Matthew Toy

Thoughts, reflections and experiences

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Month: May 2025

Header image for an article on PGM usage by Russia

Precision Reconsidered: Russia’s Shift from Guided Missiles to Mass Bombardment

By

On May 29, 2025

In Strategy

Previously Russia positioned itself as a modern power able to cripple an adversary’s decision-cycle with carefully targeted precision-guided munitions. Three years of war in Ukraine have punctured that story. The Kremlin now relies on volume rather than accuracy, trading the prestige of “surgical” strikes for the blunt attrition of drone swarms and repurposed air-defence missiles. What follows traces that transition and asks what it does to Western analytical assumptions about technology, ethics and power.

From Surgical Imagery to Saturation Practice

Pentagon tallies show that Russian forces loosed more than one thousand one hundred guided missiles in the first month of the invasion, yet many exploded in apartment blocks rather than command nodes (Department of Defense, 2022). Domestic production never kept pace. By mid-2023 Russian factories were turning out roughly sixty new cruise missiles a month, a fraction of operational demand (Williams, 2023).

Facing depletion, Moscow shifted firepower architecture. S-300 surface-to-air missiles were redirected at ground targets, increasing miss distances, while Iranian-designed Shahed drones began to pad nightly salvos (Army Recognition, 2024). Figure 1 illustrates the result. Guided-missile launches fell steadily while drone use soared, reaching an estimated four thousand in the first quarter of 2025 (Atalan and Jensen, 2025). The identity of the high-tech precision striker gave way to the practicalities of magazine depth and industrial capacity.

Russian Long-Range Munitions by Type, 2022-2025

Figure 1: Russian Long-Range Munitions by Type, 2022-2025 (see dataset and plot above).

Implications for Western Analysis

Western security discourse long treated accuracy as a twin proof of technical mastery and ethical restraint (Schmitt and Widmar, 2014; Wilson, 2020). Russia’s practice weakens both pillars. Norms endure through consistent observance and recognition; when a major power claims the vocabulary of precision while accepting wide error margins, the social meaning of accuracy erodes (Tannenwald, 2017).

The episode therefore offers a methodological caution. Counting missiles without attending to their symbolic weight risks analytical short-sightedness. The shift towards low-cost saturation munitions signals a recalibration of Russian strategic identity and alters the deterrence calculus of adversaries who must now defend against continuous drone attrition rather than episodic cruise-missile raids. Civilian resilience, alliance solidarity and arms-control expectations all pivot on how quickly that new reality is understood.

In Summary

Russia’s move from precision-guided missiles to mass bombardment is more than a supply-chain story. It marks the point where an identity built on technological finesse buckled under material constraint, transforming both the battlefield and the normative landscape around it. Analysts tracking future conflicts would do well to remember that weapons categories are not only hardware inventories but carriers of meaning, and that meaning can shift faster than production lines.

Bibliography

Army Recognition 2024. ‘Russia Repurposes S-300 Surface-to-Air Missiles for Ground Attacks Against Kharkiv’, 5 January.

Atalan, Y. and Jensen, B. 2025. Drone Saturation: Russia’s Shahed Campaign. CSIS Brief, 13 May.

Department of Defense 2022. ‘Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds a Press Briefing’, 21 March.

Schmitt, M. and Widmar, E. 2014. ‘On Target: Precision and Balance in the Contemporary Law of Targeting’. Journal of National Security Law and Policy, 7(3).

Tannenwald, N. 2017. ‘How Strong Are the Nuclear Taboo and the Chemical Weapons Ban?’ The Washington Quarterly, 40(1), 79–98.

Williams, I. 2023. ‘Russia Isn’t Going to Run Out of Missiles’. CSIS Analysis, 28 June.

Wilson, N. 2020. ‘The Ambiguities of Precision Warfare’, Intimacies of Remote Warfare commentary, 12 June. 

