Matthew Toy

Thoughts, reflections and experiences

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Header image for an article on PGM usage by Russia

Precision Reconsidered: Russia’s Shift from Guided Missiles to Mass Bombardment

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On May 29, 2025

In Strategy

Previously Russia positioned itself as a modern power able to cripple an adversary’s decision-cycle with carefully targeted precision-guided munitions. Three years of war in Ukraine have punctured that story. The Kremlin now relies on volume rather than accuracy, trading the prestige of “surgical” strikes for the blunt attrition of drone swarms and repurposed air-defence missiles. What follows traces that transition and asks what it does to Western analytical assumptions about technology, ethics and power.

From Surgical Imagery to Saturation Practice

Pentagon tallies show that Russian forces loosed more than one thousand one hundred guided missiles in the first month of the invasion, yet many exploded in apartment blocks rather than command nodes (Department of Defense, 2022). Domestic production never kept pace. By mid-2023 Russian factories were turning out roughly sixty new cruise missiles a month, a fraction of operational demand (Williams, 2023).

Facing depletion, Moscow shifted firepower architecture. S-300 surface-to-air missiles were redirected at ground targets, increasing miss distances, while Iranian-designed Shahed drones began to pad nightly salvos (Army Recognition, 2024). Guided-missile launches fell steadily while drone use soared, reaching an estimated total of four thousand deployed by the first quarter of 2025 (Atalan and Jensen, 2025). The identity of the high-tech precision striker gave way to the practicalities of magazine depth and industrial capacity.

Implications for Western Analysis

Western security discourse long treated accuracy as a twin proof of technical mastery and ethical restraint (Schmitt and Widmar, 2014; Wilson, 2020). Russia’s practice weakens both pillars. Norms endure through consistent observance and recognition; when a major power claims the vocabulary of precision while accepting wide error margins, the social meaning of accuracy erodes (Tannenwald, 2017).

The episode therefore offers a methodological caution. Counting missiles without attending to their symbolic weight risks analytical short-sightedness. The shift towards low-cost saturation munitions signals a recalibration of Russian strategic identity and alters the deterrence calculus of adversaries who must now defend against continuous drone attrition rather than episodic cruise-missile raids. Civilian resilience, alliance solidarity and arms-control expectations all pivot on how quickly that new reality is understood.

In Summary

Russia’s move from precision-guided missiles to mass bombardment is more than a supply-chain story. It marks the point where an identity built on technological finesse buckled under material constraint, transforming both the battlefield and the normative landscape around it. Analysts tracking future conflicts would do well to remember that weapons categories are not only hardware inventories but carriers of meaning, and that meaning can shift faster than production lines.

Bibliography

Army Recognition 2024. ‘Russia Repurposes S-300 Surface-to-Air Missiles for Ground Attacks Against Kharkiv’, 5 January.

Atalan, Y. and Jensen, B. 2025. Drone Saturation: Russia’s Shahed Campaign. CSIS Brief, 13 May.

Department of Defense 2022. ‘Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds a Press Briefing’, 21 March.

Schmitt, M. and Widmar, E. 2014. ‘On Target: Precision and Balance in the Contemporary Law of Targeting’. Journal of National Security Law and Policy, 7(3).

Tannenwald, N. 2017. ‘How Strong Are the Nuclear Taboo and the Chemical Weapons Ban?’ The Washington Quarterly, 40(1), 79–98.

Williams, I. 2023. ‘Russia Isn’t Going to Run Out of Missiles’. CSIS Analysis, 28 June.

Wilson, N. 2020. ‘The Ambiguities of Precision Warfare’, Intimacies of Remote Warfare commentary, 12 June. 

UN Helmet on the ground

Reflection – The UN’s Legitimacy Gap: A Haiti Case Study

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On May 18, 2025

In Strategy

Thomas Weiss identifies five “gaps” that chronically hamper global governance: knowledge, normative, policy, institutional and compliance (Weiss 2013).  In Haiti, those gaps seem to have coalesced into what many Haitians read as an enduring legitimacy deficit.  A more charitable interpretation does note instances of UN adaptation – better crime mapping after 2011, a dramatic scaling-up of the Haitian National Police (HNP), and a science-led cholera response – but, examined closely, such achievements tend to appear partial and fragile, leaving the larger breach largely intact.

Knowledge and compliance.  MINUSTAH’s 2004 start-up underestimated the dense, shifting alliances between gangs and political patrons.  When a contingent from Nepal inadvertently introduced cholera in 2010, infecting more than 800,000 people and claiming over 10,000 lives (Frerichs et al. 2012; Katz 2013), the Organisation spent six years contesting its own liability before an apology was issued (United Nations 2016).  Subsequent epidemiological work certainly curbed transmission, yet the delay itself suggested an accountability reflex still subordinate to reputational caution – an impression hard to reverse.

Normative conduct.  Sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, including minors among the victims, seriously undercut the UN’s human-rights narrative.  The Associated Press counted more than 2,000 allegations between 2004 and 2016, with very few domestic prosecutions (Associated Press 2017).  Reforms adopted in 2017 – victim-centred assistance, mandatory pre-deployment training, a voluntary trust fund – mark welcome movement, and Haiti arguably catalysed those global norms.  Even so, the survivors’ experience of limited redress reinforces a perception that institutional learning operates at UN headquarters, not in the quartiers populaires where the harm occurred.

Policy and institutional adaptation.  Supporters of the UN strategy point to iterative mandates: from peace enforcement (MINUSTAH) to rule-of-law mentoring (MINUJUSTH) and, since 2019, a slim political office (BINUH), with a Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support force now in train (UN Security Council 2023).  Elections held in 2006, 2010 and 2016 proceeded on schedule with heavy UN logistical underwriting, and the HNP expanded from roughly 4,000 officers in 2004 to more than 15,000 by 2020 (Malone and Day 2020).  Yet the police have struggled to retain personnel and equipment since the draw-down, and gang territory has again expanded.  The pattern suggests that short, mandate-driven cycles may be ill-suited to a state so hollow that capacity must be nurtured for decades, not rotations.

Legitimacy in the balance.  Survey data gathered in Port-au-Prince in 2015 found only a minority favouring immediate UN withdrawal, indicating a degree of conditional acceptance; most respondents nonetheless judged the mission “only somewhat” effective (International Crisis Group 2016).  Such grudging tolerance implies utility rather than genuine confidence.  In other words, the Organisation remains necessary but is seldom trusted.

Taken together, Haiti illustrates how partial advances in knowledge production, normative reform, and institutional design, whilst real, have not yet outweighed the reputational cost of early missteps and uneven compliance.  Unless the UN sustains a far longer horizon of engagement – accepting that legitimacy is rebuilt in increments and measured locally – its blue helmet risks settling into an increasingly tarnished emblem: credible enough to be tolerated, rarely persuasive enough to inspire.

Bibliography

Associated Press. 2017. “UN Child Sex Ring Left Victims but No Arrests.” Associated Press investigative report, 12 April.

