Imagine a world where war is waged not with bombs and bullets, but with lines of code and viral misinformation. This is the reality of grey zone conflicts, a persistent feature of modern geopolitics characterised by cyber operations, economic coercion, and disinformation. While many initially hailed these tactics as a revolutionary new form of strategic competition, a critical examination reveals that they not only fundamentally fail to achieve strategic victory in a traditional Clausewitzian sense but also introduce profound strategic uncertainty and volatility into the international system. Extending Thomas Rid’s compelling argument that “cyber war will not take place” due to the inherent lack of decisive physical destruction, this critique applies even more broadly to the entire spectrum of grey zone conflicts.¹
To understand the inherent limitations of these operations, we must return to the foundational strategic thought of Carl von Clausewitz. His framework remains a lodestar: tactical successes must always serve political objectives, and the very essence of war is to impose one’s will upon the enemy. As Michael Handel succinctly summarises, Clausewitzian war aims at the destruction of enemy forces, control of vital resources, and the sway of public opinion.² Grey zone tactics, however, are structurally incapable of achieving these aims in the decisive manner Clausewitz envisioned. They may sow disruption and discord, but they rarely deliver battlefield outcomes, nor can they compel political compliance in the way traditional military campaigns do. Consider, for instance, the persistent cyberattacks between nations; while disruptive and costly, they have yet to force a nation to fundamentally alter its core strategic direction.
The very nature of grey zone strategies – their calculated avoidance of outright force and immediately recognisable acts of aggression – means they cannot truly compel an adversary to accept a fundamentally new strategic order. Cyber operations, as Rid convincingly argues, rarely inflict the kind of lasting, tangible damage comparable to conventional military strikes.³ Disinformation campaigns, while capable of eroding trust in institutions and even mobilising populations, as seen in the Arab Spring uprisings, cannot on their own force political capitulation.⁴ Economic sanctions, though often painful and strategically useful in shaping behaviour, are notoriously slow and far from guaranteed to change a determined state’s core strategic calculations.
This inherent strategic limitation is further underscored by Colin Gray’s assertion that strategy is fundamentally about the application of force to achieve political objectives.⁵ For Gray, war is fundamentally about contesting and achieving control, and without the capacity to impose a decisive order, grey zone tactics fall drastically short of true strategic efficacy. He cautions that the absence of decisive engagement in contemporary conflicts leads not to resolution, but to a debilitating strategic paralysis.⁶ This resonates deeply with Clausewitz’s core tenet that successful war must culminate in the decisive defeat of the enemy. Grey zone conflicts, by their very nature, do not and cannot fulfil this criterion. At best, they generate protracted stalemates; at worst, they risk unintended escalation into open, conventional warfare.
Countering the Cumulative Argument and Embracing Ambiguity: Incrementalism vs. Decisiveness
It is important to acknowledge a key counterargument: that grey zone tactics, while rarely decisive alone, gain strategic effect cumulatively over time. Proponents argue that persistent cyber intrusions, disinformation, and economic pressure can erode an adversary’s strength and will. This view sees grey zone warfare as long-term shaping, not a knockout blow, exemplified by China’s “Three Warfares” doctrine.⁷
Furthermore, the ambiguity of grey zone conflicts can be strategically useful, like nuclear deterrence. Bernard Brodie argued nuclear war’s cost shifted strategy to prevention, redefining “victory” as avoiding war.⁸ Similarly, grey zone tactics might deter and manage competition below open conflict. Incremental disruption, like cyberattacks on Iran’s nuclear program, can also shift power balances.⁹
Hurting Without Winning and the Zero-Sum Nature of Grey Zone Competition
Thomas Schelling noted, “Victory is no longer a prerequisite for hurting the enemy.”¹⁰ This is key to grey zone tactics, which can aim to inflict pain and signal resolve without overt war. Even non-military gains – diplomatic wins, sanctions, legal advantages achieved through disinformation and cyber influence – become strategic victories in this zero-sum competition. This is particularly relevant as tech-savvy strategists recognise the advantages of ambiguity in these operations.
However, pursuing overwhelming military victory can backfire, escalating conflict. Grey zone tactics offer a way to avoid this, operating below the threshold of conventional war. Yet, this ambiguity breeds volatility, with miscalculation and escalation always looming.
Strategic Victory as Peace-Winning and the Challenge of Subjectivity
Rethinking “strategic victory” beyond military terms is crucial. Robert Mandel distinguishes “war-winning” from “peace-winning,” arguing true strategic victory is “peace-winning” – a multi-dimensional achievement across information, politics, economics, and diplomacy.¹¹ Grey zone tactics align with this broader view, especially as public mobilisation and decentralised networks shape geopolitics.