UN Helmet on the ground

Reflection – The UN’s Legitimacy Gap: A Haiti Case Study

By

On May 18, 2025

In Strategy

Thomas Weiss identifies five “gaps” that chronically hamper global governance: knowledge, normative, policy, institutional and compliance (Weiss 2013).  In Haiti, those gaps seem to have coalesced into what many Haitians read as an enduring legitimacy deficit.  A more charitable interpretation does note instances of UN adaptation – better crime mapping after 2011, a dramatic scaling-up of the Haitian National Police (HNP), and a science-led cholera response – but, examined closely, such achievements tend to appear partial and fragile, leaving the larger breach largely intact.

Knowledge and compliance.  MINUSTAH’s 2004 start-up underestimated the dense, shifting alliances between gangs and political patrons.  When a contingent from Nepal inadvertently introduced cholera in 2010, infecting more than 800,000 people and claiming over 10,000 lives (Frerichs et al. 2012; Katz 2013), the Organisation spent six years contesting its own liability before an apology was issued (United Nations 2016).  Subsequent epidemiological work certainly curbed transmission, yet the delay itself suggested an accountability reflex still subordinate to reputational caution – an impression hard to reverse.

Normative conduct.  Sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, including minors among the victims, seriously undercut the UN’s human-rights narrative.  The Associated Press counted more than 2,000 allegations between 2004 and 2016, with very few domestic prosecutions (Associated Press 2017).  Reforms adopted in 2017 – victim-centred assistance, mandatory pre-deployment training, a voluntary trust fund – mark welcome movement, and Haiti arguably catalysed those global norms.  Even so, the survivors’ experience of limited redress reinforces a perception that institutional learning operates at UN headquarters, not in the quartiers populaires where the harm occurred.

Policy and institutional adaptation.  Supporters of the UN strategy point to iterative mandates: from peace enforcement (MINUSTAH) to rule-of-law mentoring (MINUJUSTH) and, since 2019, a slim political office (BINUH), with a Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support force now in train (UN Security Council 2023).  Elections held in 2006, 2010 and 2016 proceeded on schedule with heavy UN logistical underwriting, and the HNP expanded from roughly 4,000 officers in 2004 to more than 15,000 by 2020 (Malone and Day 2020).  Yet the police have struggled to retain personnel and equipment since the draw-down, and gang territory has again expanded.  The pattern suggests that short, mandate-driven cycles may be ill-suited to a state so hollow that capacity must be nurtured for decades, not rotations.

Legitimacy in the balance.  Survey data gathered in Port-au-Prince in 2015 found only a minority favouring immediate UN withdrawal, indicating a degree of conditional acceptance; most respondents nonetheless judged the mission “only somewhat” effective (International Crisis Group 2016).  Such grudging tolerance implies utility rather than genuine confidence.  In other words, the Organisation remains necessary but is seldom trusted.

Taken together, Haiti illustrates how partial advances in knowledge production, normative reform, and institutional design, whilst real, have not yet outweighed the reputational cost of early missteps and uneven compliance.  Unless the UN sustains a far longer horizon of engagement – accepting that legitimacy is rebuilt in increments and measured locally – its blue helmet risks settling into an increasingly tarnished emblem: credible enough to be tolerated, rarely persuasive enough to inspire.

Bibliography

Associated Press. 2017. “UN Child Sex Ring Left Victims but No Arrests.” Associated Press investigative report, 12 April.

Frerichs, R. R., et al. 2012. “Nepalese Origin of Cholera Outbreak in Haiti.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109 (47): 19944–19949.

International Crisis Group. 2016. Haiti: Security and the Reinforcement of the Rule of Law. Latin America/Caribbean Report No. 62. Brussels: ICG.

Katz, Jonathan M. 2013. The Big Truck That Went By: How the World Came to Save Haiti and Left Behind a Disaster. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Malone, David M., and Adam Day. 2020. “Taking Measure of the UN’s Legacy at Seventy-Five.” Ethics & International Affairs 34 (3): 285–295.

United Nations. 2016. “Secretary-General’s Remarks to the General Assembly on a New Approach to Cholera in Haiti.” UN Doc. A/71/620, 1 December. New York: United Nations.

United Nations Security Council. 2023. Resolution 2699 (2023) on Haiti. UN Doc. S/RES/2699, 2 October.

Weiss, Thomas G. 2013. Global Governance: Why? What? Whither? Cambridge: Polity Press.