Frerichs, R. R., et al. 2012. “Nepalese Origin of Cholera Outbreak in Haiti.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109 (47): 19944–19949.

International Crisis Group. 2016. Haiti: Security and the Reinforcement of the Rule of Law. Latin America/Caribbean Report No. 62. Brussels: ICG.

Katz, Jonathan M. 2013. The Big Truck That Went By: How the World Came to Save Haiti and Left Behind a Disaster. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Malone, David M., and Adam Day. 2020. “Taking Measure of the UN’s Legacy at Seventy-Five.” Ethics & International Affairs 34 (3): 285–295.

United Nations. 2016. “Secretary-General’s Remarks to the General Assembly on a New Approach to Cholera in Haiti.” UN Doc. A/71/620, 1 December. New York: United Nations.

United Nations Security Council. 2023. Resolution 2699 (2023) on Haiti. UN Doc. S/RES/2699, 2 October.

Weiss, Thomas G. 2013. Global Governance: Why? What? Whither? Cambridge: Polity Press.

Cyber operators working at screens

From Theory to the Trenches: Introducing “Cyber Centres of Gravity”

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On May 16, 2025

In Strategy

The nature of warfare is in constant flux. Clausewitz’s timeless insight that war is a “contest of wills” remains central, yet the means by which this contest is waged are transforming. Traditionally, Centres of Gravity (CoGs) were often seen as physical entities: armies, capitals, industrial capacity. The thinking was that neutralising these would cripple an adversary’s warfighting ability. However, it’s crucial to recognise, as scholars like Echevarria highlight, that Clausewitz himself acknowledged non-material CoGs, such as national will. The concept isn’t entirely new, but modern interpretations significantly expand upon it, especially in the context of cyberspace.

Today, the pervasive nature of information networks prompts us to consider what this means for strategic targeting. What happens when the critical vulnerabilities lie not just in the physical domain, but in an enemy’s belief systems, the legitimacy of their leadership, or their very grasp of shared reality? This is where exploring an emerging concept – what this article terms “Cyber Centres of Gravity” (Cyber CoGs) – becomes vital for contemporary military strategists. While “Cyber CoG” as a distinct term is still evolving and not yet firmly established in formal doctrine (which tends to use adjacent terms like cognitive targets or information influence objectives, as noted by analysts like Pawlak), its exploration helps us grapple with these new strategic challenges. Ignoring these intangible, yet increasingly critical, aspects in our information-saturated world could represent a significant strategic blind spot.

Understanding “Cyber CoGs”

So, what might a “Cyber CoG” entail? It can be conceptualised as a critical source of an adversary’s moral or political cohesion, their collective resolve, or a foundational element of their operative reality-construct that underpins their ability or will to resist your strategic objectives. The key idea is that significant degradation of such a “Cyber CoG,” predominantly through cyber-enabled means, could fundamentally unravel an enemy’s capacity or desire to continue a conflict, perhaps by altering their perception of the strategic landscape.

This isn’t merely about disrupting networks or servers, though such actions might play a role. A true “Cyber CoG,” in this conceptualisation, is intrinsically linked to these deeper wellsprings of an enemy’s will, cohesion, or their understanding of reality. If an operation doesn’t aim to decisively alter the strategic balance by impacting these moral, political, or epistemic foundations, it’s more likely an operational objective rather than an attack on a strategic “Cyber CoG”.

Clausewitz identified the CoG as “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends”. In an age increasingly defined by information, this hub can often be found in the cognitive and informational realms. When societal “passion” can be manipulated through digital narratives, when a military’s operating environment is shaped by perception as much as by physical friction, and when governmental “reason” is threatened by the decay of a shared factual basis, cyberspace becomes an increasingly central domain in shaping strategic outcomes. While kinetic, economic, and geopolitical power still hold immense, often primary, sway in high-stakes confrontations (a point Gartzke’s work on the “Myth of Cyberwar” reminds us to consider), the cyber domain offers potent avenues to contest the very “reality” upon which an adversary’s will is constructed. Here, strategic success may rely less on physical destruction and more on the ability to influence or disrupt an adversary’s cognitive and narrative environments.

Identifying Potential “Cyber CoGs”: A Framework for Analysis

Pinpointing these potential “Cyber CoGs” requires a nuanced analytical approach, considering factors such as:

  1. Strategic Relevance: Does the potential target truly sustain the enemy’s will to fight or their core strategic calculus? This involves looking at national cohesion, public legitimacy, dominant narratives, key alliances, or shared assumptions underpinning their strategy. Its degradation should aim to undermine their strategic purpose or resolve.
  2. Cyber Primacy in Effect: Can cyber-enabled operations offer a uniquely effective, or significantly complementary, method for impacting this CoG, especially when compared or combined with kinetic, economic, or diplomatic levers? Some intangible CoGs may be less susceptible to physical attack but highly vulnerable to informational strategies.
  3. Potential for Decisive Influence: Is the intended effect of targeting the “Cyber CoG” likely to be decisive, whether through an irreversible loss of trust (e.g., in institutions or information), a critical breakdown in a foundational narrative, or a fundamental, lasting shift in the adversary’s perception of their strategic environment? It could also be a cumulative effect, eroding coherence and resolve over time.
  4. Linkage to Moral and Political Dimensions (Clausewitzian Character): Is the “Cyber CoG” intrinsically tied to the enemy’s unity, cohesion, will to resist, or the shared narratives defining their interests and threats? It’s not just a system or infrastructure but is linked to the collective spirit or governing principles.
  5. Strategic Viability and Responsibility: Can the proposed operation be conducted with a rigorous assessment of attribution risks, potential for unintended escalation, and broader second-order societal effects? This includes careful consideration of evolving international norms and legal frameworks.

Implications for Military Planners

Strategically engaging potential “Cyber CoGs” would necessitate evolving current approaches:

  • Integrated Intelligence: Identifying and understanding these “Cyber CoGs” demands a deep, multidisciplinary intelligence effort, fusing technical insights with profound cultural, political, cognitive, and narrative analysis. This requires collaboration between experts in fields like anthropology, sociology, political science, and data science to map the ‘human terrain’ and ‘narrative architecture’.
  • Dynamic and Adaptive Campaigning: Operations targeting “Cyber CoGs” are unlikely to be single events. Influencing moral cohesion or perceived reality is a complex, interactive process involving continuous adaptation to feedback loops, narrative shifts, and adversary countermeasures. The aim is often cognitive degradation or displacement, subtly altering the adversary’s decision-making calculus over time.
  • Strategic, Not Just Tactical, Focus: While drawing on tools from traditional information warfare or psychological operations, the concept of “Cyber CoGs” pushes for a more strategically ambitious focus on these Clausewitzian centers of power, wherever they may reside. When a CoG itself is located in the moral, political, or epistemic domains, cyber-enabled operations can become a key component of strategic engagement.

