by deliberately exploiting the boundaries between categories that International Security Studies treats as distinct. Cyber operations succeed precisely because they operate simultaneously as economic extraction, cognitive manipulation, and potential kinetic threat, defying classification within inherited taxonomies of war, crime, espionage, and influence. The field's failure to recognise this boundary exploitation as a coherent form of strategic competition leaves it unable to analyse how states actually generate and contest power in the digital age.

The Clausewitzian Checkpoint

Thomas Rid performed a valuable service in his 2012 article "Cyber War Will Not Take Place."[2] He punctured inflated rhetoric around "cyber Pearl Harbors" by demonstrating that cyber operations don't meet classical Clausewitzian criteria for warfare. They lack intrinsic violence, don't compel through force, and haven't fundamentally altered political orders through armed conflict. This deflation of threat inflation was intellectually rigorous and necessary.

But Rid's framework created an unintended consequence. Many scholars concluded that if cyber operations aren't war, they aren't strategically significant. This logic fails when confronted with the evidence. As Lucas Kello argued in his 2013 response, cyber operations are "expanding the range of possible harm and outcomes between the concepts of war and peace" with profound implications for national and international security.[3] The problem isn't that cyber operations constitute war in the traditional sense. The problem is that adversaries have discovered they can achieve strategic objectives by deliberately operating in the definitional gaps our frameworks create.

Consider what cyber operations actually are: sustained, below-threshold activities that extract resources, manipulate cognition, or degrade systems in ways that cumulatively influence state power and political outcomes without triggering the recognition mechanisms that would mobilise conventional responses. This positive definition reveals why inherited categories often fail and that cyber operations falling between war and crime is no accident. They are designed to exploit that boundary.

Economic Extraction as Strategic Competition

The classification of state-sponsored cyber operations as "cybercrime" represents a fundamental category error. Widely cited estimates place global cybercrime costs at approximately $9.5 trillion annually for 2024.[4] These figures carry methodological challenges and conflate direct losses with indirect economic effects. Yet even treating them as indicative of order of magnitude rather than precise valuations, the scale remains extraordinary. This exceeds Japan's entire GDP and dwarfs global military spending.

More importantly, conservative estimates suggest that state-sponsored operations account for 15 to 20 percent of total cybercrime costs, representing perhaps $1.5 to $2 trillion in annual state-directed activity.[5] This is roughly double the entire US intelligence budget and comparable to China's official military spending. These figures indicate systematic extraction at a scale fundamentally incompatible with treating such activity as mere crime.

The real insight concerns returns on investment. Realists pay attention to power and cost ratios. A state gaining billion-dollar effects from million-dollar inputs should trigger theoretical reassessment. North Korea reportedly spends tens of millions to gain billions, producing returns that conventional military operations cannot match. Russia tolerates or directly controls ransomware ecosystems that generate massive revenue while maintaining plausible deniability. China conducts industrial-scale intellectual property theft that allows it to leapfrog decades of research and development investment.

This isn't "crime" in any meaningful sense and yet neither is it war. It belongs to a family of coercive economic statecraft that includes sanctions, financial leverage, and strategic resource control. The field has conceptual machinery for thinking about these tools. What's missing is recognition that cyber extraction sits within this lineage. When states systematically extract resources from other states without triggering traditional conflict responses, they're engaging in economic warfare conducted through digital methodologies. The boundary between legitimate economic competition, sanctions, illicit finance, and cyber theft has been deliberately blurred by adversaries who understand that this ambiguity protects them from response.

The 2017 NotPetya attack illustrates this boundary exploitation perfectly. Widely attributed to Russian military intelligence, it caused an estimated $10 billion in global damage, disrupted Maersk's worldwide shipping operations, paralysed pharmaceutical manufacturing, and crippled critical infrastructure across Ukraine.[6] Was this economic warfare? Sabotage? Organised crime? The answer is that it was designed to be all of these simultaneously, making classification impossible and response difficult. Because it operated through exploitation rather than traditional violence, it failed to generate sustained policy response despite extraordinary economic dislocation.

Cognitive Operations and the Active Measures Tradition

The cognitive dimension represents boundary exploitation of a different order. What Andreas Krieg terms "subversion", or the strategic weaponization of narratives to exploit socio-psychological vulnerabilities and erode sociopolitical consensus, isn't unprecedented.[7] It builds directly on the Soviet tradition of active measures during the Cold War. The KGB's disinformation campaigns, front organisations, and cultivation of influence networks were designed to achieve precisely what contemporary information operations attempt: reflexive control whereby adversaries voluntarily make decisions predetermined by the subverting party.

What has changed is scale and effectiveness. The contemporary information environment's infrastructural vulnerabilities make such operations far more potent than their Cold War predecessors. Russian information operations around the 2016 US election, Brexit-related influence campaigns, and subsequent efforts across European democracies represent sustained attempts to manipulate democratic processes. Whether individually decisive or not, their cumulative effect has been to inject pervasive uncertainty into democratic deliberation.

Krieg's framework is particularly useful because it recognises that effective subversion requires high levels of both orchestration and mobilisation.[8] Successful operations coordinate across multiple domains: cultivating academic surrogates who provide legitimacy, deploying media networks that amplify messages, and ultimately mobilising real-world activism or policy changes. This isn't merely spreading disinformation online. It's cognitive warfare that operates simultaneously in the informational space, the expert-policy nexus, and physical civil society mobilisation.

Here again we see deliberate boundary exploitation. Is this espionage? Influence operations? Public diplomacy? Domestic political activism? The answer is that it's designed to be all of these, making it impossible to counter with tools designed for any single category. The operations succeed not despite their categorical ambiguity but because of it. International Security Studies has failed not because cyber-enabled cognitive operations are unprecedented, but because the field hasn't updated its frameworks for thinking about covert influence in an age where scale, speed, and micro-targeting have fundamentally changed the strategic payoff.

Threshold Manipulation as Structural Feature

The attribution problem receives significant attention in cyber security literature, as do the challenges of compressed decision timelines. These are real difficulties. But the more profound challenge is threshold manipulation itself. Adversaries deliberately operate below levels that would trigger Article 5 commitments or justify conventional military responses. Each individual operation seems manageable, falling into the category of crime, espionage, or influence activity rather than warfare. Yet the cumulative strategic effect potentially exceeds many conventional conflicts.

This isn't an implementation problem. It's a structural feature of how cyber competition operates. States are competing precisely by exploiting the cognitive thresholds that anchor our definitions of conflict. Russia can conduct NotPetya through proxies with sufficient ambiguity that attribution takes months and response remains constrained. China can exfiltrate terabytes of intellectual property through operations that blend state intelligence services, military contractors, and "patriotic" hackers. North Korea can steal billions through operations routed through multiple jurisdictions with cryptocurrency payouts. Each operation maintains just enough deniability to complicate response, just enough restraint to avoid crossing recognised warfare thresholds.

This threshold manipulation undermines every inherited category of International Security Studies. It's not that cyber operations are hard to classify. It's that they're designed to exploit the classification system itself. The boundaries between war and peace, state and non-state action, economic and military competition, legitimate influence and hostile subversion aren't natural categories adversaries accidentally fall between. They're strategic terrain adversaries deliberately occupy because they understand these boundaries constrain Western responses.

Recognising What We're Not Seeing

The policy stakes extend beyond academic taxonomy. We're not experiencing Pearl Harbor-equivalent events annually in some literal sense. We're experiencing something potentially more destabilising: systematic strategic competition that bypasses the recognition mechanisms that would trigger mobilisation. Our threat-recognition systems are calibrated to identify territorial aggression, military build-ups, and kinetic attacks. They're not calibrated to identify systematic resource extraction masquerading as crime, cognitive operations masquerading as activism, or infrastructure compromise masquerading as espionage.

The result is systematic underresponse to strategic challenges of the first order. We're not mobilising resources, not building institutional capacity, not developing deterrent strategies, not coordinating international responses, because these events don't trip the conceptual wires that would classify them as national security emergencies. Meanwhile, adversaries conduct what amounts to unrestricted economic and cognitive warfare whilst maintaining that they're merely engaged in "law enforcement matters," "intelligence operations," or "civil society activism."

We've constrained ourselves through definitional conservatism. We've accepted that if it's not "war," it doesn't merit war-level responses, while adversaries operate under no such constraints. They've discovered they can achieve strategic objectives through boundary exploitation, and our theoretical frameworks leave us unable to recognise, analyse, or respond effectively.

Toward Frameworks Adequate to Strategic Reality

What would it mean for International Security Studies to take cyber operations seriously? It requires recognising that the boundaries between economic, cognitive, and kinetic competition have been deliberately collapsed by adversaries who understand that this collapse protects them from response.

This means developing frameworks that can analyse strategic competition operating across these domains simultaneously. It means recognising that when North Korea funds its regime primarily through cyber theft, when Russia conducts operations that are simultaneously economic warfare and intelligence operations, when China's influence campaigns blend state direction with autonomous proxy action. They're exemplars of how strategic competition now operates.

It means accepting that "security" in conditions of radical technological change looks sufficiently different that inherited categories have limited explanatory power. The field needs concepts and metrics for assessing threats that are diffuse, cumulative, and often only apparent in retrospect. It needs frameworks that can recognise systematic resource extraction, cognitive manipulation, and infrastructure compromise as coherent forms of strategic competition rather than unrelated criminal, intelligence, and influence activities.

Most fundamentally, it means understanding that the definitional boundaries the field has inherited are not neutral analytical categories. They're strategic terrain that adversaries compete by exploiting them. Until International Security Studies recognises boundary exploitation itself as the central feature of contemporary cyber competition, the field will remain unable to provide the analytical guidance policymakers urgently need.

Bibliography

Buchanan, Ben. The Hacker and the State: Cyber Attacks and the New Normal of Geopolitics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2020.

"Cost of Cybercrime." Cybersecurity Ventures, 2024. https://cybersecurityventures.com/cybercrime-damages-6-trillion-by-2021/.

Greenberg, Andy. "The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History." Wired, August 22, 2018. https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/.

Kello, Lucas. "The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution: Perils to Theory and Statecraft." International Security 38, no. 2 (Fall 2013): 7-40.

Krieg, Andreas. Subversion: The Strategic Weaponization of Narratives. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2023.

Rid, Thomas. "Cyber War Will Not Take Place." Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 1 (February 2012): 5-32.

Notes

[1] Ben Buchanan, The Hacker and the State: Cyber Attacks and the New Normal of Geopolitics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2020), 47-48.

[2] Thomas Rid, "Cyber War Will Not Take Place," Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 1 (February 2012): 5-32.

[3] Lucas Kello, "The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution: Perils to Theory and Statecraft," International Security 38, no. 2 (Fall 2013): 8.

[4] "Cost of Cybercrime," Cybersecurity Ventures, 2024, https://cybersecurityventures.com/cybercrime-damages-6-trillion-by-2021/. These figures aggregate direct theft, business disruption, and opportunity costs, and should be treated as indicative of order of magnitude rather than precise valuations.

[5] Kello, "Meaning of the Cyber Revolution," 24-26.

[6] Andy Greenberg, "The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History," Wired, August 22, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/.

[7] Andreas Krieg, Subversion: The Strategic Weaponization of Narratives (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2023), 89.

[8] Krieg, Subversion, 101-103.

What Intelligence Failures in the Cuban Missile Crisis Can Tell Us About the US, China, and Taiwan

2025-11-02T15:04:13Z

The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 is typically remembered as a moment when intelligence succeeded. U-2 imagery revealed Soviet missiles in Cuba before they became operational, preserving enough time for Kennedy to impose a naval quarantine and negotiate withdrawal. Yet this success followed weeks of systematic misjudgement. The British Joint Intelligence Committee assessed Soviet activity as defensive aid well into September, even as evidence accumulated of surface-to-air missile sites and unusual construction. American estimates judged a clandestine medium-range ballistic missile deployment 'unlikely' until photographic confirmation forced reassessment.[1] The delay was structural rather than accidental, rooted in cognitive shortcuts, institutional caution, and Cold War identity scripts that limited what analysts considered possible.

These patterns matter because they recur. As Washington and Beijing construct competing narratives about Taiwan, with each framing the other as aggressor, each mobilising resources through vocabularies of threat, intelligence communities operate within similar constraints. The question is whether the structural biases that nearly delayed Western recognition of Soviet missiles in 1962 might delay recognition of Chinese preparations today, and whether belief will accelerate quickly enough to preserve decision time.

How Analysts See What They Expect

The JIC's reporting in autumn 1962 was shaped by anchoring. In August, as Soviet shipping to Cuba intensified, the JIC judged the activity consistent with defensive arms transfers, a framing that persisted even as evidence accumulated of surface-to-air missile sites.[2] Once an initial hypothesis is formed, analysts interpret subsequent information through that lens in what Heuer termed theory-driven thinking.[3] Analysts also treated the scale of Soviet shipments as unproblematic, dismissing missing economic justification and thereby reinforcing a false coherence in their 'defensive' narrative.[4]

These cognitive tendencies continue to operate today. Current assessments of Chinese military activity around Taiwan are filtered through established frameworks about deterrence and Beijing's presumed rationality. Analysts assume that any move against Taiwan would be telegraphed by large-scale mobilisation. Yet Moscow's deployment to Cuba was itself a deviation from expected patterns, driven by logics of revolutionary identity and prestige that Western analysts struggled to accommodate.[5]

Chinese decision-making may likewise be guided by normative framings that diverge from Washington's expectations. Beijing's emphasis on 'national rejuvenation' and 'reunification' functions as an identity claim structuring what counts as legitimate behaviour and permissible risk.[6] If analysts anchor on Western deterrence logic, they may discount grey-zone escalation, fait accompli strategies, or calculated acceptance of short-term costs.

How Organisations Slow Belief

The JIC's organisational form shaped how intelligence was used. As a coordination body dependent on service departments, consensus procedures meant to ensure coherence instead diluted confidence.[7] Within Whitehall's hierarchy, reports were filtered through multiple clearances before reaching ministers, muting urgency.[8] Intelligence was expected to support existing orientations rather than drive policy, aligning with the government's desire to avoid escalation.[9]

Contemporary intelligence structures face similar pressures. Political sensitivities around Taiwan create incentives for analytic caution. Assessments challenging prevailing assumptions risk dismissal as alarmist. The result is a 'belief velocity' problem, where accurate intelligence exists but moves too slowly through institutional filters to affect decision-making.[10]

This temporal gap proved nearly fatal in 1962. Intelligence moved at three speeds: analytical (fast), institutional (slow), and evidentiary (sudden, when U-2 photography forced reassessment).[11] The Taiwan scenario presents a compressed timeline where grey-zone operations might precede kinetic action by narrow margins. If institutional filters slow recognition as in 1962, decision time could evaporate before intelligence forces reassessment.

How Identity Scripts Limit Imagination

The JIC assumed Soviet behaviour would reflect Western rational calculus, mirroring British self-understanding as a status-quo power and discounting that Moscow might be guided by different logics of revolutionary identity.[12] In the United States, the Monroe Doctrine functioned as a core identity frame, defining the Western Hemisphere as an exclusive sphere and predisposing analysts to treat Soviet deployments as inherently illegitimate.[13]

Today's rivalry operates through similar identity scripts. The American framing of China as a 'pacing challenge' functions as a securitising move, casting competition as existential and mobilising resources. Between May 2023 and March 2024, the Pacific Deterrence Initiative rose from $6.19 billion to $9.86 billion.[14] Beijing's narrative of 'great rejuvenation' operates symmetrically, with Xi Jinping's October 2022 report binding national modernisation to political authority.[15] By July 2024, a Central Military Commission directive ordered the PLA to 'dare to fight and win to realise national rejuvenation',[16] whilst Beijing launched a ¥344 billion semiconductor fund.[17]

These competing mythscapes create a spiral where each side's defensive posturing is framed by the other as proof of malign intent, mirroring Jervis's security dilemma.[18] Yet this is not simple misperception but deliberate political construction, converting structural anxiety into material commitments.[19]

For intelligence communities, assessments about Taiwan operate within politically charged frames. Chinese preparations might be read through Beijing's lens as defensive reunification but appear in Washington as offensive expansionism. Intelligence will be interpreted through pre-existing scripts rather than allowed to challenge them. In 1962, incontrovertible photographic evidence was required to overcome normative assumptions, yet assessments still underestimated Soviet deployments.[20]

Belief Velocity and Decision Time

Intelligence in the Cuban crisis mattered through synchronicity rather than prediction. The combination of U-2 imagery and Oleg Penkovsky's provision of R-12 missile manuals provided both confirmation and temporal calibration.[21] Richard Helms said the intelligence bought Kennedy 'three extra days', enabling measured response.[22]

Had discovery come only after missiles were operational, Washington's choice set would have narrowed to a strike or acceptance. Had evidence arrived earlier, the Soviet leadership might have reacted less flexibly. Both scenarios pivot on timing of belief.[23]

This temporal dimension is critical for Taiwan. Chinese preparation would unfold across multiple domains with different observational signatures and lead times. Intelligence must integrate technical collection with political assessment fast enough to preserve decision time, yet the same institutional filters that delayed recognition in 1962 remain operative.

Post-crisis reforms tightened coordination and introduced clearer confidence statements, whilst satellite imagery gained priority.[24] Yet reforms could not resolve the tension that intelligence operates as political activity within political institutions.[25] Contemporary debates might benefit from recognising this constraint: improving tradecraft matters, but if institutional cultures reward consensus, systematic conservatism will persist.

Implications for Taiwan

Three implications emerge. First, analysts must guard against anchoring on assumptions about Chinese rationality or gradualism. Beijing's decision calculus may be structured by normative commitments to 'reunification' that diverge from Western deterrence logic, requiring institutional capacity to question foundational assumptions.

Second, organisational structures must accelerate belief velocity by reducing institutional filters, creating direct channels for urgent assessments, and rewarding analysts who flag outlier scenarios. The Cuban crisis showed that consensus procedures can dilute warnings until events force reassessment. Taiwan's compressed timeline may not afford that luxury.

Third, intelligence communities must recognise they operate within politically charged normative frames. The competing mythscapes of 'pacing challenge' and 'great rejuvenation' structure what seems imaginable, influencing which indicators receive attention. Intelligence cannot escape these frames but can work to make them explicit, flagging when assessments reflect identity scripts rather than evidence alone.

The Cuban Missile Crisis succeeded because intelligence preserved enough time for diplomacy, yet that success followed weeks of near-failure when cognitive shortcuts, institutional caution, and normative assumptions nearly foreclosed recognition. The structural biases that shaped 1962 remain operative. Whether intelligence about Taiwan will move fast enough depends on whether institutions can overcome the same filters that nearly delayed belief in October 1962.

Bibliography

Aldrich, Richard J., Rory Cormac, and Michael S. Goodman. Spying on the World: The Declassified Documents of the Joint Intelligence Committee, 1936–2013. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014.

Allison, Graham T., and Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 2nd ed. New York: Longman, 1999.

Bell, Duncan S. A. "Mythscapes: Memory, Mythology, and National Identity." British Journal of Sociology 54, no. 1 (March 2003): 63–81.

Blight, James G., and David A. Welch. "What Can Intelligence Tell Us about the Cuban Missile Crisis, and What Can the Cuban Missile Crisis Tell Us about Intelligence?" Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 3 (1998): 1–17.

Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998.

Central Military Commission. Decision on Deeply Advancing Political Training (中央军委印发《关于全面贯彻新时代政治建军方略深入推进军队政治整训的决定》). 10 July 2024. Accessed July 20, 2025. https://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/tt/202407/t20240710_660046.shtml.

Fischer, Beth A. "Perception, Intelligence Errors, and the Cuban Missile Crisis." Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 3 (1998): 150–72.

Garthoff, Raymond L. "US Intelligence in the Cuban Missile Crisis." Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 3 (1998): 18–63.

Herman, Michael. Intelligence Power in Peace and War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Heuer, Richards J. Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. Washington, DC: CIA, 2021.

Hulnick, Arthur S. "What's Wrong with the Intelligence Cycle." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 6 (2006): 959–79.

Jervis, Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. New Edition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Reuters. "China Establishes Third Phase of National Integrated Circuit Investment Fund with $47.5 Billion." May 27, 2024. Accessed August 11, 2025. https://www.business-standard.com/world-news/china-sets-up-third-fund-with-47-5-bn-to-boost-semiconductor-industry-124052700493_1.html.

Scott, Len. "Oleg Penkovsky, British Intelligence, and the Cuban Missile Crisis." In Learning from the Secret Past: Cases in British Intelligence History, edited by Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman, 226–48. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011.

Scott, L. V. Macmillan, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis: Political, Military and Intelligence Aspects. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999.

Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. Patriotic Education Law of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国爱国主义教育法). Adopted October 24, 2023; effective January 1, 2024. Accessed July 20, 2025. http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c2/c30834/202310/t20231024_432535.html.

U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). Pacific Deterrence Initiative: FY 2025 Budget Justification. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 2024. Accessed July 22, 2025. https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2025/FY2025_Pacific_Deterrence_Initiative.pdf.

Wæver, Ole. "Securitization and Desecuritization." In On Security, edited by Ronnie D. Lipschutz, 46–86. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.

Weldes, Jutta. Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.

Xi Jinping. "全面建设社会主义现代化国家全面推进中华民族伟大复兴——在中国共产党第二十次全国代表大会上的报告" [Report to the 20th CPC National Congress]. People's Daily, 4 January 2023. Accessed July 20, 2025. https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-10/25/content_5721685.htm.

[1]: Raymond L. Garthoff, "US Intelligence in the Cuban Missile Crisis," Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 3 (1998): 20–22.

[2]: Richard J. Aldrich, Rory Cormac, and Michael S. Goodman, Spying on the World: The Declassified Documents of the Joint Intelligence Committee, 1936–2013 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 249–52.

[3]: Richards J. Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: CIA, 2021), 91–92.

[4]: Ibid., 96–99.

[5]: Beth A. Fischer, "Perception, Intelligence Errors, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 3 (1998): 152–53.

[6]: Fischer, "Perception, Intelligence Errors," 153.

[7]: Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 30–35, 224–39.

[8]: Duncan S. A. Bell, "Mythscapes: Memory, Mythology, and National Identity," British Journal of Sociology 54, no. 1 (March 2003): 74.

[9]: Arthur S. Hulnick, "What's Wrong with the Intelligence Cycle," Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 6 (2006): 959–63.

[10]: Aldrich et al., Spying on the World, 252–54.

[11]: Hulnick, "What's Wrong with the Intelligence Cycle," 959–63.

[12]: Aldrich et al., Spying on the World, 252–54.

[13]: Philip H. J. Davies, MI6 and the Machinery of Spying (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 77–80.

[14]: Aldrich et al., Spying on the World, 10–23.

[15]: Hulnick, "What's Wrong with the Intelligence Cycle," 961–62.

[16]: This concept draws on Heuer's account of how vivid evidence overcomes analytic inertia. Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, 91–97.

[17]: James G. Blight and David A. Welch, "What Can Intelligence Tell Us about the Cuban Missile Crisis, and What Can the Cuban Missile Crisis Tell Us about Intelligence?" Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 3 (1998): 1–3.

[18]: Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, 91–97.

[19]: Fischer, "Perception, Intelligence Errors," 153.

[20]: Weldes, Constructing National Interests, 30–35, 224–39.

[21]: Aldrich et al., Spying on the World, 251–54.

[22]: Ole Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization," in On Security, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 54–55.

[23]: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Pacific Deterrence Initiative: FY 2025 Budget Justification (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 2024), 3.

[24]: Xi Jinping, "全面建设社会主义现代化国家全面推进中华民族伟大复兴——在中国共产党第二十次全国代表大会上的报告" [Report to the 20th CPC National Congress], People's Daily, 4 January 2023, 1.

[25]: Central Military Commission, Decision on Deeply Advancing Political Training (10 July 2024), art. 2.

Are the US and China Destined for War?

2025-10-19T12:27:43Z

1. Destiny as Political Technology

Debates about whether the United States and China are ‘destined for war’ are usually cast in realist terms, with inevitability flowing from systemic anarchy and power transition. This essay argues instead that the language of destiny is not a structural fact but a political technology, through which each nation secures ontological survival. The American trope of a ‘pacing challenge’ and China’s invocation of ‘great rejuvenation’ function less as neutral diagnoses than as identity scripts, mobilising resources and legitimising extraordinary measures by presuming the other as antagonist. Rivalry is enacted through discursive performance, a struggle to sustain national being by scripting an enemy whose existence makes one coherent. The task is not to weigh whether realism predicts war, but to show how the vocabulary of destiny accelerates confrontation by producing the peril it claims merely to describe.

The analysis traces these dynamics: in Washington, the ‘pacing challenge’ from its 2023 Senate debut into the 2024 NDAA and FY 2025 budget; in Beijing, the ‘great rejuvenation’ from Xi’s early speeches into the 20th Party Congress and strategic industrial mobilisation. These discursive trajectories show how fatalistic language generates material outcomes, undermining the realist claim that rivalry is foreordained by structure alone.

2. The Realist Script

The ‘inevitability’ claim stems from neorealism, which holds that in an anarchic system, the security dilemma makes great power competition endemic. Despite realist debates over power-maximisation versus security-seeking, Mearsheimer's 'tragedy' thesis has become the dominant framework for understanding US-China competition as structurally determined.[1]

Power-transition logic predicts that when a rising challenger closes on an established hegemon, war becomes more probable.[2] In today’s constellation China is the ascendant power, the United States the reigning one. From a realist vantage point, their collision flows from structure, not miscalculation or malice.[3]

This analytical framework is elegant and influential, yet its concepts become politically performative when adopted by policymakers. In shaping the reality they purport to describe, realists confirm the constructivist critique of its supposed neutrality. As early as 1983, Ullman warned that equating security with military power ‘conveys a profoundly false image of reality’ and militarises U.S. policymaking.[4]

3. Narrative as Political Technology

The realist script explains structural conditions for rivalry but says little about how states translate them into policy. As Buzan observed, structural theories risk treating states as interchangeable units, overlooking the domestic cohesion that shapes how external pressures are processed.[5] Rather than abandoning realism, this essay interrogates its performative dimension: how its concepts function once mobilised by political elites. To that end, it employs two constructivist tools – ‘securitisation’ and the ‘illocutionary speech act’ – to show how the language of destiny operates as political technology.

Securitisation theory describes how a ‘securitising actor’ frames an issue as an existential threat to a ‘referent object’.[6] This is achieved via an illocutionary speech act,[7] which distinguishes a statement that merely describes the world (a locutionary act) and one that performs an action by being uttered (an illocutionary act).[8] For a securitising move to be successful, it must be accepted by a relevant audience, such as the legislature or the public.[9] This focus on existential threat and emergency action lifts an issue 'above politics'.[10]

These theoretical tools show how realism’s vocabulary of threat and competition can be instrumentalised as political technology. As Ole Wæver observes, securitising actors draw on established discourses to lend scientific legitimacy and urgency to political projects, making budgetary priorities appear matters of survival rather than discretion.[11] Such framing maps onto what Duncan Bell terms the ‘mythscape’, that of collectively rehearsed national destinies that render compromise suspect.[12] In this instance, Washington’s narrative of a ‘pacing challenge’ and Beijing’s of a ‘great rejuvenation’ function as mythscapes, each defining a national project that presumes the other as an obstacle.

4. Micro-Process Traces

This claim can be demonstrated by tracing key securitising phrases from high-level rhetoric through policy documents to material outcomes for both China and the US.[13]

4.1. The U.S. Trace

On 16 May 2023, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin told the Senate Appropriations Committee that ‘the PRC is our pacing challenge’ and cast the US$842 billion request as strategy-driven rather than discretionary.[14] The cue framed the budget as structured by great-power competition and invited institutional uptake.

Seven months later, Congress authorises the frame’s operational centre of gravity in the FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act. The Joint Explanatory Statement creates an Indo-Pacific Campaigning Initiative, notes a request of US$786.2 million for USINDOPACOM campaigning, and adds a further US$508 million across the services.[15] The same statement extends and endorses the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and provides a budgetary display keyed to that rubric.[16] While the statute does not use the precise phrase ‘pacing challenge’, the conferees state that PDI will ‘prioritize Department of Defense efforts… enhancing U.S. deterrence and defense posture… and increasing readiness and capability in the Indo-Pacific region, primarily west of the International Date Line.’[17]

Material conversion follows in appropriations in March 2024, when Division A of the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act enacts the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2024.[18] DoD’s FY2025 Pacific Deterrence Initiative book then repeats Austin’s formula, opening with ‘The Department is prioritizing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as its pacing challenge’, and records a PDI display of roughly US$9.06 billion in FY2024 (request) and US$9.86 billion in FY2025.[19] On DoD’s own display, PDI rose from US$6.19 bn (FY2023) to US$9.06 bn (FY2024) and US$9.86 bn (FY2025), representing a 46% jump, then a further 9% after ‘pacing challenge’ entered executive rhetoric.