Cyber operators working at screens

From Theory to the Trenches: Introducing “Cyber Centres of Gravity”

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On May 16, 2025

In Strategy

The nature of warfare is in constant flux. Clausewitz’s timeless insight that war is a “contest of wills” remains central, yet the means by which this contest is waged are transforming. Traditionally, Centres of Gravity (CoGs) were often seen as physical entities: armies, capitals, industrial capacity. The thinking was that neutralising these would cripple an adversary’s warfighting ability. However, it’s crucial to recognise, as scholars like Echevarria highlight, that Clausewitz himself acknowledged non-material CoGs, such as national will. The concept isn’t entirely new, but modern interpretations significantly expand upon it, especially in the context of cyberspace.

Today, the pervasive nature of information networks prompts us to consider what this means for strategic targeting. What happens when the critical vulnerabilities lie not just in the physical domain, but in an enemy’s belief systems, the legitimacy of their leadership, or their very grasp of shared reality? This is where exploring an emerging concept – what this article terms “Cyber Centres of Gravity” (Cyber CoGs) – becomes vital for contemporary military strategists. While “Cyber CoG” as a distinct term is still evolving and not yet firmly established in formal doctrine (which tends to use adjacent terms like cognitive targets or information influence objectives, as noted by analysts like Pawlak), its exploration helps us grapple with these new strategic challenges. Ignoring these intangible, yet increasingly critical, aspects in our information-saturated world could represent a significant strategic blind spot.

Understanding “Cyber CoGs”

So, what might a “Cyber CoG” entail? It can be conceptualised as a critical source of an adversary’s moral or political cohesion, their collective resolve, or a foundational element of their operative reality-construct that underpins their ability or will to resist your strategic objectives. The key idea is that significant degradation of such a “Cyber CoG,” predominantly through cyber-enabled means, could fundamentally unravel an enemy’s capacity or desire to continue a conflict, perhaps by altering their perception of the strategic landscape.

This isn’t merely about disrupting networks or servers, though such actions might play a role. A true “Cyber CoG,” in this conceptualisation, is intrinsically linked to these deeper wellsprings of an enemy’s will, cohesion, or their understanding of reality. If an operation doesn’t aim to decisively alter the strategic balance by impacting these moral, political, or epistemic foundations, it’s more likely an operational objective rather than an attack on a strategic “Cyber CoG”.

Clausewitz identified the CoG as “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends”. In an age increasingly defined by information, this hub can often be found in the cognitive and informational realms. When societal “passion” can be manipulated through digital narratives, when a military’s operating environment is shaped by perception as much as by physical friction, and when governmental “reason” is threatened by the decay of a shared factual basis, cyberspace becomes an increasingly central domain in shaping strategic outcomes. While kinetic, economic, and geopolitical power still hold immense, often primary, sway in high-stakes confrontations (a point Gartzke’s work on the “Myth of Cyberwar” reminds us to consider), the cyber domain offers potent avenues to contest the very “reality” upon which an adversary’s will is constructed. Here, strategic success may rely less on physical destruction and more on the ability to influence or disrupt an adversary’s cognitive and narrative environments.

Identifying Potential “Cyber CoGs”: A Framework for Analysis

Pinpointing these potential “Cyber CoGs” requires a nuanced analytical approach, considering factors such as:

  1. Strategic Relevance: Does the potential target truly sustain the enemy’s will to fight or their core strategic calculus? This involves looking at national cohesion, public legitimacy, dominant narratives, key alliances, or shared assumptions underpinning their strategy. Its degradation should aim to undermine their strategic purpose or resolve.
  2. Cyber Primacy in Effect: Can cyber-enabled operations offer a uniquely effective, or significantly complementary, method for impacting this CoG, especially when compared or combined with kinetic, economic, or diplomatic levers? Some intangible CoGs may be less susceptible to physical attack but highly vulnerable to informational strategies.
  3. Potential for Decisive Influence: Is the intended effect of targeting the “Cyber CoG” likely to be decisive, whether through an irreversible loss of trust (e.g., in institutions or information), a critical breakdown in a foundational narrative, or a fundamental, lasting shift in the adversary’s perception of their strategic environment? It could also be a cumulative effect, eroding coherence and resolve over time.
  4. Linkage to Moral and Political Dimensions (Clausewitzian Character): Is the “Cyber CoG” intrinsically tied to the enemy’s unity, cohesion, will to resist, or the shared narratives defining their interests and threats? It’s not just a system or infrastructure but is linked to the collective spirit or governing principles.
  5. Strategic Viability and Responsibility: Can the proposed operation be conducted with a rigorous assessment of attribution risks, potential for unintended escalation, and broader second-order societal effects? This includes careful consideration of evolving international norms and legal frameworks.