Yet, “victory” in the grey zone remains subjective and hard to measure. Ethan Kapstein highlights the difficulty of defining metrics, gaining consensus, and obtaining reliable data in grey zone operations.¹² Progress in one area may undermine another, increasing strategic uncertainty. Whether grey zone tactics are a “strategic win” depends on perspective and chosen metrics.
Taiwan: Strategic Uncertainty in Action
Taiwan exemplifies the inherent volatility of grey zone warfare: while hybrid strategies can pressure an opponent, they provide no clear pathway to a controlled, predictable outcome. The lack of definitive thresholds makes grey zone tactics as much a risk as an opportunity for the aggressor. Imagine China using grey zone tactics against Taiwan: cyberattacks, disinformation, and economic pressure. While this might weaken Taiwan, it’s unlikely to force capitulation without risking wider conflict. Taiwan’s reaction, U.S. responses, and the ever-present risk of miscalculation create a strategic dilemma.
While Russia has shown resilience to external grey zone pressures by controlling information, societal resilience only mitigates, not eliminates, strategic uncertainty. Even the most robust resilience strategies cannot eliminate the risk of miscalculation or escalation, underscoring the inherent volatility of grey zone conflicts. Because grey zone conflicts operate ambiguously, even careful campaigns can unexpectedly escalate, making control and predictability elusive.
Policy Implications: Actively Shaping the Grey Zone for Advantage
The inherent strategic uncertainty of grey zone conflicts demands proactive policies:
- Sharpen Intelligence and Active Disruption: Enhance intelligence to understand adversary intentions and develop capabilities to actively disrupt their grey zone operations.
- Develop Flexible and Escalatory Response Options: Create a wider range of responses, including calibrated counter-grey zone tactics and clear signalling for de-escalation and conflict management. As artificial intelligence and automation continue to reshape information warfare, states must anticipate how AI-driven disinformation, deepfake technology, and autonomous cyber operations will further complicate grey zone conflicts. Developing countermeasures that integrate AI-based detection and rapid-response systems will be critical for maintaining strategic advantage.
- Promote Transparency to Force Predictability: Actively expose adversary actions to force them into a more predictable strategic posture, enhancing transparency and accountability in the grey zone.
- Focus on Proactive Crisis Management: Develop proactive crisis management to prevent crises, including clear communication, de-escalation protocols, and persistent low-intensity engagement for stability.
- Re-evaluate “Victory” and Embrace Persistent Engagement: Shift from traditional victory metrics to measures of resilience, deterrence, and long-term shaping, embracing persistent engagement as the norm in grey zone competition.
Conclusion: Embracing Uncertainty, Seeking Control Through Persistent Engagement
Russia’s pre-2022 hybrid warfare campaign in Ukraine – combining cyber operations, disinformation, and economic pressure – demonstrated the limitations of grey zone tactics. Rather than coercing Ukraine into submission, these operations reinforced Ukrainian national resistance and galvanised Western military support, ultimately leading to Russia’s full-scale invasion. This case underscores the strategic volatility of grey zone competition: while these tactics can create disruption, they provide no guarantee of controlled, predictable outcomes.
This highlights how grey zone tactics, while seemingly flexible, are unlikely to deliver traditional strategic victory and introduce significant strategic uncertainty. While ambiguity and “peace-winning” are modern adaptations, they don’t guarantee predictable outcomes or escalation control. The grey zone is a volatile battlespace defined by miscalculation and instability. Navigating the grey zone requires embracing uncertainty, prioritising crisis management, and actively shaping the battlespace. In this new era of perpetual contestation, mastering the grey zone is not about winning – it is about ensuring that one’s adversaries never can.
- Rid, Thomas. Cyber War Will Not Take Place. London: Hurst, 2013.
- Handel, Michael I. Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought. London: Frank Cass, 2001.
- Rid, Thomas. Cyber War Will Not Take Place. London: Hurst, 2013.
- Monaghan, Sean. “Twitter Revolutions? Social Media and the Arab Spring.” Whitehall Papers 69, no. 1 (2011): 21-22.
- Gray, Colin S. The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Gray, Colin S. The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Cheng, Dean. “Winning without Fighting: China’s Strategy and ‘Three Warfares’.” The Heritage Foundation, December 14, 2011. https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/winning-without-fighting-chinas-strategy-and-three-warfares.
- Brodie, Bernard. “The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order.” The Yale Review 35, no. 3 (Spring 1946): 456-472.
- Sanger, David E., and William J. Broad. “Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran.” The New York Times, June 1, 2012. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html.
- Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.
- Mandel, Robert. “Thinking about Victory in Strategy.” The Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 2 (April 2011): 199-200.
- Kapstein, Ethan B. “Measuring Success in Complex Operations.” The Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 2 (April 2011): 267-285.
- Simons, Greg. “Russia and information confrontation: perceptions, strategies and responses.” Journal of strategic studies 42, no. 1 (2019): 139-140.