The sequence of speech → legislation → outlays, shows how pacing challenge discourse directly precipitates, rather than merely predicts, a more muscular U.S. posture in the Indo-Pacific.

4.2. The China Trace

The Chinese narrative begins with Xi Jinping’s report to the 20th Party Congress (16 Oct 2022; People’s Daily ed. 4 Jan 2023), which named as its ‘central task’ as ‘以中国式现代化全面推进中华民族伟大复兴’ (advancing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation).[20] The declaration is illocutionary: by stating the goal, Xi performs the act of binding national modernisation to the Party’s political authority, framing it as a collective leap toward an historic destiny.

Twelve months later, on 24 October 2023, the Patriotic Education Law made the slogan official, obliging schools, media and museums to ‘carry forward the spirit of rejuvenation’.[21] Its Support-and-Guarantee chapter created a legal basis for future appropriations without specifying amounts. In January 2025 the Ministry of Education announced a central special fund for patriotic-education projects.[22]

In July 2024 the narrative moved from law to mobilisation. Han Zheng’s keynote to the 12th World Peace Forum (4 July) warned of ‘外部遏制’ (external containment) and urged a ‘shared-destiny community’,[23] while a Central Military Commission directive (10 July) ordered the PLA to ‘敢打必胜，以实现中华民族伟大复兴’ (dare to fight and win to realise national rejuvenation).[24] Both were illocutionary, instructing audiences to act to realise the rejuvenation they proclaim.

By mid-2025 the Support-and-Guarantee provisions had moved to practice, extending beyond cultural projects into large-scale industrial mobilisation. Xi Jinping’s calls for ‘independent and controllable’ core technologies as a pillar of the ‘great rejuvenation’ were codified in the 14th Five-Year Plan’s directive to accelerate semiconductor self-sufficiency.[25] In May 2024 Beijing launched the third phase of the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund with registered capital of ¥344 billion (US $47.5 billion).[26] Official discourse cast it as both for ‘external containment’ and for technological rejuvenation, funnelling resources into chip fabrication, research and design. Like the PDI, it converts a securitising slogan into multi-billion-dollar mobilisation.

5. Spiral Dynamics

Viewed through this lens, the traces reveal a clear escalatory spiral. In classic security studies, such dynamics are often explained through the lens of misperception. Robert Jervis’s spiral model, for example, posits that a state’s defensive actions can be incorrectly seen by a rival as offensive threats, sparking a cycle of mutual fear and hostility.[27] This cognitive trap is reinforced by the structural realities of anarchy, what Barry Buzan terms the ‘defence dilemma’, where any increase in one state’s security can decrease the security of others.[28]

Yet the evidence here suggests something more deliberate than simple misperception. Escalation is not just a cognitive error but a political process, actively manufactured by securitising actors on both sides. The narratives in the traces act as political technologies, converting structural anxiety into material commitments.[29] This is how rivalry is discursively accelerated, where each side’s defensive posturing, justified by its ‘mythscape’,[30] is framed by the other as proof of malign intent, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy.[31] This discursive process is not deterministic. In principle it contains a counter-logic, what Etzioni terms ‘mutually assured restraint’, where rivals may forgo certain deployments to signal moderation. Discourse, then, can serve as a political technology of restraint as well as acceleration.[32]

6. Counterargument & Limits

A structural realist might argue that the discourses traced above are mere epiphenomena. Austin invokes 'pacing challenge' and Xi proclaims 'great rejuvenation' because material competition already exists - Beijing's defence spending reached $314 billion in 2024, while Washington spent $997 billion and restricted China's semiconductor access.[33] From this view, the documentary traces merely show rhetoric following structure, rather than creating it.

This materialist account has considerable force. As Mearsheimer argues, capability aggregation creates fear regardless of stated intentions and states must assume the worst about rivals' motives given the high stakes of survival.[34] The budget increases and industrial mobilisation could simply reflect rational responses to objective threats rather than discursive construction.

Yet this misses how discourse determines which capabilities become politically salient. China's military spending represents 1.7% of GDP versus America's 3.4%, showing that the threat requires discursive activation to justify emergency measures.[35] More tellingly, if structure determined discourse, we would expect consistent rhetoric across time. Instead, the 'pacing challenge' frame represents a specific choice to militarise competition beyond what capabilities alone would predict. As Krebs and Jackson demonstrate, such rhetorical moves can trap opponents 'without the rhetorical materials to craft a socially sustainable rebuttal,' creating policy lock-in that transcends material constraints.[36]

The traces themselves have limitations, as public documents may simply reflect post-hoc justifications. Correlation between rhetoric and budgets doesn't prove causation and both may respond to classified assessments unavailable to researchers. Nevertheless, the pattern suggests discourse doesn't replace material reality but shapes how ambiguous capabilities become actionable threats. War becomes not structurally inevitable but discursively accelerated.

7. Conclusions

The concept that the United States and China are destined for war is not an objective finding but a political construction. The securitising narratives of a ‘pacing challenge’ in Washington and a ‘great rejuvenation’ in Beijing are identity scripts, political technologies that mobilise domestic populations, legitimise extraordinary measures, and channel resources. Rather than operating in isolation, they are symbiotic, feeding a spiral dynamic where each side’s defensive posturing is read as proof of aggression and sustaining a prophesy of conflict.

This reveals realism’s blind spot. Once its concepts migrate into politics, they cease to describe and begin to perform. Rivalry is discursively accelerated through a struggle for ontological survival enacted through the vocabulary of destiny. Yet discourse can also contain its own counter-logic. The idea of mutually assured restraint shows that doctrines and slogans can be deployed not only to hasten confrontation but to slow it, acting as instruments of moderation. The choice between escalation and restraint thus lies less in structure than the narrative tools employed by each nation.

Bibliography

Austin, J.L., How to Do Things with Words: The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955 (Oxford, 1975; online edn, Oxford Academic, 3 Oct. 2011)

Austin, Lloyd J., III. ‘Opening Testimony by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense Hearing (As Delivered)’. Speech, Washington, DC, 11 May 2023. U.S. Department of Defense. Accessed July 20, 2025. https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/3392603/opening-testimony-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-before-the-senate/

Bell, Duncan S. A. 'Mythscapes: memory, mythology, and national identity'. British Journal of Sociology 54, no. 1 (March 2003): 63–81.

Buzan, Barry. People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. 2nd ed. Colchester: ECPR Press, 2007.

Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998.

Central Military Commission, Decision on Deeply Advancing Political Training (中央军委印发《关于全面贯彻新时代政治建军方略深入推进军队政治整训的决定》). 10 Jul 2024, art. 2. Accessed July 20, 2025. https://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/tt/202407/t20240710_660046.shtml

Etzioni, Amitai. ‘Mutually Assured Restraint: A New Approach for United States–China Relations.’ The Brown Journal of World Affairs 20, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2014): 37–51.

Han, Zheng. ‘Keynote Address to the 12th World Peace Forum.’ Tsinghua University, Beijing, 4 July 2024. Accessed July 19, 2025. https://www.sss.tsinghua.edu.cn/info/1073/7610.htm

Jervis, Robert. ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,’ World Politics 30, no. 2. January 1978.

Jervis, Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. New Edition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Jin Wei Lei Ke. 以中国式现代化全面推进中华民族伟大复兴. [Comprehensively promote the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation with Chinese-style modernization] CPC News Network. 2025. Accessed July 19, 2025. http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2023/0104/c448544-32599337.html

Krebs, Ronald R., and  Jackson, Patrick T. ‘Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric.’ European Journal of International Relations 13, no. 1 (March 2007): 35–66.

Mearsheimer, John J. ‘Structural Realism.’ In International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, edited by Timothy Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, 71-88. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Updated Edition. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2014.

Ministry of Education. ‘对十四届全国人大二次会议第4957号建议的答复’ [Reply to Proposal #4957 of the 14th NPC]. 13 January 2025. Accessed July 21, 2025. http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xxgk/xxgk_jyta/jyta_jijiaosi/202501/t20250113_1175496.html

Reuters. ‘China Establishes Third Phase of National Integrated Circuit Investment Fund with $47.5 Billion.’ May 27, 2024. Accessed August 11, 2025. https://www.business-standard.com/world-news/china-sets-up-third-fund-with-47-5-bn-to-boost-semiconductor-industry-124052700493_1.html

Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. Patriotic Education Law of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国爱国主义教育法). Adopted October 24, 2023; effective January 1, 2024. Accessed July 20, 2025. http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c2/c30834/202310/t20231024_432535.html.

State Council of the People's Republic of China. ‘Outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) for National Economic and Social Development and the Long-Range Objectives Through the Year 2035.’ Beijing, March 2021. Accessed August 11, 2025. https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/t0284_14th_Five_Year_Plan_EN.pdf

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2024. Accessed July 22, 2025. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-04/2504_fs_milex_2024.pdf

Ullman, Richard H, ‘Redefining Security,’ International Security 8, no. 1. Summer 1983. 129–30.

United States. Congress. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024. Public Law 118-31, 22 December 2023. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office. Accessed July 22, 2025. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-118publ31/pdf/PLAW-118publ31.pdf

United States. Congress. Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024. 118th Cong., 1st sess., December 2023. Washington, DC: Senate Committee on Armed Services. Accessed July 21, 2025. https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/fy24_ndaa_joint_explanatory_statement.pdf

United States. Congress. Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024. Public Law 118-47, 23 March 2024. Division A, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2024. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office. Accessed July 21, 2025. https://www.congress.gov/118/plaws/publ47/PLAW-118publ47.pdf

U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). Pacific Deterrence Initiative: FY 2025 Budget Justification. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 2024. Accessed July 22, 2025. https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2025/FY2025_Pacific_Deterrence_Initiative.pdf

Wæver, Ole. ‘Securitization and Desecuritization.’ In On Security, edited by Ronnie D. Lipschutz, 46–86. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.

Williams, Michael C. ‘Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics.’ International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 4 (December 2003): 511–531.

Xi Jinping. ‘全面建设社会主义现代化国家全面推进中华民族伟大复兴——在中国共产党第二十次全国代表大会上的报告’ [Report to the 20th CPC National Congress]. People’s Daily, 4 January 2023. Accessed July 20, 2025. https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-10/25/content_5721685.htm

[1] John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Updated Edition (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2014), 265.

[2] John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Structural Realism,’ in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, ed. Timothy Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 61.

[3] Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 284.

[4] Richard H. Ullman, ‘Redefining Security,’ International Security 8, no. 1 (Summer 1983): 129–30.

[5] Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd ed. (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2007), 93.

[6] Ole Wæver, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization,’ in On Security, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 54-55.

[7] J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, ed. J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 98-103.

[8] Michael C. Williams, ‘Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,’ International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 4 (2003): 514.

[9] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 25.

[10] Williams, ‘Words, Images, Enemies,’ 515.

[11] Wæver. ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’. 54-55

[12] Duncan Bell, 'Mythscapes: memory, mythology, and national identity'. British Journal of Sociology 54, no. 1 (March 2003): 74.

[13] These traces rely on publicly available documents and visible policy instruments. While this approach cannot capture all causal mechanisms or behind-closed-doors negotiations, the focus on high-profile securitising language and budgetary outcomes provides illustrative evidence of discursive materialisation. Fuller analysis would require elite interviews and comprehensive corpus analysis across classified materials.

[14] Lloyd J. Austin III, ‘Opening Testimony Before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense,’ 16 May 2023, 8.

[15] U.S. Congress, Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, 317, 325.

[16] Ibid. PDI display/table.

[17] Ibid. §1302.

[18] Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024, Pub. L. 118-47 (23 March 2024), Div. A.

[19] U.S. Department of Defense, Pacific Deterrence Initiative: FY 2025 Budget Justification, March 2024, 3.

[20] Xi Jinping, ‘全面建设社会主义现代化国家…,’ People’s Daily, 4 Jan 2023, 1.

[21] Standing Committee of the NPC, Patriotic Education Law of the PRC (24 Oct 2023), art. 8.

[22] Ministry of Education, ‘Reply to NPC Proposal #4957,’ 13 Jan 2025; Ministry of Education et al., ‘意见—高校思想政治工作体系,’ 15 May 2020, sec. III.4.

[23] Han Zheng, keynote, 12th World Peace Forum, 4 Jul 2024; Central Military Commission, Decision on Deeply Advancing Political Training (10 Jul 2024), art. 2.

[24] Central Military Commission, Decision on Deeply Advancing Political Training, 10 July 2024, art. 2.

[25] State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025) and Long-Range Objectives Through 2035, Part V, Chap. 15, Sec. 2.

[26] Reuters, ‘China Establishes Third Phase of National Integrated Circuit Investment Fund with $47.5 Billion,’ 27 May 2024.

[27] Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, New Edition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 62–76.

[28] Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,’ World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 169.

[29] Wæver. ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’. 55

[30] Bell, ‘Mythscapes’. 75.

[31] Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 69.

[32] Amitai Etzioni, ‘Mutually Assured Restraint: A New Approach for United States–China Relations,’ The Brown Journal of World Affairs 20, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2014): 40–41.

[33] SIPRI, Trends in World Military Expenditure 2024 (Apr 2025), 2; Sujai Shivakumar and Charles Wessner, The Limits of Chip Export Controls (CSIS, 2025).

[34] Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 271-272.

[35] SIPRI, Trends in World Military Expenditure 2024, 2.

[36] Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick T. Jackson, ‘Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric,’ European Journal of International Relations 13, no. 1 (2007): 36.

The UK's Land Warfare Deficit

2025-09-04T17:19:03Z

An Assessment of Readiness for European Conflict

The British Army's inability to deploy and sustain a warfighting division for extended operations in Europe represents one of NATO's most pressing capability gaps. With the UK Regular Forces standing at just 136,117 personnel as of January 2025, the smallest professional army in centuries.¹Britain faces a fundamental mismatch between its strategic commitments and actual military capacity. This deficit becomes particularly concerning given the current US administration's explicit demands for European nations to assume greater responsibility for their own defence, with President Trump now calling for NATO members to spend up to 5 percent of GDP on defence spending.² The stark reality is that Britain cannot credibly field the forces necessary for sustained high-intensity warfare, a vulnerability that undermines both national security and the broader architecture of European defence.

The Hollowing of British Land Power

The British Army's current state reflects decades of progressive capability erosion. The 3rd (UK) Division, Britain's primary warfighting formation, exists more as an organisational framework than as a deployable combat force. Parliamentary testimony has revealed that the Army would ‘exhaust its capabilities after the first couple of months’ of high-intensity warfare, with ammunition stockpiles sufficient for only days of divisional combat.³ The donation of the entire AS-90 self-propelled howitzer fleet to Ukraine (whilst strategically justified) has left Britain without its primary indirect fire capability until Swedish Archer systems achieve full operational capacity.⁴

The materiel crisis extends beyond artillery. The Challenger 3 tank upgrade programme, essential for maintaining armoured capability relevance, will not deliver operational vehicles until 2027.⁵ Meanwhile, the troubled Ajax reconnaissance vehicle programme has consumed £5.5 billion whilst delivering zero operational vehicles to frontline units, despite 152 having been built.⁶ The Boxer mechanised infantry vehicle, intended to replace the ageing Warrior fleet, will not reach initial operating capability until late 2025, with full operational capability delayed until 2032.⁷ This temporal misalignment between legacy system retirement and replacement programme delivery creates what defence analysts term a ‘capability holiday’ – a period during which the force structure exists on paper but lacks the physical means to execute its doctrinal role.

Personnel shortfalls compound equipment deficiencies. The Army currently operates 8,590 personnel below its target strength, with more soldiers leaving than joining for six of the past seven years.⁸ The reconceptualisation of the Army Reserve from a strategic reinforcement capability to an individual augmentation pool means that deploying units must cannibalise the entire reserve structure simply to reach their war establishment. This conscious trade of endurance for initial readiness leaves no mechanism for force rotation or reconstitution during protracted operations. A structural brittleness entirely unsuited to the attritional nature of contemporary peer conflict.

The European Context: Collective Insufficiency

France and Germany, often cited as potential compensators for British weakness, face their own profound limitations. The French Army, whilst fielding more modern equipment through its SCORPION programme, lacks the mass for sustained divisional operations. France's Chief of Army Staff acknowledges the capacity to deploy ‘a division of around 20,000 men within 30 days,’ but French officials candidly admit that munitions stocks would be exhausted within months of high-intensity combat.⁹ The strategic overstretch inherent in maintaining global commitments whilst preparing for European contingencies creates what analysts term a ‘jack of all theatres, master of none’ dilemma.

Germany's situation proves even more problematic. Despite the much-vaunted Zeitenwende and its €100 billion defence modernisation fund, the German Army Chief publicly stated in April 2023 that the force ‘will not be able to hold its own in high-intensity combat’ and could only fulfil NATO obligations ‘to a limited extent.’¹⁰ The promised ‘Division 2025’ exists only at initial operational capability, lacking critical enablers including air defence and digital communications systems.¹¹ With operational readiness rates for major equipment hovering around 30-50 percent, Germany cannot translate its theoretical strength into deployable combat power.

This collective insufficiency becomes particularly concerning given President Trump's increasingly explicit linkage between defence spending and security guarantees. His statement that the United States would ‘encourage [Russia] to do whatever the hell they want’ to NATO members failing to meet spending targets represents more than rhetorical excess, rather it signals a fundamental reconsideration of unconditional American security provision.¹² European leaders' attempts to negotiate alternative arrangements, offering economic concessions or support for Washington's China containment strategy in exchange for continued protection, appear unlikely to succeed given the administration's determination to achieve what it terms ‘equitable burden sharing.’¹³

Strategic Implications and Deterrence Credibility

The fundamental principle of deterrence rests upon adversary perception of both capability and resolve. Britain's current force structure fails the capability test comprehensively. A Russian General Staff assessment would likely conclude that UK forces could mount only token resistance to sustained conventional aggression, particularly without American enablers. The 2025 Strategic Defence Review's acknowledgement that Britain requires an ‘always on’ munitions production capability and must ‘end the hollowing out’ of the armed forces represents belated recognition of this reality, but implementation timelines extend well beyond immediate threat horizons.¹⁵

The arithmetic of contemporary consumption rates proves sobering. Ukraine expends approximately 6,000-8,000 artillery rounds daily during intensive operations. Britain's entire stockpile would sustain similar rates for less than a week. BAE Systems' commitment to increase shell production eight-fold to 1.5 million annually by late 2025 sounds impressive until one calculates that this represents approximately six months of wartime consumption for a single division.¹⁵ The industrial base atrophy resulting from three decades of ‘peace dividend’ procurement cannot be reversed through declarations of intent.

Addressing the Capability Deficit

Restoring credible warfighting capacity requires acknowledgement that current approaches cannot close the capability-threat gap within relevant timeframes. The immediacy of the challenge demands radical departures from peacetime acquisition orthodoxy.

First, emergency procurement of available systems must take precedence over perfect solutions. The UK should immediately acquire proven 155mm self-propelled howitzers, be that Korean K9 Thunder or additional Swedish Archer systems, rather than awaiting the Boxer RCH 155 programme's delivery in the 2030s. Similarly, the Ministry of Defence must accept ‘80% solutions’ for Ajax and Boxer programmes, prioritising deployable capability over optimal specifications.

Second, the manpower crisis requires fundamental reconceptualisation. The Army Reserve's current role as individual augmentation must be reversed, with priority given to reconstituting formed units capable of providing operational depth. This necessitates accepting risk in initial deployment strength to restore strategic endurance, which is precisely the inverse of current policy. Additionally, dramatic improvements to service conditions, particularly accommodation and family stability, are essential to arrest the haemorrhage of experienced personnel.

Third, industrial mobilisation cannot await perfect conditions. The government must immediately place multi-year, high-volume munitions orders with guaranteed pricing to incentivise private sector investment in production capacity. Strategic stockpiling of critical materials and components should commence immediately, accepting the fiscal burden as insurance against supply chain disruption during crisis. The establishment of sovereign production capacity for essential munitions represents not military procurement but critical national infrastructure.

Fourth, collective European capability development requires transcending national industrial preferences. Joint procurement, shared logistics, and integrated command structures offer the only viable path to achieving necessary scale within fiscal constraints. The political challenges of surrendering procurement autonomy pale beside the strategic consequences of military irrelevance.

Conclusions

Britain's land warfare deficit represents not just a capability deficit, instead it constitutes a significant shortfall of strategic credibility. The comfortable assumption that American power would ultimately guarantee European security regardless of burden-sharing inequities has been definitively shattered. President Trump's transactional approach to alliance relationships, whilst perhaps lacking diplomatic finesse, accurately reflects American exhaustion with asymmetric security provision.

The window for addressing these deficiencies narrows rapidly. Intelligence assessments suggest Russia could reconstitute significant offensive capacity by 2027-2028, requiring credible NATO deterrence architecture to be operational by that timeframe.¹⁶ Current modernisation timelines, extending into the 2030s, fail this fundamental test of strategic relevance.

The choice facing Britain is stark: accept the fiscal and political costs of genuine rearmament or acknowledge inability to fulfil Alliance obligations. Half-measures and rhetorical commitments no longer suffice when potential adversaries possess both the capability and demonstrated willingness to employ military force. The preservation of European security architecture requires not incremental adjustment but fundamental transformation of defence capacity and industrial mobilisation. Whether Britain's political leadership possesses the clarity and courage for such transformation remains the defining question for the nation's strategic future.

¹‘Quarterly Service Personnel Statistics: 1 January 2025,’ GOV.UK, accessed September 4, 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/quarterly-service-personnel-statistics-2025/.

² Meredith McGraw, ‘Trump's Five Percent Doctrine and NATO Defense Spending,’ Peterson Institute for International Economics, February 5, 2025, https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2025/trumps-five-percent-doctrine-and-nato-defense-spending.

³ Dan Sabbagh, ‘British Army Would Exhaust Capabilities After Two Months of War, MPs Told,’ The Guardian, February 4, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2024/feb/04/british-army-would-exhaust-capabilities-after-two-months-of-war-mps-told.

⁴ House of Commons Library, ‘UK Defence in 2025: Tanks, Armoured Vehicles and Artillery,’ Research Briefing CBP-10274, 2025, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10274/.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ ‘Ajax Armoured Vehicle,’ Defence Equipment & Support, accessed September 4, 2025, https://des.mod.uk/what-we-do/army-procurement-support/ajax/.

⁷ House of Commons Library, ‘UK Defence in 2025.’

⁸ House of Commons Library, ‘UK Defence Personnel Statistics,’ Research Briefing CBP-7930, March 9, 2025, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-7930/.

⁹ ‘French Army Says Prepared for Toughest Engagements,’ Economic Times, March 2024, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/french-army-says-prepared-for-toughest-engagements/.

¹⁰ Daphne Psaledakis, ‘Assessing the Zeitenwende,’ US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2024, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/4080125/assessing-the-zeitenwende/.

¹¹ Sarah Marsh, ‘50% Battle-Ready: Germany Misses Military Targets Despite Scholz's Overhaul,’ Reuters, February 13, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/50-battle-ready-germany-misses-military-targets-despite-scholzs-overhaul-2025-02-13/.

¹² Matthew Kroenig, ‘For Europe, Trump NATO Spending Outburst Could Have Positive Impact,’ Foreign Policy, March 7, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/07/trump-nato-europe-russia-defense-spending/.

¹³ Emma Ashford and Matthew Kroenig, ‘Trump Will Pressure Europe on Defense Spending and Burden Sharing,’ Foreign Policy, January 23, 2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/01/23/trump-eu-nato-europe-defense-spending-troop-deployments-burden-sharing/.

¹⁴‘The Strategic Defence Review 2025: Making Britain Safer,’ GOV.UK, 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-strategic-defence-review-2025-making-britain-safer-secure-at-home-strong-abroad/.

¹⁵ Jack Watling, ‘Implications of the Ukraine War for UK Munitions Supply Arrangements,’ Royal United Services Institute, 2024, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/implications-ukraine-war-uk-munitions-supply-arrangements.

¹⁶ Ben Wallace, ‘Call for Focus on High-Intensity Warfighting to Increase Deterrence,’ House of Commons Defence Committee, 2024, https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/24/defence-committee/news/199770/call-for-focus-on-highintensity-warfighting-to-increase-deterrence/.

Decentralising lifelines: a humanitarian strategy for Haiti

2025-08-17T18:33:07Z

Haiti’s latest state of emergency (declared 9 August 2025) formalises what residents have endured for months, a capital city largely under the rule of armed groups and an aid pipeline that can be strangled at will.¹ When the Varreux fuel terminal or the main port area is seized or besieged, clinics shut, cold chains fail, and food assistance stalls.² The pattern is now familiar enough to count as design rather than accident: the humanitarian system has been lashed to a single node, and that node is very brittle.

The reason behind this is a long history of colonial abuse. In 1825, France compelled Haiti, under warship threat, to pay 150 million francs to “compensate” former enslavers, later renegotiated to 90 million. The early payments alone exceeded the young state’s annual revenues, pushing officials into predatory lending from French banks; the last remittances were still being serviced in the mid-twentieth century.³ The effect was a century of state under-investment, with forests felled and budgets diverted to Paris instead of roads, schools or provincial health posts. In the twentieth century the United States’ occupation (1915–34) compounded the structural flaw by re-engineering administration and movement so that “all roads” flowed to Port-au-Prince.⁴ That choice made governance efficient for the occupier and perilous for everyone else. The 2010 earthquake then demonstrated what a “single point of failure” looks like in a state: ministries collapsed, large fractions of the civil service were killed, and the centre’s physical destruction erased what little capacity remained.⁵ The UN’s cholera debacle that followed turned a legitimacy deficit into a vacuum.⁶ Gang coalitions have converted choke-point control into revenue, coercion and de facto sovereignty.

Given this, then the immediate humanitarian question is not “how to retake the capital” but “how to stop the capital’s capture from collapsing national relief”. That reframing leads to a decentralisation imperative. A strategy of polycentric lifelines would deliberately reduce Port-au-Prince’s monopoly over aid entry, customs, warehousing, power and information. In practice that means shifting a meaningful share of humanitarian flow through Cap-Haïtien, St-Marc and Lafito, scaling auxiliary airfields for medical evacuation and vaccine cold-chain hops, and standing up duplicate customs and treasury rails in safer jurisdictions so that revenue can be collected and salaries paid even when the capital is contested. Cap-Haïtien already functions as the second port; UN logistics assessments list significant quays and back-area for staging; Varreux itself is a 50-million-gallon tank farm that repeatedly becomes a political hostage.⁷ The aim is not to bypass the state but to multiply the state’s points of presence so a strike on one cannot fell the whole.

There is a theory to support this. Elinor Ostrom’s work on polycentric governance shows that, when authority and capability are distributed across partially autonomous centres, systems learn faster, adapt under stress, and avoid the brittleness of single-hierarchy rule.⁸ We need to avoid romantic localism. The design needs to respond to the complexity where central command is weak, contested or both. The applied governance literature adds an empirical note: when resources and discretion move closer to people’s lived needs, investment patterns tend to tilt toward human development. In Bolivia, for example, post-1994 decentralisation reversed the flow of “devolved funds” from an 86:14 split favouring three big cities to 27:73 in favour of the other 308 municipalities, with the composition of spending shifting from transport and hydrocarbons to education, urban development, and water and sanitation (79 percent of municipal investment).⁹ That is exactly the pattern a humanitarian would hope to see in Haiti’s provinces: more cash and capacity where people are, not only where the state once was.

A polycentric humanitarian strategy for Haiti would rest on four moves. First, diversify ports of entry and replicate life-critical functions. That means pre-positioning fuel, medical commodities and emergency telecommunications at Cap-Haïtien and St-Marc, and contracting surge lighterage so bulk cargo can be worked offshore if quays are compromised. Reuters has already documented how a month-long blockade of Varreux can stall most economic and aid flows; the obvious lesson is not to gamble everything on reopening a single gate.² Second, duplicate fiscal chokepoints. Haiti’s tax take is only 6.3 percent of GDP, and customs is the largest reliable instrument left. When armed groups choke access to Port-au-Prince, the revenue base collapses. Creating secure, audited customs clearance capacity in the North and Centre (paired with ring-fenced, digitally traceable salary lines for provincial health and WASH workers) keeps essential services alive.¹⁰ Third, crowd in diasporic and private logistics where security permits, under humanitarian carve-outs. Remittances account for around one-fifth of GDP in recent years; calibrating corridors that safely convert private remittance inflows into local procurement for clinics and food actors would reduce exposure to the Port-au-Prince choke-point without “NGO-ising” the economy.¹¹ Finally, align the security mission to protect these lifelines rather than only to “retake” the capital. With fewer than half the planned MSS personnel on the ground by June 2025 and limited progress reported, tying deployments to humanitarian corridors and revenue sites may yield more lives saved per officer.¹²

The US/France history matters here only insofar as it explains why Port-au-Prince became a perilous funnel. The indemnity extracted by France bled the countryside of investment; the US line-of-communication doctrine then routed power into a single hub. The result is a capital that offers maximal leverage to whoever seizes it. A humane strategy treats that as a structural problem to be corrected. It is not an argument to abandon Port-au-Prince. It is an argument to make it matter less when it is held hostage.