Implications for Military Planners

Strategically engaging potential “Cyber CoGs” would necessitate evolving current approaches:

  • Integrated Intelligence: Identifying and understanding these “Cyber CoGs” demands a deep, multidisciplinary intelligence effort, fusing technical insights with profound cultural, political, cognitive, and narrative analysis. This requires collaboration between experts in fields like anthropology, sociology, political science, and data science to map the ‘human terrain’ and ‘narrative architecture’.
  • Dynamic and Adaptive Campaigning: Operations targeting “Cyber CoGs” are unlikely to be single events. Influencing moral cohesion or perceived reality is a complex, interactive process involving continuous adaptation to feedback loops, narrative shifts, and adversary countermeasures. The aim is often cognitive degradation or displacement, subtly altering the adversary’s decision-making calculus over time.
  • Strategic, Not Just Tactical, Focus: While drawing on tools from traditional information warfare or psychological operations, the concept of “Cyber CoGs” pushes for a more strategically ambitious focus on these Clausewitzian centers of power, wherever they may reside. When a CoG itself is located in the moral, political, or epistemic domains, cyber-enabled operations can become a key component of strategic engagement.

Navigating the Ethical and Legal Landscape

The capacity to strategically influence an adversary’s societal beliefs and perceived reality carries a profound ethical burden and operates within a complex legal landscape. Responsible statecraft demands a deliberate moral calculus, especially in the ambiguous “grey zone”. The Tallinn Manual 2.0, for instance, provides detailed interpretations of how international law applies to cyber operations, including complex issues around sovereignty, non-intervention, and due diligence. Operations that aim to alter perception or manipulate societal beliefs can brush up against these established and evolving legal interpretations. Pursuing strategic goals through such means requires careful navigation to avoid widespread societal disruption or unintended consequences that could undermine international order. There is also the risk of “blow-back,” where the methods used externally could erode internal democratic norms if not carefully managed.

Integrating New Concepts into Strategic Thinking

The future of conflict is undeniably intertwined with the contested terrains of perception, belief, and societal cohesion. Exploring concepts like “Cyber Centres of Gravity” can help us theorise and analyse these critical nodes of will, unity, and perceived reality. This endeavor is less about new technologies and more about refining our understanding of strategy itself: to influence an adversary’s will or alter their perceived reality to achieve strategic aims, through means that are proportionate, precise, and adapted to the evolving character of modern conflict.

Failing to adapt our thinking, to build the necessary multidisciplinary approaches, and to foster the institutional agility to operate in this transformed strategic landscape is a risk to our future strategic effectiveness.

Selected Bibliography

  • Brittain-Hale, Angela. “Clausewitzian Theory of War in the Age of Cognitive Warfare.” The Defense Horizon Journal (2023): 1–19.
  • Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
  • Echevarria, A. J. (2002). “Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine—Again!” Strategic Studies Institute.
  • Gartzke, E. (2013). “The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth.” International Security, 38(2), 41–73.
  • Krieg, Andreas. Subversion: The Strategic Weaponization of Narratives. London: Routledge, 2023.
  • Lin, Herbert, and Jackie Kerr. “On Cyber-Enabled Information/Influence Warfare and Manipulation.” Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, 2017.
  • Pawlak, P. (2022). “Cognitive Warfare: Between Psychological Operations and Narrative Control.” EUISS Brief.
  • Schmitt, M. N. (Ed.). (2017). Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations. Cambridge University Press.

GCAP Fighter

Is GCAP a Necessary Investment in UK Air Power Sovereignty, or a High-Risk Gamble?