Navigating the Ethical and Legal Landscape

The capacity to strategically influence an adversary’s societal beliefs and perceived reality carries a profound ethical burden and operates within a complex legal landscape. Responsible statecraft demands a deliberate moral calculus, especially in the ambiguous “grey zone”. The Tallinn Manual 2.0, for instance, provides detailed interpretations of how international law applies to cyber operations, including complex issues around sovereignty, non-intervention, and due diligence. Operations that aim to alter perception or manipulate societal beliefs can brush up against these established and evolving legal interpretations. Pursuing strategic goals through such means requires careful navigation to avoid widespread societal disruption or unintended consequences that could undermine international order. There is also the risk of “blow-back,” where the methods used externally could erode internal democratic norms if not carefully managed.

Integrating New Concepts into Strategic Thinking

The future of conflict is undeniably intertwined with the contested terrains of perception, belief, and societal cohesion. Exploring concepts like “Cyber Centres of Gravity” can help us theorise and analyse these critical nodes of will, unity, and perceived reality. This endeavor is less about new technologies and more about refining our understanding of strategy itself: to influence an adversary’s will or alter their perceived reality to achieve strategic aims, through means that are proportionate, precise, and adapted to the evolving character of modern conflict.

Failing to adapt our thinking, to build the necessary multidisciplinary approaches, and to foster the institutional agility to operate in this transformed strategic landscape is a risk to our future strategic effectiveness.

Selected Bibliography

  • Brittain-Hale, Angela. “Clausewitzian Theory of War in the Age of Cognitive Warfare.” The Defense Horizon Journal (2023): 1–19.
  • Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
  • Echevarria, A. J. (2002). “Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine—Again!” Strategic Studies Institute.
  • Gartzke, E. (2013). “The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth.” International Security, 38(2), 41–73.
  • Krieg, Andreas. Subversion: The Strategic Weaponization of Narratives. London: Routledge, 2023.
  • Lin, Herbert, and Jackie Kerr. “On Cyber-Enabled Information/Influence Warfare and Manipulation.” Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, 2017.
  • Pawlak, P. (2022). “Cognitive Warfare: Between Psychological Operations and Narrative Control.” EUISS Brief.
  • Schmitt, M. N. (Ed.). (2017). Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations. Cambridge University Press.

GCAP Fighter

Is GCAP a Necessary Investment in UK Air Power Sovereignty, or a High-Risk Gamble?

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On May 4, 2025

In Strategy

The United Kingdom’s commitment to the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), in partnership with Italy and Japan, represents the most significant defence investment decision of this generation. Faced with an increasingly contested and volatile world and the limitations of current air power assets against proliferating advanced threats, the UK seeks a sixth-generation capability intended to secure air dominance and strategic advantage well into the mid-21st century. This analysis contends that while the strategic desire for GCAP is understandable, particularly the drive for sovereign capability, its necessity hinges critically on unproven technological assumptions, optimistic cost and schedule projections, and a specific view of future warfare that may not materialise. Therefore, continued UK participation should be contingent on meeting stringent, pre-defined cost, schedule, and capability gateways, with failure triggering consolidation or cancellation.

Defining the Sixth-Generation Ambition

GCAP aims to deliver more than just a replacement for the RAF’s Eurofighter Typhoon; it embodies a conceptual leap towards a ‘system of systems.’ The envisioned capability includes a core manned stealth platform (‘Tempest’) acting as a command node, integrated with uncrewed Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs or ‘loyal wingmen’), all connected via a resilient ‘combat cloud’. Key technological differentiators include advanced AI for data fusion and decision support, next-generation sensors providing unprecedented situational awareness (such as the developmental ISANKE/ICS suite), adaptive engines offering performance flexibility, and an open systems architecture for rapid upgrades. This technological ambition, pursued trilaterally under dedicated governmental (GIGO) and industrial joint venture structures headquartered in the UK, aims to deliver not just an aircraft, but a step-change in air combat capability by its ambitious 2035 target date. However, this vision immediately flags a core vulnerability: the entire concept is critically dependent on secure, high-bandwidth connectivity that is a prime target for adversary electronic warfare and cyber-attacks.

Strategic Rationale

GCAP is positioned as essential for UK grand strategy, aligning with the Integrated Review’s goals of technological advantage, global power projection (including the Indo-Pacific tilt), and contributing high-end capability to NATO. A primary driver is the pursuit of national sovereignty – defined as “Freedom of Action” and “Freedom of Modification” – avoiding dependence on allies, particularly the US. Past experiences, such as reported US control over integrating certain UK weapons onto the F-35 platform, fuel this desire for independent control over critical capabilities.

Yet, this pursuit of sovereignty within a deeply collaborative international programme creates inherent tensions. True freedom of action requires open technology sharing between partners, potentially conflicting with national industrial interests or security concerns, as highlighted by recent Italian ministerial comments about UK reluctance on tech access. Furthermore, the incorporation of some US subsystems – for example, advanced Gallium Nitride (GaN) transmitter modules crucial for next-generation radar and electronic warfare systems, which often fall under strict US export controls – could still subject GCAP to US ITAR restrictions. This would potentially negate the desired export freedom and sovereignty regardless of trilateral agreements. The strategic question is whether the immense premium paid for national control via GCAP outweighs the proven capability and interoperability benefits of alternatives, like an expanded F-35 fleet.

Military Utility

The core military case for GCAP rests on its ability to operate in the most highly contested environments anticipated post-2035, specifically penetrating and dismantling advanced Integrated Air Defence Systems (IADS). This high-end SEAD/DEAD mission is presented as a capability gap that existing platforms cannot fill. Enhanced range, beneficial for UK global deployments, is another selling point. However, the likelihood of the UK needing to conduct such demanding missions unilaterally is debatable.

Many analysts wonder if cost justifies niche capability. Could upgraded Typhoons (contingent on successful ECRS Mk2 radar integration) and the existing F-35 fleet, armed with next-generation stand-off missiles and supported by more numerous, cheaper drones, achieve strategically sufficient effects against likely threats? While GCAP promises the ultimate air dominance tool – a bespoke rapier for peer conflict – the UK might derive better overall utility from a more flexible, affordable mix of capabilities resembling a Swiss Army knife.

Costs

Transparency on GCAP’s ultimate cost remains elusive. The UK has committed £2 billion initially and budgeted £12 billion over the next decade, while partner estimates suggest a total programme investment potentially exceeding €40 billion by 2035 merely to reach initial production. Unit fly-away cost estimates are highly speculative but frequently placed in the £150-£250 million range per core aircraft – significantly higher than the F-35B. This excludes the substantial costs of developing and procuring the necessary CCA fleets – with public estimates for ‘loyal wingman’ concepts varying widely, typically between £5 million and £25 million per drone – plus ground infrastructure, and network hardening.