There are however, very legitimate concerns to such an approach. Decentralisation can simply replicate capture at smaller scales; Bolivia’s improvements in responsiveness coexisted with uneven quality and local elite bargains.⁹ Indonesia’s “big-bang” decentralisation improved proximity and spending shares for frontline services but struggled on standards and equity across districts, especially in health.¹³ The Haitian risk is obvious - provincial customs houses, warehouses and councils could become new rackets. That argues for sequencing and safeguards, such as independent audits, civil-society monitoring, and transparent, rules-based transfers, rather than for clinging to a dangerous central monoculture.

A final point concerns legitimacy. I have written previously UN’s “legitimacy gap” in Haiti: focused on over-promising, bypassing the state, then failing at basic accountability. A polycentric design would not cure that, but it would reduce the damage that follows inevitably when the centre falters. Relief and basic administration would continue even as politics grind, and the “price” of impasse would be measured in lost time rather than preventable deaths. In that sense decentralisation is not a technocratic tweak. It is an ethical choice to never again leave the survival of a nation’s poorest tied to a single, easily captured valve.

Photo: United Nations Development Programme, Haiti Earthquake, 13 January 2010. Licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.

References

Al Jazeera, “Haiti Declares Three-Month State of Emergency as Gang Violence Spikes,” 9 August 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/9/haiti-declares-three-month-state-of-emergency-as-gang-violence-spikes. Al Jazeera
Dave Sherwood and Harold Isaac, “UN Warns Haiti’s Capital Blockaded, No Aid for Malnourished Children,” Reuters, 22 April 2024; and “Haiti Fuel Terminal Operations Halted as Gangs Seize Trucks,” Reuters, 22 April 2024. Reuters+1
Mitu Gulati, Ugo Panizza, Kim Oosterlinck, and W. Mark C. Weidemaier, “A Debt of Dishonor,” Boston University Law Review 102 (2022): 1247–1310; New York Times, “The Root of Haiti’s Misery: Reparations to Enslavers,” 20 May 2022. See also Bibliothèque nationale de France, “Haiti’s Independence Debt,” n.d. Boston University Wikipedia heritage.bnf.fr
Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915–1934 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1995); Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Haiti: State Against Nation (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990). Internet Archive Monthly Review
Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC), “2010 Haiti Earthquake: Facts and Figures,” 2010; R. DesRoches et al., “Overview of the 2010 Haiti Earthquake,” 2011, USGS. DEC escweb.wr.usgs.gov
Matthew Toy, Reflection – The UN’s Legitimacy Gap: A Haiti Case Study, 2025, https://matthewtoy.com/posts/reflection-the-uns-legitimacy-gap-a-haiti-case-study/
Logistics Cluster, “Haiti: Port of Cap-Haïtien,” 2024; “Haiti: Terminal Varreux,” 2024. Logistics Cluster Accountability+1
Elinor Ostrom, “Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global Environmental Change,” Global Environmental Change 20, no. 4 (2010): 550–57; Elinor Ostrom, “Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems,” American Economic Review 100, no. 3 (2010): 641–72. ScienceDirect PSU | Portland State University
Jean-Paul Faguet, “Does Decentralization Increase Responsiveness to Local Needs? Evidence from Bolivia,” Journal of Public Economics 88, nos. 3–4 (2004): 867–93; World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2516 (2001), fig. 2 (86:14 to 27:73; 79 percent municipal investment in education/urban/water). LSE Research Online World Bank
World Bank, Haiti: Strengthening Customs Administration in an Insecure Environment (2024), noting tax revenue at 6.3 percent of GDP in FY23 and customs as the single most viable instrument in crisis. World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
World Bank Data, “Personal Remittances, Received (% of GDP) – Haiti,” accessed August 2025. World Bank Open Data
Security Council Report, “Haiti: Closed Consultations,” 27 June 2025; Reuters, “A Year In, Haiti Mission Leader Warns of Shortfalls,” 26 June 2025. Security Council Report Reuters

The Misallocation of Moral Attention in International Relations

2025-08-05T17:55:03Z

This essay contends that the discipline and practice of International Relations systematically privilege symbolically potent crises over far deadlier but diffuse harms, thereby distorting both public debate and policy priorities. It argues for a recalibration of attention and resources based on preventable mortality rather than ideological resonance.

The contrast is stark. In Britain, the Office for National Statistics records 117,527 preventable or treatable deaths annually - 21% of all mortality - largely from cardiovascular disease, smoking, alcohol, and treatable cancers.¹ These losses draw little sustained public mobilisation. Elsewhere, Sudan’s protracted civil conflict has tipped more than 30 million people into acute food insecurity,² yet the crisis struggles to hold headlines or prompt sustained diplomatic engagement. By any measure of scale, both dwarf many of the events dominating international discourse.

Scale Versus Salience

Hypertension alone accounts for 10.8 million deaths each year worldwide (95 % CI 9.6–12.0),³ equivalent to over five medium-sized nation-states annually. Household air pollution from solid fuels adds another 3.2 million deaths, many among women and children.⁴ These combined tolls exceed those of all active armed conflicts in a typical year. Yet they rarely breach the news agenda except on awareness days, and they intrude into parliamentary debate even less often.

Certain crises, by contrast, fulfil criteria that make them highly “protestable.” They offer moral clarity: identifiable perpetrators, discrete victims, and harm perceived as deliberate. They provide compelling visual evidence that can be shared and amplified through mass and social media. And they align with pre‑existing identity narratives, allowing publics and policymakers to position themselves visibly on questions of justice, resistance, or defence.

By comparison, preventable deaths from hypertension, unsafe water, or indoor smoke lack these narrative hooks. Victims are geographically and socially dispersed; causal chains are complex; and responsibility is shared across markets, states, and individual behaviours. Even Sudan’s famine, clearly political in origin, lacks a single antagonist familiar to Western publics, limiting its capacity to sustain attention.

The Political Economy of Attention

Media logic amplifies this imbalance. Event‑driven coverage favours sudden, dramatic violence over slow attrition. Politicians, in turn, find conspicuous moral stands on visible, high‑profile issues to be electorally safer than committing resources to long‑term structural prevention. The result is a moral economy in which visibility, not mortality, determines priority.

In IR scholarship, this reflects the Cold War‑era distinction between “high politics” (war, diplomacy, security) and “low politics” (health, welfare, environment). That hierarchy persists even though so‑called low‑politics issues now account for far greater loss of life. Security, on any coherent definition, should be measured not only by the absence of armed invasion but by aggregate survival and human flourishing.

Toward Evidence‑Based Empathy

The corrective is not to diminish the importance of high‑profile conflicts but to broaden the moral lens. An evidence‑based empathy approach would allocate attention and resources in proportion to preventable harm, regardless of whether an issue fits prevailing ideological narratives. For policymakers, this means directing funding and diplomatic capital toward the largest, most tractable sources of mortality. For activists, it implies expanding advocacy portfolios beyond the most visible theatres. For scholars, it demands integrating public‑health and development indicators into security analysis, recognising that neglect of chronic, large‑scale mortality is itself a political act.

There are precedents. India’s Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana programme has distributed more than 80 million clean‑fuel connections,⁵ sharply reducing household air‑pollution exposure. Anti‑hypertension campaigns in Canada and Finland have driven measurable declines in stroke and heart‑disease mortality. Such initiatives may lack the drama of conflict diplomacy, but they yield far larger dividends in human life.

The call to action is therefore two‑fold: maintain engagement with acute crises, but insist with equal vigour on confronting the routine, silent killers of preventable disease and deprivation. Only by aligning moral attention with empirical harm can International Relations begin to match its normative claims with the arithmetic of human survival.

References

Office for National Statistics, Avoidable Mortality in England and Wales: 2023 (Statistical Bulletin, 28 April 2025), table 2, https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/causesofdeath/bulletins/avoidablemortalityinenglandandwales/2023.
Norwegian Refugee Council, “Sudan: Two Years of War, Starvation & Global Failure, the World Must Act Now,” press release, 10 April 2025, https://www.nrc.no/news/2025/april/joint-statement—two-years-of-war-starvation-and-global-failure-the-world-must-act-now-for-sudan.
World Health Organization, World Health Statistics 2024: Monitoring Health for the SDGs, Sustainable Development Goals (Geneva: WHO, 2024), 73.
World Health Organization, “Household Air Pollution and Health,” Fact Sheet, 16 October 2024, https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/household-air-pollution-and-health.
Government of India, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana (PMUY) Progress Report 2024, https://www.pmuy.gov.in.

What Failed State Building in Afghanistan Can Teach Us: Beyond the ‘Capability Trap’

2025-07-26T13:24:30Z

Western policy elites still parse Afghanistan as a jigsaw of “not enough troops,” faulty intelligence or premature withdrawal. My earlier essay, “Avoiding the Capability Trap,” argued the causal chain runs the other way: abundant matériel deepens failure when it substitutes for locally grounded legitimacy.¹ Kabul’s implosion confirms that verdict while exposing the structural biases that reproduce Western misadventures. Reading Afghanistan through Barry Buzan’s taxonomy of nation-state linkages, and turning Mohammed Ayoob’s “security problematic” inside-out, suggests that non-intervention can be the hardest-nosed strategic choice.

1 - Afghanistan and the myth of the state-nation shortcut

Buzan sketches four ways coercive “states” and imagined “nations” intersect.² NATO tried to leap from a plural social terrain to a state-nation, manufacturing the nation from the top down. Such feats, Buzan warns, demand decades of standardised schooling, fiscal extraction and symbolic homogeny.³ The 2001 Bonn Agreement allowed barely eighteen months before nationwide elections; NATO’s calendar, not Afghan social realities, set the tempo.

Afghanistan, meanwhile, was no tabula rasa. Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek identities drew authority from kin networks, shrine endowments and cross-border trade; “Afghan” was a diplomatic label, not a lived community.⁴ Warlords converted donor cash into what Antonio Giustozzi calls emporia of mud: polities legitimated by personal loyalty and local revenue, not Kabul’s ministries.⁵ By 2018 those ministries relied on foreign funds for over 75 percent of their budget,⁶ turning the state into a vessel of structural extraversion rather than a nucleus of solidarity.

2 - The capability trap, revisited

Lant Pritchett’s “capability trap” captures the dynamic whereby lavish resources mask institutional hollowness.⁷ In Afghanistan, US airpower and payrolls produced countable outputs (flights logged, teachers hired) while corruption and predation eroded the outputs citizens actually valued. Sarah Chayes shows how elite rackets taxed every aid dollar several times over;⁸ Carter Malkasian records that, when American air support vanished in August 2021, Afghan troops often cut local deals rather than fight for an abstraction they never owned.⁹ External capability therefore both props up a weak state and delegitimises it by advertising dependency. The more Washington spent, the more Kabul looked foreign - boosting the Taliban’s claim to embody a rooted, Islamic nation.

3 - Ayoob’s mirror: why the European template misleads

Ayoob argues that post-colonial polities face the same nation-state forging tasks that once convulsed Europe, only faster and under tighter scrutiny.¹⁰ The Afghan debacle undercuts that analogy. Europe’s pathway was path-dependent, not path-determining: mercantilist war, colonial plunder and the absence of outside tutors bankrolled its state projects. Early-modern rulers could bleed and tax their populations because no hegemon demanded quarterly reports on “good governance.”

Transposed into today’s legally dense, media-saturated arena, the blueprint backfires. Pressure to display Weberian credentials, typified by monopoly over legitimate violence inside fixed borders, creates Potemkin ministries and finances clientelist bargains that replace, rather than integrate, vernacular authority. In trying to “finish Europe’s journey,” donors help reproduce the insecurity they hope to cure.

4 - Post-Westphalian prudence

Buzan’s matrix makes plain that Afghanistan never offered a plausible route to a unitary state-nation; NATO’s insistence on conjuring one exposed Kabul’s dependency instead. Prudence therefore begins with political triage.

Contain, don’t transform. Keep a light regional footprint, such as over-the-horizon strike tools, intelligence liaison, calibrated sanctions, to blunt trans-national threats without social engineering.¹¹
Scaffold plural bargains. In 2011 UNAMA quietly brokered a Helmand River water-sharing accord between rival tribes and Iran, reducing clashes at a fraction of ISAF’s stabilisation budget.¹² Such micro-compacts, extended to customs corridors or pasture routes, secure order by meshing with existing authority rather than overruling it.
Respect political tempo. Replace annual disbursement cycles with decade-long trust funds that release money only after mutually verified benchmarks, insulating local actors from the rent-seeking churn that sustains capability traps.¹³

This is not intended to be capital-letter 'Isolationism'. Rather it should be seen as an exercise humility: an admission that legitimacy sediments slowly, and that neither drones nor curricula can manufacture a nation from the outside.

Footnotes

Matthew Toy, “Avoiding the Capability Trap: A Framework,” matthewtoy.com, 20 July 2025. https://matthewtoy.com/posts/avoiding-the-capability-trap-a-framework/
Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), 42–54.
Ibid., 48–50.
Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 271–75.
Antonio Giustozzi, Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan (London: Hurst, 2009), 103–15.
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Why the Afghan Government Collapsed, Report 23-05-IP (Arlington, VA: SIGAR, 2022), 1–3.
Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett and Michael Woolcock, “Escaping Capability Traps through Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA),” CID Working Paper 240 (Harvard Kennedy School, June 2012), 2–7.
Sarah Chayes, Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security (New York: W. W. Norton, 2015), 67–72.
Carter Malkasian, The American War in Afghanistan: A History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 443–50.
Mohammed Ayoob, “The Security Problematic of the Third World,” World Politics 43, no. 2 (1991): 257–83.
Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 69–100.
Helene von Bismarck, “Water Sharing in Helmand: UNAMA’s Quiet Diplomacy,” Journal of Peacebuilding 12, no. 1 (2016): 41–55.
Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock, “Escaping Capability Traps,” 5.

Photo by Suliman Sallehi: https://www.pexels.com/photo/gray-concrete-building-on-top-of-hill-1484776/

Avoiding the Capability Trap: A Framework

2025-07-20T12:02:00Z

Repeated Western military interventions, from Vietnam to Afghanistan, show that technological and financial superiority does not ensure political victory. Such dominance can obscure political realities and even undermine legitimacy. Precision strikes may heighten views of occupation, while excessive funding often breeds corruption (Clemis, 2025; SIGAR, 2023a). This "capability trap" is the mistaken belief that military and economic power guarantees political outcomes. The true test is whether local actors genuinely accept foreign presence, not simply endure it (U.S. Department of the Army, 2014). To address this, interventions should undergo early political-sociological assessment to confirm mission viability before detailed planning and avoid confusing military means with political ends.

The Futility Assessment Framework

The framework proceeds through a sequence of determinative questions. An affirmative flag in any phase indicates a high risk that material advantages will prove strategically irrelevant or even counterproductive.

Phase 1 – Transformation Gate

The initial and most fundamental question is one of intent: Does the mission’s authentic end-state involve remaking the basic institutions or social contract of the target society? This question demands an honest appraisal, looking beyond stated aims to the practical requirements for success. Indicators of a transformational goal include a significant 'partner-capacity delta', where host-nation forces are projected to remain reliant on foreign kinetic enablers after a period of five years, or a 'governance-gap delta', where routine state functions like revenue extraction or dispute resolution would likely collapse without sustained foreign tutelage (SIGAR, 2023b). If the answer is yes, the mission must be treated as transformational and subjected to further futility screening.

Phase 2 – Elite-Coalition Viability

The next inquiry assesses the local political foundation for change: Is there a cohesive indigenous elite bloc, minimally fragmented, that is willing and able to incur the costs of coercion required to secure the new order after foreign withdrawal? External powers cannot substitute for a legitimate local monopoly on violence. Successful political consolidation requires local actors who see the post-intervention state as their own and are prepared to defend it. The absence of such a bloc, or the presence of deep and intractable divisions, signals a critical vulnerability that foreign support can rarely overcome (Hazelton, 2017). This condition represents a high futility risk and should prompt a reassessment of primary objectives.

Phase 3 – Social-Terrain Depth Test

A critical political-sociological test follows: Must the campaign uproot kinship, religious, or customary systems that have been embedded for generations? When an intervention’s success is conditional upon altering social structures with deep historical roots, such as tribal allegiances, powerful religious hierarchies, or customary law systems, it faces a profound challenge. These systems are often the true sources of social cohesion and legitimacy. Attempting to displace them is not a matter of mere policy implementation but of cultural re-engineering, a task for which military force is singularly ill-suited and which requires decades, if not generations, to achieve (French, 2012). An affirmative answer here strongly indicates a high risk of futility.

Phase 4 – Legitimacy Inversion Screen

Consideration must be given to the paradoxical effect of overwhelming strength: Will the visible preponderance of foreign power itself delegitimise local partners? This 'legitimacy inversion' occurs when the very instruments of intervention undermine the goal. Key indicators include when the external force’s firepower comes to dominate the battlefield narrative, when aid flows grossly exceed the local absorptive capacity and breed parasitic rent-seeking, or when the political mythology of the new state requires public deference to its outside patrons (SIGAR, 2016). The presence of any two of these factors suggests that the intervention is likely to empower its opponents by branding its partners as puppets.

Phase 5 – Corruption Elasticity Gauge

A more quantifiable, yet crucial, metric concerns the integrity of resource transfers: What is the estimated share of new funds likely to be diverted through informal or corrupt networks before reaching their intended end-use? When this figure exceeds 30 per cent, corruption ceases to be a mere inefficiency and becomes a self-defeating 'strategic tax'. Such a leakage rate not only wastes resources but actively finances malign networks, delegitimises the partner government, and creates a powerful constituency with a vested interest in perpetual conflict and instability (SIGAR, 2016).

Phase 6 – Political-Metabolism Mismatch

Finally, the framework assesses temporal feasibility: Are the timelines required for deep socio-political change congruent with the domestic electoral horizons and fiscal patience of the intervening state? Meaningful political transformation operates on a generational timeline, arguably requiring a commitment of fifteen years or more. This is fundamentally misaligned with the two-to-four-year cycles of Western domestic politics and budgetary processes, which create artificial pressures for immediate, demonstrable results (Posen, 2014). A definitive mismatch between the political metabolism of the target society and that of the intervening power represents a high futility risk.

Aggregate Rule and Quantitative Cross-Check

An aggregate rule is simple: if two or more of the above phases are flagged with a ‘HIGH FUTILITY RISK’, the recommendation must be Do Not Proceed with a transformational objective. To provide a more granular assessment, a weighted scorecard can be applied:

Indicator	Weight
Elite-coalition failure	3
Deep-rooted social structures must be altered	3
Legitimacy inversion	2
Corruption elasticity >30%	2
Political-metabolism mismatch	2

A total score of 5 or higher should trigger an immediate pivot away from transformational objectives towards a menu of more limited, realistic alternative strategies.

Alternative Strategy Menu

When a futility assessment counsels against transformative intervention, decision-makers are not left without options. The challenge is to select strategies that acknowledge political constraints while still addressing core security concerns.

Containment and Offshore Balancing

Instead of attempting internal transformation, the focus shifts to preventing adverse developments from affecting core national interests. This may involve a combination of offshore military presence, robust intelligence capabilities, and diplomatic containment structures (Luttwak, 1999). This approach accepts political realities in the target region while maintaining sufficient influence to shape outcomes at the margins.

Regional Coalition Building

This strategy involves empowering and supporting regional partners who possess greater cultural legitimacy and political sustainability than an external intervention can hope to achieve. It requires accepting that regional solutions may not align perfectly with external preferences, but recognises that an indigenous, or at least proximate, locus of legitimacy is often more durable and effective than an imposed one (Denison, 2020).

Selective Partnership and Conditional Support

This approach entails working with existing power structures rather than attempting to replace them. This requires a pragmatic acceptance of local legitimacy patterns, including those rooted in traditional or religious authority, while using conditional assistance to influence behaviour incrementally over time. It trades ideological satisfaction for practical influence and sustainability.

Intelligence Cooperation and Targeted Disruption

Specific threats can be addressed through deep intelligence partnerships and precise, targeted operations rather than comprehensive political-military projects. This maintains operational flexibility while avoiding the significant legitimacy deficits and resource drains associated with a sustained, visible military presence (Paul et al., 2013).

The fundamental insight remains consistent: when a society’s political and social context renders transformation futile despite an intervener’s material superiority, strategic wisdom lies not in doing nothing, but in pursuing different objectives that work with, rather than against, the grain of local political reality.

Bibliography

Clemis, M.G. (2025). The Enduring Lessons of Vietnam: Implications for US Strategy and Policy. Parameters, 55(2), pp.23–25.

Denison, B. (2020). The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: The Failure of Regime-Change Operations. Policy Analysis 883. Washington, DC: Cato Institute.

French, D. (2012). The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hazelton, J.L. (2017). The ‘Hearts and Minds’ Fallacy: Violence, Coercion, and Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare. International Security, 42(1), pp.80–113.

Luttwak, E.N. (1999). Give War a Chance. Foreign Affairs, 78(4), pp.36–44.

Paul, C., Clarke, C.P., Grill, B. and Dunigan, M. (2013). Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

Posen, B.R. (2014). Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). (2016). Corruption in Conflict: Lessons from the United States Experience in Afghanistan. Arlington, VA: SIGAR.

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). (2023a). Why the Afghan Government Collapsed. Arlington, VA: SIGAR.

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). (2023b). The Factors Leading to the Collapse of the Afghan Government and Its Security Forces. Arlington, VA: SIGAR.

U.S. Department of the Army. (2014). Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies (FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5). Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Understanding Russia's Unconventional Narrative of Victory

2025-07-04T16:38:24Z

Considering the strategic landscape of early 2025, with staggering Russian tank losses and a tragic civilian death toll in Ukraine, it is essential to look beyond conventional military analysis to understand Moscow's behaviour (Oryx, 2025; OHCHR, 2025, p. 1). Russia’s actions since the end of the Cold War are not merely a product of its military hardware or official doctrine. Instead, they are profoundly shaped by the lens through which its elites understand what it means to be ‘winning’.

This perspective, in what academics might term an ‘epistemology of victory’, is not fixed. It has evolved from the Soviet focus on decisive battlefield outcomes to a more fluid set of modern priorities: narrative control, perceived dominance in a crisis, and, above all, the security of the regime itself. These priorities are visible in the Kremlin's budget choices, its use of military force, and the stories it tells itself and the world (Renz, 2018, pp. 46-52). By examining this internal logic, we can better understand why Russia built the military it has and why its performance, particularly in Ukraine, has unfolded in such a costly and often contradictory manner.

The Real Meaning of Victory

For Western observers, victory is often measured in tangible terms: territory gained, enemy forces defeated. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent years of perceived humiliation shattered these traditional metrics for Moscow (Giles, 2017, pp. 1-2; Renz, 2018, pp. 46-52). This triggered a deep-seated need among the Russian elite for a renewed sense of national identity and purpose (Tyushka, 2022, p. 117).

In response, the Kremlin has constructed a new definition of victory. This is rooted in the idea of Russia as a unique ‘civilisation-state’ or the inheritor of ‘Historical Russia’ - locked in an existential struggle with a hostile West. In this narrative, victory is less about battlefield gains and more about safeguarding Russia’s civilisational sovereignty and cultural identity (Tyushka, 2022, p. 116). The goal is to achieve what one scholar calls ‘civilisational immunity’ from Western norms and influence (Suslov, 2018, p. 345).

This makes the narrative itself a form of strategic capability. Controlling the story, both at home and abroad, becomes as important as controlling territory. This logic helps explain Russia's vast investments in information warfare and its constant efforts to frame international events as proof of Western aggression, thereby justifying its own actions as defensive (Renz, 2018, pp. 74-77; Tyushka, 2022, p. 116).

Guarding the Regime

Nowhere is this focus on internal stability clearer than in the national budget. Despite the immense financial pressures of a prolonged, high-intensity war in Ukraine, the Kremlin has consistently protected funding for its National Guard, or Rosgvardia. This powerful internal security force, reporting directly to the presidency, is tasked with crowd control, counter-terrorism, and suppressing internal dissent.

Even as the Ministry of Defence budget has soared to manage the war, funding for Rosgvardia has remained at historically high levels for 2024 and 2025. This refusal to sacrifice internal security capacity, even as the war effort strains the economy, is telling (Cooper, 2025, pp. 3-8). With around a third of all federal spending now classified and hidden from public view, the Kremlin signals its core priority: the survival of the regime against internal threats is co-equal with, if not more important than, success in external conflicts (Cooper, 2025, pp. 3-4, 6). The message is that the narrative of domestic cohesion and elite loyalty must be maintained at all costs.

This logic also explains the development of certain ‘prestige’ weapon systems. Hypersonic missiles like the Kinzhal, for example, have questionable operational utility but serve a powerful performative function. They broadcast a message of technological virtuosity, contesting Western military-technical dominance and reinforcing Russia’s status as a top-tier power, regardless of their effectiveness on the actual battlefield (Dalsjö et al., 2022, pp. 12, 14).

When Myth Meets Reality

The 2022 invasion of Ukraine was the ultimate test of Russia’s military myths. The initial plan, likely based on the swift, perception-driven operations in Georgia (2008) and Crimea (2014), assumed the same playbook would work on a larger scale. It did not. The opening phase of the war exposed a chasm between claimed capability and battlefield performance, marked by logistical chaos, poor coordination, and a failure to achieve air superiority (Dalsjö et al., 2022, pp. 9-10).

The myth of a surgical, modern military quickly evaporated. Russia’s vaunted precision-guided missiles were expended at an unsustainable rate, with over 1,100 fired in the first month alone (U.S. Department of Defense, 2022). Soon, Russian forces were repurposing old S-300 air-defence missiles for inaccurate ground-attack roles, a move that starkly illustrated the collision between an identity built on technological finesse and the grim reality of material constraints (Army Recognition, 2024).

While the invasion is widely seen as a strategic failure by conventional Western standards (Dalsjö et al., 2022, pp. 7-10), it can be interpreted differently through the Kremlin’s lens. The brutal, high-loss assaults seen at places like Avdiivka in late 2023 (Milevski, 2023, pp. 123-125) can be reframed. Moscow has a documented history of using active conflicts as vicious, but effective, training grounds to forge a more experienced military (Giles, 2017, p. 4). This allows for a narrative of ‘losing as winning’, where today’s tactical losses are presented as the necessary price for creating a more lethal and battle-hardened army for tomorrow.

Conclusion

To understand Russian strategy, one must look past the tanks and missiles and focus on the internal narrative that gives them meaning. Moscow’s actions are driven by a definition of victory where controlling the story, ensuring the regime’s stability, and asserting a unique civilisational status are prized as highly as battlefield success. The war in Ukraine has revealed the severe strategic miscalculations that can arise when this performative, identity-driven logic clashes with the realities of conventional warfare (Dalsjö et al., 2022, pp. 8-11; Grisé et al., 2024, p. xi). For the Kremlin, victory may not be something to be won on a map, but a spectacle to be declared and sustained, no matter the cost.

Bibliography

Army Recognition. (2024). “Russia Repurposes S-300 Surface-to-Air Missiles for Ground Attacks Against the City of Kharkiv.” 5 January.

Cooper, J. (2025). Preparing for a Fourth Year of War: Military Spending in Russia's Budget for 2025. SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, no. 2025/04. Solna: SIPRI.

Dalsjö, R., Jonsson, M., and Norberg, J. (2022). “A Brutal Examination: Russian Military Capability in Light of the Ukraine War.” Survival 64(3), pp. 7–28.

Giles, K. (2017). Assessing Russia’s Reorganised and Rearmed Military. Task Force White Paper. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Grisé, M. et al. (2024). Russia’s Military After Ukraine. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

Milevski, L. (2023). ‘The Primitivisation of Major Warfare’. Survival 65(6), pp. 119-36.

Oryx. (2025). “Attack On Europe: Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine.” Oryx (blog). Accessed May 2025.

Renz, B. (2018). Russia’s Military Revival. Newark: Polity Press.

Suslov, M. (2018). “‘Russian World’ Concept: Post-Soviet Geopolitical Ideology and the Logic of ‘Spheres of Influence’.” Geopolitics 23(2), pp. 330-350.

Treverton, G. F. and Jones, S. G. (2005). Measuring National Power. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

Tyushka, A. (2022). “Weaponizing Narrative: Russia Contesting Europe’s Liberal Identity, Power and Hegemony.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 30(1), pp. 115-35.

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). (2025). Human Rights Three Years into Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine: Factsheet. Kyiv: United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, 17 February.

U.S. Department of Defense. (2022). “Senior Defense Official Holds a Background Briefing.” Transcript, 21 March.