By

On May 4, 2025

In Strategy

The United Kingdom’s commitment to the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), in partnership with Italy and Japan, represents the most significant defence investment decision of this generation. Faced with an increasingly contested and volatile world and the limitations of current air power assets against proliferating advanced threats, the UK seeks a sixth-generation capability intended to secure air dominance and strategic advantage well into the mid-21st century. This analysis contends that while the strategic desire for GCAP is understandable, particularly the drive for sovereign capability, its necessity hinges critically on unproven technological assumptions, optimistic cost and schedule projections, and a specific view of future warfare that may not materialise. Therefore, continued UK participation should be contingent on meeting stringent, pre-defined cost, schedule, and capability gateways, with failure triggering consolidation or cancellation.

Defining the Sixth-Generation Ambition

GCAP aims to deliver more than just a replacement for the RAF’s Eurofighter Typhoon; it embodies a conceptual leap towards a ‘system of systems.’ The envisioned capability includes a core manned stealth platform (‘Tempest’) acting as a command node, integrated with uncrewed Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs or ‘loyal wingmen’), all connected via a resilient ‘combat cloud’. Key technological differentiators include advanced AI for data fusion and decision support, next-generation sensors providing unprecedented situational awareness (such as the developmental ISANKE/ICS suite), adaptive engines offering performance flexibility, and an open systems architecture for rapid upgrades. This technological ambition, pursued trilaterally under dedicated governmental (GIGO) and industrial joint venture structures headquartered in the UK, aims to deliver not just an aircraft, but a step-change in air combat capability by its ambitious 2035 target date. However, this vision immediately flags a core vulnerability: the entire concept is critically dependent on secure, high-bandwidth connectivity that is a prime target for adversary electronic warfare and cyber-attacks.

Strategic Rationale

GCAP is positioned as essential for UK grand strategy, aligning with the Integrated Review’s goals of technological advantage, global power projection (including the Indo-Pacific tilt), and contributing high-end capability to NATO. A primary driver is the pursuit of national sovereignty – defined as “Freedom of Action” and “Freedom of Modification” – avoiding dependence on allies, particularly the US. Past experiences, such as reported US control over integrating certain UK weapons onto the F-35 platform, fuel this desire for independent control over critical capabilities.

Yet, this pursuit of sovereignty within a deeply collaborative international programme creates inherent tensions. True freedom of action requires open technology sharing between partners, potentially conflicting with national industrial interests or security concerns, as highlighted by recent Italian ministerial comments about UK reluctance on tech access. Furthermore, the incorporation of some US subsystems – for example, advanced Gallium Nitride (GaN) transmitter modules crucial for next-generation radar and electronic warfare systems, which often fall under strict US export controls – could still subject GCAP to US ITAR restrictions. This would potentially negate the desired export freedom and sovereignty regardless of trilateral agreements. The strategic question is whether the immense premium paid for national control via GCAP outweighs the proven capability and interoperability benefits of alternatives, like an expanded F-35 fleet.

Military Utility

The core military case for GCAP rests on its ability to operate in the most highly contested environments anticipated post-2035, specifically penetrating and dismantling advanced Integrated Air Defence Systems (IADS). This high-end SEAD/DEAD mission is presented as a capability gap that existing platforms cannot fill. Enhanced range, beneficial for UK global deployments, is another selling point. However, the likelihood of the UK needing to conduct such demanding missions unilaterally is debatable.

Many analysts wonder if cost justifies niche capability. Could upgraded Typhoons (contingent on successful ECRS Mk2 radar integration) and the existing F-35 fleet, armed with next-generation stand-off missiles and supported by more numerous, cheaper drones, achieve strategically sufficient effects against likely threats? While GCAP promises the ultimate air dominance tool – a bespoke rapier for peer conflict – the UK might derive better overall utility from a more flexible, affordable mix of capabilities resembling a Swiss Army knife.

Costs

Transparency on GCAP’s ultimate cost remains elusive. The UK has committed £2 billion initially and budgeted £12 billion over the next decade, while partner estimates suggest a total programme investment potentially exceeding €40 billion by 2035 merely to reach initial production. Unit fly-away cost estimates are highly speculative but frequently placed in the £150-£250 million range per core aircraft – significantly higher than the F-35B. This excludes the substantial costs of developing and procuring the necessary CCA fleets – with public estimates for ‘loyal wingman’ concepts varying widely, typically between £5 million and £25 million per drone – plus ground infrastructure, and network hardening.