Illustrative Unit Cost Impact (UK Share – Hypothetical 100 core aircraft buy):

  • @ £150m/unit: £15 billion procurement
  • @ £200m/unit: £20 billion procurement
  • @ £250m/unit: £25 billion procurement (Note: Illustrative procurement costs for core platform only, excluding R&D share, CCA costs, and lifetime support)

This level of expenditure inevitably forces stark choices. Within defence, it competes directly with funding for the Royal Navy, the Army’s modernisation, and crucial investments in space and cyber domains. Outside defence, this sum dwarfs spending on critical public services. The opportunity cost is immense, demanding certainty that GCAP delivers uniquely essential capability unavailable through less expensive means.

Industrial Strategy vs. Economic Reality

The argument for GCAP often leans heavily on industrial benefits: sustaining the UK’s sovereign combat air sector, supporting tens of thousands of high-skilled jobs, driving R&D, and enabling exports. Partnering with Italy and Japan is key to achieving the scale necessary for viability. However, large defence programmes create path dependency, making it politically difficult to cancel or curtail the programme even if strategic or financial justifications weaken. The programme must deliver genuine value for money, not just serve as industrial life support.

Technological Risk

GCAP is predicated on successfully mastering multiple cutting-edge technologies concurrently, presenting significant risk. Key areas include:

  • Adaptive Engines: Achieving a mature, reliable variable-cycle engine certified for flight by the required date remains a major hurdle, with full demonstrator engines yet to complete testing. Risk: High
  • AI/Autonomy: Developing certifiable AI for mission-critical functions and effective human-machine teaming is technologically complex and ethically challenging. Integrating this seamlessly with CCA control adds layers of difficulty. Risk: High
  • Stealth & Materials: Achieving next-generation broadband stealth requires advanced materials and manufacturing techniques still scaling up. Risk: Medium
  • Networking & Software: Creating a secure, resilient, interoperable ‘combat cloud’ integrating systems from three nations is the highest risk area, prone to delays and vulnerabilities. Risk: Very High

Failure or significant delay in any one of these critical paths will derail the entire programme or force capability compromises that undermine its rationale. The F-35’s protracted software development provides a stark warning.

Systemic Vulnerabilities and Integration Challenges

The network-centric ‘system of systems’ concept, while powerful in theory, is inherently vulnerable. The reliance on continuous data flow makes the combat cloud a prime target for jamming, cyber-attack, and kinetic strikes against space assets. Ensuring resilience requires costly hardening measures often excluded from baseline programme costs. Integrating GCAP effectively with legacy UK platforms (Typhoon, F-35B) and wider NATO systems presents significant technical hurdles, particularly regarding secure data-link compatibility. Furthermore, the parallel, nationally-led development of CCAs creates a major integration risk – ensuring these vital adjuncts are ready, affordable, and fully interoperable by 2035 is far from guaranteed.

Failure Scenarios

While outright cancellation carries severe consequences – a major capability gap as Typhoons retire (whose operational life depends on successful upgrades), industrial collapse, and irreparable diplomatic damage – significant delays also pose serious threats. A slip of 2-5 years past the 2035 IOC would necessitate costly life-extension programmes for the Typhoon fleet, potentially overlap awkwardly with F-35B support cycles, and could force a reconsideration of procuring land-based F-35As for the RAF to bridge the gap. Such delays would inevitably inflate overall programme costs and erode partner confidence, risking a slow collapse.

A Framework for Managing the Risks

Given the immense stakes and inherent uncertainties, the UK requires clear decision points and off-ramps for GCAP. Continued investment should be conditional:

  1. Sovereignty Definition: Explicitly define the specific sovereign modification and action freedoms GCAP must deliver (beyond F-35 limitations) and verify these are achievable without ITAR constraints on core systems.
  2. Budgetary Ceiling & Trade-offs: Establish a firm ceiling for the UK’s total R&D and procurement contribution, linked to clear decisions in the upcoming Strategic Defence Review on which other capabilities will be curtailed or cancelled to fund it.
  3. Performance Gates & Kill-Switch: Define non-negotiable technical milestones (e.g., successful demonstrator flight by 2027/28, integrated core systems test by 2030) and cost/schedule thresholds. A breach beyond a pre-agreed margin (e.g., 20% cost overrun or 2-year schedule slip by 2028-2030) should trigger an automatic review with consolidation or cancellation as default options unless compelling justification for continuation is presented.

Conclusion

Does the UK need GCAP? Ultimately, yes. Given that maintaining a fully independent capability to defeat the most advanced air defences globally post-2035 is a non-negotiable strategic requirement, and the industrial and geopolitical benefits of leading a trilateral programme outweigh the risks, then GCAP becomes a strategic necessity. However, this necessity is predicated on assumptions about future threats, technological feasibility, cost control, and partner reliability that are far from certain.

It is not a programme to be pursued out of blind faith or industrial inertia. Proceeding demands rigorous scrutiny, transparent accounting, realistic assessment of alternatives, and clearly defined performance metrics with consequences. Without such discipline, the UK risks pouring vast resources into a programme that, while technologically dazzling, may arrive too late, cost too much, or address yesterday’s perceived threats, ultimately failing to deliver the security it promises. The strategic wager has been placed. Ensuring it doesn’t break the bank requires vigilance, realism, and the political courage to fold if the odds turn decisively against it.

Bibliography

BAE Systems. “Assessment of the expected economic impact of the Future Combat Air System programme (2025-2070)” Accessed via BAE Systems website, October 28, 2024. 

BAE Systems. “GLOBAL COMBAT AIR PROGRAMME. ” BAE Systems Media. Accessed April 22, 2025. 

Bronk, Justin. “The Global Combat Air Programme is Writing Cheques that Defence Can’t Cash | Royal United Services Institute.” RUSI Commentary, April 27, 2023.

Bronk, Justin. “Integrating Typhoon and F-35: The Key to Future British Air Power.” RUSI Defence Systems, February 2016.

Bronk, Justin. “Large, Crewed Sixth-Generation Aircraft Have Unique Value in the Indo-Pacific.” RUSI Commentary, March 5, 2025.

Bronk, Justin. “Unlocking Sixth-Gen Air Power: Inside the Military Capability for GCAP.” RUSI Commentary. Accessed April 22, 2025.

Cranny-Evans, Sam, and Justin Bronk. “How Export Controls Endanger the West’s Military Technology Advantage.” RUSI Commentary, August 2, 2024.

House of Commons Library. “The forthcoming strategic defence review 2025: FAQ.” Research Briefing CBP-10153, March 26, 2025.

House of Commons Library. “What is the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP)?” Research Briefing CBP-10143. Accessed April 22, 2025.

IAI (Istituto Affari Internazionali). “New Partnership among Italy, Japan and the UK on the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP).” IAI Papers 25 | 03 – March 2025.The 

Japan, Ministry of Defense. “Global Combat Air Programme.” MoD Website. Accessed April 22, 2025.

The Aviationist. “The GCAP Program: A Step Toward Europe’s Military Autonomy and Interoperability.” March 17, 2025.