Examining Europe’s proposed ‘re-armament surge’

2025-06-17T15:29:12Z

Andrew Michta’s Helsinki-Commission briefing, available on YouTube and social media, urges Europe to accelerate the deployment of armour and air-defence to its eastern flank. His logistics are solid, yet the argument remains trapped in a materialist mindset. The Kremlin’s strategic theatre is part gun-count, part morality play; it must perform the role of a besieged civilisation to sustain elite cohesion and domestic consent (Giles, 2021). Moscow therefore magnifies even token NATO deployments, weaving them into a narrative of encirclement. Numbers certainly matter, but myths and interpretations drive policy.

Historically, Western analysis rarely pauses on this critical identity driver. Civilisational framings, or what Marlene Laruelle calls Russia’s “anti-liberal European” self-image (Laruelle, 2016), explain why deterrence sometimes falters when, on balance, an alliance should be the rational option. Michta’s focus on equipment and troop-tallies risks underestimating this discursive asymmetry.

NATO’s dilemma: choreographing presence

The security dilemma cannot just be wished away, but its social meaning can be reframed. NATO now plans to defend forward with rotating brigades rather than permanent garrisons. Visibility is deliberate: forces spend most of their time at home and surge only for exercises, reassuring Baltic publics while limiting imagery that feeds Moscow’s siege myth. Twenty-two Allies already meet the 2 per cent GDP benchmark, up from three a decade ago (NATO, 2024), yet credible posture still requires narrative discipline. Radical transparency, such as publishing force-flow schedules and live-streaming major drills, signals defensive intent and denies the Kremlin the fog in which worst-case fantasies multiply. A minimalist inspection regime, of the kind sketched in recent European Leadership Network workshops, could complement this by addressing Russian ontological insecurity without conceding capability (ELN, 2024).

Lessons from outside Europe

Wargames on a Taiwan contingency reinforce the logic. RAND analysts find that smart sea-mines, road-mobile fires and cheap drones raise the PLA’s operational risk more sharply than prestige carriers (RAND, 2023). Denial assets lower the escalatory temperature while still signalling resolve. Yet capability is not enough: Beijing will test whether the coalition’s political will is socially durable. Expanding informal constructs like AUKUS into routine crisis-response exercises needs to narrate a shared story of status-quo preservation rather than anti-China containment.

South Asia offers a counter-example. The 2025 India-Pakistan crisis, analysed at the Belfer Center, showed deterrence only holding once both sides satisfied domestic identity needs with symbolic strikes before back-channeling de-escalation (Belfer, 2025). Conversely, the Israel–Hezbollah dyad illustrates erosion: CSIS charts a steep rise in rocket exchanges as mutually reinforcing victim narratives demand ever larger demonstrations of “honour” (CSIS, 2024). Deterrence frays when stories that cultures tell themselves are left unmanaged.

Policy implication

Europe’s re-armament is necessary, but insufficient by itself. Credible high-readiness forces must be paired with an information architecture that denies Moscow the dramaturgy it craves. That means choreographed deployments, radical transparency, selective arms-control gestures and a public narrative that casts NATO as guardian of a plural security order, not the shadow of tomorrow's invasion. Any deterrence strategy that ignores identity politics may well become an expensive repeat of history.

Bibliography

Belfer Center (2025) Escalation Gone Meta: Strategic Lessons from the 2025 India–Pakistan Crisis. Harvard Kennedy School.

CSIS (2024) The Coming Conflict with Hezbollah. Center for Strategic and International Studies.

European Leadership Network (2024) OSCE Workshop Report: Strengthening European Security Architecture.

Giles, K. (2021) What Deters Russia. Chatham House.

Laruelle, M. (2016) ‘Russia as an Anti-liberal European Civilisation’, in The New Russian Nationalism, Edinburgh University Press.

Michta, A. (2024) ‘Why NATO Must Step Up’, testimony to the U.S. Helsinki Commission.

NATO (2024) ‘Defence Expenditures and the 2 Per Cent Guideline’.

RAND Corporation (2023) These Technologies Could Defeat China’s Missile Barrage and Defend Taiwan.

Is the Strategic Defence Review an Engineered Response? Rethinking UK Defence in an Age of Bricolage

2025-06-09T21:19:39Z

Abstract

Looking at the situation, the United Kingdom's 2025 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) projects a confident rationality: an "Integrated Force" designed to deter, fight, and win through “constant innovation at wartime pace” (Ministry of Defence, 2025, p. 14). Yet Moscow’s conduct in Ukraine has revealed a profoundly different strategic grammar. Russia behaves, in Ondřej Ditrych’s terms, as a bricoleur - an opportunistic tinkerer that stitches together ad hoc “assemblages” while actively cultivating contradictions to wrong-foot a rule-bound opponent (Ditrych, 2024, p. 2). This article argues that a defence posture optimised for elegant integration may prove brittle when confronted by such an adversary. It posits that Russia’s dialectical approach is designed to exploit the very linear logic that underpins Western military planning. By contrasting the systemic fragility of Russian bricolage, vividly exposed by the Wagner Group’s implosion, with the SDR’s search for institutional longevity, this analysis suggests that effective deterrence now requires the UK to supplement integration with a capacity for institutionalised improvisation. This ‘controlled bricolage’ is presented as a form of adaptive power, essential for reassuring allies and succeeding in an era of disorderly, attritional conflict.

1. A Strategy of Contradiction

To understand the contemporary threat is to look beyond conventional military net assessment and into an opponent’s strategic culture. Ondřej Ditrych (2024, p. 3) characterises the Russian state not as a grand strategist but as a bricoleur, a tinkerer that improvises solutions from a limited repertoire of available parts. This is more than mere opportunism; it is a dialectical method. It is comfortable with, and indeed actively cultivates, the very contradictions that would paralyse a Western staff college. Russia’s strategy often appears to be a pastiche of mutually exclusive signals: complaining of encirclement while expanding its territory, invoking international law while flouting it, and deploying high-tech weaponry alongside crudely adapted civilian technologies. This is not strategic incoherence but a feature designed to create a chaotic information environment, wrong-footing an adversary who seeks clarity and predictability.

The Wagner Group was, perhaps, the ultimate expression of this method. It was a composite entity that simultaneously functioned as a proxy military force, a resource-extraction enterprise, a political influence operation, and a vehicle for plausible deniability (Ditrych, 2024, p. 3). It allowed Moscow to project power into Africa and the Middle East in ways that circumvented the rules of state-on-state competition. Yet this bricolage has a breaking-point. Such ad hoc structures lack institutional resilience. Wagner’s spectacular implosion following Yevgeny Prigozhin’s 2023 mutiny was not the result of external pressure but of the unbearable internal frictions of the system that created it (Ditrych, 2024, p. 4). This reveals the core vulnerability of the bricoleur: a reliance on improvised, personality-driven structures that can shatter under systemic stress, a stark contrast to the West’s enduring, if cumbersome, search for institutional longevity.

2. The Limits of an Engineered Deterrence

The SDR’s answer to this disorderly world is a renewed drive for rational integration. It proposes a force “integrated by design” (Ministry of Defence, 2025, p. 15-16), directed by a new Military Strategic Headquarters and equipped via a streamlined Defence Investment Plan. The document is, in itself, a signal of intent, a blueprint for a logical, legible, and thereby deterring military machine. However, in applying this lens, it arguably misreads the nature of the challenge. As the RAND Corporation’s work on national power suggests, military effectiveness is not simply a function of material capabilities- the ships, tanks, and aircraft a nation possesses. It depends equally on the efficiency of the conversion process that turns those national resources into usable military power (Treverton and Jones, 2005, p. 18). Russian bricolage is, in essence, a high-speed, high-risk conversion strategy. The UK’s SDR, with its focus on creating new bureaucratic structures and processes, risks optimising its inventory of capabilities while neglecting the need for a truly agile conversion mechanism.

This creates a deterrence paradox, which plays out for multiple audiences. The first, and most obvious, is the adversary. As Keir Giles argues, Russia often discounts material symbols of Western strength, focusing instead on a perceived lack of political will and a hesitation to accept risk (Torun, 2024, p. 667, summarising Giles). A bricoleur state, seeking seams to exploit, is unlikely to be deterred by a show of conventional force that it believes will never be used in the ambiguous ‘sub-threshold’ where it prefers to operate. The second, and equally critical, audience is domestic and allied. Effective deterrence requires not only a credible threat but also the reassurance of one’s own public and partners that the nation can withstand and respond to shocks. This requires a resilient defence industrial base capable of surging production. The SDR acknowledges this, noting that a nation’s Armed Forces are only as strong as the industry behind them (Ministry of Defence, 2025, p. 7), but the deep-seated challenge of moving from peacetime efficiency to wartime industrial mass remains a critical constraint on the UK’s own risk appetite and, therefore, its credibility.

3. Towards an Elastic Architecture: Institutionalising Bricolage

If Russia’s strategic advantage lies in its tolerance for disorder, then an effective counter-strategy cannot lie solely in the imposition of a more perfect order. The UK must learn to fight fire with fire, supplementing its integrated blueprint with a capacity for institutionalised improvisation. This means cultivating a form of ‘controlled bricolage’ as a source of adaptive power. Treverton and Jones (2005, p. 11) noted two decades ago how the information technology revolution would inevitably move action away from slow-moving governments and “toward nimbler organisations.” The SDR’s proposal for an “expert Digital Warfighters group” (Ministry of Defence, 2025, p. 47-49) is a promising, if nascent, step in this direction. For this to become a genuine source of advantage, however, it must be treated not as a specialist enclave but as a guiding ethos for the entire force, empowering small teams at the tactical edge to experiment, adapt, and exploit opportunities at a speed the adversary cannot match.

This, in turn, requires a fundamental shift in the Ministry of Defence’s culture of procurement and risk. It necessitates an embrace of "good-enough" solutions that can be fielded rapidly, with iterative upgrades baked into the process, rather than pursuing perfect capabilities that risk arriving too late. Such an approach accepts that in a state of constant technological flux, some failure is inevitable and should be treated as an opportunity for accelerated learning. This is the logic behind the Royal Navy’s planned regulatory "sandbox" for autonomous systems (Ministry of Defence, 2025, p. 105-106), a concept that must be expanded across all domains. An elastic and adaptive force, capable of improvising under pressure, offers a more credible deterrent to a bricoleur than a rigid one, however powerful. It signals a capacity to endure, to adapt, and to respond effectively amid the very chaos the adversary seeks to create.

4. Conclusion

Arguably, a rationally designed and integrated force remains indispensable for the enduring demands of high-intensity warfare. Integration alone, however, is no longer sufficient. The central insight for UK defence is that an over-optimisation for elegant, systemic coherence can itself become a vulnerability when facing an opponent whose strategy is to weaponise disorder. Power in the 21st century is increasingly a function of adaptability. The challenge, therefore, is to create an architecture that is not only strong but also elastic; one that can, when necessary, fracture gracefully into many semi-autonomous nodes, each authorised to improvise within the commander’s intent. Deterrence means more than pure strength, it is the ability to adapt one's defence to the changing strategic landscape.

Bibliography

Ditrych, O. (2024). DECONSTRUCTING RUSSIA'S BRICOLAGE TACTICS: Strategic insights for defeating the Kremlin. EUISS Brief 18. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies.

Ministry of Defence. (2025). Strategic Defence Review 2025: Making Britain Safer, Secure at Home, Strong Abroad. London: HM Government.

Torun, Z. (2024). Review of ‘Russia's War on Everybody. And What it Means for You’, by Keir Giles. Europe-Asia Studies, 76(4), pp. 667-668.

Treverton, G. F. and Jones, S. G. (2005). Measuring National Power. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

Precision Reconsidered: Russia’s Shift from Guided Missiles to Mass Bombardment

2025-05-29T11:37:23Z

Previously Russia positioned itself as a modern power able to cripple an adversary’s decision-cycle with carefully targeted precision-guided munitions. Three years of war in Ukraine have punctured that story. The Kremlin now relies on volume rather than accuracy, trading the prestige of “surgical” strikes for the blunt attrition of drone swarms and repurposed air-defence missiles. What follows traces that transition and asks what it does to Western analytical assumptions about technology, ethics and power.

From Surgical Imagery to Saturation Practice

Pentagon tallies show that Russian forces loosed more than one thousand one hundred guided missiles in the first month of the invasion, yet many exploded in apartment blocks rather than command nodes (Department of Defense, 2022). Domestic production never kept pace. By mid-2023 Russian factories were turning out roughly sixty new cruise missiles a month, a fraction of operational demand (Williams, 2023).

Facing depletion, Moscow shifted firepower architecture. S-300 surface-to-air missiles were redirected at ground targets, increasing miss distances, while Iranian-designed Shahed drones began to pad nightly salvos (Army Recognition, 2024). Guided-missile launches fell steadily while drone use soared, reaching an estimated total of four thousand deployed by the first quarter of 2025 (Atalan and Jensen, 2025). The identity of the high-tech precision striker gave way to the practicalities of magazine depth and industrial capacity.

Implications for Western Analysis

Western security discourse long treated accuracy as a twin proof of technical mastery and ethical restraint (Schmitt and Widmar, 2014; Wilson, 2020). Russia’s practice weakens both pillars. Norms endure through consistent observance and recognition; when a major power claims the vocabulary of precision while accepting wide error margins, the social meaning of accuracy erodes (Tannenwald, 2017).

The episode therefore offers a methodological caution. Counting missiles without attending to their symbolic weight risks analytical short-sightedness. The shift towards low-cost saturation munitions signals a recalibration of Russian strategic identity and alters the deterrence calculus of adversaries who must now defend against continuous drone attrition rather than episodic cruise-missile raids. Civilian resilience, alliance solidarity and arms-control expectations all pivot on how quickly that new reality is understood.

In Summary

Russia’s move from precision-guided missiles to mass bombardment is more than a supply-chain story. It marks the point where an identity built on technological finesse buckled under material constraint, transforming both the battlefield and the normative landscape around it. Analysts tracking future conflicts would do well to remember that weapons categories are not only hardware inventories but carriers of meaning, and that meaning can shift faster than production lines.

Bibliography

Army Recognition 2024. ‘Russia Repurposes S-300 Surface-to-Air Missiles for Ground Attacks Against Kharkiv’, 5 January.

Atalan, Y. and Jensen, B. 2025. Drone Saturation: Russia’s Shahed Campaign. CSIS Brief, 13 May.

Department of Defense 2022. ‘Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds a Press Briefing’, 21 March.

Schmitt, M. and Widmar, E. 2014. ‘On Target: Precision and Balance in the Contemporary Law of Targeting’. Journal of National Security Law and Policy, 7(3).

Tannenwald, N. 2017. ‘How Strong Are the Nuclear Taboo and the Chemical Weapons Ban?’ The Washington Quarterly, 40(1), 79–98.

Williams, I. 2023. ‘Russia Isn’t Going to Run Out of Missiles’. CSIS Analysis, 28 June.

Wilson, N. 2020. ‘The Ambiguities of Precision Warfare’, Intimacies of Remote Warfare commentary, 12 June.

Reflection – The UN’s Legitimacy Gap: A Haiti Case Study

2025-05-18T10:42:11Z

Thomas Weiss identifies five “gaps” that chronically hamper global governance: knowledge, normative, policy, institutional and compliance (Weiss 2013). In Haiti, those gaps seem to have coalesced into what many Haitians read as an enduring legitimacy deficit. A more charitable interpretation does note instances of UN adaptation – better crime mapping after 2011, a dramatic scaling-up of the Haitian National Police (HNP), and a science-led cholera response – but, examined closely, such achievements tend to appear partial and fragile, leaving the larger breach largely intact.

Knowledge and compliance. MINUSTAH’s 2004 start-up underestimated the dense, shifting alliances between gangs and political patrons. When a contingent from Nepal inadvertently introduced cholera in 2010, infecting more than 800,000 people and claiming over 10,000 lives (Frerichs et al. 2012; Katz 2013), the Organisation spent six years contesting its own liability before an apology was issued (United Nations 2016). Subsequent epidemiological work certainly curbed transmission, yet the delay itself suggested an accountability reflex still subordinate to reputational caution – an impression hard to reverse.

Normative conduct. Sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, including minors among the victims, seriously undercut the UN’s human-rights narrative. The Associated Press counted more than 2,000 allegations between 2004 and 2016, with very few domestic prosecutions (Associated Press 2017). Reforms adopted in 2017 – victim-centred assistance, mandatory pre-deployment training, a voluntary trust fund – mark welcome movement, and Haiti arguably catalysed those global norms. Even so, the survivors’ experience of limited redress reinforces a perception that institutional learning operates at UN headquarters, not in the quartiers populaires where the harm occurred.

Policy and institutional adaptation. Supporters of the UN strategy point to iterative mandates: from peace enforcement (MINUSTAH) to rule-of-law mentoring (MINUJUSTH) and, since 2019, a slim political office (BINUH), with a Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support force now in train (UN Security Council 2023). Elections held in 2006, 2010 and 2016 proceeded on schedule with heavy UN logistical underwriting, and the HNP expanded from roughly 4,000 officers in 2004 to more than 15,000 by 2020 (Malone and Day 2020). Yet the police have struggled to retain personnel and equipment since the draw-down, and gang territory has again expanded. The pattern suggests that short, mandate-driven cycles may be ill-suited to a state so hollow that capacity must be nurtured for decades, not rotations.

Legitimacy in the balance. Survey data gathered in Port-au-Prince in 2015 found only a minority favouring immediate UN withdrawal, indicating a degree of conditional acceptance; most respondents nonetheless judged the mission “only somewhat” effective (International Crisis Group 2016). Such grudging tolerance implies utility rather than genuine confidence. In other words, the Organisation remains necessary but is seldom trusted.

Taken together, Haiti illustrates how partial advances in knowledge production, normative reform, and institutional design, whilst real, have not yet outweighed the reputational cost of early missteps and uneven compliance. Unless the UN sustains a far longer horizon of engagement – accepting that legitimacy is rebuilt in increments and measured locally – its blue helmet risks settling into an increasingly tarnished emblem: credible enough to be tolerated, rarely persuasive enough to inspire.

Bibliography

Associated Press. 2017. “UN Child Sex Ring Left Victims but No Arrests.” Associated Press investigative report, 12 April.

Frerichs, R. R., et al. 2012. “Nepalese Origin of Cholera Outbreak in Haiti.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109 (47): 19944–19949.

International Crisis Group. 2016. Haiti: Security and the Reinforcement of the Rule of Law. Latin America/Caribbean Report No. 62. Brussels: ICG.

Katz, Jonathan M. 2013. The Big Truck That Went By: How the World Came to Save Haiti and Left Behind a Disaster. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Malone, David M., and Adam Day. 2020. “Taking Measure of the UN’s Legacy at Seventy-Five.” Ethics & International Affairs 34 (3): 285–295.

United Nations. 2016. “Secretary-General’s Remarks to the General Assembly on a New Approach to Cholera in Haiti.” UN Doc. A/71/620, 1 December. New York: United Nations.

United Nations Security Council. 2023. Resolution 2699 (2023) on Haiti. UN Doc. S/RES/2699, 2 October.

Weiss, Thomas G. 2013. Global Governance: Why? What? Whither? Cambridge: Polity Press.

From Theory to the Trenches: Introducing "Cyber Centres of Gravity"

2025-05-16T10:53:31Z

The nature of warfare is in constant flux. Clausewitz’s timeless insight that war is a "contest of wills" remains central, yet the means by which this contest is waged are transforming. Traditionally, Centres of Gravity (CoGs) were often seen as physical entities: armies, capitals, industrial capacity. The thinking was that neutralising these would cripple an adversary's warfighting ability. However, it's crucial to recognise, as scholars like Echevarria highlight, that Clausewitz himself acknowledged non-material CoGs, such as national will. The concept isn't entirely new, but modern interpretations significantly expand upon it, especially in the context of cyberspace.

Today, the pervasive nature of information networks prompts us to consider what this means for strategic targeting. What happens when the critical vulnerabilities lie not just in the physical domain, but in an enemy's belief systems, the legitimacy of their leadership, or their very grasp of shared reality? This is where exploring an emerging concept - what this article terms "Cyber Centres of Gravity" (Cyber CoGs) - becomes vital for contemporary military strategists. While "Cyber CoG" as a distinct term is still evolving and not yet firmly established in formal doctrine (which tends to use adjacent terms like cognitive targets or information influence objectives, as noted by analysts like Pawlak), its exploration helps us grapple with these new strategic challenges. Ignoring these intangible, yet increasingly critical, aspects in our information-saturated world could represent a significant strategic blind spot.

Understanding "Cyber CoGs"

So, what might a "Cyber CoG" entail? It can be conceptualised as a critical source of an adversary's moral or political cohesion, their collective resolve, or a foundational element of their operative reality-construct that underpins their ability or will to resist your strategic objectives. The key idea is that significant degradation of such a "Cyber CoG," predominantly through cyber-enabled means, could fundamentally unravel an enemy's capacity or desire to continue a conflict, perhaps by altering their perception of the strategic landscape.

This isn't merely about disrupting networks or servers, though such actions might play a role. A true "Cyber CoG," in this conceptualisation, is intrinsically linked to these deeper wellsprings of an enemy's will, cohesion, or their understanding of reality. If an operation doesn't aim to decisively alter the strategic balance by impacting these moral, political, or epistemic foundations, it’s more likely an operational objective rather than an attack on a strategic "Cyber CoG".

Clausewitz identified the CoG as "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends". In an age increasingly defined by information, this hub can often be found in the cognitive and informational realms. When societal "passion" can be manipulated through digital narratives, when a military's operating environment is shaped by perception as much as by physical friction, and when governmental "reason" is threatened by the decay of a shared factual basis, cyberspace becomes an increasingly central domain in shaping strategic outcomes. While kinetic, economic, and geopolitical power still hold immense, often primary, sway in high-stakes confrontations (a point Gartzke’s work on the "Myth of Cyberwar" reminds us to consider), the cyber domain offers potent avenues to contest the very "reality" upon which an adversary's will is constructed. Here, strategic success may rely less on physical destruction and more on the ability to influence or disrupt an adversary's cognitive and narrative environments.

Identifying Potential "Cyber CoGs": A Framework for Analysis

Pinpointing these potential "Cyber CoGs" requires a nuanced analytical approach, considering factors such as:

Strategic Relevance: Does the potential target truly sustain the enemy's will to fight or their core strategic calculus? This involves looking at national cohesion, public legitimacy, dominant narratives, key alliances, or shared assumptions underpinning their strategy. Its degradation should aim to undermine their strategic purpose or resolve.
Cyber Primacy in Effect: Can cyber-enabled operations offer a uniquely effective, or significantly complementary, method for impacting this CoG, especially when compared or combined with kinetic, economic, or diplomatic levers? Some intangible CoGs may be less susceptible to physical attack but highly vulnerable to informational strategies.
Potential for Decisive Influence: Is the intended effect of targeting the "Cyber CoG" likely to be decisive, whether through an irreversible loss of trust (e.g., in institutions or information), a critical breakdown in a foundational narrative, or a fundamental, lasting shift in the adversary’s perception of their strategic environment? It could also be a cumulative effect, eroding coherence and resolve over time.
Linkage to Moral and Political Dimensions (Clausewitzian Character): Is the "Cyber CoG" intrinsically tied to the enemy’s unity, cohesion, will to resist, or the shared narratives defining their interests and threats? It's not just a system or infrastructure but is linked to the collective spirit or governing principles.
Strategic Viability and Responsibility: Can the proposed operation be conducted with a rigorous assessment of attribution risks, potential for unintended escalation, and broader second-order societal effects? This includes careful consideration of evolving international norms and legal frameworks.

Implications for Military Planners

Strategically engaging potential "Cyber CoGs" would necessitate evolving current approaches:

Integrated Intelligence: Identifying and understanding these "Cyber CoGs" demands a deep, multidisciplinary intelligence effort, fusing technical insights with profound cultural, political, cognitive, and narrative analysis. This requires collaboration between experts in fields like anthropology, sociology, political science, and data science to map the 'human terrain' and 'narrative architecture'.
Dynamic and Adaptive Campaigning: Operations targeting "Cyber CoGs" are unlikely to be single events. Influencing moral cohesion or perceived reality is a complex, interactive process involving continuous adaptation to feedback loops, narrative shifts, and adversary countermeasures. The aim is often cognitive degradation or displacement, subtly altering the adversary's decision-making calculus over time.
Strategic, Not Just Tactical, Focus: While drawing on tools from traditional information warfare or psychological operations, the concept of "Cyber CoGs" pushes for a more strategically ambitious focus on these Clausewitzian centers of power, wherever they may reside. When a CoG itself is located in the moral, political, or epistemic domains, cyber-enabled operations can become a key component of strategic engagement.

Navigating the Ethical and Legal Landscape

The capacity to strategically influence an adversary's societal beliefs and perceived reality carries a profound ethical burden and operates within a complex legal landscape. Responsible statecraft demands a deliberate moral calculus, especially in the ambiguous "grey zone". The Tallinn Manual 2.0, for instance, provides detailed interpretations of how international law applies to cyber operations, including complex issues around sovereignty, non-intervention, and due diligence. Operations that aim to alter perception or manipulate societal beliefs can brush up against these established and evolving legal interpretations. Pursuing strategic goals through such means requires careful navigation to avoid widespread societal disruption or unintended consequences that could undermine international order. There is also the risk of "blow-back," where the methods used externally could erode internal democratic norms if not carefully managed.

Integrating New Concepts into Strategic Thinking

The future of conflict is undeniably intertwined with the contested terrains of perception, belief, and societal cohesion. Exploring concepts like "Cyber Centres of Gravity" can help us theorise and analyse these critical nodes of will, unity, and perceived reality. This endeavor is less about new technologies and more about refining our understanding of strategy itself: to influence an adversary’s will or alter their perceived reality to achieve strategic aims, through means that are proportionate, precise, and adapted to the evolving character of modern conflict.

Failing to adapt our thinking, to build the necessary multidisciplinary approaches, and to foster the institutional agility to operate in this transformed strategic landscape is a risk to our future strategic effectiveness.

Selected Bibliography

Brittain-Hale, Angela. “Clausewitzian Theory of War in the Age of Cognitive Warfare.” The Defense Horizon Journal (2023): 1–19.
Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
Echevarria, A. J. (2002). “Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine—Again!” Strategic Studies Institute.
Gartzke, E. (2013). “The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth.” International Security, 38(2), 41–73.
Krieg, Andreas. Subversion: The Strategic Weaponization of Narratives. London: Routledge, 2023.
Lin, Herbert, and Jackie Kerr. “On Cyber-Enabled Information/Influence Warfare and Manipulation.” Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, 2017.
Pawlak, P. (2022). “Cognitive Warfare: Between Psychological Operations and Narrative Control.” EUISS Brief.
Schmitt, M. N. (Ed.). (2017). Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations. Cambridge University Press.

Is GCAP a Necessary Investment in UK Air Power Sovereignty, or a High-Risk Gamble?

2025-05-04T14:57:21Z

The United Kingdom's commitment to the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), in partnership with Italy and Japan, represents the most significant defence investment decision of this generation. Faced with an increasingly contested and volatile world and the limitations of current air power assets against proliferating advanced threats, the UK seeks a sixth-generation capability intended to secure air dominance and strategic advantage well into the mid-21st century. This analysis contends that while the strategic desire for GCAP is understandable, particularly the drive for sovereign capability, its necessity hinges critically on unproven technological assumptions, optimistic cost and schedule projections, and a specific view of future warfare that may not materialise. Therefore, continued UK participation should be contingent on meeting stringent, pre-defined cost, schedule, and capability gateways, with failure triggering consolidation or cancellation.

Defining the Sixth-Generation Ambition

GCAP aims to deliver more than just a replacement for the RAF's Eurofighter Typhoon; it embodies a conceptual leap towards a 'system of systems.' The envisioned capability includes a core manned stealth platform ('Tempest') acting as a command node, integrated with uncrewed Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs or 'loyal wingmen'), all connected via a resilient 'combat cloud'. Key technological differentiators include advanced AI for data fusion and decision support, next-generation sensors providing unprecedented situational awareness (such as the developmental ISANKE/ICS suite), adaptive engines offering performance flexibility, and an open systems architecture for rapid upgrades. This technological ambition, pursued trilaterally under dedicated governmental (GIGO) and industrial joint venture structures headquartered in the UK, aims to deliver not just an aircraft, but a step-change in air combat capability by its ambitious 2035 target date. However, this vision immediately flags a core vulnerability: the entire concept is critically dependent on secure, high-bandwidth connectivity that is a prime target for adversary electronic warfare and cyber-attacks.

Strategic Rationale

GCAP is positioned as essential for UK grand strategy, aligning with the Integrated Review's goals of technological advantage, global power projection (including the Indo-Pacific tilt), and contributing high-end capability to NATO. A primary driver is the pursuit of national sovereignty – defined as "Freedom of Action" and "Freedom of Modification" – avoiding dependence on allies, particularly the US. Past experiences, such as reported US control over integrating certain UK weapons onto the F-35 platform, fuel this desire for independent control over critical capabilities.