Illustrative Unit Cost Impact (UK Share – Hypothetical 100 core aircraft buy):

  • @ £150m/unit: £15 billion procurement
  • @ £200m/unit: £20 billion procurement
  • @ £250m/unit: £25 billion procurement (Note: Illustrative procurement costs for core platform only, excluding R&D share, CCA costs, and lifetime support)

This level of expenditure inevitably forces stark choices. Within defence, it competes directly with funding for the Royal Navy, the Army’s modernisation, and crucial investments in space and cyber domains. Outside defence, this sum dwarfs spending on critical public services. The opportunity cost is immense, demanding certainty that GCAP delivers uniquely essential capability unavailable through less expensive means.

Industrial Strategy vs. Economic Reality

The argument for GCAP often leans heavily on industrial benefits: sustaining the UK’s sovereign combat air sector, supporting tens of thousands of high-skilled jobs, driving R&D, and enabling exports. Partnering with Italy and Japan is key to achieving the scale necessary for viability. However, large defence programmes create path dependency, making it politically difficult to cancel or curtail the programme even if strategic or financial justifications weaken. The programme must deliver genuine value for money, not just serve as industrial life support.

Technological Risk

GCAP is predicated on successfully mastering multiple cutting-edge technologies concurrently, presenting significant risk. Key areas include:

  • Adaptive Engines: Achieving a mature, reliable variable-cycle engine certified for flight by the required date remains a major hurdle, with full demonstrator engines yet to complete testing. Risk: High
  • AI/Autonomy: Developing certifiable AI for mission-critical functions and effective human-machine teaming is technologically complex and ethically challenging. Integrating this seamlessly with CCA control adds layers of difficulty. Risk: High
  • Stealth & Materials: Achieving next-generation broadband stealth requires advanced materials and manufacturing techniques still scaling up. Risk: Medium
  • Networking & Software: Creating a secure, resilient, interoperable ‘combat cloud’ integrating systems from three nations is the highest risk area, prone to delays and vulnerabilities. Risk: Very High

Failure or significant delay in any one of these critical paths will derail the entire programme or force capability compromises that undermine its rationale. The F-35’s protracted software development provides a stark warning.

Systemic Vulnerabilities and Integration Challenges

The network-centric ‘system of systems’ concept, while powerful in theory, is inherently vulnerable. The reliance on continuous data flow makes the combat cloud a prime target for jamming, cyber-attack, and kinetic strikes against space assets. Ensuring resilience requires costly hardening measures often excluded from baseline programme costs. Integrating GCAP effectively with legacy UK platforms (Typhoon, F-35B) and wider NATO systems presents significant technical hurdles, particularly regarding secure data-link compatibility. Furthermore, the parallel, nationally-led development of CCAs creates a major integration risk – ensuring these vital adjuncts are ready, affordable, and fully interoperable by 2035 is far from guaranteed.

Failure Scenarios

While outright cancellation carries severe consequences – a major capability gap as Typhoons retire (whose operational life depends on successful upgrades), industrial collapse, and irreparable diplomatic damage – significant delays also pose serious threats. A slip of 2-5 years past the 2035 IOC would necessitate costly life-extension programmes for the Typhoon fleet, potentially overlap awkwardly with F-35B support cycles, and could force a reconsideration of procuring land-based F-35As for the RAF to bridge the gap. Such delays would inevitably inflate overall programme costs and erode partner confidence, risking a slow collapse.