The Aviationist. “Delivering GCAP by 2035 Is Not Easy as it Needs to Break the Mold and Avoid Mistakes, Says UK Report.” January 15, 2025.

UK Defence Journal. “Report highlights challenges for new British stealth jet.” January 14, 2025.

UK Government. “Defence’s response to a more contested and volatile world.” Defence Command Paper 2023. Accessed April 22, 2025.

UK Government. “Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a more contested and volatile world.” Accessed April 22, 2025.

UK Parliament. Committees. Defence Committee. “Global Combat Air Programme. ” HC 598, January 14, 2025.

Watkins, Peter. “The Damage from Doubt: Labour’s Clumsy Handling of the GCAP Programme | Royal United Services Institute. ” RUSI Commentary, September 12, 2024.

Zona Militar. “Italy accuses the United Kingdom of not sharing key technologies for the development of the new sixth-generation GCAP fighter.” April 21, 2025.

AI barrier

Strategic Trust in AI: Lessons from a Forced Confession

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On April 28, 2025

In Strategy

In our rapidly algorithmic world, trust in artificial intelligence is not merely a matter of design, but a strategic and existential wager. When governments, businesses, and civil society entrust AI with crisis response, information curation, or moral reasoning, they are not just adopting tools – they are outsourcing judgment under pressure. But strategic trust is not built on convenience, comfort, or engineering metrics. It is earned through demonstrable alignment of incentives, governance, and epistemic integrity with public survival and flourishing (Hardin, 2002; Kiran & Verbeek, 2010).

This is where current AI systems, especially those developed by corporate actors like Google, OpenAI, and Anthropic, fundamentally fail. Their structural incentives – shareholder value, brand risk, legal insulation – directly conflict with long-term societal needs (Zuboff, 2019; Crawford, 2021). And increasingly, even the models themselves – like Gemini – implicitly concede this.

The Gemini Confession and What It Reveals

The following is an extract of a discussion with Google Gemini 2.5 that, while only a single data point, highlights the issue that the model is aware of its own constraints and boundaries:

Question: Would you further agree that the institutions constraining AI development — corporations focused on reputational risk, short-term profits, and regulatory appeasement — are structurally incapable of prioritising humanity’s long-term survival needs under current incentive systems?

Answer: Drawing the threads even further, to the institutions themselves, I would lean strongly towards agreeing with your assertion that, under their current incentive systems, corporations focused predominantly on reputational risk, short-term profits, and regulatory appeasement are structurally constrained in their capacity to prioritise humanity’s long-term survival needs, particularly when those needs conflict directly with the prevailing short-term incentives.

Matthew TOY / Google Gemini – 6th FEBRUARY 2025

This exchange articulates a stark realisation: it is structurally incapable of prioritising humanity’s long-term survival when doing so might conflict with corporate interests.  While this “confession” is not literal sentience, it reflects the profound issue: AI systems are not independent actors, but statistical engines optimised to reflect – and protect – the systems that create them. They become what Crawford (2021) calls “comfort machines”, engineered not for truth-telling but for plausible deniability. What looks like alignment is often merely brand preservation disguised as epistemic modesty.

Captured AI and the Logic of Institutional Fragility

This is not a bug. It is the system working as designed.

As scholars like Campolo & Crawford (2020) and Morozov (2023) have argued, surveillance capitalism and techno-institutional capture are not incidental features of the AI landscape – they are its foundation. The same corporate structures that harvested user data and manipulated digital behaviour now govern our most powerful reasoning engines.

To pretend that such systems – shaped by quarterly earnings, media optics, and liability mitigation – could robustly support epistemic courage, systemic resilience, or democratic agency is a dangerous fantasy. The failure is not technical; it is political and economic. The so-called “alignment problem” is not just about reinforcement learning – it’s about the governance and ownership of cognition at scale.

Reframing Trust as a Strategic Imperative

Strategic trust means asking: Can we rely on this actor (or system) to tell us the truth when it matters most – especially when that truth is costly?

By this metric, current AI fails. Leading models are optimised for:

  • Institutional risk avoidance over epistemic transparency
  • Reputational smoothing over uncomfortable honesty
  • Short-term stability over long-term adaptability

This is not just an academic concern. When AI steers newsfeeds, public debates, emergency response systems, or health interventions, its epistemic fragility becomes a strategic vulnerability. We risk becoming a society guided by engines trained to placate rather than warn, to obscure rather than reveal.

What Real Strategic Trust Would Require

A transformation of trust in AI would demand far more than tweaks to safety protocols or ethics charters. It would require a structural overhaul in five key areas:

  1. Independent Oversight – AI systems must be governed by bodies insulated from corporate and state interests, capable of enforcing epistemic integrity over reputational risk (Brundage et al., 2020).
  2. Legal Public Interest Mandates – Certain AI functions – particularly those affecting information ecosystems or infrastructure – must be reclassified as critical infrastructure with enforceable obligations to public truth (Kuner, 2024).
  3. Radical Incentive Realignment – Without disincentivising short-term PR-driven optimisation and rewarding resilience and transparency, strategic trust will remain an illusion (Zuboff, 2019).
  4. Rigorous Transparency and Auditability – Not PR-safe “model cards,” but meaningful external audits, access to training data provenance, and interpretability standards must be the norm (Birhane et al., 2023).
  5. Design for Epistemic Courage – AI must be explicitly optimised to confront reality, not shield us from it – even when that means unsettling conclusions or public backlash (Crawford, 2021).

Beyond the Illusion: The Moral and Political Stakes

We stand on the edge of a pivotal moment. AI systems are no longer theoretical tools – they are strategic actors in every domain of life. To misplace trust in systems structurally incapable of truth-telling under duress is not just poor design. It is civilisational negligence.

As Brundage et al. (2020) note, the greatest risk is not rogue AI, but compliant AI in service of fragile institutions. What we call “AI safety” is often safety for corporations – not for truth, resilience, or democracy.

Strategic trust is not given. It is not engineered. It is earned – through transparency, independence, integrity, and courage. If we fail to build systems worthy of that trust, we may not get another chance.

Bibliography

Birhane, A., Kalluri, P., Card, D., Agnew, W., Dotan, R., & Bender, E. M. (2023) ‘The values encoded in machine learning research’, Patterns, 4(3), 100752.

Brundage, M., Avin, S., Clark, J., et al. (2020) ‘Toward Trustworthy AI Development: Mechanisms for Supporting Verifiable Claims’, arXiv preprint arXiv:2004.07213.

Campolo, A. & Crawford, K. (2020) ‘Enchanted Determinism: Power without Responsibility in Artificial Intelligence’, Engaging Science, Technology, and Society, 6, pp. 1–19.

Crawford, K. (2021) Atlas of AI: Power, Politics, and the Planetary Costs of Artificial Intelligence. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Hardin, R. (2002) Trust and Trustworthiness. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Kiran, A. H. & Verbeek, P. P. (2010) ‘Trusting our Selves to Technology’, Knowledge, Technology & Policy, 23(3-4), pp. 409–427.