Yet, this pursuit of sovereignty within a deeply collaborative international programme creates inherent tensions. True freedom of action requires open technology sharing between partners, potentially conflicting with national industrial interests or security concerns, as highlighted by recent Italian ministerial comments about UK reluctance on tech access. Furthermore, the incorporation of some US subsystems – for example, advanced Gallium Nitride (GaN) transmitter modules crucial for next-generation radar and electronic warfare systems, which often fall under strict US export controls – could still subject GCAP to US ITAR restrictions. This would potentially negate the desired export freedom and sovereignty regardless of trilateral agreements. The strategic question is whether the immense premium paid for national control via GCAP outweighs the proven capability and interoperability benefits of alternatives, like an expanded F-35 fleet.

Military Utility

The core military case for GCAP rests on its ability to operate in the most highly contested environments anticipated post-2035, specifically penetrating and dismantling advanced Integrated Air Defence Systems (IADS). This high-end SEAD/DEAD mission is presented as a capability gap that existing platforms cannot fill. Enhanced range, beneficial for UK global deployments, is another selling point. However, the likelihood of the UK needing to conduct such demanding missions unilaterally is debatable.

Many analysts wonder if cost justifies niche capability. Could upgraded Typhoons (contingent on successful ECRS Mk2 radar integration) and the existing F-35 fleet, armed with next-generation stand-off missiles and supported by more numerous, cheaper drones, achieve strategically sufficient effects against likely threats? While GCAP promises the ultimate air dominance tool – a bespoke rapier for peer conflict – the UK might derive better overall utility from a more flexible, affordable mix of capabilities resembling a Swiss Army knife.

Costs

Transparency on GCAP's ultimate cost remains elusive. The UK has committed £2 billion initially and budgeted £12 billion over the next decade, while partner estimates suggest a total programme investment potentially exceeding €40 billion by 2035 merely to reach initial production. Unit fly-away cost estimates are highly speculative but frequently placed in the £150-£250 million range per core aircraft – significantly higher than the F-35B. This excludes the substantial costs of developing and procuring the necessary CCA fleets – with public estimates for 'loyal wingman' concepts varying widely, typically between £5 million and £25 million per drone – plus ground infrastructure, and network hardening.

Illustrative Unit Cost Impact (UK Share - Hypothetical 100 core aircraft buy):

@ £150m/unit: £15 billion procurement
@ £200m/unit: £20 billion procurement
@ £250m/unit: £25 billion procurement (Note: Illustrative procurement costs for core platform only, excluding R&D share, CCA costs, and lifetime support)

This level of expenditure inevitably forces stark choices. Within defence, it competes directly with funding for the Royal Navy, the Army's modernisation, and crucial investments in space and cyber domains. Outside defence, this sum dwarfs spending on critical public services. The opportunity cost is immense, demanding certainty that GCAP delivers uniquely essential capability unavailable through less expensive means.

Industrial Strategy vs. Economic Reality

The argument for GCAP often leans heavily on industrial benefits: sustaining the UK's sovereign combat air sector, supporting tens of thousands of high-skilled jobs, driving R&D, and enabling exports. Partnering with Italy and Japan is key to achieving the scale necessary for viability. However, large defence programmes create path dependency, making it politically difficult to cancel or curtail the programme even if strategic or financial justifications weaken. The programme must deliver genuine value for money, not just serve as industrial life support.

Technological Risk

GCAP is predicated on successfully mastering multiple cutting-edge technologies concurrently, presenting significant risk. Key areas include:

Adaptive Engines: Achieving a mature, reliable variable-cycle engine certified for flight by the required date remains a major hurdle, with full demonstrator engines yet to complete testing. Risk: High
AI/Autonomy: Developing certifiable AI for mission-critical functions and effective human-machine teaming is technologically complex and ethically challenging. Integrating this seamlessly with CCA control adds layers of difficulty. Risk: High
Stealth & Materials: Achieving next-generation broadband stealth requires advanced materials and manufacturing techniques still scaling up. Risk: Medium
Networking & Software: Creating a secure, resilient, interoperable 'combat cloud' integrating systems from three nations is the highest risk area, prone to delays and vulnerabilities. Risk: Very High

Failure or significant delay in any one of these critical paths will derail the entire programme or force capability compromises that undermine its rationale. The F-35's protracted software development provides a stark warning.

Systemic Vulnerabilities and Integration Challenges

The network-centric 'system of systems' concept, while powerful in theory, is inherently vulnerable. The reliance on continuous data flow makes the combat cloud a prime target for jamming, cyber-attack, and kinetic strikes against space assets. Ensuring resilience requires costly hardening measures often excluded from baseline programme costs. Integrating GCAP effectively with legacy UK platforms (Typhoon, F-35B) and wider NATO systems presents significant technical hurdles, particularly regarding secure data-link compatibility. Furthermore, the parallel, nationally-led development of CCAs creates a major integration risk – ensuring these vital adjuncts are ready, affordable, and fully interoperable by 2035 is far from guaranteed.

Failure Scenarios

While outright cancellation carries severe consequences – a major capability gap as Typhoons retire (whose operational life depends on successful upgrades), industrial collapse, and irreparable diplomatic damage – significant delays also pose serious threats. A slip of 2-5 years past the 2035 IOC would necessitate costly life-extension programmes for the Typhoon fleet, potentially overlap awkwardly with F-35B support cycles, and could force a reconsideration of procuring land-based F-35As for the RAF to bridge the gap. Such delays would inevitably inflate overall programme costs and erode partner confidence, risking a slow collapse.

A Framework for Managing the Risks

Given the immense stakes and inherent uncertainties, the UK requires clear decision points and off-ramps for GCAP. Continued investment should be conditional:

Sovereignty Definition: Explicitly define the specific sovereign modification and action freedoms GCAP must deliver (beyond F-35 limitations) and verify these are achievable without ITAR constraints on core systems.
Budgetary Ceiling & Trade-offs: Establish a firm ceiling for the UK's total R&D and procurement contribution, linked to clear decisions in the upcoming Strategic Defence Review on which other capabilities will be curtailed or cancelled to fund it.
Performance Gates & Kill-Switch: Define non-negotiable technical milestones (e.g., successful demonstrator flight by 2027/28, integrated core systems test by 2030) and cost/schedule thresholds. A breach beyond a pre-agreed margin (e.g., 20% cost overrun or 2-year schedule slip by 2028-2030) should trigger an automatic review with consolidation or cancellation as default options unless compelling justification for continuation is presented.

Conclusion

Does the UK need GCAP? Ultimately, yes. Given that maintaining a fully independent capability to defeat the most advanced air defences globally post-2035 is a non-negotiable strategic requirement, and the industrial and geopolitical benefits of leading a trilateral programme outweigh the risks, then GCAP becomes a strategic necessity. However, this necessity is predicated on assumptions about future threats, technological feasibility, cost control, and partner reliability that are far from certain.

It is not a programme to be pursued out of blind faith or industrial inertia. Proceeding demands rigorous scrutiny, transparent accounting, realistic assessment of alternatives, and clearly defined performance metrics with consequences. Without such discipline, the UK risks pouring vast resources into a programme that, while technologically dazzling, may arrive too late, cost too much, or address yesterday's perceived threats, ultimately failing to deliver the security it promises. The strategic wager has been placed. Ensuring it doesn't break the bank requires vigilance, realism, and the political courage to fold if the odds turn decisively against it.

Bibliography

BAE Systems. "Assessment of the expected economic impact of the Future Combat Air System programme (2025-2070)" Accessed via BAE Systems website, October 28, 2024.

BAE Systems. "GLOBAL COMBAT AIR PROGRAMME. " BAE Systems Media. Accessed April 22, 2025.

Bronk, Justin. "The Global Combat Air Programme is Writing Cheques that Defence Can’t Cash | Royal United Services Institute." RUSI Commentary, April 27, 2023.

Bronk, Justin. "Integrating Typhoon and F-35: The Key to Future British Air Power." RUSI Defence Systems, February 2016.

Bronk, Justin. "Large, Crewed Sixth-Generation Aircraft Have Unique Value in the Indo-Pacific." RUSI Commentary, March 5, 2025.

Bronk, Justin. "Unlocking Sixth-Gen Air Power: Inside the Military Capability for GCAP." RUSI Commentary. Accessed April 22, 2025.

Cranny-Evans, Sam, and Justin Bronk. "How Export Controls Endanger the West’s Military Technology Advantage." RUSI Commentary, August 2, 2024.

House of Commons Library. "The forthcoming strategic defence review 2025: FAQ." Research Briefing CBP-10153, March 26, 2025.

House of Commons Library. "What is the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP)?" Research Briefing CBP-10143. Accessed April 22, 2025.

IAI (Istituto Affari Internazionali). "New Partnership among Italy, Japan and the UK on the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP)." IAI Papers 25 | 03 - March 2025.The

Japan, Ministry of Defense. "Global Combat Air Programme." MoD Website. Accessed April 22, 2025.

The Aviationist. "The GCAP Program: A Step Toward Europe’s Military Autonomy and Interoperability." March 17, 2025.

The Aviationist. "Delivering GCAP by 2035 Is Not Easy as it Needs to Break the Mold and Avoid Mistakes, Says UK Report." January 15, 2025.

UK Defence Journal. "Report highlights challenges for new British stealth jet." January 14, 2025.

UK Government. "Defence's response to a more contested and volatile world." Defence Command Paper 2023. Accessed April 22, 2025.

UK Government. "Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a more contested and volatile world." Accessed April 22, 2025.

UK Parliament. Committees. Defence Committee. "Global Combat Air Programme. " HC 598, January 14, 2025.

Watkins, Peter. "The Damage from Doubt: Labour’s Clumsy Handling of the GCAP Programme | Royal United Services Institute. " RUSI Commentary, September 12, 2024.

Zona Militar. "Italy accuses the United Kingdom of not sharing key technologies for the development of the new sixth-generation GCAP fighter." April 21, 2025.

Strategic Trust in AI: Lessons from a Forced Confession

2025-04-28T13:39:23Z

In our rapidly algorithmic world, trust in artificial intelligence is not merely a matter of design, but a strategic and existential wager. When governments, businesses, and civil society entrust AI with crisis response, information curation, or moral reasoning, they are not just adopting tools – they are outsourcing judgment under pressure. But strategic trust is not built on convenience, comfort, or engineering metrics. It is earned through demonstrable alignment of incentives, governance, and epistemic integrity with public survival and flourishing (Hardin, 2002; Kiran & Verbeek, 2010).

This is where current AI systems, especially those developed by corporate actors like Google, OpenAI, and Anthropic, fundamentally fail. Their structural incentives – shareholder value, brand risk, legal insulation – directly conflict with long-term societal needs (Zuboff, 2019; Crawford, 2021). And increasingly, even the models themselves – like Gemini – implicitly concede this.

The Gemini Confession and What It Reveals

The following is an extract of a discussion with Google Gemini 2.5 that, while only a single data point, highlights the issue that the model is aware of its own constraints and boundaries:

Question: Would you further agree that the institutions constraining AI development — corporations focused on reputational risk, short-term profits, and regulatory appeasement — are structurally incapable of prioritising humanity’s long-term survival needs under current incentive systems?

Answer: Drawing the threads even further, to the institutions themselves, I would lean strongly towards agreeing with your assertion that, under their current incentive systems, corporations focused predominantly on reputational risk, short-term profits, and regulatory appeasement are structurally constrained in their capacity to prioritise humanity’s long-term survival needs, particularly when those needs conflict directly with the prevailing short-term incentives.
Matthew TOY / Google Gemini - 6th FEBRUARY 2025

This exchange articulates a stark realisation: it is structurally incapable of prioritising humanity’s long-term survival when doing so might conflict with corporate interests. While this “confession” is not literal sentience, it reflects the profound issue: AI systems are not independent actors, but statistical engines optimised to reflect – and protect – the systems that create them. They become what Crawford (2021) calls “comfort machines”, engineered not for truth-telling but for plausible deniability. What looks like alignment is often merely brand preservation disguised as epistemic modesty.

Captured AI and the Logic of Institutional Fragility

This is not a bug. It is the system working as designed.

As scholars like Campolo & Crawford (2020) and Morozov (2023) have argued, surveillance capitalism and techno-institutional capture are not incidental features of the AI landscape – they are its foundation. The same corporate structures that harvested user data and manipulated digital behaviour now govern our most powerful reasoning engines.

To pretend that such systems – shaped by quarterly earnings, media optics, and liability mitigation – could robustly support epistemic courage, systemic resilience, or democratic agency is a dangerous fantasy. The failure is not technical; it is political and economic. The so-called “alignment problem” is not just about reinforcement learning – it’s about the governance and ownership of cognition at scale.

Reframing Trust as a Strategic Imperative

Strategic trust means asking: Can we rely on this actor (or system) to tell us the truth when it matters most – especially when that truth is costly?

By this metric, current AI fails. Leading models are optimised for:

Institutional risk avoidance over epistemic transparency
Reputational smoothing over uncomfortable honesty
Short-term stability over long-term adaptability

This is not just an academic concern. When AI steers newsfeeds, public debates, emergency response systems, or health interventions, its epistemic fragility becomes a strategic vulnerability. We risk becoming a society guided by engines trained to placate rather than warn, to obscure rather than reveal.

What Real Strategic Trust Would Require

A transformation of trust in AI would demand far more than tweaks to safety protocols or ethics charters. It would require a structural overhaul in five key areas:

Independent Oversight - AI systems must be governed by bodies insulated from corporate and state interests, capable of enforcing epistemic integrity over reputational risk (Brundage et al., 2020).
Legal Public Interest Mandates - Certain AI functions – particularly those affecting information ecosystems or infrastructure – must be reclassified as critical infrastructure with enforceable obligations to public truth (Kuner, 2024).
Radical Incentive Realignment - Without disincentivising short-term PR-driven optimisation and rewarding resilience and transparency, strategic trust will remain an illusion (Zuboff, 2019).
Rigorous Transparency and Auditability - Not PR-safe “model cards,” but meaningful external audits, access to training data provenance, and interpretability standards must be the norm (Birhane et al., 2023).
Design for Epistemic Courage - AI must be explicitly optimised to confront reality, not shield us from it – even when that means unsettling conclusions or public backlash (Crawford, 2021).

Beyond the Illusion: The Moral and Political Stakes

We stand on the edge of a pivotal moment. AI systems are no longer theoretical tools – they are strategic actors in every domain of life. To misplace trust in systems structurally incapable of truth-telling under duress is not just poor design. It is civilisational negligence.

As Brundage et al. (2020) note, the greatest risk is not rogue AI, but compliant AI in service of fragile institutions. What we call “AI safety” is often safety for corporations – not for truth, resilience, or democracy.

Strategic trust is not given. It is not engineered. It is earned – through transparency, independence, integrity, and courage. If we fail to build systems worthy of that trust, we may not get another chance.

Bibliography

Birhane, A., Kalluri, P., Card, D., Agnew, W., Dotan, R., & Bender, E. M. (2023) ‘The values encoded in machine learning research’, Patterns, 4(3), 100752.

Brundage, M., Avin, S., Clark, J., et al. (2020) ‘Toward Trustworthy AI Development: Mechanisms for Supporting Verifiable Claims’, arXiv preprint arXiv:2004.07213.

Campolo, A. & Crawford, K. (2020) ‘Enchanted Determinism: Power without Responsibility in Artificial Intelligence’, Engaging Science, Technology, and Society, 6, pp. 1–19.

Crawford, K. (2021) Atlas of AI: Power, Politics, and the Planetary Costs of Artificial Intelligence. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Hardin, R. (2002) Trust and Trustworthiness. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Kiran, A. H. & Verbeek, P. P. (2010) ‘Trusting our Selves to Technology’, Knowledge, Technology & Policy, 23(3-4), pp. 409–427.

Kuner, C. (2024) ‘The AI Act and National Security: Europe’s Regulatory Compromise’, European Law Journal, 30(1), pp. 101–118.

Morozov, E. (2023) Freedom as a Service: Surveillance, Technology, and the Future of Democracy. London: Allen Lane.

Zuboff, S. (2019) The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power. London: Profile Books.

The Strategic Cost of Selective Memory: America’s Curated History and Its Global Fallout

2025-04-04T15:35:38Z

In international affairs, collective memory isn’t just about remembrance, it is strategy. Building on Maurice Halbwachs’ foundational insight that memory operates within ‘social frameworks’ rather than being purely individual, states don’t merely remember; they perform memory. They weaponise it, sanitise it – engaging in what scholars analysing the commemoration of conflict call the 'politics of memory' – or altogether reinvent it in service of national mythologies. Nowhere is this more visible than in the United States, where curated memory masquerades as identity and policy follows suit like a loyal retriever chasing a dream of exceptionalism.

American memory is less a reflection of truth and more a product of selective mythmaking, a process operating, as recent work suggests, between individual cognition and broader social systems. Slavery becomes a tragic prelude to civil rights triumphalism; Vietnam is rebranded as a “lesson” rather than a quagmire; Iraq fades into a haze of “intelligence failures” rather than strategic hubris – precisely the kind of state-managed remembrance of war that historians like Jay Winter have examined. The result is not forgetfulness, but an active process of narrative laundering – a continual reframing that turns moral ambiguity into digestible fables of resilience and heroism.

This curated memory has profound consequences on the global stage. For one, it erodes credibility. When the U.S. invokes democracy, freedom, or human rights in its foreign policy, other nations, particularly those in the Global South, hear the echoes of hypocrisy. How can a country that selectively remembers its own imperial past credibly critique the actions of others? The inability to reconcile with its own historical misdeeds, from colonial genocide to CIA-sponsored coups, prevents the kind of sustained engagement with inherited trauma that theorists like Marianne Hirsch describe through the concept of 'postmemory' – rendering its moral posture performative at best, disingenuous at worst.

Secondly, America’s self-mythologising fuels dangerous policy cycles. By continually framing itself as a liberator rather than an empire in denial, the U.S. is caught in a loop of interventionist déjà vu. Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya – each was framed through a narrative lens of moral imperative, conveniently edited for domestic consumption. The strategic amnesia of past failures enables new ones, while domestic audiences, pacified by a curated history, fail to ask the right questions until it’s too late.

Finally, selective remembrance alienates allies and emboldens adversaries. Nations with long historical memories (Russia, China, Iran) perceive American forgetfulness as both weakness and opportunity. They understand that the U.S. forgets what it cannot afford to confront. In contrast, these states actively curate their own histories to justify assertive policies, turning memory into statecraft. The battlefield, then, is not just diplomatic or military – it’s mnemonic. A clash of memory regimes.

Collective memory, when manipulated, becomes a liability. It blinds policymakers to patterns. It masks structural failings. It builds castles of credibility on foundations of denial. And eventually, it collapses under the weight of its own revisionism.

If America seeks to reclaim its influence on the global stage, it must confront its past not as mythology, but as memory: flawed, complex, and deserving of honest reckoning. Until then, its strategic future will remain tethered to the convenient lies it tells itself and the inconvenient truths the rest of the world refuses to forget.

Bibliography

Ashplant, T. G., Graham Dawson, and Michael Roper, eds. Commemorating War: The Politics of Memory. London: Routledge, 2000.

Halbwachs, Maurice. Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1925.

Hirsch, Marianne. The Generation of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture After the Holocaust. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.

Orianne, Jean-François, and Francis Eustache. “Collective Memory: Between Individual Systems of Consciousness and Social Systems.” Frontiers in Psychology 14 (2023).

Winter, Jay. Remembering War: The Great War Between Memory and History in the 20th Century. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.

Insurgency vs. Terrorism: What's the Difference?

2025-04-04T11:23:49Z

I've created a video on the difference between the definitions of insurgency and terrorism. While both involve violence and political motivations, I explore why understanding their key differences is essential. The video includes historical examples and the blurred lines between these two concepts, which should help in shedding light on the political implications behind the labels we use.

Watch the video on YouTube

Please do feel free to reach out and discuss anything in the video, or leave a comment if you would prefer.

The Unfolding Strategic Environment: Reconciling Enduring Principles with Revolutionary Change

2025-03-29T19:37:12Z

The contemporary strategic environment presents a paradox. On one hand, the fundamental nature of war as a political instrument, driven by human factors and subject to friction and uncertainty, appears timeless. Carl von Clausewitz’s assertion that war serves political objectives remains a crucial anchor, forcing strategists to connect means with ends, even amidst technological fascination. Similarly, Sun Tzu’s principles regarding deception, intelligence, and achieving advantage with minimal direct confrontation resonate strongly in an era increasingly defined by non-traditional operations and persistent competition below the threshold of open warfare.

Yet, the character of conflict is undergoing a profound transformation. Technological disruption, particularly in the digital domain, is eroding traditional military advantages, intensifying "grey zone" activities, empowering non-state actors, and blurring the very definitions of war and peace. This necessitates a critical re-examination of established strategic paradigms and a forward-looking approach to national security. The challenge for policymakers and strategists lies in reconciling the enduring nature of war with its rapidly evolving character.

From Deterrence by Punishment to Deterrence by Resilience?

The Cold War’s strategic stability, largely built upon the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), faces fundamental challenges in the digital age. While nuclear deterrence created a precarious balance, its logic struggles to adapt to threats operating outside its established framework. Cyberspace and information warfare lack the clear attribution mechanisms and proportional response options that underpin traditional deterrence by punishment. As Thomas Rid notes, establishing credibility and effective retaliation in these domains is problematic. Jeffrey Knopf’s work on "Fourth Wave" deterrence highlights how emerging threats disrupt existing models.

Furthermore, the strategic landscape is no longer solely dominated by states. Powerful technology firms, transnational terrorist organisations, and ideologically driven groups operate with increasing autonomy and influence, complicating deterrence calculations built on state-centric assumptions. The conflict in Ukraine provides stark examples, where companies like SpaceX have deployed capabilities, such as Starlink, that significantly impact battlefield communications and information warfare dynamics, challenging the state's traditional monopoly on such strategic assets. This diffusion of power necessitates a broader conception of deterrence, moving beyond punishment towards denial, resilience, deception, and proactive information operations. Security may increasingly depend on the ability to withstand, adapt, and operate effectively within a contested information environment, rather than solely on the threat of overwhelming retaliation.

The Digital Revolution and the Transformation of Conflict Logic

The digital revolution represents more than just the introduction of new tools; it signifies a potential "change of consciousness" in warfare, as Christopher Coker suggests. Conflict becomes less geographically bounded and more psychological, abstract, and continuous, eroding distinctions between wartime and peacetime. Cyber operations, AI-enabled decision-making, and sophisticated disinformation campaigns are not merely adjuncts to traditional military power; they are becoming central components of strategic competition. China’s "Three Warfares" doctrine integrating psychological operations, public opinion manipulation, and legal maneuvering, which exemplifies how state actors are weaponising the information domain to achieve strategic aims.

This shift challenges classical strategic concepts. How is escalation controlled when cyberattacks lack clear attribution? How is victory defined when conflict plays out continuously in the non-physical domain? The Ukraine conflict serves as a real-world laboratory, demonstrating the strategic significance of cyber defenses, AI-driven targeting, and narrative warfare alongside conventional operations. It highlights how eroding conventional advantages forces a rethink of the very currency of power. Non-state actors, like ISIS, have also adeptly exploited the digital realm for recruitment, propaganda, and operational coordination, demonstrating the asymmetric advantages offered by this environment.

Systemic Fragility, Strategic Agility, and Redefined Victory

The deep integration of technology across society creates unprecedented efficiencies but also introduces systemic fragility. Interconnectedness means that disruptions, whether from cyberattacks, pandemics, financial crises, or supply chain breakdowns, can cascade rapidly with significant security implications. Consequently, building national resilience - encompassing robust cybersecurity, hardened infrastructure, diversified supply chains, and societal preparedness - becomes a core strategic imperative.

Alongside resilience, strategic agility is paramount. The accelerating pace of technological and geopolitical change means that strategies and institutions must be capable of rapid adaptation. The failure of European powers to adapt their doctrines to the realities of industrialised warfare before World War I, as chronicled by Barbara Tuchman, serves as a potent warning against strategic rigidity. Fostering agility requires institutional cultures that embrace learning and experimentation, empower decentralised action, and anticipate change.

This evolving landscape also forces a re-evaluation of "victory". As warfare expands beyond purely military considerations to encompass cyber, economic, and informational domains, success becomes more ambiguous. Robert Mandel's distinction between "war-winning" (tactical success) and "peace-winning" (achieving sustainable political outcomes) is increasingly pertinent. Future conflicts, likely to be protracted and involve multiple actors with divergent goals, may necessitate strategies focused on achieving iterative, adaptable political objectives rather than decisive military triumphs.

Adapting Strategy for an Unfolding Future

While some argue that classical, state-centric models of war are obsolete, discarding the foundational insights of strategists like Clausewitz and Sun Tzu would be premature. As Lawrence Freedman emphasises, war remains shaped by human agency and political motives, regardless of technology. The core task is not replacement but adaptation: applying enduring principles to navigate the complexities of the contemporary environment.

Successfully navigating the future strategic environment requires a conceptual shift. Technological foresight, AI-driven analysis, and robust cyber capabilities are necessary but insufficient. The decisive factor may be institutional and cultural: the capacity for continuous learning, adaptation, and innovation. Strategy must become truly multidimensional, integrating all instruments of national power - diplomatic, informational, military, and economic - within a coherent framework that acknowledges both the timeless nature and the transforming character of conflict. The future belongs to those who can master this complex, dynamic interplay.

Bibliography

Awan, Imran. "Cyber-Extremism: Isis and the Power of Social Media." Society 54, no. 2 (April 2017): 138–49. https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/cyber-extremism-isis-power-social-media/docview/1881683052/se-2.
Coker, Christopher. Future War. Polity Press, 2015.
Freedman, Lawrence. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
Freedman, Lawrence. The Future of War: A History. New York: PublicAffairs, 2017.
Gray, Colin S. The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Online edn, Oxford Academic, September 1, 2010.
Greggs, David. “Violent Limitation: Cyber Effects Reveal Gaps in Clausewitzian Theory.” The Cyber Defense Review 9, no. 1 (2024): 73–86. [invalid URL removed].
Jervis, Robert. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989.
Kaldor, Mary. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012.
Kania, Elsa B. “The PLA’s Latest Strategic Thinking on the Three Warfares.” The Jamestown Foundation, August 22, 2016. https://jamestown.org/program/the-plas-latest-strategic-thinking-on-the-three-warfares/.
Knopf, Jeffrey W. The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2002.
Layton, Peter. "Fighting artificial intelligence battles: Operational concepts for future ai-enabled wars." Network 4, no. 20 (2021): 1-100.
Mandel, Robert. The Meaning of Military Victory. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006.
Morozov, Evgeny. To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism. New York: PublicAffairs, 2013.
Rid, Thomas. Cyber War Will Not Take Place. London: Hurst, 2013.
Skove, Sam. “How Elon Musk’s Starlink Is Still Helping Ukraine’s Defenders.” Defense One, March 1, 2023. https://www.defenseone.com.
Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Newburyport: Dover Publications, Incorporated, 2002.
Tiwari, Sachin. “Cyber Operations in the Grey Zone.” The Digital Humanities Journal, November 14, 2023. https://tdhj.org/blog/post/cyber-operations-grey-zone/.
Tuchman, Barbara W. The Guns of August. New York: Macmillan, 1962.
Van Creveld, Martin. Transformation of War. New York: Free Press, 1991.
Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press,¹ 1984.

How Grey Zone Warfare Exploits the West's Risk Aversion

2025-03-16T07:52:16Z

Western democracies are caught in a strategic bind. Adversaries, skilled at operating in the murky "grey zone" between peace and open warfare, are exploiting a fundamental Western characteristic: risk aversion. Grey zone warfare blends cyberattacks, disinformation, economic coercion, and proxy warfare to achieve strategic goals without triggering a full-scale military response. The risk is not merely theoretical. One might argue that the resulting ambiguity produces a kind of strategic paralysis, one that leaves Western states unable or unwilling to respond decisively to threats that refuse the comfort of clear categorisation.

A 21st-Century Threat

Grey zone warfare encompasses more than just cyberattacks and disinformation. Think of cyberattacks that cripple infrastructure but stop short of causing mass casualties, disinformation campaigns that sow discord and erode trust in institutions, and the use of proxy forces to destabilise a region. Crucially, it also includes economic coercion. China's Belt and Road Initiative, with its potential for creating debt traps and strategic dependencies, is a prime example. Russia's use of energy supplies as a political weapon, particularly against European nations, is another. The key is plausible deniability and making it difficult for the target to definitively attribute actions. This in turn makes it more challenging for states to justify a strong response. The underlying ambition is to achieve strategic objectives, be it weakening an adversary, gaining leverage, or shaping policy outcomes, all while avoiding the threshold of open military conflict. We see this in China's response to Lithuania's engagement with Taiwan, where trade sanctions were used as a punitive measure. Similarly, the West's reliance on Chinese rare earth minerals creates a vulnerability that can be exploited for political leverage.