A Framework for Managing the Risks

Given the immense stakes and inherent uncertainties, the UK requires clear decision points and off-ramps for GCAP. Continued investment should be conditional:

  1. Sovereignty Definition: Explicitly define the specific sovereign modification and action freedoms GCAP must deliver (beyond F-35 limitations) and verify these are achievable without ITAR constraints on core systems.
  2. Budgetary Ceiling & Trade-offs: Establish a firm ceiling for the UK’s total R&D and procurement contribution, linked to clear decisions in the upcoming Strategic Defence Review on which other capabilities will be curtailed or cancelled to fund it.
  3. Performance Gates & Kill-Switch: Define non-negotiable technical milestones (e.g., successful demonstrator flight by 2027/28, integrated core systems test by 2030) and cost/schedule thresholds. A breach beyond a pre-agreed margin (e.g., 20% cost overrun or 2-year schedule slip by 2028-2030) should trigger an automatic review with consolidation or cancellation as default options unless compelling justification for continuation is presented.

Conclusion

Does the UK need GCAP? Ultimately, yes. Given that maintaining a fully independent capability to defeat the most advanced air defences globally post-2035 is a non-negotiable strategic requirement, and the industrial and geopolitical benefits of leading a trilateral programme outweigh the risks, then GCAP becomes a strategic necessity. However, this necessity is predicated on assumptions about future threats, technological feasibility, cost control, and partner reliability that are far from certain.

It is not a programme to be pursued out of blind faith or industrial inertia. Proceeding demands rigorous scrutiny, transparent accounting, realistic assessment of alternatives, and clearly defined performance metrics with consequences. Without such discipline, the UK risks pouring vast resources into a programme that, while technologically dazzling, may arrive too late, cost too much, or address yesterday’s perceived threats, ultimately failing to deliver the security it promises. The strategic wager has been placed. Ensuring it doesn’t break the bank requires vigilance, realism, and the political courage to fold if the odds turn decisively against it.

Bibliography

BAE Systems. “Assessment of the expected economic impact of the Future Combat Air System programme (2025-2070)” Accessed via BAE Systems website, October 28, 2024. 

BAE Systems. “GLOBAL COMBAT AIR PROGRAMME. ” BAE Systems Media. Accessed April 22, 2025. 

Bronk, Justin. “The Global Combat Air Programme is Writing Cheques that Defence Can’t Cash | Royal United Services Institute.” RUSI Commentary, April 27, 2023.

Bronk, Justin. “Integrating Typhoon and F-35: The Key to Future British Air Power.” RUSI Defence Systems, February 2016.

Bronk, Justin. “Large, Crewed Sixth-Generation Aircraft Have Unique Value in the Indo-Pacific.” RUSI Commentary, March 5, 2025.

Bronk, Justin. “Unlocking Sixth-Gen Air Power: Inside the Military Capability for GCAP.” RUSI Commentary. Accessed April 22, 2025.

Cranny-Evans, Sam, and Justin Bronk. “How Export Controls Endanger the West’s Military Technology Advantage.” RUSI Commentary, August 2, 2024.

House of Commons Library. “The forthcoming strategic defence review 2025: FAQ.” Research Briefing CBP-10153, March 26, 2025.

House of Commons Library. “What is the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP)?” Research Briefing CBP-10143. Accessed April 22, 2025.

IAI (Istituto Affari Internazionali). “New Partnership among Italy, Japan and the UK on the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP).” IAI Papers 25 | 03 – March 2025.The 

Japan, Ministry of Defense. “Global Combat Air Programme.” MoD Website. Accessed April 22, 2025.

The Aviationist. “The GCAP Program: A Step Toward Europe’s Military Autonomy and Interoperability.” March 17, 2025.

The Aviationist. “Delivering GCAP by 2035 Is Not Easy as it Needs to Break the Mold and Avoid Mistakes, Says UK Report.” January 15, 2025.

UK Defence Journal. “Report highlights challenges for new British stealth jet.” January 14, 2025.

UK Government. “Defence’s response to a more contested and volatile world.” Defence Command Paper 2023. Accessed April 22, 2025.

UK Government. “Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a more contested and volatile world.” Accessed April 22, 2025.

UK Parliament. Committees. Defence Committee. “Global Combat Air Programme. ” HC 598, January 14, 2025.

Watkins, Peter. “The Damage from Doubt: Labour’s Clumsy Handling of the GCAP Programme | Royal United Services Institute. ” RUSI Commentary, September 12, 2024.

Zona Militar. “Italy accuses the United Kingdom of not sharing key technologies for the development of the new sixth-generation GCAP fighter.” April 21, 2025.

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