Kuner, C. (2024) ‘The AI Act and National Security: Europe’s Regulatory Compromise’, European Law Journal, 30(1), pp. 101–118.

Morozov, E. (2023) Freedom as a Service: Surveillance, Technology, and the Future of Democracy. London: Allen Lane.

Zuboff, S. (2019) The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power. London: Profile Books.

Symbolic representation of US memories

The Strategic Cost of Selective Memory: America’s Curated History and Its Global Fallout

By

On April 4, 2025

In Strategy

In international affairs, collective memory isn’t just about remembrance, it is strategy. Building on Maurice Halbwachs’ foundational insight that memory operates within ‘social frameworks’ rather than being purely individual, states don’t merely remember; they perform memory. They weaponise it, sanitise it – engaging in what scholars analysing the commemoration of conflict call the ‘politics of memory’ – or altogether reinvent it in service of national mythologies. Nowhere is this more visible than in the United States, where curated memory masquerades as identity and policy follows suit like a loyal retriever chasing a dream of exceptionalism.

American memory is less a reflection of truth and more a product of selective mythmaking, a process operating, as recent work suggests, between individual cognition and broader social systems. Slavery becomes a tragic prelude to civil rights triumphalism; Vietnam is rebranded as a “lesson” rather than a quagmire; Iraq fades into a haze of “intelligence failures” rather than strategic hubris – precisely the kind of state-managed remembrance of war that historians like Jay Winter have examined. The result is not forgetfulness, but an active process of narrative laundering – a continual reframing that turns moral ambiguity into digestible fables of resilience and heroism.

This curated memory has profound consequences on the global stage. For one, it erodes credibility. When the U.S. invokes democracy, freedom, or human rights in its foreign policy, other nations, particularly those in the Global South, hear the echoes of hypocrisy. How can a country that selectively remembers its own imperial past credibly critique the actions of others? The inability to reconcile with its own historical misdeeds, from colonial genocide to CIA-sponsored coups, prevents the kind of sustained engagement with inherited trauma that theorists like Marianne Hirsch describe through the concept of ‘postmemory’ – rendering its moral posture performative at best, disingenuous at worst.

Secondly, America’s self-mythologising fuels dangerous policy cycles. By continually framing itself as a liberator rather than an empire in denial, the U.S. is caught in a loop of interventionist déjà vu. Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya – each was framed through a narrative lens of moral imperative, conveniently edited for domestic consumption. The strategic amnesia of past failures enables new ones, while domestic audiences, pacified by a curated history, fail to ask the right questions until it’s too late.

Finally, selective remembrance alienates allies and emboldens adversaries. Nations with long historical memories (Russia, China, Iran) perceive American forgetfulness as both weakness and opportunity. They understand that the U.S. forgets what it cannot afford to confront. In contrast, these states actively curate their own histories to justify assertive policies, turning memory into statecraft. The battlefield, then, is not just diplomatic or military – it’s mnemonic. A clash of memory regimes.

Collective memory, when manipulated, becomes a liability. It blinds policymakers to patterns. It masks structural failings. It builds castles of credibility on foundations of denial. And eventually, it collapses under the weight of its own revisionism.

If America seeks to reclaim its influence on the global stage, it must confront its past not as mythology, but as memory: flawed, complex, and deserving of honest reckoning. Until then, its strategic future will remain tethered to the convenient lies it tells itself and the inconvenient truths the rest of the world refuses to forget.

Bibliography

Ashplant, T. G., Graham Dawson, and Michael Roper, eds. Commemorating War: The Politics of Memory. London: Routledge, 2000.

Halbwachs, Maurice. Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1925.

Hirsch, Marianne. The Generation of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture After the Holocaust. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.  

Orianne, Jean-François, and Francis Eustache. “Collective Memory: Between Individual Systems of Consciousness and Social Systems.” Frontiers in Psychology 14 (2023).  

Winter, Jay. Remembering War: The Great War Between Memory and History in the 20th Century. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.  

Insurgency vs. Terrorism: What’s the Difference?

By

On April 4, 2025

In Strategy

I’ve created a video on the difference between the definitions of insurgency and terrorism. While both involve violence and political motivations, I explore why understanding their key differences is essential. The video includes historical examples and the blurred lines between these two concepts, which should help in shedding light on the political implications behind the labels we use.

Please do feel free to reach out and discuss anything in the video, or leave a comment if you would prefer.

Strategic Chessboard

The Unfolding Strategic Environment: Reconciling Enduring Principles with Revolutionary Change

By

On March 29, 2025

In Strategy

The contemporary strategic environment presents a paradox. On one hand, the fundamental nature of war as a political instrument, driven by human factors and subject to friction and uncertainty, appears timeless. Carl von Clausewitz’s assertion that war serves political objectives remains a crucial anchor, forcing strategists to connect means with ends, even amidst technological fascination. Similarly, Sun Tzu’s principles regarding deception, intelligence, and achieving advantage with minimal direct confrontation resonate strongly in an era increasingly defined by non-traditional operations and persistent competition below the threshold of open warfare.

Yet, the character of conflict is undergoing a profound transformation. Technological disruption, particularly in the digital domain, is eroding traditional military advantages, intensifying “grey zone” activities, empowering non-state actors, and blurring the very definitions of war and peace. This necessitates a critical re-examination of established strategic paradigms and a forward-looking approach to national security. The challenge for policymakers and strategists lies in reconciling the enduring nature of war with its rapidly evolving character.

From Deterrence by Punishment to Deterrence by Resilience?

The Cold War’s strategic stability, largely built upon the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), faces fundamental challenges in the digital age. While nuclear deterrence created a precarious balance, its logic struggles to adapt to threats operating outside its established framework. Cyberspace and information warfare lack the clear attribution mechanisms and proportional response options that underpin traditional deterrence by punishment. As Thomas Rid notes, establishing credibility and effective retaliation in these domains is problematic. Jeffrey Knopf’s work on “Fourth Wave” deterrence highlights how emerging threats disrupt existing models.

Furthermore, the strategic landscape is no longer solely dominated by states. Powerful technology firms, transnational terrorist organisations, and ideologically driven groups operate with increasing autonomy and influence, complicating deterrence calculations built on state-centric assumptions. The conflict in Ukraine provides stark examples, where companies like SpaceX have deployed capabilities, such as Starlink, that significantly impact battlefield communications and information warfare dynamics, challenging the state’s traditional monopoly on such strategic assets. This diffusion of power necessitates a broader conception of deterrence, moving beyond punishment towards denial, resilience, deception, and proactive information operations. Security may increasingly depend on the ability to withstand, adapt, and operate effectively within a contested information environment, rather than solely on the threat of overwhelming retaliation.