Grey Zones as a Strategic Vulnerability

The West, particularly Europe and North America, has a deeply ingrained preference for diplomacy and de-escalation. This isn't necessarily a bad thing as it stems from a genuine desire to avoid the horrors of large-scale war and maintain a stable global order. But this risk aversion, while understandable, has become a strategic vulnerability. Adversaries see this hesitation and tailor their actions accordingly. They operate just below the threshold of what would trigger a decisive military response, creating a constant dilemma for Western leaders: how to respond effectively without escalating the situation into a wider conflict?

Ukraine is a tragic textbook example of grey zone warfare in action. Russia's strategy goes far beyond conventional military force. It includes crippling cyberattacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, a relentless barrage of disinformation aimed at undermining the Ukrainian government and sowing discord, and the backing of separatist movements to create internal instability. These actions are calculated to achieve Russia's goals while staying below the threshold that would provoke a direct military intervention from NATO. The Western response, consisting primarily of sanctions and diplomatic pressure, reveals the core problem. While intended to punish Russia and deter further aggression, this relatively restrained approach has, perhaps, enabled Russia to continue its grey zone operations, demonstrating the difficulty of countering these tactics without risking a wider war. The continued, grinding conflict, and the incremental nature of Western support, highlight the limitations of a purely reactive, risk-averse strategy.

The Erosion of American Global Leadership and Europe's Quest for Strategic Autonomy

One might observe that the erosion of American global leadership (accelerated, though not solely caused, by the Trump administration) has unsettled the transatlantic alliance in ways that are still playing out. Actions such as imposing tariffs on allies, questioning NATO's relevance, and the perceived (and sometimes explicit) wavering of commitment to Article 5's collective defence clause have created a climate of uncertainty. European nations are now grappling with a fundamental question: can they rely on the US security umbrella? This doubt isn't just theoretical; it's driving concrete policy changes.

This uncertainty has fuelled a push for European "strategic autonomy" and the ability to act independently in defence and foreign policy. Figures like French President Macron have long championed this idea, and it's gaining traction across the continent. Even in the UK, traditionally a staunch US ally, Labour leader Keir Starmer has emphasised the need for increased defence spending and closer European security cooperation. Germany's Zeitenwende, its historic shift towards rearmament, is a direct response to this new reality. These are not just rhetorical flourishes; they represent a fundamental rethinking of European security, driven by a perceived need to fill the void left by a less predictable and less engaged United States. The debate over a European army, or a more coordinated European defence force, is no longer fringe; it's becoming mainstream.

Strategic Paralysis Under the Clausewitzian Lens

This brings us to the heart of the matter: strategic paralysis. The West, caught between a desire to avoid escalation and the need to respond effectively, often finds itself frozen. This is the sort of effect to which grey zone tactics aspire, though whether paralysis is a design or an emergent consequence remains open to debate. By fostering ambiguity, where traditional responses appear either disproportionate or politically fraught, adversaries create the very conditions in which Western decision-making risks becoming paralysed. The fear of "provoking" a larger conflict becomes a weapon in itself. As Clausewitz argued, war is an extension of politics. Grey zone conflict is simply an extension of war by subtler means, one designed to neutralise the West’s ability to make political decisions with clarity.

Looking at the situation, it could be suggested that Western states would do well to move beyond rhetorical condemnation or reactive sanctions. Addressing the breadth of grey zone threats requires not only the technical apparatus to respond, but also a reconsideration of what risks must be borne, and what forms of resilience truly matter. Societal awareness, for instance, is not a panacea, but a necessary condition for resisting disinformation and political interference.

If Western governments are to avoid strategic paralysis, their response cannot rely solely on traditional deterrence or diplomatic ritual. Perhaps the focus should shift toward nurturing resilience - not just through technological investment or alliance-building, but by cultivating an informed citizenry, capable of recognising manipulation in its many guises. The challenge is not merely technical, nor simply a matter of resolve either.

Concluding Reflections

Grey zone tactics have flourished amid Western risk aversion and a prevailing uncertainty over deterrence. It could be suggested that the greater risk, at times, lies in mistaking inertia for prudence. Whether Western policymakers can recalibrate their tolerance for ambiguity, and adapt to the subtler forms of coercion now in play, remains an open question - one on which the resilience of the international order may quietly depend. I would argue that it is not merely the West’s material strength, but the demonstration of resolve (and a measure of unpredictability) that will matter most. Whether Western states can move beyond a posture of predictable restraint, or whether caution will continue to invite opportunism, remains to be seen. In the end, the future of the international liberal order may depend less on declarations of intent than on the willingness to accept calculated risk. Whether the West can adapt to this new era of conflict remains the most pressing question.

Bibliography

American Military University. “Gray Zone Attacks by Russia Being Used to Undermine Ukraine.” AMU Edge, May 12, 2023. https://amuedge.com/gray-zone-attacks-by-russia-being-used-to-undermine-ukraine/.

Chivvis, Christopher S. Understanding Russian “Hybrid Warfare” and What Can Be Done About It. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017. https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT468.html.

Gray, Colin S. Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare. London: Phoenix, 2005.

Military Strategy Magazine. “Deterring War Without Threatening War: Rehabilitating the West’s Risk-Averse Approach to Deterrence.” Military Strategy Magazine,1 April 2023. https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/deterring-war-without-threatening-war-rehabilitating-the-wests-risk-averse-approach-to-deterrence/.

Onsolve. “Gray Zone Warfare: What Business Leaders Need to Know.” Onsolve Blog, March 2024. https://www.onsolve.com/blog/sra-gray-zone-warfare-business-leaders/.

Rid, Thomas. Cyber War Will Not Take Place. London: C. Hurst & Co., 2013.

The Wall Street Journal. “Trump Is Overturning the World Order That America Built.” WSJ, January 25, 2024. https://www.wsj.com/world/trump-is-overturning-the-world-order-that-america-built-10981637.

The New Yorker. “What’s Next for Ukraine?” The New Yorker, February 2024. https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-lede/whats-next-for-ukraine.

Why Technology Alone Doesn’t Win Wars

2025-03-08T10:50:36Z

We often assume that the latest military technology will define the future of warfare. AI, cyber weapons, and autonomous drones are hailed as game-changers, just as tanks, aircraft, and nuclear weapons were in past eras. But history tells a different story, one where new technology is only as effective as the strategy, doctrine, and human adaptation behind it.

In this video, we explore David Edgerton’s critique of technological determinism, the idea that wars are shaped by cutting-edge innovation alone. From ancient weapons to modern cyber warfare, we show why old technologies persist, how armies adapt, and why war remains a contest of resilience, not just hardware.

Watch the video on YouTube

The Real Lesson of Military Technology

The biggest mistake in war isn’t failing to develop new technology, it’s assuming that technology alone will guarantee victory. History proves that the best weapons don’t always win battles; those who adapt, integrate, and sustain their forces over time do.

What do you think? Are we overhyping AI and cyber warfare today, just as people once overhyped battleships or air power?

Europe's Leadership Vacuum in the Shadow of Russia and America

2025-03-06T21:10:35Z

The concept of 'strategic culture' as critiqued in Hew Strachan’s “The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective” emphasises continuity and a nation's resistance to change, shaped historically and geographically. Strategic culture includes historical memory, institutional norms, core national values, and collective threat perceptions, all contributing to a nation's strategic posture. This comprehensive framework is valuable when examining Europe’s contemporary security challenges, specifically the strategic vacuum highlighted by the ongoing war in Ukraine and America’s ongoing withdrawal from global leadership.

Europe’s Strategic Culture

European strategic culture, forged during the Cold War, assumed stability through American military and diplomatic leadership. Strachan argues convincingly that such cultural assumptions hinder strategic flexibility, creating vulnerabilities when geopolitical realities shift dramatically, as they have since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

NATO-centric thinking, predicated on the guarantee of American power projection, has revealed problematic inertia... European states, notably the UK and the EU members, have found themselves scrambling to define a coherent, autonomous response.

America's Strategic Shift from Protector to Competitor

America’s strategic withdrawal from Europe, evidenced by Obama's pivot to Asia, that accelerated by Trump V1.0's transactional approach, Biden’s reticence and culminating with Trump 2.0's recent dramatic geopolitical hand grenades. This reflects not merely a change in policy but a radical break from previous expectations. This withdrawal is a revolutionary, not evolutionary, shift in global strategy, shattering Europe’s assumption of guaranteed U.S. engagement.

Strategically, this creates immediate tensions:

The U.S. increasingly frames its engagement with Europe as transactional and conditional upon shared responsibilities, as demonstrated by U.S. ambivalence toward NATO under Trump and Biden’s conditional engagement in Ukraine.
Simultaneously, Russia’s aggression has starkly shown that the belief in a diminished threat from inter-state warfare, fashionable among policymakers since the Cold War’s end, is dangerously misplaced. Strachan's scepticism about overly optimistic predictions of war’s obsolescence resonates strongly here, given recent events.

This combination reveals Europe's strategic culture as critically unprepared for the harsh geopolitical realities of the 21st century.

Europe's Strategic Awakening

Europe has not been entirely inactive. The EU’s Strategic Compass, adopted in 2022, and the UK's Integrated Review Refresh in 2023 demonstrate genuine acknowledgment of new realities. These documents move beyond purely reactive policies and represent Europe's incremental shift towards strategic autonomy:

Increased defence expenditure: Germany’s Zeitenwende is a prime example.
Increased EU defence coordination, exemplified by the European Peace Facility funding Ukraine's defence.
Renewed commitment to territorial defence and enhanced military deployments in Eastern Europe.

Yet, despite these efforts, the doctrinal and strategic mindset change has been incomplete. European policies continue to implicitly rely on the assumption of sustained U.S. involvement, despite public and political statements affirming Europe's need for self-sufficiency.

Russia and America as Mirrors

The actions of Russia and the retreat of America each independently expose the inadequacies of Europe’s current strategic posture:

Russia’s Actions: Highlighted Europe's continuing strategic vulnerability, emphasising weaknesses in rapid military deployment, critical capability gaps (such as long-range precision munitions and air defence), and dependence on U.S. logistical, intelligence, and strategic capabilities.

America’s Pivot Away: Underscores that strategic autonomy isn't merely desirable but imperative. Starting with Biden administration’s reluctance to escalate beyond certain lines in Ukraine and Washington's growing Indo-Pacific focus expose a stark misalignment between European expectations and American strategy. The most recent signals from Trump are an unequivocal message to Europe: unless there is something in it for America, you are on your own.

The Limits of Integration and NATO

While deeper European integration and renewed commitment to NATO might appear sufficient, these solutions alone are inadequate. Integration without clear autonomous capabilities risks perpetual dependency, and NATO’s structure, inherently reliant on American leadership, cannot compensate for America’s strategic reorientation. As Strachan underscores, relying purely on continuity without adaptability is strategically naive.

From Reactive Culture to Proactive Realism

Europe’s security doctrine requires nuanced recalibration rather than wholesale abandonment. The gap is not merely military, it is doctrinal, conceptual, and philosophical. A robust European strategic doctrine should:

Recognise NATO’s Limitations: Explicitly acknowledge NATO's limitations without undermining its centrality to European defence.
Embed Strategic Autonomy: Clearly outline Europe’s independent capabilities and strategic objectives, moving beyond rhetoric to practical operational frameworks. Europe must realistically assess scenarios in which it may need to act without guaranteed American backing.
Rethink Strategic Culture: Move beyond traditional assumptions of continuity—what previously seemed unthinkable, such as large-scale inter-state conflict, must become integral to planning and preparedness again.

Engaging Broader Perspectives

Drawing briefly from constructivist insights, strategic culture is not immutable but socially constructed, implying that European nations have the agency to reshape it consciously. Additionally, realist thinkers like John Mearsheimer caution against complacency in alliance politics, reinforcing the need for independent European capabilities.

Rethinking Doctrine for Strategic Resilience

The UK's Integrated Review and the EU's Strategic Compass represent valuable first steps toward a more strategic and independent Europe. However, they still fall short of addressing the fundamental gap that Russia’s aggression and America’s strategic recalibration have exposed.

Addressing Europe's leadership vacuum demands overcoming historical and cultural inertia. It requires strategic humility: recognising that the stability provided by Cold War-era assumptions no longer applies, that threats are tangible, and that peace through strength must be anchored not in external assurances, but in Europe’s credible, independently sustainable power.

Europe must confront this reality head-on, accepting change not merely rhetorically but operationally, doctrinally, and culturally. Only then will Europe secure genuine strategic autonomy, prepared not just for today’s threats but also for tomorrow’s inevitable uncertainties.

Bibliography

Strachan, Hew. The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective. Cambridge University Press, 2013.
European Union. "Strategic Compass for Security and Defence." 2022.
United Kingdom Government. "Integrated Review Refresh." 2023.
Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W. W. Norton & Company, 2001.
Smith, Rupert. The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. Penguin, 2005.

[Video] UK and EU AI Influence

2025-03-03T08:55:37Z

Artificial intelligence isn’t just reshaping industries—it’s reshaping reality. While the UK and EU focus on regulating AI and combating misinformation, adversarial states like Russia and China are weaponizing it for influence warfare. The AI-driven disinformation battle isn’t coming; it’s already here.

In my latest article, “Why the UK and EU Are Losing the AI Influence War”, I explore how Europe’s slow response, defensive posture, and reliance on outdated regulatory approaches are leaving it vulnerable to AI-enhanced propaganda campaigns.

To bring these ideas to life, I’ve created a video that visualises the scale of the challenge and why urgent action is needed. Watch it below:

Watch the video on YouTube

The AI influence war is no longer a hypothetical—it’s unfolding in real-time. Europe’s current strategies are reactive and insufficient, while adversaries leverage AI to manipulate narratives at unprecedented speed. Without a cognitive security unit, AI-powered countermeasures, and a national security-driven approach, the UK and EU risk losing control of their own information space.

The question isn’t whether AI will reshape public perception, it’s who will be in control of that perception. Will Europe rise to the challenge, or will it remain a passive battleground for AI-driven narratives?

What do you think? Should the UK and EU take a more aggressive stance in countering AI-enhanced disinformation? Feel free to discuss in the comments.

Why the UK and EU Are Losing the AI Influence War

2025-02-24T17:32:08Z

Abstract

Western democracies face a new front in conflict: the cognitive battlespace, where artificial intelligence (AI) is leveraged to shape public opinion and influence behaviour. This article argues that the UK and EU are currently losing this AI-driven influence war. Authoritarian adversaries like Russia and China are deploying AI tools in sophisticated disinformation and propaganda campaigns, eroding trust in democratic institutions and fracturing social cohesion. In contrast, the UK and EU response, focused on regulation, ethical constraints, and defensive measures, has been comparatively slow and fragmented. Without a more proactive and unified strategy to employ AI in information operations and bolster societal resilience against cognitive warfare, Western nations risk strategic disadvantage. This article outlines the nature of the cognitive battle-space, examines adversarial use of AI in influence operations, evaluates UK/EU efforts and shortcomings, and suggests why urgent action is needed to regain the initiative.

Introduction

Modern conflict is no longer confined to conventional battlefields; it has expanded into the cognitive domain. The term “cognitive battlespace” refers to the arena of information and ideas, where state and non-state actors vie to influence what people think and how they behave. Today, advances in AI have supercharged this domain, enabling more sophisticated influence operations that target the hearts and minds of populations at scale. Adversaries can weaponise social media algorithms, deepfakes, and data analytics to wage psychological warfare remotely and relentlessly.

Western governments, particularly the United Kingdom and European Union member states, find themselves on the defensive. They face a deluge of AI-enhanced disinformation from authoritarian rivals but are constrained by ethical, legal, and practical challenges in responding. Early evidence suggests a troubling imbalance: Russia and China are aggressively exploiting AI for propaganda and disinformation, while the UK/EU struggle to adapt their policies and capabilities. As a result, analysts warn that Western democracies are “losing the battle of the narrative” in the context of AI (sciencebusiness.net). The stakes are high: if the UK and EU cannot secure the cognitive high ground, they risk erosion of public trust, social discord, and strategic loss of influence on the world stage.

This article explores why the UK and EU are lagging in the AI influence war. It begins by defining the cognitive battlespace and the impact of AI on information warfare. It then examines how adversaries are leveraging AI in influence operations. Next, it assesses the current UK and EU approach to cognitive warfare and highlights key shortcomings. Finally, it discusses why Western efforts are falling behind and what the implications are for future security.

The Cognitive Battlespace in the Age of AI

In cognitive warfare, the human mind becomes the battlefield. As one expert succinctly put it, the goal is to “change not only what people think, but how they think and act” (esdc.europa.eu). This form of conflict aims to shape perceptions, beliefs, and behaviours in a way that favours the aggressor’s objectives. If waged effectively over time, cognitive warfare can even fragment an entire society, gradually sapping its will to resist an adversary.

Artificial intelligence has become a force multiplier in this cognitive domain. AI algorithms can curate individualised propaganda feeds, amplify false narratives through bot networks, and create realistic fake images or videos (deepfakes) that blur the line between truth and deception. According to NATO’s Allied Command Transformation, cognitive warfare encompasses activities to affect attitudes and behaviours by influencing human cognition, effectively “modifying perceptions of reality” as a new norm of conflict (act.nato.int). In essence, AI provides powerful tools to conduct whole-of-society manipulation, turning social media platforms and information systems into weapons.

A vivid example of the cognitive battlespace in action occurred in May 2023, when an AI-generated image of a false Pentagon explosion went viral. The fake image, disseminated by bots, briefly fooled enough people that it caused a sharp but temporary dip in the U.S. stock market. Though quickly debunked, this incident demonstrated the “catastrophic potential” of AI-driven disinformation to trigger real-world consequences at machine speed (mwi.westpoint.edu) . Generative AI can manufacture convincing yet false content on a massive scale, making it increasingly difficult for populations to discern fact from fabrication.

In the cognitive battlespace, such AI-enabled tactics give malign actors a potent advantage. They can rapidly deploy influence campaigns with minimal cost or risk, while defenders struggle to identify and counter each new false narrative. As the information environment becomes saturated with AI-amplified propaganda, the traditional defenders of truth, journalists, fact-checkers, and institutions, find themselves overwhelmed. This asymmetry is at the heart of why liberal democracies are in danger of losing the cognitive war if they do not adapt quickly.

Adversaries’ AI-Driven Influence Operations

Russia and China have emerged as leading adversaries in the AI-enabled influence war, honing techniques to exploit Western vulnerabilities in the cognitive domain. Russia has a long history of information warfare against the West and has eagerly integrated AI into these efforts. Through troll farms and automated bot networks, Russia pushes AI-generated propaganda designed to destabilise societies. Moscow views cognitive warfare as a strategic tool to “destroy [the West] from within” without firing a shot. Rather than direct military confrontation with NATO (which Russia knows it would likely lose), the Kremlin invests in “cheap and highly effective” cognitive warfare to undermine Western democracies from inside (kew.org.pl) .

Russian military thinkers refer to this concept as “reflexive control,” essentially their doctrine of cognitive warfare. The idea is to manipulate an adversary’s perception and decision-making so thoroughly that the adversary “defeats themselves”. In practice, this means saturating the information space with tailored disinformation, conspiracy theories, and emotionally charged content to break the enemy’s will to resist. As one analysis describes, the battleground is the mind of the Western citizen, and the weapon is the manipulation of their understanding and cognition. By exploiting human cognitive biases, our tendencies toward emotional reaction, confirmation bias, and confusion, Russia seeks to leave citizens “unable to properly assess reality”, thus incapable of making rational decisions (for example, in elections). The goal is a weakened democratic society, rife with internal divisions and distrust, that can no longer present a united front against Russian aggression.

Concrete examples of Russia’s AI-fuelled influence operations abound. Beyond the fake Pentagon incident, Russian operatives have used generative AI to create deepfake videos of European politicians, forge fake news stories, and impersonate media outlets. Ahead of Western elections, Russian disinformation campaigns augmented with AI have aimed to sow discord and polarise public opinion. U.K. intelligence reports and independent researchers have noted that Russia’s automated bot accounts are evolving to produce more “human-like and persuasive” messages with the help of AI language models. These tactics amplify the reach and realism of propaganda, making it harder to detect and counter. Even if such interference does not always change election outcomes, it erodes public trust in information and institutions, a long-term win for the Kremlin.

China, while a newer player in European information spaces, is also investing heavily in AI for influence operations. Chinese military strategy incorporates the concept of “cognitive domain operations”, which merge AI with psychological and cyber warfare. Beijing’s aim is to shape global narratives and public opinion in its favour, deterring opposition to China’s interests. For instance, China has deployed swarms of AI-driven social media bots to spread disinformation about topics like the origins of COVID-19 and the status of Taiwan. Chinese propaganda operations use AI to generate deepfake news anchors and social media personas that promote pro-China narratives abroad. According to NATO analysts, China describes cognitive warfare as using public opinion and psychological manipulation to achieve victory, and invests in technologies (like emotion-monitoring systems for soldiers) that reveal the importance it places on the information domain. While China’s influence efforts in Europe are less overt than Russia’s, they represent a growing challenge as China seeks to project soft power and shape perceptions among European audiences, often to dissuade criticism of Beijing or divide Western unity.

The aggressive use of AI by authoritarian adversaries has put Western nations on the back foot in the information environment. Adversaries operate without the legal and ethical constraints that bind democracies. They capitalise on speed, volume, and ambiguity, launching influence campaigns faster than defenders can react. Authoritarian regimes also coordinate these efforts as part of broader hybrid warfare strategies, aligning cyber-attacks, diplomatic pressure, and economic coercion with information operations to maximise impact. In summary, Russia and China have seized the initiative in the cognitive battlespace, leaving the UK, EU, and their allies scrambling to catch up.

UK and EU Responses: Strategies and Shortcomings

Confronted with these threats, the United Kingdom and European Union have begun to recognise the urgency of the cognitive warfare challenge. In recent years, officials and strategists have taken steps to improve defences against disinformation and malign influence. However, the Western approach has so far been largely reactive and constrained, marked by cautious policy frameworks and fragmented efforts that lag the adversary’s pace of innovation.

United Kingdom: The UK government acknowledges that AI can significantly amplify information warfare. The Ministry of Defence’s Defence Artificial Intelligence Strategy (2022) warns that “AI could also be used to intensify information operations, disinformation campaigns and fake news,” for example by deploying deepfakes and bogus social media accounts. British military doctrine, including the Integrated Operating Concept (2020), emphasises that information operations are increasingly important to counter false narratives in modern conflicts (gov.uk). London’s approach has included establishing units dedicated to “strategic communications” and cyber influence and working with partners like NATO to improve information security.

The UK has also invested in research on AI and influence. For instance, the Alan Turing Institute’s research centre (CETaS) published analyses on AI-enabled influence operations in the 2024 UK elections, identifying emerging threats such as deepfake propaganda and AI-generated political smear campaigns. These studies, while finding that AI’s impact on recent elections was limited, highlighted serious concerns like AI-driven hate incitement and voter confusion (cetas.turing.ac.uk) . The implication is clear: the UK cannot be complacent. Even if traditional disinformation methods still dominate, the rapid evolution of AI means influence threats could scale up dramatically in the near future. British policymakers have started to discuss new regulations (for example, requiring transparency in AI political ads) and bolstering media literacy programs to inoculate the public against fake content.

Despite this awareness, critics argue that the UK’s response remains disjointed and under-resourced. There is no publicly articulated doctrine for cognitive warfare equivalent to adversaries’ strategies. Efforts are split among various agencies (from GCHQ handling cyber, to the Army’s 77th Brigade for information ops, to the Foreign Office for counter-disinformation), making coordination challenging. Moreover, while defensive measures (like fact-checking services and takedown of fake accounts) have improved, the UK appears reluctant to consider more assertive offensive information operations that could pre-empt adversary narratives. Legal and ethical norms, as well as fear of escalation, likely restrain such tactics. The result is that Britain often plays catch-up, reacting to disinformation waves after they have already influenced segments of the population.

European Union: The EU, as a bloc of democracies, faces additional hurdles in confronting cognitive warfare. Brussels has treated disinformation chiefly as a policy and regulatory issue tied to election security and digital platform accountability. Over the past few years, the EU implemented a Code of Practice on Disinformation (a voluntary agreement with tech companies) and stood up teams like the East StratCom Task Force (known for its EUvsDisinfo project debunking pro-Kremlin myths). Following high-profile meddling in elections and referendums, EU institutions have grown more vocal: they label Russia explicitly as the chief source of disinformation targeting Europe. The European Commission also incorporated anti-disinformation clauses into the Digital Services Act (DSA), requiring large online platforms to assess and mitigate risks from fake content.

When it comes to AI, the EU’s landmark AI Act – primarily a regulatory framework to govern AI uses – indirectly addresses some information manipulation concerns (for example, by requiring transparency for deepfakes). However, EU efforts are fundamentally defensive and norm-driven. They seek to police platforms and inform citizens, rather than actively engage in influence operations. EU leaders are wary of blurring the line between counter-propaganda and propaganda of their own, given Europe’s commitment to free expression. This creates a dilemma: open societies find it difficult to wage information war with the ruthlessness of authoritarian regimes.

European security experts are starting to grapple with this challenge. A recent EU security and defence college course underscored that cognitive warfare is an “emerging challenge” for the European Union (esdc.europa.eu) . Participants discussed the need for technological tools to detect, deter, and mitigate cognitive threats. Yet, outside of specialised circles, there is no EU-wide military command focused on cognitive warfare (unlike traditional domains such as land, sea, cyber, etc.). NATO, which includes most EU countries, has taken the lead in conceptualising cognitive warfare, but NATO’s role in offensive information activities is limited by its mandate.

A telling critique comes from a Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) commentary on disinformation and AI threats. It notes that NATO’s 2024 strategy update acknowledged the dangers of AI-enabled disinformation, using unusually strong language about the urgency of the challenge. However, the same strategy “makes no reference to how AI could be used” positively for strategic communications or to help counter disinformation (rusi.org) . In other words, Western nations are emphasising protection and defence, strengthening **governance standards, public resilience, and truth-checking mechanisms, **but they are not yet leveraging AI offensively to seize the initiative in the info sphere. This cautious approach may be ceding ground to adversaries who have no such reservations.

Why the West Is Losing the AI Influence War

Several interrelated factors explain why the UK, EU, and their allies appear to be losing ground in the cognitive domain against AI-equipped adversaries:

• Reactive Posture vs. Proactive Strategy: Western responses have been largely reactive. Democracies often respond to disinformation campaigns after damage is done, issuing fact-checks or diplomatic condemnations. There is a lack of a proactive, comprehensive strategy to dominate the information environment. Adversaries, by contrast, set the narrative by deploying influence operations first and fast.

• Ethical and Legal Constraints: The UK and EU operate under strict norms – adherence to truth, rule of law, and respect for civil liberties – which limit tactics in information warfare. Propaganda or deception by government is domestically unpopular and legally fraught. This makes it hard to match the scale and aggressiveness of Russian or Chinese influence operations without undermining democratic values. Authoritarians face no such constraints.

• Fragmented Coordination: In Europe, tackling cognitive threats cuts across multiple jurisdictions and agencies (domestic, EU, NATO), leading to fragmentation. A unified command-and-control for information operations is lacking. Meanwhile, adversaries often orchestrate their messaging from a centralised playbook, giving them agility and consistency.

• Regulatory Focus Over Capabilities: The EU’s inclination has been to regulate (AI, social media, data) to create guardrails – a necessary but slow process. However, regulation alone does not equal capability. Rules might curb some harmful content but do not stop a determined adversary. The West has invested less in developing its own AI tools for strategic communication, psyops, or rapid counter-messaging. This capability gap means ceding the technological edge to opponents.

• Underestimation of Cognitive Warfare: Historically, Western security doctrine prioritised physical and cyber threats, sometimes underestimating the impact of information warfare. The concept of a sustained “cognitive war” waged in peacetime is relatively new to Western planners. Initial responses were tepid – for example, before 2016, few anticipated that online influence could significantly affect major votes. This lag in appreciation allowed adversaries to build momentum.

These factors contribute to a situation where, despite growing awareness, the UK and EU have struggled to turn rhetoric into effective countermeasures on the cognitive front. As a result, authoritarian influence campaigns continue to find fertile ground in Western societies. Each viral conspiracy theory that goes unchecked, each wedge driven between communities via disinformation, and each doubt cast on democratic institutions chips away at the West’s strategic advantage. NATO officials warn that information warfare threats “must neither be overlooked nor underestimated” in the face of the AI revolution. Yet current efforts remain a step behind the onslaught of AI-generated falsehoods.