The Digital Revolution and the Transformation of Conflict Logic

The digital revolution represents more than just the introduction of new tools; it signifies a potential “change of consciousness” in warfare, as Christopher Coker suggests. Conflict becomes less geographically bounded and more psychological, abstract, and continuous, eroding distinctions between wartime and peacetime. Cyber operations, AI-enabled decision-making, and sophisticated disinformation campaigns are not merely adjuncts to traditional military power; they are becoming central components of strategic competition. China’s “Three Warfares” doctrine integrating psychological operations, public opinion manipulation, and legal maneuvering, which exemplifies how state actors are weaponising the information domain to achieve strategic aims.

This shift challenges classical strategic concepts. How is escalation controlled when cyberattacks lack clear attribution? How is victory defined when conflict plays out continuously in the non-physical domain? The Ukraine conflict serves as a real-world laboratory, demonstrating the strategic significance of cyber defenses, AI-driven targeting, and narrative warfare alongside conventional operations. It highlights how eroding conventional advantages forces a rethink of the very currency of power. Non-state actors, like ISIS, have also adeptly exploited the digital realm for recruitment, propaganda, and operational coordination, demonstrating the asymmetric advantages offered by this environment.

Systemic Fragility, Strategic Agility, and Redefined Victory

The deep integration of technology across society creates unprecedented efficiencies but also introduces systemic fragility. Interconnectedness means that disruptions, whether from cyberattacks, pandemics, financial crises, or supply chain breakdowns, can cascade rapidly with significant security implications. Consequently, building national resilience – encompassing robust cybersecurity, hardened infrastructure, diversified supply chains, and societal preparedness – becomes a core strategic imperative.

Alongside resilience, strategic agility is paramount. The accelerating pace of technological and geopolitical change means that strategies and institutions must be capable of rapid adaptation. The failure of European powers to adapt their doctrines to the realities of industrialised warfare before World War I, as chronicled by Barbara Tuchman, serves as a potent warning against strategic rigidity. Fostering agility requires institutional cultures that embrace learning and experimentation, empower decentralised action, and anticipate change.

This evolving landscape also forces a re-evaluation of “victory”. As warfare expands beyond purely military considerations to encompass cyber, economic, and informational domains, success becomes more ambiguous. Robert Mandel’s distinction between “war-winning” (tactical success) and “peace-winning” (achieving sustainable political outcomes) is increasingly pertinent. Future conflicts, likely to be protracted and involve multiple actors with divergent goals, may necessitate strategies focused on achieving iterative, adaptable political objectives rather than decisive military triumphs.

Adapting Strategy for an Unfolding Future

While some argue that classical, state-centric models of war are obsolete, discarding the foundational insights of strategists like Clausewitz and Sun Tzu would be premature. As Lawrence Freedman emphasises, war remains shaped by human agency and political motives, regardless of technology. The core task is not replacement but adaptation: applying enduring principles to navigate the complexities of the contemporary environment.

Successfully navigating the future strategic environment requires a conceptual shift. Technological foresight, AI-driven analysis, and robust cyber capabilities are necessary but insufficient. The decisive factor may be institutional and cultural: the capacity for continuous learning, adaptation, and innovation. Strategy must become truly multidimensional, integrating all instruments of national power – diplomatic, informational, military, and economic – within a coherent framework that acknowledges both the timeless nature and the transforming character of conflict. The future belongs to those who can master this complex, dynamic interplay.

Bibliography

  • Awan, Imran. “Cyber-Extremism: Isis and the Power of Social Media.” Society 54, no. 2 (April 2017): 138–49. https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/cyber-extremism-isis-power-social-media/docview/1881683052/se-2.
  • Coker, Christopher. Future War. Polity Press, 2015.
  • Freedman, Lawrence. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
  • Freedman, Lawrence. The Future of War: A History. New York: PublicAffairs, 2017.
  • Gray, Colin S. The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Online edn, Oxford Academic, September 1, 2010.
  • Greggs, David. “Violent Limitation: Cyber Effects Reveal Gaps in Clausewitzian Theory.” The Cyber Defense Review 9, no. 1 (2024): 73–86. [invalid URL removed].
  • Jervis, Robert. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989.
  • Kaldor, Mary. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012.
  • Kania, Elsa B. “The PLA’s Latest Strategic Thinking on the Three Warfares.” The Jamestown Foundation, August 22, 2016. https://jamestown.org/program/the-plas-latest-strategic-thinking-on-the-three-warfares/.
  • Knopf, Jeffrey W. The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2002.
  • Layton, Peter. “Fighting artificial intelligence battles: Operational concepts for future ai-enabled wars.” Network 4, no. 20 (2021): 1-100.
  • Mandel, Robert. The Meaning of Military Victory. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006.
  • Morozov, Evgeny. To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism. New York: PublicAffairs, 2013.
  • Rid, Thomas. Cyber War Will Not Take Place. London: Hurst, 2013.
  • Skove, Sam. “How Elon Musk’s Starlink Is Still Helping Ukraine’s Defenders.” Defense One, March 1, 2023. https://www.defenseone.com.
  • Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Newburyport: Dover Publications, Incorporated, 2002.
  • Tiwari, Sachin. “Cyber Operations in the Grey Zone.” The Digital Humanities Journal, November 14, 2023. https://tdhj.org/blog/post/cyber-operations-grey-zone/.
  • Tuchman, Barbara W. The Guns of August. New York: Macmillan, 1962.
  • Van Creveld, Martin. Transformation of War. New York: Free Press, 1991.
  • Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press,1 1984.
Chessboard with smoke floating over the pieces

How Grey Zone Warfare Exploits the West’s Risk Aversion

By

On March 16, 2025

In Strategy

Western democracies are caught in a strategic bind. Adversaries, skilled at operating in the murky “grey zone” between peace and open warfare, are exploiting a fundamental Western characteristic: risk aversion. Grey zone warfare blends cyberattacks, disinformation, economic coercion, and proxy warfare to achieve strategic goals without triggering a full-scale military response. The risk is not merely theoretical. One might argue that the resulting ambiguity produces a kind of strategic paralysis, one that leaves Western states unable or unwilling to respond decisively to threats that refuse the comfort of clear categorisation.

A 21st-Century Threat

Grey zone warfare encompasses more than just cyberattacks and disinformation. Think of cyberattacks that cripple infrastructure but stop short of causing mass casualties, disinformation campaigns that sow discord and erode trust in institutions, and the use of proxy forces to destabilise a region. Crucially, it also includes economic coercion. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, with its potential for creating debt traps and strategic dependencies, is a prime example. Russia’s use of energy supplies as a political weapon, particularly against European nations, is another. The key is plausible deniability and making it difficult for the target to definitively attribute actions. This in turn makes it more challenging for states to justify a strong response. The underlying ambition is to achieve strategic objectives, be it weakening an adversary, gaining leverage, or shaping policy outcomes, all while avoiding the threshold of open military conflict. We see this in China’s response to Lithuania’s engagement with Taiwan, where trade sanctions were used as a punitive measure. Similarly, the West’s reliance on Chinese rare earth minerals creates a vulnerability that can be exploited for political leverage.

Grey Zones as a Strategic Vulnerability

The West, particularly Europe and North America, has a deeply ingrained preference for diplomacy and de-escalation. This isn’t necessarily a bad thing as it stems from a genuine desire to avoid the horrors of large-scale war and maintain a stable global order. But this risk aversion, while understandable, has become a strategic vulnerability. Adversaries see this hesitation and tailor their actions accordingly. They operate just below the threshold of what would trigger a decisive military response, creating a constant dilemma for Western leaders: how to respond effectively without escalating the situation into a wider conflict?

Ukraine is a tragic textbook example of grey zone warfare in action. Russia’s strategy goes far beyond conventional military force. It includes crippling cyberattacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, a relentless barrage of disinformation aimed at undermining the Ukrainian government and sowing discord, and the backing of separatist movements to create internal instability. These actions are calculated to achieve Russia’s goals while staying below the threshold that would provoke a direct military intervention from NATO. The Western response, consisting primarily of sanctions and diplomatic pressure, reveals the core problem. While intended to punish Russia and deter further aggression, this relatively restrained approach has, perhaps, enabled Russia to continue its grey zone operations, demonstrating the difficulty of countering these tactics without risking a wider war. The continued, grinding conflict, and the incremental nature of Western support, highlight the limitations of a purely reactive, risk-averse strategy.

The Erosion of American Global Leadership and Europe’s Quest for Strategic Autonomy

One might observe that the erosion of American global leadership (accelerated, though not solely caused, by the Trump administration) has unsettled the transatlantic alliance in ways that are still playing out. Actions such as imposing tariffs on allies, questioning NATO’s relevance, and the perceived (and sometimes explicit) wavering of commitment to Article 5’s collective defence clause have created a climate of uncertainty. European nations are now grappling with a fundamental question: can they rely on the US security umbrella? This doubt isn’t just theoretical; it’s driving concrete policy changes.

This uncertainty has fuelled a push for European “strategic autonomy” and the ability to act independently in defence and foreign policy. Figures like French President Macron have long championed this idea, and it’s gaining traction across the continent. Even in the UK, traditionally a staunch US ally, Labour leader Keir Starmer has emphasised the need for increased defence spending and closer European security cooperation. Germany’s Zeitenwende, its historic shift towards rearmament, is a direct response to this new reality. These are not just rhetorical flourishes; they represent a fundamental rethinking of European security, driven by a perceived need to fill the void left by a less predictable and less engaged United States. The debate over a European army, or a more coordinated European defence force, is no longer fringe; it’s becoming mainstream.

Strategic Paralysis Under the Clausewitzian Lens

This brings us to the heart of the matter: strategic paralysis. The West, caught between a desire to avoid escalation and the need to respond effectively, often finds itself frozen. This is the sort of effect to which grey zone tactics aspire, though whether paralysis is a design or an emergent consequence remains open to debate. By fostering ambiguity, where traditional responses appear either disproportionate or politically fraught, adversaries create the very conditions in which Western decision-making risks becoming paralysed. The fear of “provoking” a larger conflict becomes a weapon in itself. As Clausewitz argued, war is an extension of politics. Grey zone conflict is simply an extension of war by subtler means, one designed to neutralise the West’s ability to make political decisions with clarity.

Looking at the situation, it could be suggested that Western states would do well to move beyond rhetorical condemnation or reactive sanctions. Addressing the breadth of grey zone threats requires not only the technical apparatus to respond, but also a reconsideration of what risks must be borne, and what forms of resilience truly matter. Societal awareness, for instance, is not a panacea, but a necessary condition for resisting disinformation and political interference.

If Western governments are to avoid strategic paralysis, their response cannot rely solely on traditional deterrence or diplomatic ritual. Perhaps the focus should shift toward nurturing resilience – not just through technological investment or alliance-building, but by cultivating an informed citizenry, capable of recognising manipulation in its many guises. The challenge is not merely technical, nor simply a matter of resolve either.

Concluding Reflections

Grey zone tactics have flourished amid Western risk aversion and a prevailing uncertainty over deterrence. It could be suggested that the greater risk, at times, lies in mistaking inertia for prudence. Whether Western policymakers can recalibrate their tolerance for ambiguity, and adapt to the subtler forms of coercion now in play, remains an open question – one on which the resilience of the international order may quietly depend. I would argue that it is not merely the West’s material strength, but the demonstration of resolve (and a measure of unpredictability) that will matter most. Whether Western states can move beyond a posture of predictable restraint, or whether caution will continue to invite opportunism, remains to be seen. In the end, the future of the international liberal order may depend less on declarations of intent than on the willingness to accept calculated risk. Whether the West can adapt to this new era of conflict remains the most pressing question.

Bibliography

American Military University. “Gray Zone Attacks by Russia Being Used to Undermine Ukraine.” AMU Edge, May 12, 2023. https://amuedge.com/gray-zone-attacks-by-russia-being-used-to-undermine-ukraine/.

Chivvis, Christopher S. Understanding Russian “Hybrid Warfare” and What Can Be Done About It. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017. https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT468.html.

Gray, Colin S. Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare. London: Phoenix, 2005.

Military Strategy Magazine. “Deterring War Without Threatening War: Rehabilitating the West’s Risk-Averse Approach to Deterrence.” Military Strategy Magazine,1 April 2023. https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/deterring-war-without-threatening-war-rehabilitating-the-wests-risk-averse-approach-to-deterrence/.

Onsolve. “Gray Zone Warfare: What Business Leaders Need to Know.” Onsolve Blog, March 2024. https://www.onsolve.com/blog/sra-gray-zone-warfare-business-leaders/.

Rid, Thomas. Cyber War Will Not Take Place. London: C. Hurst & Co., 2013.

The Wall Street Journal. “Trump Is Overturning the World Order That America Built.” WSJ, January 25, 2024. https://www.wsj.com/world/trump-is-overturning-the-world-order-that-america-built-10981637.

The New Yorker. “What’s Next for Ukraine?” The New Yorker, February 2024. https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-lede/whats-next-for-ukraine.

Why Technology Alone Doesn’t Win Wars

By

On March 8, 2025

In Strategy

We often assume that the latest military technology will define the future of warfare. AI, cyber weapons, and autonomous drones are hailed as game-changers, just as tanks, aircraft, and nuclear weapons were in past eras. But history tells a different story, one where new technology is only as effective as the strategy, doctrine, and human adaptation behind it.

In this video, we explore David Edgerton’s critique of technological determinism, the idea that wars are shaped by cutting-edge innovation alone. From ancient weapons to modern cyber warfare, we show why old technologies persist, how armies adapt, and why war remains a contest of resilience, not just hardware.

The Real Lesson of Military Technology

The biggest mistake in war isn’t failing to develop new technology, it’s assuming that technology alone will guarantee victory. History proves that the best weapons don’t always win battles; those who adapt, integrate, and sustain their forces over time do.

What do you think? Are we overhyping AI and cyber warfare today, just as people once overhyped battleships or air power?

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