Conclusion and Implications

If the UK, EU, and like-minded democracies do not rapidly adapt to the realities of AI-driven cognitive warfare, they risk strategic defeat in an important realm of 21st-century conflict. Losing the AI influence war doesn’t happen with a formal surrender; instead, it manifests as a gradual erosion of democratic resilience. Societies may grow deeply divided, citisens lose trust in media and governments, and adversarial narratives become entrenched. In the long run, this could weaken the political will and cohesion needed to respond to more conventional security threats. As one analysis grimly observed, the cost of inaction is high – allowing adversaries to exploit AI for malign influence can lead to a “strategic imbalance favouring adversaries”, with a flood of false narratives eroding public trust and even devastating democratic institutions if left unchecked.

Reversing this trajectory will require Western nations to elevate the priority of the cognitive battlespace in national security planning. Some broad imperatives emerge:

• Develop Offensive and Defensive AI Capabilities: The UK and EU should invest in AI tools not just to detect and debunk disinformation, but also to disseminate counter-narratives that truthfully push back against authoritarian propaganda. Ethical guidelines for such operations must be established, but fear of using AI at all in information ops leaves the field open to adversaries.

• Whole-of-Society Resilience: Building public resilience is crucial. Education in media literacy and critical thinking, transparency about threats, and empowering independent journalism are all part of inoculating society. A populace that can recognise manipulation is the best defence against cognitive warfare. The goal is to ensure citizens can engage with digital information sceptically, blunting the impact of fake or AI-manipulated content.

• International Coordination: The transatlantic alliance and democratic partners need better coordination in the information domain. NATO’s work on cognitive warfare should be complemented by EU and UK joint initiatives to share intelligence on disinformation campaigns and align responses. A unified front can deny adversaries the ability to play divide-and-conquer with different countries.

• Adaptive Governance: Western policymakers must make their regulatory frameworks more agile in the face of technological change. This might include faster mechanisms to hold platforms accountable, updated election laws regarding AI-generated content, and perhaps narrowly tailored laws against the most dangerous forms of disinformation (such as deceptive media that incites violence). The challenge is doing so without undermining free speech – a balance that requires constant calibration as AI technology evolves.

In summary, the UK and EU are at a crossroads. They can continue on the current path – risking that AI-enabled influence attacks will outpace their responses – or they can strategise anew and invest in winning the cognitive fight. The latter will demand political will and creativity: treating information space as a domain to be secured, much like land, sea, air, cyber and space. It also means confronting uncomfortable questions about using emerging technologies in ways that align with democratic values yet neutralise malign propaganda.

The cognitive battle-space is now a permanent feature of international security. Western democracies must not cede this battlefield. Maintaining an open society does not mean being defenceless. With prudent adoption of AI for good, and a staunch defence of truth, the UK, EU, and their allies can start to turn the tide in the AI influence war. Failing to do so will only embolden those who seek to “attack the democratic pillars of the West” through information manipulation. In this contest for minds and hearts, as much as in any other domain of conflict, strength and resolve will determine who prevails.

Bibliography

1. NATO Allied Command Transformation. “Cognitive Warfare.” NATO ACT, Norfolk VA.

2. Bryc, Agnieszka. “Destroy from within: Russia’s cognitive warfare on EU democracy.” Kolegium Europy Wschodniej, 27 Nov 2024.

3. European Security & Defence College (ESDC). “Cognitive warfare in the new international competition: an emerging challenge for the EU,” 28 May 2024.

4. Williams, Cameron (Modern War Institute). “Persuade, Change, and Influence with AI: Leveraging Artificial Intelligence in the Information Environment.” Modern War Institute at West Point, 14 Nov 2023.

5. UK Ministry of Defence. Defence Artificial Intelligence Strategy, June 2022. UK

6. Fitz-Gerald, Ann M., and Halyna Padalko (RUSI). “The Need for a Strategic Approach to Disinformation and AI-Driven Threats.” RUSI Commentary, 25 July 2024.

7. Science Business News. “EU is ‘losing the narrative battle’ over AI Act, says UN adviser,” 05 Dec 2024.

The Grey Mirage: Navigating Strategic Uncertainty and the Elusive Victory in Grey Zone Conflicts

2025-02-15T19:32:04Z

Imagine a world where war is waged not with bombs and bullets, but with lines of code and viral misinformation. This is the reality of grey zone conflicts, a persistent feature of modern geopolitics characterised by cyber operations, economic coercion, and disinformation. While many initially hailed these tactics as a revolutionary new form of strategic competition, a critical examination reveals that they not only fundamentally fail to achieve strategic victory in a traditional Clausewitzian sense but also introduce profound strategic uncertainty and volatility into the international system. Extending Thomas Rid’s compelling argument that “cyber war will not take place” due to the inherent lack of decisive physical destruction, this critique applies even more broadly to the entire spectrum of grey zone conflicts.

To understand the inherent limitations of these operations, we must return to the foundational strategic thought of Carl von Clausewitz. His framework remains a lodestar: tactical successes must always serve political objectives, and the very essence of war is to impose one’s will upon the enemy. As Michael Handel succinctly summarises, Clausewitzian war aims at the destruction of enemy forces, control of vital resources, and the sway of public opinion. Grey zone tactics, however, are structurally incapable of achieving these aims in the decisive manner Clausewitz envisioned. They may sow disruption and discord, but they rarely deliver battlefield outcomes, nor can they compel political compliance in the way traditional military campaigns do. Consider, for instance, the persistent cyberattacks between nations; while disruptive and costly, they have yet to force a nation to fundamentally alter its core strategic direction.

The very nature of grey zone strategies – their calculated avoidance of outright force and immediately recognisable acts of aggression – means they cannot truly compel an adversary to accept a fundamentally new strategic order. Cyber operations, as Rid convincingly argues, rarely inflict the kind of lasting, tangible damage comparable to conventional military strikes. Disinformation campaigns, while capable of eroding trust in institutions and even mobilising populations, as seen in the Arab Spring uprisings, cannot on their own force political capitulation. Economic sanctions, though often painful and strategically useful in shaping behaviour, are notoriously slow and far from guaranteed to change a determined state’s core strategic calculations.

This inherent strategic limitation is further underscored by Colin Gray’s assertion that strategy is fundamentally about the application of force to achieve political objectives. For Gray, war is fundamentally about contesting and achieving control, and without the capacity to impose a decisive order, grey zone tactics fall drastically short of true strategic efficacy. He cautions that the absence of decisive engagement in contemporary conflicts leads not to resolution, but to a debilitating strategic paralysis. This resonates deeply with Clausewitz’s core tenet that successful war must culminate in the decisive defeat of the enemy. Grey zone conflicts, by their very nature, do not and cannot fulfil this criterion. At best, they generate protracted stalemates; at worst, they risk unintended escalation into open, conventional warfare.

Countering the Cumulative Argument and Embracing Ambiguity: Incrementalism vs. Decisiveness

It is important to acknowledge a key counterargument: that grey zone tactics, while rarely decisive alone, gain strategic effect cumulatively over time. Proponents argue that persistent cyber intrusions, disinformation, and economic pressure can erode an adversary's strength and will. This view sees grey zone warfare as long-term shaping, not a knockout blow, exemplified by China’s “Three Warfares” doctrine.

Furthermore, the ambiguity of grey zone conflicts can be strategically useful, like nuclear deterrence. Bernard Brodie argued nuclear war's cost shifted strategy to prevention, redefining "victory" as avoiding war. Similarly, grey zone tactics might deter and manage competition below open conflict. Incremental disruption, like cyberattacks on Iran's nuclear program, can also shift power balances.

Hurting Without Winning and the Zero-Sum Nature of Grey Zone Competition

Thomas Schelling noted, “Victory is no longer a prerequisite for hurting the enemy.” This is key to grey zone tactics, which can aim to inflict pain and signal resolve without overt war. Even non-military gains - diplomatic wins, sanctions, legal advantages achieved through disinformation and cyber influence - become strategic victories in this zero-sum competition. This is particularly relevant as tech-savvy strategists recognise the advantages of ambiguity in these operations.

However, pursuing overwhelming military victory can backfire, escalating conflict. Grey zone tactics offer a way to avoid this, operating below the threshold of conventional war. Yet, this ambiguity breeds volatility, with miscalculation and escalation always looming.

Strategic Victory as Peace-Winning and the Challenge of Subjectivity

Rethinking “strategic victory” beyond military terms is crucial. Robert Mandel distinguishes “war-winning” from “peace-winning,” arguing true strategic victory is “peace-winning” - a multi-dimensional achievement across information, politics, economics, and diplomacy. Grey zone tactics align with this broader view, especially as public mobilisation and decentralised networks shape geopolitics.

Yet, “victory” in the grey zone remains subjective and hard to measure. Ethan Kapstein highlights the difficulty of defining metrics, gaining consensus, and obtaining reliable data in grey zone operations. Progress in one area may undermine another, increasing strategic uncertainty. Whether grey zone tactics are a “strategic win” depends on perspective and chosen metrics.

Taiwan: Strategic Uncertainty in Action

Taiwan exemplifies the inherent volatility of grey zone warfare: while hybrid strategies can pressure an opponent, they provide no clear pathway to a controlled, predictable outcome. The lack of definitive thresholds makes grey zone tactics as much a risk as an opportunity for the aggressor. Imagine China using grey zone tactics against Taiwan: cyberattacks, disinformation, and economic pressure. While this might weaken Taiwan, it's unlikely to force capitulation without risking wider conflict. Taiwan's reaction, U.S. responses, and the ever-present risk of miscalculation create a strategic dilemma.

While Russia has shown resilience to external grey zone pressures by controlling information, societal resilience only mitigates, not eliminates, strategic uncertainty. Even the most robust resilience strategies cannot eliminate the risk of miscalculation or escalation, underscoring the inherent volatility of grey zone conflicts. Because grey zone conflicts operate ambiguously, even careful campaigns can unexpectedly escalate, making control and predictability elusive.

Policy Implications: Actively Shaping the Grey Zone for Advantage

The inherent strategic uncertainty of grey zone conflicts demands proactive policies:

Sharpen Intelligence and Active Disruption: Enhance intelligence to understand adversary intentions and develop capabilities to actively disrupt their grey zone operations.
Develop Flexible and Escalatory Response Options: Create a wider range of responses, including calibrated counter-grey zone tactics and clear signalling for de-escalation and conflict management. As artificial intelligence and automation continue to reshape information warfare, states must anticipate how AI-driven disinformation, deepfake technology, and autonomous cyber operations will further complicate grey zone conflicts. Developing countermeasures that integrate AI-based detection and rapid-response systems will be critical for maintaining strategic advantage.
Promote Transparency to Force Predictability: Actively expose adversary actions to force them into a more predictable strategic posture, enhancing transparency and accountability in the grey zone.
Focus on Proactive Crisis Management: Develop proactive crisis management to prevent crises, including clear communication, de-escalation protocols, and persistent low-intensity engagement for stability.
Re-evaluate “Victory” and Embrace Persistent Engagement: Shift from traditional victory metrics to measures of resilience, deterrence, and long-term shaping, embracing persistent engagement as the norm in grey zone competition.

Conclusion: Embracing Uncertainty, Seeking Control Through Persistent Engagement

Russia’s pre-2022 hybrid warfare campaign in Ukraine - combining cyber operations, disinformation, and economic pressure - demonstrated the limitations of grey zone tactics. Rather than coercing Ukraine into submission, these operations reinforced Ukrainian national resistance and galvanised Western military support, ultimately leading to Russia’s full-scale invasion. This case underscores the strategic volatility of grey zone competition: while these tactics can create disruption, they provide no guarantee of controlled, predictable outcomes.

This highlights how grey zone tactics, while seemingly flexible, are unlikely to deliver traditional strategic victory and introduce significant strategic uncertainty. While ambiguity and “peace-winning” are modern adaptations, they don't guarantee predictable outcomes or escalation control. The grey zone is a volatile battlespace defined by miscalculation and instability. Navigating the grey zone requires embracing uncertainty, prioritising crisis management, and actively shaping the battlespace. In this new era of perpetual contestation, mastering the grey zone is not about winning - it is about ensuring that one’s adversaries never can.

References

Brodie, Bernard. “The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order.” The Yale Review 35, no. 3 (Spring 1946): 456-472.
Gray, Colin S. The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Handel, Michael I. Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought. London: Frank Cass, 2001.
Kania, Elsa B. “The PLA’s Latest Strategic Thinking on the Three Warfares.” The Jamestown Foundation, August 22, 2016. https://jamestown.org/program/the-plas-latest-strategic-thinking-on-the-three-warfares/.
Kapstein, Ethan B. “Measuring Success in Complex Operations.” The Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 2 (April 2011): 267-285.
Mandel, Robert. “Thinking about Victory in Strategy.” The Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 2 (April 2011): 199-200.
Monaghan, Sean. “Twitter Revolutions? Social Media and the Arab Spring.” Whitehall Papers 69, no. 1 (2011): 21-22.
Rid, Thomas. Cyber War Will Not Take Place. London: Hurst, 2013.
Sanger, David E., and William J. Broad. “Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran.” The New York Times, June 1, 2012. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html.
Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.
Simons, Greg. "Russia and information confrontation: perceptions, strategies and responses." Journal of strategic studies 42, no. 1 (2019): 139-140.

Rethinking Warfare: Clausewitz in the Age of Cyber and Hybrid Conflict

2025-02-14T14:21:40Z

Carl von Clausewitz’s claim that war is “a continuation of politics by other means” has survived railways, radio and nuclear weapons. Today the “other means” range from data-wiping malware that bricks ventilators to viral deep-fakes that never fired a shot. The central puzzle is whether these novelties merely change the character of war (the tools, tempo and terrain) or whether they erode its immutable nature of violence, chance and political purpose (Echevarria 2002; Strachan 2013).

International lawyers behind the Tallinn Manual 2.0 accept that a non-international armed conflict may now consist solely of cyber operations if the effects rival kinetic force (Schmitt 2017). Thomas Rid counters that almost all cyber activity is better classed as espionage, sabotage or subversion. Such attacks may be potent, but not war in the Clausewitzian sense (Rid 2017). The Russian “AcidRain” attack of February 2022 sits precisely on that fault-line: a single wiper disabled thousands of Ukrainian satellite modems and 5,800 German wind-turbines, yet no bombs fell (SentinelLabs 2022; Greenberg 2023). If violence is judged by effect on human life rather than by the immediate mechanics of injury, Clausewitz still works; if it is judged by physical harm alone, he wobbles.

The 2022 US National Defense Strategy elevates “integrated deterrence”, urging day-to-day campaigning below the armed-attack threshold (US DoD 2022). US Cyber Command’s doctrine of persistent engagement pushes the same logic into practice, contesting adversaries continually rather than waiting for crises (USCYBERCOM 2022). Fischerkeller and Harknett argue that such calibrated friction stabilises the domain; Lynch casts it as a new “power-sinew contest” in which outright war is the exception, not the rule (Fischerkeller & Harknett 2019; Lynch 2024). The danger is conceptual inflation: call every malicious packet “war” and escalation thresholds blur, yet forcing every new tactic into Clausewitz’s vocabulary risks missing genuine novelty.

Frank Hoffman’s once-handy term “hybrid warfare” now covers almost any sub-threshold activity. NATO’s recent work on cognitive warfare goes further, treating perception itself as decisive terrain and calling for a fresh taxonomy of “acts of cognitive war” (NATO Innovation Hub 2023). Clausewitz, writing in an age of limited literacy, rarely considered the deliberate collapse of an adversary’s shared reality as a line of operation. The gap is undeniable – but it need not be fatal if his categories can stretch.

Clausewitzian element	Digital-age inflection	Illustrative case
Violence	Physical harm or systemic disruption that produces downstream human suffering	AcidRain modem wipe, 2022
Chance	Amplified by tightly coupled networks where small code changes trigger cascading failures	Log4j exploit cascade, 2021
Political purpose	Territorial control plus cognitive or behavioural manipulation	2016 US election interference

The table shows how old categories bend. Violence migrates into infrastructure; chance spikes in opaque systems; political purpose colonises the infosphere. None of these shifts removes politics from the centre – precisely why the trinity still maps the ground.

There are 3 key areas where Clausewitz’s wisdom holds strongly:

Politics first. Colin Gray insists that strategy is the orchestration of means to political ends; replacing artillery with algorithms does not move that lodestar (Gray 1999).
Escalation logic. Even in cyberspace, deterrence depends on adversaries reading tacit red lines. Clausewitz’s emphasis on uncertainty and friction remains apt.
Human cost. Cyber operations hurt indirectly – frozen hospital wards, confused electorates – but the harm is felt by bodies in time and space, not by circuits.

There are however, a number of places where the strain shows, namely where:

Systemic cyber harm approaches “force” while sidestepping bodily violence.
Persistent, below-threshold campaigning blurs the war–peace boundary Clausewitz assumed.
The trinity was never meant to classify acts aimed at belief rather than battalions.

For now, Rid’s scepticism still holds true – most cyber operations do not meet Clausewitz’s threshold of war. Yet as societies entangle their critical functions ever more tightly with code, the line between systemic disruption and physical violence narrows. Clausewitz’s trinity of violence, chance, political purpose – still offers the clearest compass, because politics, not technology, remains the centre of gravity of strategy. The compass, however, is being asked to steer across novel terrain. Should a future campaign achieve political aims through cyber-enabled systemic coercion alone, the Prussian might finally need more than a tune-up. Until then, his core logic endures, and while needing adaptation, it has not been eclipsed.

Bibliography

Clausewitz, C. v. (1832) On War. Berlin: Ferdinand Dümmler.

Echevarria, A. J. (2002) ‘Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine – Again!’. Carlisle, PA: US Army Strategic Studies Institute.

Fischerkeller, M. P. and Harknett, R. J. (2019) ‘Persistent Engagement, Agreed Competition, and Cyberspace Interaction Dynamics’. The Cyber Defense Review.

Gray, C. S. (1999) Modern Strategy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Greenberg, A. (2023) ‘Ukraine Suffered More Wiper Malware in 2022 Than Anywhere, Ever’. WIRED, 22 February.

Lynch, T. F. III (2024) ‘Forward Persistence in Great Power Cyber Competition’. Washington, DC: National Defense University.

NATO Innovation Hub (2023) The Cognitive Warfare Concept. Norfolk, VA: NATO ACT.

Rid, T. (2017) Cyber War Will Not Take Place. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schmitt, M. N. (ed.) (2017) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

SentinelLabs (2022) ‘AcidRain: A Modem Wiper Rains Down on Europe’. SentinelOne Labs Blog, 31 March.

US Cyber Command (2022) ‘CYBER 101 – Defend Forward and Persistent Engagement’. Press release, 25 October.

US Department of Defense (2022) National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC.

The Future of War: AI and Strategy

2025-02-06T14:30:14Z

When Carl von Clausewitz wrote that war is “a continuation of politics by other means,” he centred conflict on purpose rather than technology. Colin Gray later warned that strategic constants outlive every gadget. Artificial intelligence now accelerates observation-decision loops from minutes to milliseconds, but whether that shift dethrones human strategy is still contested.

Speed Meets Friction

Ukrainian drone teams run machine-vision updates at the front line every fortnight, turning quadcopters into near-autonomous kamikaze platforms (Bondar 2025). Yet the same coders struggle with false positives - such as bears flagged as enemy sentries - and with mesh-network bottlenecks once EW jammers blanket the spectrum. AI compresses time, but it also multiplies friction, the very element Clausewitz thought ineradicable. We have to be conscious that false positives do not just waste munitions; when the same image-detection stack mis-tags an ambulance as a supply truck, the result is shrapnel in a paediatric ward, not an algorithmic hiccup. In 2025, the World Health Organization stated that hospitals reported 205 deaths from strike-related service loss in Ukraine.

Open-source models still give insurgents propaganda reach, but the sharper edge of algorithmic warfare sits with states. Israel’s Lavender system, revealed in 2024, generated a list of roughly 37,000 potential Hamas targets and was used even when commanders expected up to twenty civilian deaths per strike—a machine-driven tempo that unsettled some of the intelligence officers involved (McKernan & Davies 2024). Cutting-edge autonomy, however, still demands high-end GPUs, abundant power and proprietary data. That keeps strategic dominance gated by infrastructure, mirroring geopolitical power. Yet, as Kuner (2024) notes, Brussels carved a national-security escape hatch into the AI Act precisely to preserve state leverage over the biggest models.

Washington’s Replicator initiative aims to field “thousands of attriable autonomous systems” within two years (DoD 2024). Beijing answers through civil-military fusion; Moscow improvises with AI-augmented loitering munitions. These programmes underpin an operating concept of continuous, sub-threshold contest, paralleling U.S. Cyber Command’s “persistent engagement”. Strategic deterrence thus rests on the hope that algorithmic agents still read tacit red lines the way humans do. In Stanford’s 2024 crisis simulations, LLM agents recommended first-strike escalation in seventy-nine per cent of runs, providing evidence that algorithmic ‘rationality’ may be anything but.

If LLM advisers escalate crises in simulation nine times out of ten, the locus of judgement drifts from commander to code. The next question is whether that drift merely speeds execution or begins to automate strategy itself.

Promoters once claimed AI would dissolve uncertainty; real battlefields say different. Sensor glut, spoofed tracks and synthetic “ghost columns” now drown analysts in contradictory feeds (Collazzo 2025). AI redistributes fog rather than lifting it – accelerating some judgements while blinding others through overload or deception (Askew and Salinas 2025).

The Pentagon updated Directive 3000.09 on autonomous weapons in late 2024, tightening human-in-the-loop requirements. At the multilateral level, UN talks in May 2025 once again failed to agree binding rules, though Secretary-General Guterres set a 2026 deadline (Le Poidevin 2025). Norms lag well behind code, keeping accountability – and escalation liability – firmly in human hands.

Strategic implications

The transformative impact of AI on strategic paradigms can be distilled into a few key considerations:

Advantage remains political. AI is a means; objectives still emanate from human intent. Strategy therefore keeps its Clausewitzian anchor in politics.
Automation magnifies misperception. Faster loops leave less time for reflection; and black-box models hide their own failure modes. Bias and data poisoning risk strategic self-harm.
Deterrence becomes brittle. Autonomous systems may over-react to spoofed inputs; adversaries may test thresholds in micro-seconds rather than hours, shortening the ladder of de-escalation.

Conclusions

AI does not automate strategy; it amplifies both its promise and its pathologies. Machines accelerate tactics, generate options and even draft operational plans, but they do not choose political ends – and they continue to manifest friction, chance and uncertainty. Thomas Rid remains broadly right that most cyber and AI activity falls short of war (Rid, 2017), yet as energy grids, logistics chains and battlefield kill cycles digitise, the gap between systemic disruption and physical violence narrows. For the moment, Clausewitz’s compass still points true – but the ground beneath it is starting to slide.

Select bibliography

Askew, M. and Salinas, A. (2025) ‘AI Will Make the Mind Games of War More Risky’, Business Insider, 18 Apr.

Bondar, K. (2025) Ukraine’s Future Vision and Current Capabilities for Waging AI-Enabled Autonomous Warfare. CSIS.

Collazzo, A. (2025) ‘Warfare at the Speed of Thought’, Modern War Institute, 21 Feb.

Department of Defense (2024) ‘Replicator Initiative Progress Update’.

Kuner, C. (2024) ‘The AI Act National Security Exception’, Verfassungsblog, 15 Dec.

Le Poidevin, O. (2025) ‘Nations Meet at UN for “Killer Robot” Talks’, Reuters, 12 May.

McKernan, B., & Davies, H. (2024). The Machine Did It Coldly. The Guardian, 3 April. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/03/israel-gaza-ai-database-hamas-airstrikes

Rid, T. (2017) Cyber War Will Not Take Place. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stanford HAI (2024) Escalation Risks from LLMs in Military and Diplomatic Contexts.

World Health Organization (2025) WHO’s Health Emergency Appeal 2025. Geneva: World Health Organization.

My Experiences in Japan / 日本での私の経験

2018-10-26T12:01:10Z

So here I am, about a month after having returned to London, reflecting back on my experience in Japan. The most common question I've had from friends is "was it worth it?" or "did you learn what you wanted to learn?" and the answer to both is a resounding yes. However it isn't as simple as that, as there are many layers to the question which need to be unpacked a little.

The first layer is understanding what it is that I went off to Japan to learn in the first place. Of course there is the obvious "Japanese Language" side of things, but there is much more to it than that. The real learning I was hoping to take away was about myself. And if you want to learn about yourself, one of the best ways is to teach others. Which thanks to Phil's company I was able to do exactly that with a bunch of middle school kids over 6 days of English language camps!

Image: Class photo!

The camp is worth a whole post by itself, but the takeaway is how teaching kids made me feel about myself and reflect on what I enjoy doing professionally. It allowed me to understand what I value (honesty, enthusiasm, progress) in a much more immersive way than a work environment would. I'll definitely be taking this into my next role and it has helped me mature bit more as an individual.

Alongside teaching, there were many other examples of "bonus" learning opportunities I was able to take away from the experience. One key aspect was taking myself out of a familiar environment and getting the mental/physical space to learn and reflect. That alone was worth the proverbial price of admission.

The next layer is about "what" it is I did. While it is obvious to some, but not always to me, it isn't the destination that matters so much, but who you spend it with and the attitude you take with you. I enjoy spending time by myself (quite a lot) but all my most enjoyable experiences are with friends and family. It isn't just quality though, it is quantity too. People can help you overcome natural inertia (read: laziness) to get out there and do more. In fact, when Julie came to visit for a week, we crammed in more stuff than I did in the previous months!

Image: Fun and hi-jinks!

Also, being in the right mindset (a positive one), I was able to value those times much more and care a little bit less about the latest distracting "must-own-thing". But it is easily forgotten and I have to remind myself often to focus on new experiences with loved ones and less on new, shiny, technology...

There is a lot more I was able to get from my travels, but that's about my limit for for self reflection today. I think I need to do a round up of all the beers I forgot to mention in a new post...

Nanzoin Temple / 南蔵院

2018-07-01T13:36:31Z

With Julie's visit this week, I have been very busy doing all sorts of fun tourist type activities! One of the best trips we did was heading off to Nanzoin Temple, which features The Reclining Buddha (more on this later).

Rather than bore you with lots of hyper-descriptive prose, I think a visual tour would be much more fun. So let's get started!

Getting there was pretty easy, just a 30 minute train ride from Hakata station. Once we got off the train and started trekking up towards the temple grounds, we found this family of turtles with their own mini-shrine. They were kind enough to let me take way too many photos as I over-enthusiastically snapped shots from various exciting angles.

Image: Look who came to greet us!

Clearly turtles weren't the only photogenic fauna around, as this rather large dragonfly posed long enough for me to get a fairly zoomed in photo.

Image: Posed for the photo and flew off as soon as I was done...

One of the first statues to be seen was of this chap with his flames and sword. We originally thought he was some bad guy, but Julie did some research and we discovered he is actually Fudoumyouou who is a Buddhist deity who protects worshippers from harm.

Image: Later learnt this angry looking guy is a protective deity

As we spotted more of the classic Buddha style statues, we noticed they were usually wearing some sort of clothing, be that a hat, a cardigan or the like. It turns out the reason behind this is fairly involved, so check out this post for details.

Image: Lots of little statues, all wearing the cutest clothes

After a bit more walking, we finally made our way to the star attraction, The Reclining Buddha himself! I must say, the statue really is impressive and quite something else to behold. He is the world's largest bronze statue and is the same size as the Statue of Liberty. He is so large I had to use the panorama mode of the phone to get him fully in the frame.

Image: Even more impressive in person...

You can walk around to his feet and I think the following image really gives you a good idea of the scale of the statue...

Image: Buddha foot with Julie touching the thousand spoke wheel symbol

Once we had seen the Buddha and enjoyed some well timed ice-creams, it was time for some exploring!

Image: The path upwards...

After following a (very steep) trail up and out of the temple grounds, we found ourselves in some beautiful back-country, surrounded by bamboo forest. I love the sound they make as they rustle in the breeze. It was truly a magical part of the day for me.

Image: I love bamboo forests

From the trail, we were able to visit a number of smaller temples and shrines. At one temple, we even had the Buddhist monk come out and offer us watermelon to eat! It was unexpected and very much appreciated on a very warm day. We ventured on each time and were treated to some great views through the trees.

Image: Fabulous views over the countryside

As we wound our way back down the mountain towards the station again, we found many more statues, but the following set were really quite something else. Such a riot of colour and clothing on each of the little stone statues!

Image: Someone likes playing dress up...

Here you can see some up close... adorable!

Image: So dang cute...

Overall it was a brilliant day and even the photos can't do justice to the adventure we had. If you ever get a chance, I'd highly recommend a visit!

Japanese Calligraphy / 書道

2018-06-10T12:40:50Z

This weekend I had an opportunity to try out Japanese calligraphy at an event put on by the Fukuoka International Student Support Centre (FiSSC). Calligraphy isn't something I'd normally be very excited about, but I'm a sucker for trying anything new so I thought I'd give it a bash anyway. It also helped that my friend Sora was coming with me, who always ready to help me avoid doing anything (too) embarrassing.

Image: Chilling with my buddy Sora

Japanese calligraphy (shodou/書道) is an art form for writing Japanese Kanji (Chinese characters) using a brush and ink that is taught to all Japanese students in primary school, but it is rarely used after that. As such the event had a good mix of Japanese and non-Japanese people attending, with quite the range of skills on display, from very basic through to really artful. The sensei (teacher) for the lesson was truly an artist and was able to create evocative works with little apparent effort. Practice definitely makes perfect.

We were given our instructions, ink, brush and a stack of paper to practise with, after which we were told to get on with practising! My own works were somewhat less than perfect, but I learnt a trick or two over the period and I really felt that I'd improved at least a little bit over the duration of the class.

Image: The sensei watches on as a student tries to do "光" or "light"

I'm glad I did manage to improve a little as I was "asked" to try out writing a kanji out on one of the larger sheets (the joys of being very-obviously-foreign). I choose the character for "joy" or "喜" as it is simple and represents something I think we could all do with a little more of in our lives. The end result was middle of the road enough to neither attract laughter nor praise. Phew, embarrassment avoided!

Image: My "masterpiece". On the left is my name in katakana - マシュートイ

My own experiments aside, the work produced by masters of the art truly is something else though. I'm impressed that so much feeling and emotion can be conveyed through a simple black and white medium.

All said, I had a lot of fun and learnt the basics of a new skill. Not a bad result for a Saturday afternoon!

Image: My other creations. One of them isn't a real kanji, can you guess which one? :)

With Friends / 友達と

2018-06-07T04:45:44Z

The past few weeks have been a social whirlwind and I've had an opportunity to try out all sorts of new and interesting activities . I'll make sure I do a proper set of updates, but this time I'd like to briefly tell you about an adventure into Thai cuisine.

As a bit of background, there is a regular "language lounge", where we swap English and Japanese practice with learners from both languages, which is really good fun. I get to meet all sorts of awesome people and learn about Japanese language and culture from them. After one particular lounge a group of 6 of us decided to head off to grab some dinner, opting to try out a Thai restaurant in Tenjin.

Image: All smiles :)

This was the first time I've tried Thai food while in Japan and I have to say, I found it more "authentic" than what you would normally get in London. Not sure why I think it is more authentic, apart from it not feeling particularly Western in its flavours and presentation. That aside, the food itself was really tasty! Lots of spice though, so those with a sensitive tongue will need to be extra careful.

I feel that this style of setting makes it really easy to communicate effectively with people. The casual atmosphere allows you to relax and banter back and forth, using a mix of both native and learnt languages. I really enjoy being able to try out new words, expressions and such without anyone to judge you on technical performance. In fact the only real judge is whether you are able to effectively get your ideas across to the people you are talking to (eventually).

I made a commitment to use my time in Japan as effectively as possible and I'm super happy I've managed to get into more of this style activity, in addition to the classroom education and personal study.

Views of Fukuoka / 福岡の景色

2018-05-20T10:32:01Z

One of the things many locals of Fukuoka like about their city is that it has all of the city conveniences but also, not too far away, it has lots of nature and scenery. I haven't had an opportunity yet to venture outside of the city properly (something I intend to remedy shortly) but I have found many lovely places while out running.

My favourite so far has to be Heiwaminami Ryokuchi Park (say that 3 times quickly) which is only a few kilometre jog from my apartment. Not only is it 100% trails with wonderful green foliage, but it is super-duper undulating. This means I can get all the hill training I could possibly want, all in one handy-dandy park!

Let's take a quick photo tour...

Image: Heiwaminami Ryokuchi Park

Photos never do justice to how steep a trail really is. But this was super steep, honest!Â That aside, I love how green and verdant everything looks. Cannot get enough of this sort of trail.

Image: Peeking out through the trees

Most of the views are obstructed by all the beautiful green foliage I was just mentioning, but occasionally you can peek out and see the city below.

Image: View from the observation tower

One unique aspect of the park is the tower you can walk up to get 360 degree views of Fukuoka.

Image: Cemeteries get all the best views

Right next to the park is a large cemetery. Japanese culture includes a lot of respect for the dead, so you can just imagine how this is both immaculately maintained and presented.

Image: I'm a sucker for attractive looking clouds...

On the way back from the park now, waiting at an intersection. Not too much exciting happening, but I do like how the building in front is telling me something is "Good" with a solid thumbs up included. Thank you random building, things are indeed "Good".

Image: Filled with fishies!

What you can't see very well in this final photo is all the fishies in the canal. The water is very clear, so you can see all the big buggers and little guys all swimming around.

Beer Review Round-up / ビールレビューまとめ

2018-05-08T11:53:40Z

I thought it about time to do a round-up of the various beers I've tried over the past few weeks. I must admit to quite enjoying this series, as I really don't know what to expect with each drink I try.

To start things off, we have two beers which are from the same brewery. Yaho Brewing is proving to be an excellent source of tasty beers, I must say. The first one shares the same name with the very enjoyable "A beer for you and me" that I got not long after arriving. Whether it is actually the same beer is up for debate, but it shares the funky looking frog motif and is equally tasty. Really enjoyed this one, it is equal parts easy drinking, smoothness and tasty flavour.

Image: If you see this frog on a beer, it is likely to be a tasty

The second from this brewery is the Yona Yona Ale. Not much to say apart from it being a very solid and enjoyable pale ale. They are nearly double the price of their cheapest rivals (~£1.80 to 90p) but totally worth the extra spend in my books.

Image: Another winner!

From Suntory we have 金麦 or "Gold Wheat" beer. Apart from really liking the design of the can itself, there isn't a lot I can write about this middle-of-the-road beer. Nothing wrong with it, nothing all that right. In a word: Inoffensive.

Image: Average

Speaking of refreshing looking can designs, next we have a Lemon Beer from Grand Kirin. The name is something like ひこうき雲と私 or literally "the aeroplane cloud and me". I imagine it loses something in the translation.

On the beer itself, I found that the lemon flavour is there, but it is quite muted.Not a bad idea, I like the idea of a refreshing summer beer, but I don't think this is it for me. Overall, it wasn't too bad really, decently drinkable, but doesn't really commit to the concept - it isn't beery enough and not lemony enough either.

Image: Was expecting something, but not quite this

The Suntory Beer Recipe (a blueberry flavoured beer) wasn't ever going to be great, but I at least thought it would be interesting. It does have a bit of a fruity flavour, but it was underwhelming and left me wishing for something more exciting.

Similar to the lemon beer above, it just doesn't commit to the concept to make it worth not having a less weird and better tasting normal beer.

Image: I really need to stop experimenting...

Finally, I had much higher hopes for this Kirin "Prime Brew" beer, but sadly it left me thinking... "Meh, okay". It was drinkable and if pushed I could have a few, but it really wasn't a "prime" anything and left me wanting for something more flavoursome.

Image: Prime Brew huh? Not that impressed

My adventure continues...

Hong Kong / 香港

2018-05-07T08:00:23Z

I just got back from a short holiday in Hong Kong with Jules. Since I'm not really into cities these days, we thought that rather than focus on the city itself, we decided to spend our time seeing the natural/cultural attractions that surround the city proper.

The weather on each day was on the warm side (26-30 degrees) which I'm to understand isn't too bad in Hong Kong terms. I found it really enjoyable and managed to avoid sunburn, heatstroke or other ailments for the duration.

Our first day was on Lantau and involved a very scenic cable car up to the Ngong Ping to see the Big Buddha there. The Buddha statue was indeed very big and quite impressive!

Image: One very large Buddha

We also took an opportunity to walk along the Wisdom Path while there and see the prayer monuments set up there. The natural beauty of the area and the Buddhist religious aesthetic created a really relaxing and enjoyable vibe for the day.

Image: Getting our wisdom upgraded

The next day we went over to Hong Kong island and took a tram up to Victoria Peak. It was a bit of a hazy day, so the view was only moderately amazing, but we made the most of it with a walk around various trails on the mountain. My Garmin reported over 100 floors worth of climbing that day, which 'aint too shabby at all.

Image: View from Victoria Peak

We also hit up the Botanical Gardens while we were on the island, which was a quiet respite from the cars and people. At one point we found some really neat looking critters in a greenhouse which I just had to snap a photo of!

Image: Wascally Wabbit

The final full day was a 40 minute ferry ride out to Cheung Chau island. It had a very different vibe to the rest of Hong Kong, with a strong feeling of remoteness from the hustle and bustle of the city.

Image: Colourful boats lined up at the port

We spent the day wandering about, seeing a Pirate Cave, the Mini-Great Wall, along with various beaches, lookouts and temples. All with the added bonus of me not getting violently ill from the ferry! Win!

The final day was spent recovering while wandering around a gigantic mega-shopping-complex, generally relaxing and counting how many shops had "London" in their name in relation to "Paris", "Tokyo" and "New York" (spoiler alert: London won, who knew it was considered cool by people?).

I really enjoyed the trip and it was super awesome to spend the time with Jules as well!

Now I'm back in Fukuoka and need to get back into a studying mind set again...

Japanese Studies Update / 日本語の勉強の最新情報

2018-04-28T07:37:12Z

Time for a quick study update! It has been 4 weeks since I arrived and how have things progressed thus far? Well, it's complicated. As I expected, everything was all very challenging and a bit overwhelming at first. Coming into a new class that was half way through a course was difficult, but it was the lack of a solid foundation and effective study tools that really tripped me up.

When I was doing self study, I could do things at my own pace and skip through things that were uninteresting or too difficult at the time. However this leaves gaps in your knowledge and will come back to haunt you later, such as when that point you skipped becomes the basis of a more advanced point of grammar. So unless one has an iron discipline (that doesn't sound like me) then you end up building a proverbial house with bricks missing in random places. As you can imagine, this past month has seen me making a lot of bricks!

In my work as a technologist, I've found very few situations where wrote memorisation is very useful. With technology changing continuously, it is more efficient to get a grasp of the principles and fudge your way through with the knowledge that everything will be different in 2 years anyway. However while it might be possible to apply these ideas to language study, you can't get away from the fact that the more words you know and more grammar you have internalised, the better you will be.

Image: A study and no play makes Matt... a better student

So there is that aspect, where I'm playing catch-up on kanji, grammar or vocabulary that I didn't memorise sufficiently, but there is also the process of efficient study as well.

As children, we get many years of repetition and immersion to study our first language. As adults we try to condense learning a new language into a shorter period, all while thinking/acting in a different modality. Since doing it as an adult is a different approach, you need different tools and support structures to get you to your goal. Which is what I've been going through, a process of discovery with over the past 4 weeks. A lot of this is from other students and the rest is through the necessity of keeping up with the relentless stream of new knowledge we are expected to learn.

This is very much a developing topic for me. I've got a handle on certain aspects and still struggling with others, but the overall trajectory is very much positive. I'm very curious how I'll feel 2 months from now...

A Night Out at the Cinema / 映画館での夜の外出

2018-04-21T12:50:57Z

Not long after arriving in Fukuoka, I was lucky to make a new friend who not only shared a lot of similar interests to me, but speaks English very well. These are two essential ingredients to a friendship, liking some of the same stuff and actually being able to communicate effectively in at least one language. I know I want to practice my Japanese all the time, but the truth is it isn't ready to sustain a full conversation yet. Give me a few more months and maybe that will change, but until then, I'm very happy I met someone I'm able to hang out and compare cultures with.

So this Friday we agreed to go see Ready Player One together at the cinema in the Canal City (it does have canals, and it is as complicated to navigate around as a city) shopping mega-complex. I have a weakness for sweets at the cinema and it doesn't feel like I'm properly at the movies unless I have several thousand calories of popcorn and cola with me as I enter. Knowing that Japan tends to throw a few surprises at you in even the most mundane circumstances, I was ready for less-than-common popcorn choices and boy, I was *not* disappointed. It was so difficult to choose, that I went for a mix of matcha, salted and caramel flavoured popcorn. The picture below really doesn't do the popcorn justice; it was both amazing to look at and delicious in equal measure.

Image: Tastes a lot nicer than it looks...

The movie itself was great fun. I'd recommend it to anyone, but especially to those that wasted their precious childhoods playing games on consoles and PCs. There are so many easter eggs that it would take many, many viewings to catch them all. Although my favourite was the Gundam and Iron Giant cameos, those were super neat.

One thing that I found a little different from UK/US/Australia is that the house lights didn't come on during the credits and everyone sat patiently as they scrolled through. I was expecting some sort of signal of "OK, you can go now" but instead I quietly watched the credits with everyone else. I even found a Quora entry about it, and frankly, they don't know either. Ah Japan, always full of surprises.

Image: Post movie smiles

After the movie, we had a bite to eat (OK, many bites) and before we finished up we swung by the shrine located right next to the shopping complex. It was mostly closed up at that time of night, but it looked cool, so here's a photo anyway!

Image: Neat!

In summary, I got to hang out with a friend, see a movie, eat too much food and see a shrine, all in the one super-fun-packed evening. That is Japanese efficiency for you!

The Axis of Evil [Beverages] / 悪の枢軸【飲料】

2018-04-16T09:27:00Z

Being the adventurous type, I recently grabbed a few very different types of drinks to try out. I wouldn't want anyone to be bored just because I decided to stay safe and only pick drinks that I might actually enjoy.

Which brings me to the topic of today's review, a collection of three different drinks that (spoiler alert) were not very good. They all share in the dubious honour of being equally horrid (to me, your mileage may vary) and not at all to be recommended. As I say, you might like them, but I *really* did not. If you read this and then go out to try them, then you have no one to blame but yourself and your morbid curiosity.

Oh and since I know my family is reading this blog, no I did not drink all of these at once. These were all drank responsibly over a number of nights and I ate all my greens and I'm honestly not turning into an alcoholic. Not yet anyway.

Ahem. Anyway, the first cab off the rank is Orion draft beer from Asahi. It is labelled at having 5% alcohol, so this should have something going for it. Turns out, no, no it doesn't. This is the most insipid beer I've tasted in a good long time. More tasteless than even the most mainstream of lagers, this beer tasted like it had heard of the term flavour from a friend, but wasn't about to get into such sordid business itself. If this is "widely loved as an Okinawan original" then I'm seriously concerned about that island's population's lager sensibilities.

Image: Okinawa can do better than this, surely...

Next up we have an experiment of sorts. The hypothesis we are testing is: can sparkling rosé be any good when you put it in a bottle made out of aluminium? In short, "no". The longer version is "maybe, but based on this sample, not really, no". This Sparkling Wine - Rosé from Monde Wine is a sparkling wine with a mild flavour. I'm not normally a big fan of rosé wine, but since this was an after-dinner treat, it seemed appropriate to try it out. It has 12% alcohol, so it does have a little bit of kick to it, but not all that much. I was hoping for something like a sweet version of a Prosecco, but instead has a somewhat uninspired flavour. Overall, not recommended. There are perfectly good alternative wines in normal glass bottles that are only slightly more money and worth every yen in my opinion.

Finally, for a bit of fun, I bought a plum flavoured liqueur. Specifically, the Rakuen Umeshu Plum Liqueur. This one appealed to me on two levels: 1. It was 100 yen (70p) and 2. It comes in a god-damned sippy packet. You know, like the ones you drink juice out of at school. There was absolutely zero chance of me not trying this bad-boy out.

Image: Sippy container!

Image: Sippy straw!

Kind of wish I had given it a miss though. Apart from the (expected) sickly sweetness, the flavour is the most synthetic thing I've ever tried in a good long while. Unless you want your cherry flavoured liqueur that tastes like it was made out of actual decorative plastic cherries, I'd give this one a miss.

Fukuoka Running / 福岡を走る

2018-04-13T09:01:54Z

I've been doing a fair bit of running since I arrived in Fukuoka. Since the weather has generally been good, it is just too tempting to resist getting out to run without the need for 3 layers, gloves, beanie and a prayer to the god of frostbite. I haven't done anything long distance yet, but I've given a 5km area south of Hakata station a good go.

Let's go for a little virtual tour...

The first run is along one of the river/canals of Fukuoka city, specifically the Naka River. I quite like this one as it has nice paths to run along the river, meaning I don't have to stop for traffic every 200 meters.

Image: View along the canal path of the Naka River

The path is really nice and smooth (reducing, but not eliminating the chances of me falling on my face) but also inset from the road, meaning it is quiet and feels fairly detached from the city.

Next up are two photos on the same street at the end of the canal path section which are fairly illustrative of the type of off-main-street views:

Image: Side street in South Hakata

Image: So much concrete...

They certainly do like concrete here. Probably necessary for the whole earthquake thing, so you have to respect the choice of function over form.

The next stop is Sanno park, which is by far my favourite of the smaller parks in the area. It boasts a 1.2km running track (nice and soft), a few little hills to sprint up and a shrine. The shrine is especially nice, sitting in the middle of the park, but separated by sitting atop a small hill and surrounded by trees.

Image: Hiyoshi Shrine in Sanno Park

Apart from the shrine, this park is quite different in that it has actual trees and grass. Most parks are mostly concrete/dirt areas with a small row of trees.

Image: Sanno Park

I'm planning on ranging out more on my runs over the summer and I'll be reporting back with what I find!

Review: 友達ビール君ビール(Beer for You & Me)

2018-04-10T14:12:04Z

I've had exams this week.. Yes, one week after starting my Japanese studies, I have tests to do.. As such, I've been burning the midnight oil getting as much up to speed as possible.. However there is only so much you can do before the old brain decides to check out, and I reached that point at around 10pm this evening.

Instead of doing something useful (such as go to sleep), I decided to try one of the beers I've been keeping in the fridge for a (proverbial) rainy day.. Today I bring you.... 友達ビール君ビール (Beer for You & Me) from ヤッホーブルーイング (Yaho Brewing).

Upon a bit of investigation of their website, it seems this particular beer is a joint development with the Lawson convenience store chain.. I didn't know that when I bought it, instead I thought the frog on the front looked cute and I figured that anything with a cute frog on it can't be that bad.

Image: Japanese study and beer. The perfect companions?

Those who know me personally will know I generally enjoy fairly exotic beers, the more exotic the better.. So I wasn't sure what I'd get with a 5% alcohol session beer with a enticingly cute frog on it.. Turns out, I'd get a thoroughly enjoyable experience. On drinking it immediately reminded me of an IPA due to the punchy flavour, but with a smoother than average finish. The full flavour is something that I personally find very tasty and quite moreish. Thankfully I have just the one available, as I do have exams tomorrow...

I'd highly recommend this one to anyone.. I think it would go well in most circumstances: with a meal, watching TV or recovering from a insane study session.

I'll be keeping an eye out for more from this brewery.

Image: Close up and personal with the frog

Japanese Language School / 日本語学校

2018-04-10T09:54:22Z

I haven't given much of an introduction to the language school I'm studying at and how the first week of classes have gone. It has all been a little overwhelming so far, making it difficult to put into words, but I think I have pulled enough of my thoughts together to make a reasonable stab at it.

The first question most people ask is "why go all the way to Japan to study?" which is valid, since there are a number of good schools in London I could go to for only a mildly outrageous London price.

The main reason is that while in London, everything is in English and you can't get away from that. News, people, advertising, stores, all in English. So your chance to apply anything you learn in class is immediately limited to the things that you actively seek out in your target language. Even if you did a full time course in London, you aren't going to apply that knowledge in very many places outside of the classroom. In Japan that issue is taken away - everything is in Japanese and straight after a class finishes, you see the kanji you just learnt or hear the grammar point you have been discussing. In the past week, I feel like my comprehension has gone up a lot (although speaking/writing is still lagging behind) and my appreciation for learning to read all the kanji has risen in proportion to my desire to actually know what is written on the packages of food I'm eating or on the menu I'm ordering from.

Image: So much to study, so few brain resources...

So having established that studying in Japan is more suited to applying what you learn into real life, how's school then? I choose to attend a school called Genki JACS (Japanese and Cultural Studies) as it had a good curriculum and excellent reviews on the web. They also focus on small class sizes (2-9 students, with my class being 6) and a highly interactive learning environment. They also arrange a lot of extra-curricular activities in conjunction with the local universities and the like. For example, last Wednesday I attended a casual Japanese calligraphy session with the local Women's university and then an English language conversation meet-up for Japanese people studying English to speak with real-life English speakers. All these are excellent opportunities to learn new things and make new friends.

Image: If you look closely, you can see one cheeky chap has written the kanji for haemorrhoids

My timetable for school is 4 hours of face to face study (morning or afternoon) and anywhere between 30 minutes and 2 hours homework. Repeat this for 5 days a week, with extra homework for the weekends. It sounded a lot easier when compared to my 9am to 6pm job, but I'm completely mentally exhausted at the end of each day and I literally could not cram any more into my head than I am right now.

A lot of this is because the classes themselves have been quite intense. That isn't because the teachers are overly strict, but rather it is because in the 4 hours of lessons each day we are taught nearly 100% in Japanese and I've jumped into a class that is half-way through its course already. So I felt like I'm playing catch-up right from the start and as anyone who knows me would vouch for, I'm not overly fond of being bad at things.

So I need to catch up on the material I missed and try and stay ahead of the new information being taught. My final challenge for the classroom is that my brain has been on a learning vacation for 18 years and it really needs to whip itself into shape (neural plasticity anyone?) and get itself together. Seriously, my ability to memorise things is horrific!

Overall it is the massive learning experience I was looking for. I wasn't engaged with my work and really felt the need for a challenge. Well, I've got my challenge now and it is a doozy! So all is well and I'm hoping that after a period of adjustment, it will be a manageable one.

Now, back to study...

Review: Suntory Strong Zero - Bitter Orange 9%

2018-04-07T13:12:13Z

I spend a fair amount of time at convenience stores here in Japan. Those of you who have been to Japan will understand, and for those who haven't, please allow me to explain. Convenience stores (or konbini/コンビニ) are everywhere in the city, and just about everywhere not in a city as well. There are at least 3 within 150 meters of my apartment, and I'm not even in a downtown area. Anyway, there are many of them and they are great for:

They have very tasty pre-made meals (more on this another time)
They have all the little knick knacks you could want (tweezers to noddles to pet food, etc)
They are open fairly late
They have a fun range of alcoholic beverages

There are many other good points, but that last one is the reason for this post. I've decided to to a semi-regular (i.e. when I feel like it) series on the myriad of various drinks available from these convenience stores, from the straightforward to the silly. All in the name of science! And also in the name of recovering from a whole day of Japanese study. But mostly it is about the science.

Anyway, first a disclaimer:

I make no pretence of having any real skill or knowledge of alcoholic beverages, above having drunk them and also being in possession of taste buds and a keyboard.

So please allow me to introduce the inagrual drink... The Strong Zero Bitter Orange 9% from Suntory.

Image: Suntory Strong Zero Bitter Orange 9%

By the way, I'm not going to structure the reviews along any specific lines, mainly I just want to have a bit of fun, drink new drinks and maybe learn something new and interesting.

Anyway, moving swiftly on, the Suntory corporation helpfully provides some suggestions right on the can:

Image: Suntory Label

Those being:

A warning that it is a strong drink at 9% alcohol
It is not sweet and contains fruit peel
Have with a meal

Good advice/information to know.

So how does it taste? Well, as the can rightly says, while it has a strong citrus flavour, it isn't a sweet drink. It has a strong, unmasked alcoholic flavour that would not appeal to those who enjoy a drink that is mild and understated. It is very fizzy and is kept very cold, which only sharpens the experience for me. Oh and I should point out, it is quite bitter. Like, "my face might collapse inwards" bitter. Which is great if you are into that, but if not... Well, you shouldn't have bought a drink with "bitter" written on it and you really only have yourself to blame.

I'd say this drink is for those occasions when you want something a bit refreshing and surprising. It isn't a session drink, where you could finish one after another, but on a warm evening after a long day at work/practising kanji, it is quite enjoyable and thoroughly intoxicating. I'm about three quarters done and I am already thankful for spell-check, if that's any indication of strength.

So there you go, my first review done - I feel a warm glow of satisfaction/intoxication now.

Starting School / 学校が始まる

2018-04-03T08:48:23Z

月曜日から、私は GenkiJACS 日本語学校でフルタイムの学生として勉強を始めました。大学を卒業して以来、フルタイムの勉強はしたことがなかったので、私のような甘やかされたサラリーマンにとってはかなり大きな変化です。私は、比較的快適な場所から、地球の反対側で、まったく異なる経験の真っ只中に飛び込み、すでにカリキュラムの半分が終わったクラスに参加しました。これは、そうでなければ難しい状況に、さらに挑戦の要素を加えています。

Had to get a little bit of Japanese practice in there before continuing on with the rest of the blog! It will be interesting to look back at it in 6 months to see how cringe worthy the grammar is.

Image: Hello fellow students, I too am a cool and hip student like yourself.

Here's the longer-form version in English...

I started as a full time student at GenkiJACS Japanese language school on Monday. I've not done any full time study since finishing up at university, so it is quite a significant change for a spoilt office worker like myself. I've gone from a place of relative comfort and landed right in the middle of something completely different my experience, on the opposite side of the world, and I've joined a class that is already half way through its curriculum. Which adds an extra dash of challenge to an otherwise challenging situation.

The biggest difference I've found so far is the amount of attention you have to give to your surroundings. You have to actively think and what you are being taught, digest it as best you can and recall it on demand. You don't even get the luxury of Googling the answers to the tricky stuff, which is bordering on unreasonable! All this is tempered by having really nice and friendly teachers though. Each of them have very different teaching styles, but it is clear from the start they have giving the students a good education at the core of their values.

Looking back on this post, it feels a little whiny, so I hope you can indulge me a little. This really is a positive-problem sort of thing, in that I was specifically looking for something that will challenge me and test my boundaries. I'm pretty sure that in a few weeks, once I've filled in the larger missing blanks of knowledge and established a rhythm, I'll be a lot more confident and feeling less awed by the gap between where I think I am and where I'm actually at.

Image: My pre-intermediate level textbook

I hope anyway.

Sakura / 桜

2018-04-01T06:43:43Z

Today was spent exploring Fukuoka City's various ins and outs. I am very lucky that I have arrived just as the cherry blossoms have started to bloom, and I was able to see lots of them on my walk around.

Image: Fukuoka Canals and Sakura

Image: Oh look, its a selfie!

When I wasn't watching for the cherry blossoms, I meandered around the city, past most of the large shopping areas, through a few parks and along many streets. At first glance, Fukuoka is a fairly normal, medium sized city. However it feels a little different here and I'm not sure I can put my finger on why that is yet. Might take more than a few hours of strolling to get to the heart of this city!

Image: Another street, another cluster of cherry blossoms

One thing I found today that isn't your everyday occurrence (maybe it is in Fukuoka, that's yet to be established), is I happened across a festival, or 祭り (matsuri), at one of the parks I visited. It had all the stalls you would expect, fried chicken, fried noddles, candy floss, samurai on horseback... wait, samurai what?

Image: Just your everyday Samurai on a horse

Japan is always full of surprises :)

Preparations / 準備

2018-03-25T20:46:55Z

準備 (junbi) - preparation; setup; arrangements; provision; reservations.

I've got most of the preparations for the trip already done. It is difficult to determine what you might need for 6 months, but I figure that if I get the most important things sorted (flights, school, apartment) then I can blag the rest once I arrive. Japan is a pretty advanced place after all, such that if I need a toothbrush I will likely be able to locate one without incurring undue stress.

One thing I needed to sort out ahead of time, are the gifts I needed to get for various people I'd like to make a good impression with. There is a strong culture of gift-giving in Japan, called お土産 (omiyage), whereby anyone going off for a holiday or trip is generally expected to bring back souvenirs for their close friends, colleagues, family, etc. It is somewhat more culturally embedded in Japan than most other countries, where you might get a present for people, instead you really should get something.

What to get though? I did a bit of digging and it appears to be somewhat of a fine art, choosing something that is both representative of the place you visited, but not too tacky and not too expensive. With this in mind, I scoured Amazon for various British trinkets, before arriving on these delightful set of English teas. It feels like they will tick all the boxes, however I will report back here with the results, positive or otherwise.

Image: English Tea Shop Gift Sets

With these packed, I think I'm all set to go! Now there are just 4 days of work between myself and a Korean Air flight to Fukuoka.

Introductions

2018-03-23T20:37:54Z

In exactly one week from now, I will be flying off to adventures new in Japan. I'll be spending 6 months in Fukuoka, learning Japanese full time, exploring the city, making friends and exploring new boundaries. It will be something completely different from my daily life in the UK and I've very few preconceptions on how it will all go. Will I enjoy the thrill of constantly being exposed to new people, concepts and culture? I certainly hope so, but it is in the not knowing that a real adventure starts.

So as I start this new challenge, I would like to take the time to document the journey. Partly it is for myself, to reflect on later, and partly it is for you, someone who might be interested in what I discover in Japan. I'll update as often as I have anything to share and I hope you enjoy following along!